Are Traditional Armored Formations Becoming Obsolete in the Drone Era?
- Thread starter Miragedriver
- Start date
A human can easily misjudge a trophy M113 too, which is why most trophy vehicles are used behind the lines working as ferry taxis.
The same applies to captured Ukrainian drones too. For example Baba Yagas are put down by EW measures and then recovered, then repurposed by the Russians for their own use. As Baba Yagas are routinely intercepted by Russian FPV drones, the captured drones are used behind lines to ferry supplies to forward troops. The Russian high command itself has been a bit slow in adopting heavy lift quadcopter and hexacopter drones for logistical purposes but on the tactical level, the troops are free to use whatever means to get the job done.
Now, if FPV drones are striking at supply lines, a drone would also have problems distinguishing whether this is a civilian car with civilians or a civilian car with troops on it. So often the Ukrainians are using cars, SUVs and pickups for military transport, and if we used previous wireless drones, the image isn't so good, a drone can easily hit civilians. One of the benefits of fiberoptic is that the data throughput is high enough without interference that images are clear enough that operators can easier tell civilians apart from military.
This points that if you want better AI target recognition using the backend, not on the drone itself, you need higher data throughput.
Reading through the thread I do not believe the trends most people are speaking of.
In my opinion, we are still in the midst of a transition in warfare and history is instructive in this regard. Whenever technology progresses much faster than tactics we see a shock period, but then a transition period, which is what we have to look at now. Ultimately, trench lines and machine guns were not defeated with the appearance of the tank. They were defeated much earlier during the Brusilov offensive in 1916. The tactics pioneered there is what eventually ended trench warfare, rather than the simple invention of the tank.
What does this mean? Adaptation to rapid technological change (and therefore the character of war) does not simply mean phasing out an entire arm of the army, or adoption of a single technology. No. Adaptation to such radical changes means multi-domain adaptation throughout several components of your armed forces. An instructive historical analogue here is the Cavalry arm of the military.
Cavalry did not simply stop existing in 1516, nor did heavy cavalry become obsolete. In fact, French cuirassiers continued to terrorize the battlefield even during the Crimean War of 1853. Cavalry adapted. It changed tactics, it eschewed the extreme heavy armor of the Gendarme in favor of mobility, coordination, and precision.
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All of this is a long winded way of saying that no, traditional armor formations are unlikely to become obsolete in my opinion, but they will change. In fact, they may drastically change in tactics and CONEMP. Moreover, it's not just the armored arm that will have to make adaptations, it is also all the units working around Armor as well.
So, what changes do I personally think will happen? Or at least should happen if a military force wants to remain effective in the face of the drone threat?
Firstly, let's start with the equipment. I believe that current third generation designs are largely obsolete. The worst losers here are ongoing modernization efforts. Projects like the Challenger 3, which is really just a super expensive 3rd generation design. In my eyes, next generation vehicles will substantially change. They will still prioritize classic strengths of armor, which are, protection, mobility, and firepower. However, much greater considerations will be given to electronic warfare, active protection systems, and protection of critical components.
In particular, I think smart designers will give considerable attentions to hull design, in order to optimize placement of EW and APS systems to maximize coverage and limit blindspots, as well as mounting of last-ditch layers of protection like cage armor. The designs will emphasize unobstructing infantry and crew access while still providing protection. They will also have to give considerations to power generation for the purpose of EW systems. After all, logically, any armored vehicle will have greater power than a drone, giving it an advantage in the EM spectrum.
Second, I believe that tactics will have to heavily shift to prioritize EW coverage and battlefield awareness. Battlefield management will become more important, concentration of mass will only be possible in "safe" areas where the battlespace is sanitized and protected from drones. Which is possible given enough protection and especially distance.
Which means that large assaults are still possible but will require thorough preparation and speed to achieve penetration. Militaries did not give up on achieving breakthrough after World War 1, and I assure you, they will not give up post Ukraine.
Third, military forces will have to reorganize and develop new methods of employment centered around enabling armor to do its job. I don't know if you noticed, by being an infantryman sucks. Being blown up sucks. Losing valuable and experienced manpower really sucks. As such, it is sensible for militaries to prioritize survival and maximizing armored platforms to enable survival. Which means that more support units and therefore more coordination will have to be created in order to enable armor to do its job. This means more counter-UAV assets, more EW, more ISR, and so on. All of it will have to work together to maximize the survivability and lethality of armored forces.
