Are Traditional Armored Formations Becoming Obsolete in the Drone Era?

Miragedriver

Brigadier
Anti-Vehicle Drones in tomorrow’s Battlespaces will take on some or all of the following scenarios:

  1. Precision Standoff Engagement
    Loitering munitions—often called “kamikaze drones”—will increasingly serve as organic, precision-strike assets for platoons and companies. Mounted on light vehicles or carried in trucks, these small UAVs can be launched minutes before contact, hover to identify high-value targets (tanks, APCs, logistics convoys) via electro-optical or infrared seekers, and then dive at armor weak points. Their loiter time and networked targeting mean that even armored formations will face the threat of sensors and warheads that can track, select, and hit them from outside the effective range of their own guns.
  2. Swarm Saturation Attacks
    Looking ahead, nations will deploy large “swarms” of cheap, expendable drones working in concert to overwhelm vehicle defenses. Hundreds of small quad- or fixed-wing drones, each carrying fragmentation or shaped-charge payloads, can approach from multiple azimuths. While APS (Active Protection Systems) on modern tanks may destroy a few inbound threats, a well-coordinated swarm can saturate those systems—forcing vehicles to maneuver defensively, break formation, or risk penetration. Swarms will also be used to blind and confuse vehicle-mounted sensors, clearing the way for heavier drones or missile strikes.
  3. Combined-Arms Integration & AI Autonomy
    Anti-vehicle drones will not operate in isolation but as integral elements of networked fires. Forward scouts—whether manned or unmanned—will “paint” enemy columns for drone loiterers, which can then autonomously choose which vehicles to strike based on pre-programmed target profiles. Machine-learning algorithms will allow drones to recognize specific vehicle silhouettes (e.g., by turret shape or thermal signature) and even re-assign targets in flight if higher-priority assets appear. Coordinated with artillery drones and recon platforms, these drones will give commanders a fast, responsive, and scalable anti-armor capability.
  4. Mitigation, Counter-Swarm & Future Dynamics
    As lethal as anti-vehicle drones will be, armies will also field dedicated counter-UAS systems—short-range air defenses, electronic warfare pods to jam datalinks, and interceptor drones programmed to chase down loiterers. Vehicle designers will enhance low-observable coatings and introduce infrared-suppressing exhausts. Still, the era of hiding behind thick steel is ending: future survivability will hinge on mobility, dispersion, signature management, and layered active defenses. In this new domain, even light mechanized units will need organic drone wings to both strike and defend against the next wave of anti-vehicle UAV threats.

Overall, anti-vehicle drones will reshape the calculus of armored warfare—forcing a shift from massed tank assaults to dispersed, sensor-driven combined-arms operations where drones take center stage in both offense and defense.
 

Miragedriver

Brigadier
Deep Dive: Combined‐Arms Integration & AI Autonomy

As anti‐vehicle drones become more capable, they won't act as lone wolves but as tightly integrated nodes in a combined-arms network, melding reconnaissance, target-cueing, and strike in near-real-time. Future units will field a layered architecture of sensors (manned scouts, ground radars, tethered aerostats, and wide-area surveillance drones) all linked by high‐bandwidth datalinks. When a forward sensor “paints” an enemy tank column, that data instantly propagates to loitering and “kamikaze” drones sitting hundreds of meters overhead.

