Look what tiny Mongolia did. They are in the same position..
No, they were not in the same position. Chinese military was based on a sedantary peasant farming society. China has never been much of a nomadic "horsy" pastoral society, despite allusions to it in many ancient Chinese military and historic works of romance. Mongol military was based on a nomadic life stock based mobile society. Each of their societies and cultures provides the customs, skills, and organization to enable their military to prosper in their own geographic environement, but not in the other's.
An army of peasant soldiers from a sedentary river valley based culture would lack the expertise to support mass as well as the skill and background to sustain mobility in steppes of Inner Asia. It would need a logistic tail unsupportable prior to the 19th century to just to survive in this environment.
An elite Chinese raiding force might make a superficially impressive foray into such an environment as Chinese army did during Han dynasty by going all the way to the Aral Sea in modern Uzbekistan. But it required unsustainably herculean logistic effort, as well as extensive buying off of local potentates, not to mention massive outlays for enlisting local mercenaries. It's a thing too costly to repeat more often than once or twice during a very strong dynasty, and certainly too costly to sustain for any length of time even by the strongest dynasty.
A large Chinese occupation army could not live off the land; a large Chinese army of conquest could not match the mobility of the locals, and would simply be absorbed into the environment like rain drops on parched dirt if they were to try. This is why ancient China had no prayer of sustained expansion north westwards in way similar to what the Mongols had done. Not because they lacked fighting prowess in the combat environment in which Chinese military tradition was developed, but because it required crossing vast stretches which is highly unsuited to Chinese military tradition.
But the land over which the Mongols expanded so quickly was precsely the ones highly suited to Mogol military tradition. If you look past the superficially impressive Mongol invincibility, you would see the Mongol’s westward expansion into central Europe and Western Asia brought to a screeching halt by a head on collision with geographic suitability, just as any Chinese expansion into Mongolia would have been stopped.
When the Mongols reached Ukraine, and Syria, they left the steppe land that could have supported the Mongol hords of horses. When they ventured into western Ukraine, they even left land that was suitable for massed cavalry maneuver. Four or five horses to a man, and the ability to live literally off of the horses (Mongol soldiers can eat and drink nothing but horses' milk and horse's blood for a month), was secret of both the awesome Mongol strategic mobility (Mongol armies' 2000 mile forced march to attack Northern Persia remain the longest lmarch into battle by far in recorded military history, and was done 10 times faster than Alexander's march from Persia to India), as well as the uncanny tacitical capacity to call up timely concentration of overwhelming force at precisely the focal point of a battle, despite overall numerical inferiority. When the mongols became robbed of the ability to support a concentration of horses to support their strategic and tactical mobility, their initial expansion also sputtered and came to an end.
Contrary to what some other people have said here, Mongol forces were later able to adapt, and thus remain formidable forces in central and south Asia for upwards of another 300 years. But they were merely formidable. Their invincibility was never again regained once they left the boundaries of "horsy" steppe territory on which they evolved their superior military system.
Chinese and Mongol armies were both confined by geography. The fact that the Chinese army were not able to expand Chinese domination into inner Asia is attributable to the same causes as that which stopped the Mongols at the border of central Europe and Western Asia. Neither mongol nor Chinese militaries were ultimately able to break the confines of the geography in which their respective military, social and economic traditions were formed.
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