I believe that there will be far more drone and counter drone (SHORAD, EW) units, much more emphasis on battlespace awareness for ground forces, particularly armor.
TL;DR
1. New, redesigned vehicles that handle the drone threat better
2. Changes in armored and infantry tactics to maximize armor resilience against drones
3. More supporting elements to maximize employment of armor
In my opinion, we are still in the midst of a transition in warfare and history is instructive in this regard. Whenever technology progresses much faster than tactics we see a shock period, but then a transition period, which is what we have to look at now. Ultimately, trench lines and machine guns were not defeated with the appearance of the tank. They were defeated much earlier during the Brusilov offensive in 1916. The tactics pioneered there is what eventually ended trench warfare, rather than the simple invention of the tank.
What does this mean? Adaptation to rapid technological change (and therefore the character of war) does not simply mean phasing out an entire arm of the army, or adoption of a single technology. No. Adaptation to such radical changes means multi-domain adaptation throughout several components of your armed forces. An instructive historical analogue here is the Cavalry arm of the military.
Cavalry did not simply stop existing in 1516, nor did heavy cavalry become obsolete. In fact, French cuirassiers continued to terrorize the battlefield even during the Crimean War of 1853. Cavalry adapted. It changed tactics, it eschewed the extreme heavy armor of the Gendarme in favor of mobility, coordination, and precision.
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All of this is a long winded way of saying that no, traditional armor formations are unlikely to become obsolete in my opinion, but they will change. In fact, they may drastically change in tactics and CONEMP. Moreover, it's not just the armored arm that will have to make adaptations, it is also all the units working around Armor as well.
So, what changes do I personally think will happen? Or at least should happen if a military force wants to remain effective in the face of the drone threat?
Firstly, let's start with the equipment. I believe that current third generation designs are largely obsolete. The worst losers here are ongoing modernization efforts. Projects like the Challenger 3, which is really just a super expensive 3rd generation design. In my eyes, next generation vehicles will substantially change. They will still prioritize classic strengths of armor, which are, protection, mobility, and firepower. However, much greater considerations will be given to electronic warfare, active protection systems, and protection of critical components.
In particular, I think smart designers will give considerable attentions to hull design, in order to optimize placement of EW and APS systems to maximize coverage and limit blindspots, as well as mounting of last-ditch layers of protection like cage armor. The designs will emphasize unobstructing infantry and crew access while still providing protection. They will also have to give considerations to power generation for the purpose of EW systems. After all, logically, any armored vehicle will have greater power than a drone, giving it an advantage in the EM spectrum.
Second, I believe that tactics will have to heavily shift to prioritize EW coverage and battlefield awareness. Battlefield management will become more important, concentration of mass will only be possible in "safe" areas where the battlespace is sanitized and protected from drones. Which is possible given enough protection and especially distance.
Which means that large assaults are still possible but will require thorough preparation and speed to achieve penetration. Militaries did not give up on achieving breakthrough after World War 1, and I assure you, they will not give up post Ukraine.
Third, military forces will have to reorganize and develop new methods of employment centered around enabling armor to do its job. I don't know if you noticed, by being an infantryman sucks. Being blown up sucks. Losing valuable and experienced manpower really sucks. As such, it is sensible for militaries to prioritize survival and maximizing armored platforms to enable survival. Which means that more support units and therefore more coordination will have to be created in order to enable armor to do its job. This means more counter-UAV assets, more EW, more ISR, and so on. All of it will have to work together to maximize the survivability and lethality of armored forces.
I believe that there will be far more drone and counter drone (SHORAD, EW) units, much more emphasis on battlespace awareness for ground forces, particularly armor.
TL;DR
1. New, redesigned vehicles that handle the drone threat better
2. Changes in armored and infantry tactics to maximize armor resilience against drones
3. More supporting elements to maximize employment of armor
Sorry for being a killjoy for bringing this up : Less than 10 months ago a cool discussion took place on this thread.
Just curious that no more posts on this topic after the IDF armored formations were taken to the cleaner
— Defense Express, April 2026
— The Times of Israel, April 26, 2026
For NATO forces; Trophy is being integrated into european tanks (Leclerc XLR). They might want to conduct an immediate reassessment of this whole concept.
