DOT&E’s assessment of CVN 78 remains consistent with the DOT&E Operational Assessment report submitted in December 2013. Poor or unknown reliability of newly designed catapults, arresting gear, weapons elevators, and radar, which are all critical for flight operations, could affect CVN 78’s ability to generate sorties, make the ship more vulnerable to attack, or create limitations during routine operations. The poor or unknown reliability of these critical subsystems is the most significant risk to CVN 78. - Reliability for the catapults was last reported in December 2014. While catapult reliability is above the re-baselined reliability growth curve, the re-baselined curve is well below the reliability requirement and the catapults are unlikely to achieve required reliability. - Reliability for the arresting gear has not been reported in almost two years. The last reported reliability estimates for the arresting gear were well below the re-baselined reliability growth curve, and indicated that the system was unlikely to achieve required reliability. The Navy began measuring reliability again in 4QFY15, but does not expect to have new reliability estimates until the end of 2015. Additionally, reliability test data are not available for the radar and the weapons elevators. - Absent a major redesign, the catapults and arresting gear are not likely to meet reliability requirements. • In FY14, testing at the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launching System (EMALS) functional demonstration test site at Joint Base McGuire- Dix- Lakehurst, New Jersey, discovered excessive airframe stress during launches of F/A-18E/F and EA-18G with wing-mounted 480-gallon external fuel tanks (EFTs). This discovery, until corrected, will preclude the Navy from conducting normal operations of the F/A-18E/F and EA-18G from CVN 78. • In FY15, the Navy identified an inability to readily electrically isolate EMALS components to perform concurrent maintenance. This inability to readily electrically isolate EMALS components could preclude some types of EMALS maintenance during flight operations, decreasing EMALS operational availability. • In October 2015, the Navy discovered that one of the three Prime Power Interface Subsystems (PPIS) Transformer Rectifiers (TRs) had been damaged during shipboard certification testing. Two of the three TRs are required for normal catapult operations. The TRs were designed to last the life of the ship. Earlier faults discovered during developmental testing resulted in stepwise improvements to the PPIS TR design and construction. This failed TR had one of the four improvements. • In FY15, the Navy began performance testing of the Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) at a jet car track site at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey. This testing is examining the performance of the redesigned arresting gear to meet the system specification with improve reliability.