AI Autonomy Enhancements, and what to expect:
  1. Dynamic Tasking & Reallocation:
    • AI algorithms onboard each drone will assess target priority—identifying high-value assets (e.g., command vehicles, artillery tractors) by their unique thermal and visual signatures.
    • Should higher-value targets emerge, drones can reassign themselves in mid-flight, ensuring the system concentrates its fire where it matters most.
  2. Swarm Coordination & Collision Avoidance:
    • Sophisticated AI enables drones to fly collaboratively in dense formations, deconflicting flight paths and optimizing attack patterns.
    • Algorithms distribute drones across multiple engagement axes, maximizing saturation while preventing mid-air collisions—an exponentially complex problem as swarm size grows.
  3. Adversarial Evasion & Deception:
    • Equipped with onboard machine-learning models, drones will recognize common anti-drone defenses (radar frequencies, jamming signatures, interceptor trajectories) and autonomously alter their flight profiles—diving through valleys, hugging terrain, or temporarily powering down emissions to slip past EW nets.
    • Some AI-enabled swarms may even deploy decoy drones programmed to mimic real threats, forcing defenders to burn precious interceptors.
Complicating Anti-Drone Defenses
  • Jamming & Spoofing Arms Race: As defenders deploy EW pods to jam GPS or datalinks, attackers will field AI that dynamically hops frequencies, identifies and exploits spectral “holes,” or switches to inertial guidance with minimal signal reliance.
  • ML Adversarial Attacks: Attackers can train their drone vision systems on “adversarial examples”—camouflage patterns or visual perturbations that cause defender radars or optical trackers to misclassify or ignore incoming UAVs.
  • Rapid Learning & Adaptation: In-theater data collection allows AI models to be continually updated within hours, teaching drones to defeat the latest counter-UAS tactics. Meanwhile, defenders struggle to retrain their systems as quickly under contested conditions.
In short, the rise of networked, AI-driven anti-vehicle drones will demand a radical rethink of defense: no longer will a single EW van or interceptor battery suffice. Instead, successful counter-drone strategies will hinge on multi-domain sensing, decentralized decision-making, and AI-augmented defenders—setting the stage for an unprecedented technological and doctrinal arms race in future combat.
 

Miragedriver

Brigadier
I'm thinking that light, wheeled, platforms can be a cost-effective layer against AI-driven drone swarms. As the drone threat evolves, growing in numbers, armies will need affordable, highly mobile counters that can be fielded in volume. Two complementary approaches stand out. one would require more IFV's to be built. the other could use older APC reconditioned for new uses.
 
  • Like
Reactions: Tam

Miragedriver

Brigadier

Option 1: Wheeled APC/IFV with Large-Caliber Cannon for Infantry Support​

Concept:

Use 8×8 or 6×6 vehicles (e.g., Stryker, Patria AMV, Boxer, BTR80/90) up-gunned with a 30–40 mm cannon (or even a low-recoil 57 mm) capable of rapid airburst or programmable airburst ammunition.

Keep light armor to maintain high road and cross-country speed, easy strategic deployability, and low unit cost.

Advantages:

Area-Air Defense: Airburst rounds create an aerial fragmentation curtain—effective against small, slow-moving drones at close range (up to 2 km).

Volume of Fire: A high-rate cannon can engage multiple drones in quick succession, disrupting swarm attacks.

Multi-Role Utility: When not fighting drones, the same platform provides mechanized infantry support, convoy escort, and light anti-armor capability.

Mass and Redundancy: Lower per-vehicle cost means you can field more vehicles, diluting the risk if some are lost to enemy fire.

Hurdles/Considerations:

Sensor Package: Must be paired with an electro-optical/IR turret or lightweight AESA radar to cue the gun system.

Ammunition Logistics: Airburst shells are more expensive than standard rounds—requires mixed-load doctrine.



Option 2: Surplus APCs Converted to Dedicated Counter-Drone Launchers or EW Vehicles​

Concept:

Repurpose surplus or common APC hulls (M-113s, etc.) to carry pod-mounted anti-drone missiles (e.g., loitering interceptors) or scalable EW suites (RF jammers, directed-energy prototypes).

Vehicles operate in pairs or small teams alongside infantry and other combat systems.

Advantages:

Modular Payloads: Quick-change mission modules allow the same vehicle to act as a jammer, interceptor launcher, or sensor node.

Distributed EW / Kinetic Layer: A network of these vehicles blankets the battlefield with electronic and missile defenses, forcing swarms to contend with multiple denial and shoot-down zones.

Scalability & Cost-Control: Basic APC chassis are cheap compared to purpose-built air defense vehicles; payloads can be upgraded iteratively.

Flexibility: Can accompany mechanized units, protect logistics, or be staged as rear-area “drone bastions.”

Hurdles/Considerations:

Power & Cooling: High-power EW systems and directed-energy weapons demand robust onboard power generation and thermal management.

Spectrum Management: Friendly jamming must be centrally coordinated to avoid fratricide of friendly unmanned assets or communications.



Which Option Is Better?