Just curious that no more posts on this topic after the IDF armored formations were taken to the cleaner
1. The Trophy System Myth Has Collapsed
"The drone approaches the target at angles that are perfectly acceptable for the Trophy, effectively creating ideal interception conditions. The UAV hits almost the Trophy's launcher. However, the system doesn't even attempt to intercept the drone."— Defense Express, April 2026
2. Fiber-Optic Drones Have Broken the EW Shield
"The attack laid bare a growing vulnerability: Israel's lack of preparedness for FPV drones in Lebanon, which have become an increasingly prominent weapon in Hezbollah's arsenal."— The Times of Israel, April 26, 2026
3. Measurable Damage to Armored Formations
The April 26 attack was particularly significant: a double-tap strike that hit soldiers as a medical helicopter arrived to evacuate casualties . This represents a new level of tactical sophistication.For NATO forces; Trophy is being integrated into european tanks (Leclerc XLR). They might want to conduct an immediate reassessment of this whole concept.
Thought that FPV are too slow to trigger a response from Trophy system, which targets RPGs?Sorry for being a killjoy for bringing this up : Less than 10 months ago a cool discussion took place on this thread.
Just curious that no more posts on this topic after the IDF armored formations were taken to the cleaner
1. The Trophy System Myth Has Collapsed
"The drone approaches the target at angles that are perfectly acceptable for the Trophy, effectively creating ideal interception conditions. The UAV hits almost the Trophy's launcher. However, the system doesn't even attempt to intercept the drone."
— Defense Express, April 2026
2. Fiber-Optic Drones Have Broken the EW Shield
"The attack laid bare a growing vulnerability: Israel's lack of preparedness for FPV drones in Lebanon, which have become an increasingly prominent weapon in Hezbollah's arsenal."
— The Times of Israel, April 26, 2026
3. Measurable Damage to Armored Formations
The April 26 attack was particularly significant: a double-tap strike that hit soldiers as a medical helicopter arrived to evacuate casualties . This represents a new level of tactical sophistication.
For NATO forces; Trophy is being integrated into european tanks (Leclerc XLR). They might want to conduct an immediate reassessment of this whole concept.
FPV slow speed is one factor, others being small size and a complete lack of an electronic signature. IDF fielded "cope cages" to pre-detonate drones before they hit the main armor. A clear deviation from relying on electronics, indicating that electronic defenses are not working.
Trophy's struggle is less about its "thinking" speed and more about its fundamental design philosophy. It was built to fight the last generation of anti-tank weapons.
Trophy's struggle is less about its "thinking" speed and more about its fundamental design philosophy. It was built to fight the last generation of anti-tank weapons.
Cope cages work only to a certain extent. That is any external protection --- grills, ERA, "active defenses" --- will work, but will work only up to a ceiling, as the armored vehicle faces not a few drones, but a swarm. These defenses wear away, as drones smartly concentrate on the same weakened spot.
EW will work only against wireless drones, zilch against fiberoptics.
EW through it's emissions only betrays the presence of the armored vehicle. Likewise for small portable radars used to detect drones or UAVs.
Drones also work with artillery, even with mortar and indirect tank fire support, so it's not unusual for the vehicle to be splashed by artillery fragments while being hit by drones. Passive and active defenses will further wear out faster when you have a drone coordinated artillery strike.
A vehicular ender is a drone directed laser guided artillery round. Compared to a GPS guided round, a laser guided round can deal with objects on the move. Reaction time is short since the drone only has to light up the target, the shooter only needs to send the shell to the general vicinity. A 152mm shell landing on top of a vehicle isn't nice.
Certain drones carry a shaped charge warhead. Russians have a particular range of drone warheads that can be switched onto a Lancet or Moliniya depending on the target. One of these is a shaped charged warhead meant for cages intended to predetonate drones. As the drone predetonates, the warhead creates a directed plume with a solid projectile that shoots through. Given the loitering drone strikes from the top, this will go through the thin armor at the top of the vehicle.
Drones can also drop mines ahead of the path. They can drop an entire antitank mine on top of you, and an antitank mine can have as much explosive weight as an artillery shell. Even worst is remote jumping antitank mines being dropped. These mines, when detecting vibration, will jump to the air, shoot something from above, to the direction of the vibration.
