09III/09IV (093/094) Nuclear Submarine Thread

[BoraTas]

Nuclear attack submarines are still faster than surface ships. What I think will happen more is persistent undersea sonar networks. And then the attack submarines can act as interceptors, you launch them to intercept a target and use active sonar to engage.

They are much slower than helos they carry and their rocket-launched torpedoes

The ships use active sonar, just like submarines, and are slower than nuclear attack submarines. So I really do not see how this is true. It is true that aircraft are a problem. But they use two means to detect submarines, sonobuys, or magnetic anomaly detectors. And they strike submarines with either mines or torpedos. I think you will see submarines use composite materials on the hull or non-magnetic materials which render the magnetic anomaly detectors useless.

Actually no. Subs can't use active sonar unless they are really desperate. It gives away their presence and location. In the cold war, passive sonar on the sub was the king. Below layer and very long range. But passive sonar absolutely sucks against modern submarines that are quieter than the background noise. And active sonar has improved a lot and towed variable-depth active arrays became common. Now, ships detect submarines from longer distances compared to other subs.

You also forgot radars and infrared detectors. Which are the bane of submarines that have to snorkel (aka SSKs).

"Short" ranged is like 50-60km...

More like 15 km at best if you want your torpedo to evade detection long enough and still catch up to the ship. Down to 5-10 km against ships at flank speed. Remember, torpedos are slow munitions and their targets' speed is significant. 45 nm range at 45 knots only equals 15 knots effective range against a vessel at 30 knots.

It might be possible to process the signal if your sonar is stationary you can likely just filter out the background.

It complicates ranging too because of multiple reflections. Ranging takes a lot of time without using the periscope which makes you helo food. SSKs have it even worse.

Soryu is not particularly quiet. The Swedish Stirling engines they use are mechanical engines and quite noisy. Fuel cells like on German submarines should be a lot quieter.

China is using active sonar anyway. Soryus are scary quiet according to everyone that went against it. Well below background noise.

Like I said you can use a composite hull or some other non-magnetic hull and try to reduce the visibility of the SSK.

Machinery is still steel

And just where will you put the sensor on the submarine? Radar would make the submarine visible, and IR sensors would likely work poorly from under water.

In tests Germans were able to detect an ASW helicopter by sonar using its downwash on the sea surface. Look at the IDAS missile. You can cue it by the sub's radar too. It is an act of desperation by the sub but it counts. So helos can't just recklessly use dipping sonar everywhere they are suspicious of.

Not really. At least not current AIP. Which in all cases is really low power.

It prevents you from getting stalked by space and aviation assets for a few weeks. Quite important.

Maybe. Until China pushes out beyond the first island chain the nuclear submarines won't be all that useful to be honest.

I don't agree. China needs to be able to go on a submarine offensive beyond the first island chain. Chinese SSNs will be persistent threats. Have really good 30 SSNs and deploy 20 of them to the West Pacific before starting to conquer Taiwan. US planners will have to think a lot more times. Also, there is a chain effect. CVNs further away and less mobile -> more Chinese MPAs and ASW ships -> Less aggressive US SSNs -> A lot more PLAN warships -> even more area denial. SSKs can't do this effectively, it is not WW2 anymore.

 

[antiterror13]

God help me about to enter this 3 hour 15 min podcast and look for it

where is the link to the podcast ?

 

[sequ]

where is the link to the podcast ?

 

[BoraTas]

How about the craziest one of all: during the podcast Patchwork states that the J-20 is *significantly* superior to all US aircraft.

Probably true in a WESTPAC context. The F-22 is really short-range and is a hangar queen, and lacks IRST. The F-35 has it better but still lacks proper IRST, has a medium-power radar, and is still somewhat short-range. The J-20 is really WESTPAC specific. Long range, massive radar, has IRST, and can be fast. Its stealth characteristics might be weaker but I think the overall concept is really sound for WESTPAC. Anyway off topic

 

[Biscuits]

SSNs if they're able to get them down to the same level as late Virginia class or better can be devastating by poking the enemy back line and putting a stricter timer on their operations. SSKs would not be able to do this due to lacking speed.