This distributed, affordable architecture leverages common, easily maintained hulls and allows militaries to scale their drone-counter capabilities without the prohibitive costs of heavy tracked vehicles or advanced fixed air-defense platforms. It also dovetails with modern combined-arms tactics—keeping infantry, armor, and UAVs mutually supportive in the face of AI-driven aerial threats. Now all we have to worry about is an EMP attack.
 

Option 1: Wheeled APC/IFV with Large-Caliber Cannon for Infantry Support​

Concept:

Use 8×8 or 6×6 vehicles (e.g., Stryker, Patria AMV, Boxer, BTR80/90) up-gunned with a 30–40 mm cannon (or even a low-recoil 57 mm) capable of rapid airburst or programmable airburst ammunition.

Keep light armor to maintain high road and cross-country speed, easy strategic deployability, and low unit cost.

Advantages:

Area-Air Defense: Airburst rounds create an aerial fragmentation curtain—effective against small, slow-moving drones at close range (up to 2 km).

Volume of Fire: A high-rate cannon can engage multiple drones in quick succession, disrupting swarm attacks.

Multi-Role Utility: When not fighting drones, the same platform provides mechanized infantry support, convoy escort, and light anti-armor capability.

Mass and Redundancy: Lower per-vehicle cost means you can field more vehicles, diluting the risk if some are lost to enemy fire.

Hurdles/Considerations:

Sensor Package: Must be paired with an electro-optical/IR turret or lightweight AESA radar to cue the gun system.

Ammunition Logistics: Airburst shells are more expensive than standard rounds—requires mixed-load doctrine.



Option 2: Surplus APCs Converted to Dedicated Counter-Drone Launchers or EW Vehicles​

Concept:

Repurpose surplus or common APC hulls (M-113s, etc.) to carry pod-mounted anti-drone missiles (e.g., loitering interceptors) or scalable EW suites (RF jammers, directed-energy prototypes).

Vehicles operate in pairs or small teams alongside infantry and other combat systems.

Advantages:

Modular Payloads: Quick-change mission modules allow the same vehicle to act as a jammer, interceptor launcher, or sensor node.

Distributed EW / Kinetic Layer: A network of these vehicles blankets the battlefield with electronic and missile defenses, forcing swarms to contend with multiple denial and shoot-down zones.

Scalability & Cost-Control: Basic APC chassis are cheap compared to purpose-built air defense vehicles; payloads can be upgraded iteratively.

Flexibility: Can accompany mechanized units, protect logistics, or be staged as rear-area “drone bastions.”

Hurdles/Considerations:

Power & Cooling: High-power EW systems and directed-energy weapons demand robust onboard power generation and thermal management.

Spectrum Management: Friendly jamming must be centrally coordinated to avoid fratricide of friendly unmanned assets or communications.



Which Option Is Better?

This distributed, affordable architecture leverages common, easily maintained hulls and allows militaries to scale their drone-counter capabilities without the prohibitive costs of heavy tracked vehicles or advanced fixed air-defense platforms. It also dovetails with modern combined-arms tactics—keeping infantry, armor, and UAVs mutually supportive in the face of AI-driven aerial threats. Now all we have to worry about is an EMP attack.
How much of that was AI generated?
 

Breadbox

Junior Member
Registered Member
People like to bring up APS, laser or other hard kill counter measures as possible response to drones. But I find them to be the least probable of drone counters. APS are limited use and deployed only on the most expensive vehicles.
Lasers is simply not ready to be a practical weapon in a high intensity war, high power demand and many limitations for mediocre results. Like Railguns, lots of attention, good amount of funding and...crickets in terms of formal adoption.

Soft kill (EW) countermeasures are by far the primary cause of drone losses in Ukraine, it's much cheaper, lower footprint and can be deployed on a much lower level.
Obviously, fibre optics is a way around that, but the real question is when would autonomous suicide drones finally emerge? That is when soft kill lose much of its effectiveness.

Small UAS development will only continue to outpace anti-drone technology on the principle of economies of scale alone, the entirety of world's civilian and military market is incentivising the next UAS to be cheaper, faster, more versatile and easier to use. UAS can be used for many things, anti-drone devices..... are not used for anything other than disabling drones. Economics alone doomed the latter, military UAS were around for decades, but didn't explode in usage until recently for the same reason.