In the face of all these, armor and boots are still needed as drones cannot occupy territory until we have terminator style robots in the battlefield, something we may get there eventually.
The AFV must be completely overhauled. The whole idea of designing a tank for tank vs tank needs to be scrapped. Extreme frontal armor bias leads to weak armor on top and on the rear. Armor must be equally distributed at all sides instead.
A high power to weight ratio is needed for fielded augmented active and passive augmentations.
Turret bustles intended to load sabots should be scrapped. This area is another drone target magnet. Even with its disadvantages, we might be looking at using autoloaders. Reducing crew from 4 to 3, to even 2, reduces potential casualties. Even if the crew escapes a damaged tank, they remain at a heavy risk in a drone infested area. The less the crew the less they can be spotted escaping on foot.
Mobility is life. Armor can only go there so far, you need to get the hell out of there.
Focus on HE delivery. Turrets should increase elevation, maybe up to 45 degrees, enabling them to work indirectly as self propelled guns.
EW will work only against wireless drones, zilch against fiberoptics.
EW through it's emissions only betrays the presence of the armored vehicle. Likewise for small portable radars used to detect drones or UAVs.
Drones also work with artillery, even with mortar and indirect tank fire support, so it's not unusual for the vehicle to be splashed by artillery fragments while being hit by drones. Passive and active defenses will further wear out faster when you have a drone coordinated artillery strike.
A vehicular ender is a drone directed laser guided artillery round. Compared to a GPS guided round, a laser guided round can deal with objects on the move. Reaction time is short since the drone only has to light up the target, the shooter only needs to send the shell to the general vicinity. A 152mm shell landing on top of a vehicle isn't nice.
Certain drones carry a shaped charge warhead. Russians have a particular range of drone warheads that can be switched onto a Lancet or Moliniya depending on the target. One of these is a shaped charged warhead meant for cages intended to predetonate drones. As the drone predetonates, the warhead creates a directed plume with a solid projectile that shoots through. Given the loitering drone strikes from the top, this will go through the thin armor at the top of the vehicle.
Drones can also drop mines ahead of the path. They can drop an entire antitank mine on top of you, and an antitank mine can have as much explosive weight as an artillery shell. Even worst is remote jumping antitank mines being dropped. These mines, when detecting vibration, will jump to the air, shoot something from above, to the direction of the vibration.
In the face of all these, armor and boots are still needed as drones cannot occupy territory until we have terminator style robots in the battlefield, something we may get there eventually.
The AFV must be completely overhauled. The whole idea of designing a tank for tank vs tank needs to be scrapped. Extreme frontal armor bias leads to weak armor on top and on the rear. Armor must be equally distributed at all sides instead.
A high power to weight ratio is needed for fielded augmented active and passive augmentations.
Turret bustles intended to load sabots should be scrapped. This area is another drone target magnet. Even with its disadvantages, we might be looking at using autoloaders. Reducing crew from 4 to 3, to even 2, reduces potential casualties. Even if the crew escapes a damaged tank, they remain at a heavy risk in a drone infested area. The less the crew the less they can be spotted escaping on foot.
Mobility is life. Armor can only go there so far, you need to get the hell out of there.
Focus on HE delivery. Turrets should increase elevation, maybe up to 45 degrees, enabling them to work indirectly as self propelled guns.
given all the limitations of traditional warfare in the drone era, does that mean that the outcome of an amphibian assault on an island becomes much more complicated to predict?
you can blockade the island, but you incur severe diplomatic penalties.
you can bomb the island if you have air superiority, but you still need to send in infantry, and the recent ops in lebanon seem to suggest that nowadays, with fiber optic drones, conquering territory under the threat of drones becomes a messy business.
not to mention the fact that your infantry must be sufficiently skilled to operate in that kind of environment, when instead big army can sometimes receive less resources and funding compared to the air force and navy
you can blockade the island, but you incur severe diplomatic penalties.
you can bomb the island if you have air superiority, but you still need to send in infantry, and the recent ops in lebanon seem to suggest that nowadays, with fiber optic drones, conquering territory under the threat of drones becomes a messy business.
not to mention the fact that your infantry must be sufficiently skilled to operate in that kind of environment, when instead big army can sometimes receive less resources and funding compared to the air force and navy
Maybe tanks will get bigger or let go of some systems to allow thicker armor to maintain the same weight?