A future large SSN force can head into the west Pacific and deter US aggression by forcing a dilemma. Either stay in the West Pacific, devote long time to ASW missions and be unable to replenish bases or send significant airpower in East Asia, or enter East Asia in force, but then risk being squeezed between hypersonic missiles from the west and by sub threat from the east.

China should in theory have the tech base given their SSK experience, funding is(was??) a major issue. Another seeming issue is nuclear propulsion.
But now we are seeing the start of a SSN fleet that is not just to maintain development like the earlier ones.

With earlier ship types, PLA usually moves in leaps and then mass produces a design, such as the Type 055. Ideally we are seeing such a scenario here.

 

[Michaelsinodef]

SSNs if they're able to get them down to the same level as late Virginia class or better can be devastating by poking the enemy back line and putting a stricter timer on their operations. SSKs would not be able to do this due to lacking speed.

A future large SSN force can head into the west Pacific and deter US aggression by forcing a dilemma. Either stay in the West Pacific, devote long time to ASW missions and be unable to replenish bases or send significant airpower in East Asia, or enter East Asia in force, but then risk being squeezed between hypersonic missiles from the west and by sub threat from the east.

China should in theory have the tech base given their SSK experience, funding is(was??) a major issue. Another seeming issue is nuclear propulsion.
But now we are seeing the start of a SSN fleet that is not just to maintain development like the earlier ones.

With earlier ship types, PLA usually moves in leaps and then mass produces a design, such as the Type 055. Ideally we are seeing such a scenario here.

Isn't it kinda of given, since we got pretty good confirmation of massive expansion of Bohai, where sub construction takes place.

 

[ACuriousPLAFan]

Firstly, since I'm too lazy to type out the full term every single time, here're the abbreviations:
First Island Chain = FIC
Second Island Chain = SIC
Third Island Chain = TIC
North Sea Fleet = NSF
East Sea Fleet = ESF
South Sea Fleet = SSF

- China will probably de-prioritize non-nuclear subs. They will continue to exist, but I believe they will make around 1/3-to-1/2 of the fleet in ~2050.

Despite as such, I believe that non-nuclear subs i.e. SSKs would still remain as a significant underwater arm for China for at least until the mid-21st century, even as the PLAN moves further towards the goal of becoming a true blue-water navy.

The main reason would be China's geographical and geopolitical situation (and thus, its submarine operational doctrine) is very different than the US and more similar to Russia.

Unlike the US who has neighbours with either a navy so weak that it couldn't even rival any one Chinese fleet (NSF/ESF/SSF) to the north, or a navy that is more like an anti-drug smuggling coast guard to the south - China has neighbours with considerably formidable navies to face against in the Westpac (Japan, South Korea, Australia, UK and possibly even India).

That means while the PLAN would deploy their SSNs deep into the Pacific for interdiction beyond the FIC, SSKs would remain within and around the FIC to patrol and guard against any attempted intrusions by enemy warships that has managed to bypass the screening of Chinese surface fleets around the FIC.

For starters, the publically available stat of the maximum range for the 039A/B/C-class is around 8000 nautical miles, or 14800 kilometers. For reference, 14800 kilometers is enough for a one-way trip from Ningbo to southern Mexico through the Miyako Strait.

Meanwhile, since submarines are not sent for one-way suicide missions, then the shortest possible navigable distances from:
1. Ningbo (ESF) to Guam - ~3000 kilometers;
2. Sanya (SSF) to Guam - ~3800 kilometers; and
3. Qinghai (NSF) to Guam - ~3600 kilometers.

Then, assume that a 039A/B/C SSK would spend half of its permissible range on station i.e. patrol in the Pacific, by my very rough estimation, that means the sub would:
1. Travel around 3000 kilometers between her home base and their designated patrol zone;
2. Conduct patrol around the designated zone for around 6000 kilometers, before;
3. Travelling another 3000 kilometers back to her home base
With 2800 kilometers of range of fuel to spare, and without any mid-sea refueling.

Therefore, I believe that theoractially and operationally-speaking, those 039A/B/C SSKs can roam freely within the FIC and as far as between the FIC and SIC.

Kindly refer to the map below..


The red, orange and lines would operate as something like "underwater island chains" (UIC) of sorts for China.