Traditional tank formation have being bad for some time, I would personally say the moment when SACLOS atgms saw widespread adoption as the point of sharp and irrevesible decline. You can screen tanks from RPGs with infantry, nothing infantry can do against atgms fired from 4km away. People simply hadn't caught up to the realities yet.

'Drone swarm' as of right now, imo is overkill as a concept and only lead to unneeded drone losses. I honestly don't see many scenarios where it's needed to overcome a target..
 

Tam

Brigadier
Registered Member
AI might be overrated due to the limitations of image recognition. For example, when drones attack an air base for example, the drone is programmed to attack via an image of the aircraft, let's say to target a part. This can fail under some conditions like if the aircraft is a dummy, or the aircraft is junk and nonfunctional, or is a carcass being cannibalized for parts. This can extend to air defense systems, artillery pieces, to even using mannequins. What will stop drones from repeatedly striking the same destroyed vehicle, an entire swarm ends up getting consumed that way. An entire expensive vehicle might have been sacrificed, but the entire assault ends up being successful and the position gets grabbed.

Likewise with enough camouflage, armor add ons, and cope cages, a vehicle can alter it's look to the point that it's no longer recognizable as say, a T-72. On field modifications can make each Turtle Tank visually unique. For AI and image recognition to work, the drone must have preset images of the target stored in it's memory. If a potential target doesn't fit that image, it's going to bypass it.

If we loosen the image requirements to say, let's attack a box with wheels, you risk the drone attacking your own forces. Especially a problem if both sides have similar designs.

Targets hiding in foliage and forest, and with camouflage can also disrupt a visual algorithm.

While AI can be used to gather and spot for potential targets, human intervention may be necessary to prevent hitting dummies, friendlies, already destroyed vehicles, and to verify authenticity of the target.

The more expensive a drone gets, the less attractive it becomes as an option. The more complex a drone gets the more things it's likely to get wrong. The more complex the software gets, the more bugs are likely to happen and the system will suffer increased latencies.
 

Miragedriver

Brigadier
Quite a few AI generated post on this thread.
I apologize for that. since English is not my first language, I normally write my posts in Spanish and I would then run it through google translate. However, I recently started using AI to check my facts and write the translation in American English
 

Miragedriver

Brigadier
AI might be overrated due to the limitations of image recognition. For example, when drones attack an air base for example, the drone is programmed to attack via an image of the aircraft, let's say to target a part. This can fail under some conditions like if the aircraft is a dummy, or the aircraft is junk and nonfunctional, or is a carcass being cannibalized for parts. This can extend to air defense systems, artillery pieces, to even using mannequins. What will stop drones from repeatedly striking the same destroyed vehicle, an entire swarm ends up getting consumed that way. An entire expensive vehicle might have been sacrificed, but the entire assault ends up being successful and the position gets grabbed.

Likewise with enough camouflage, armor add ons, and cope cages, a vehicle can alter it's look to the point that it's no longer recognizable as say, a T-72. On field modifications can make each Turtle Tank visually unique. For AI and image recognition to work, the drone must have preset images of the target stored in it's memory. If a potential target doesn't fit that image, it's going to bypass it.

If we loosen the image requirements to say, let's attack a box with wheels, you risk the drone attacking your own forces. Especially a problem if both sides have similar designs.

Targets hiding in foliage and forest, and with camouflage can also disrupt a visual algorithm.

While AI can be used to gather and spot for potential targets, human intervention may be necessary to prevent hitting dummies, friendlies, already destroyed vehicles, and to verify authenticity of the target.

The more expensive a drone gets, the less attractive it becomes as an option. The more complex a drone gets the more things it's likely to get wrong. The more complex the software gets, the more bugs are likely to happen and the system will suffer increased latencies.
When you mentioned the turtle tank and trying to have AI do a visual recognition of the vehicle (especially with all of the customized modification), hopefully it wouldn't misrecognize a donated M-113 as a potential target. Use of artificial intelligence is in its infancy as the aircraft was in WW I. Withing the next decade we will see an increase in its use, especially among the more industrialized nation with the capabilities and declining birth rates.
 
Top