1. Firstly, any warships not from the Westpac region (i.e. Atlantic, Indian, Eastern Pacific, Arctic, Southern Oceans) would be facing the First UIC (green line), which is patrolled and guarded by PLAN SSNs (093/095) and extends as far as the nuclear reactors on those SSNs can allow.
2. If the enemy warships successfully crossed the First UIC, then they would be facing the Second UIC for China (red lines), which is patrolled and guarded by newer and more capable PLAN SSKs (039A/B/C) and extends along the middle region between the FIC and SIC.
4. If the enemy warships successfully crossed the Second UIC, then they would be facing the Third and Final UIC (orange lines), which is patrolled and guarded by older and less capable PLAN SSKs (035/039) and extends along the FIC.

If the PLAN can operate a substantial size of SSK fleets around China's coastlines, it would significantly reduce the burden of her SSN fleets WRT guarding seas closer to home shore. This would definitely help the PLAN a lot by stretching the interception network further away from Chinese shorelines. Of course, such strategy would be done as a compliment and support for PLAN surface warships and carriers against enemy warships, and less likely a submarine-independent-specific operation.

The US enacted their Island Chain Strategy to contain China. It's time that China turn that around and stopping the US from getting close to China.

I do understand that this post could veer out of this topic discussion, so if the moderators find my post unsuitable for this thread, feel free to move this post to the relevent thread.

 

[AndrewS]

Early 09-III equals Sturgeon
The latest ones equal Los Angeles

Early Los Angeles or Improved Los Angeles?

 

[AndrewS]

Firstly, since I'm too lazy to type out the full term every single time, here're the abbreviations:
First Island Chain = FIC
Second Island Chain = SIC
Third Island Chain = TIC
North Sea Fleet = NSF
East Sea Fleet = ESF
South Sea Fleet = SSF


Despite as such, I believe that non-nuclear subs i.e. SSKs would still remain as a significant underwater arm for China for at least until the mid-21st century, even as the PLAN moves further towards the goal of becoming a true blue-water navy.

The main reason would be China's geographical and geopolitical situation (and thus, its submarine operational doctrine) is very different than the US and more similar to Russia.

Unlike the US who has neighbours with either a navy so weak that it couldn't even rival any one Chinese fleet (NSF/ESF/SSF) to the north, or a navy that is more like an anti-drug smuggling coast guard to the south - China has neighbours with considerably formidable navies to face against in the Westpac (Japan, South Korea, Australia, UK and possibly even India).

That means while the PLAN would deploy their SSNs deep into the Pacific for interdiction beyond the FIC, SSKs would remain within and around the FIC to patrol and guard against any attempted intrusions by enemy warships that has managed to bypass the screening of Chinese surface fleets around the FIC.

For starters, the publically available stat of the maximum range for the 039A/B/C-class is around 8000 nautical miles, or 14800 kilometers. For reference, 14800 kilometers is enough for a one-way trip from Ningbo to southern Mexico through the Miyako Strait.

Meanwhile, since submarines are not sent for one-way suicide missions, then the shortest possible navigable distances from:
1. Ningbo (ESF) to Guam - ~3000 kilometers;
2. Sanya (SSF) to Guam - ~3800 kilometers; and
3. Qinghai (NSF) to Guam - ~3600 kilometers.

Then, assume that a 039A/B/C SSK would spend half of its permissible range on station i.e. patrol in the Pacific, by my very rough estimation, that means the sub would:
1. Travel around 3000 kilometers between her home base and their designated patrol zone;
2. Conduct patrol around the designated zone for around 6000 kilometers, before;
3. Travelling another 3000 kilometers back to her home base
With 2800 kilometers of range of fuel to spare, and without any mid-sea refueling.

Therefore, I believe that theoractially and operationally-speaking, those 039A/B/C SSKs can roam freely within the FIC and as far as between the FIC and SIC.

Kindly refer to the map below..
View attachment 103500

The red, orange and lines would operate as something like "underwater island chains" (UIC) of sorts for China.

1. Firstly, any warships not from the Westpac region (i.e. Atlantic, Indian, Eastern Pacific, Arctic, Southern Oceans) would be facing the First UIC (green line), which is patrolled and guarded by PLAN SSNs (093/095) and extends as far as the nuclear reactors on those SSNs can allow.
2. If the enemy warships successfully crossed the First UIC, then they would be facing the Second UIC for China (red lines), which is patrolled and guarded by newer and more capable PLAN SSKs (039A/B/C) and extends along the middle region between the FIC and SIC.
4. If the enemy warships successfully crossed the Second UIC, then they would be facing the Third and Final UIC (orange lines), which is patrolled and guarded by older and less capable PLAN SSKs (035/039) and extends along the FIC.

If the PLAN can operate a substantial size of SSK fleets around China's coastlines, it would significantly reduce the burden of her SSN fleets WRT guarding seas closer to home shore. This would definitely help the PLAN a lot by stretching the interception network further away from Chinese shorelines. Of course, such strategy would be done as a compliment and support for PLAN surface warships and carriers against enemy warships, and less likely a submarine-independent-specific operation.

The US enacted their Island Chain Strategy to contain China. It's time that China turn that around and stopping the US from getting close to China.

I do understand that this post could veer out of this topic discussion, so if the moderators find my post unsuitable for this thread, feel free to move this post to the relevent thread.

I just see SSKs as being too vulnerable once they are being tracked by airborne ASW assets, because they don't have the speed/endurance to disengage.

So ideally, SSKs should operate to the 1st Island Chain, and possibly somewhat further if the Chinese Navy or Air Force can keep the airspace clear. Beyond this, SSNs are better.

But that still means a significant SSK fleet is useful. So call it a steady-state fleet of 30 SSKs being replaced at 1 per year.

 

[Staedler]

Ran through the podcast again to fetch some timestamps.


22:33 Toaster talks about the Russian vs China comparison. They differ even in philosophy of their weapons system. PLA weaponry has a lot more in common with US/NATO than Russia.

40:04 Patch talks about Tomahawks
Center for Naval Analysis + Defence Intelligence Agency (1993 study) after 2nd salvo, ~50% of all Tomahawks sent was shot down by Iraq - more didn't hit the target due to bad terrain map, etc. Tomahawks also fail 10-15% of the time in their initial pre-cruise flight phase. So Burke salvo size is about 16 due to this and VLS power constraints, etc. This is before considering jamming and shootdowns.

45:20 Toaster mentions US submarines communicate to satellites on a 3 Mbit pipe, so they have to circle at periscope depth for hours to get data to do Tomahawk strikes

1:10:00 Patch says J20 availability rates are 85-95% partially because they don't run their individual airframes as hard and partially because they have robust logistics. Segways into USA having an habit of overusing their airframes and submarines. Toaster mentions early VA boats are sent out for 6-9 months instead of the 4-6 during the Cold War resulting in the boat needing to be put in maintenance for 2-3 years after the deployment. Patch mentions PLA doesn't defer maintenance as much as the USA does and the PLA spreads hours between frames more evenly than the US. Toaster mentions USS Boise as an example; came back 2015 and has been in maintenance for 7+ years now.

1:39:00 Toaster mentions original 093 were close to Sturgeon class boats. New 093 are decent, about LA class. (Patch mentions 688i) Expects them to eventually reach early-mid VA noise by 2030. Early VA noise level is already disminishing returns where further quieting doesn't make that much difference.

1:57:25 SSK topic starts here. Modern Radars can detect submarines at periscope depth. Doing Target Motion Analysis with passive requires a few hours of zig-zagging to get ranging solution. SSKs are slow and bad at it and so they need to go to periscope depth which exposes them tremendously. SSK don't have great evasive characteristics because their underwater endurance is sub-hour and is basically a suicide mission. Toaster mentions torpedoes like Mk 48 have functional ranges of 3-5 nm max because anything further than that gives too much time for evasion and detection of your submarine.

2:13:20 Patch denies insitutional knowledge exists

2:41:45 Toaster mentions Li-ion, AIP, etc. help but don't solve SSK's fundamental problems of extremely limited underwater endurance.

2:51:34 Patch "the J20 is significantly superior to just about every single United States aircraft in production right now"

2:59:18 India slander

3:05:00 Patch asserts PLA can invade Okinawa even if US, Japan, Taiwan, (maybe even) SK as well get involved.