075 LHD thread

[Blitzo]

Relative to the USN, the PLAN is not trying to play the world's policeman or desiring to win two wars at the same time, so having "only" 1/4 of the USN's ARG's is really not a meaningful comparison. Name me another navy in the world that has or plans to have 3 ARGs. TBH for all I know the PLAN may want to have even more than 3 ARGs in the future; we just don't know. Also, SCS or ECS contingencies are more than met by any preparation for a Taiwan contingency, unless you somehow think the PLAN is trying to plan for both or all three to occur at the same time, so there is no need to add Taiwan + ECS + SCS as if their requirements have to be summed separately into some kind of greater whole.

I'm lumping ECS/SCS/Taiwan all together -- in that they would have to have enough ships (including amphibious assault) left at home to deter or act as a fleet in being, for ECS or SCS or Taiwan, not that they would have to do all three at the same time. That would be rather ridiculous.

If you agree that the PLAN is not likely to form ARGs by the early 2020s and also that they will end up with more than 6 LPDs, then the obvious solution is to assign 6 LPDs to the 3 ARGs when they actually form and the other 2-3 (or 5-6 or whatever) to lead their own ad hoc non-permanent task forces, to include LSTs, large LCUs, Zubrs, etc., as the need arises. This size of amphibious forces is already literally unheard outside of the USN.

I'm not trying to say that China's amphibious assault fleet of the 2020s will be lacking relative to all the world's navies -- obviously three LHDs and 6 LPDs would be one of the most capable amphibious assault fleets in the world, even not including LSTs.

I'm just saying that the fleet it will be lacking relative to the USN and lacking for the Chinese Navy's own requirements, if they try to pursue a USN style ARG deployment pattern while also trying to have enough amphibious assault ships to form a fleet in being for ECS, SCS and Taiwan contingincies.

The other point is that (specifically) for a Taiwan contingency, we aren't talking about just needing 3 ARGs, or even 6 ARGs, or even 10 ARGs. We are talking about every available ship that can land troops/tanks/IFVs/trucks/cargo, including civilian ships, being employed to take a beachhead and expand from there. An ARG in the scope of a Taiwan contingency is just a minor player in a major invasion. Even 3 ARGs all tasked together would just merely constitute a flanking maneuver to complement the main landing force. For SCS contingencies, a single ARG would surely be enough to accomplish whatever the PLAN wanted in that region, however unlikely such a scenario would even occur. For an ECS contingency, somewhere in between these two scenarios. All of this speaks nothing of any need to form permanent "ARG" organizational structures that include LSTs (or any other smaller unit) on a routine basis.

Yes, I wasn't suggesting that an ARG or some LPDs would be able to complete a full Taiwan or SCS or even ECS operation, but rather exist as a component of the overall fleet in being/"home fleet" that China will have as a deterrence force and potentially an initial response force.

 

[Iron Man]

I'm just saying that the fleet it will be lacking relative to the USN and lacking for the Chinese Navy's own requirements, if they try to pursue a USN style ARG deployment pattern while also trying to have enough amphibious assault ships to form a fleet in being for ECS, SCS and Taiwan contingincies.

I guess we will just have to disagree here. We're going from 0 ARGs now to maybe 3 full ARGs 10-15 years from now. Three ARGs allows one ARG to be constantly on station or to redeploy elsewhere as a rapid response force, and one additional ARG to surge as needed. I just don't see any short to medium term scenarios where the PLAN would have need of more than a single ARG actively deployed at a time.

 

[Blitzo]

I guess we will just have to disagree here. We're going from 0 ARGs now to maybe 3 full ARGs 10-15 years from now. Three ARGs allows one ARG to be constantly on station or to redeploy elsewhere as a rapid response force, and one additional ARG to surge as needed. I just don't see any short to medium term scenarios where the PLAN would have need of more than a single ARG actively deployed at a time.

I agree with such an projection of the potential deployment pattern, the thing is I think given China's current regions of interest, the ARG on station will probably be on station somewhere in the west Indian ocean area near Africa/Middle East.

I think the Navy can definitely surge deploy an additional ARG or have surge readiness for an ARG for its immediate periphery (Taiwan/SCS/ECS), I just don't think surge deploying a single ARG and having the other ARG on station on the other side of the world (which will likely need weeks to return home and having to navigate through a series of waterways around potentially hostile or at least non-allied nations) isn't as optimal as I'd like.

If they could have two ARGs or near ARG equivalents, at home, capable of being surge deployed in China's immediate periphery, then I think that would be much better (though of course even having a single ARG with LHD would be a step forward than what China has today) -- so to compromise I think if the Chinese Navy really wants to have a permanent, forward stationed amphibious assault presence on the other side of the world, I think making an ARG be 1 LHD, 1 LPD, and 2-4 LSTs could make sense, where the LSTs and their complement could spend most of their time docked and unloaded at the naval station at Djibouti to preserve its endurance/crew endurance. That would free up 5 LPDs at home, where 3 or maybe even 4 of them would be available to surge alongside other 1 surge LHD (of 2 LHDs at home), which I think would be a more comfortable deterrence force than 1 LHD and 2 LPDs.

That said, this is all getting very nitty gritty and the difference of 1 or 2 LPDs available at home to surge is not that big of a deal. It's more my own reasoning for why/how I think having an LST component in a forward stationed ARG (if China decides on such a deployment doctrine) could make sense.

 

[Iron Man]

I agree with such an projection of the potential deployment pattern, the thing is I think given China's current regions of interest, the ARG on station will probably be on station somewhere in the west Indian ocean area near Africa/Middle East.

I think the Navy can definitely surge deploy an additional ARG or have surge readiness for an ARG for its immediate periphery (Taiwan/SCS/ECS), I just don't think surge deploying a single ARG and having the other ARG on station on the other side of the world (which will likely need weeks to return home and having to navigate through a series of waterways around potentially hostile or at least non-allied nations) isn't as optimal as I'd like.

If they could have two ARGs or near ARG equivalents, at home, capable of being surge deployed in China's immediate periphery, then I think that would be much better (though of course even having a single ARG with LHD would be a step forward than what China has today) -- so to compromise I think if the Chinese Navy really wants to have a permanent, forward stationed amphibious assault presence on the other side of the world, I think making an ARG be 1 LHD, 1 LPD, and 2-4 LSTs could make sense, where the LSTs and their complement could spend most of their time docked and unloaded at the naval station at Djibouti to preserve its endurance/crew endurance. That would free up 5 LPDs at home, where 3 or maybe even 4 of them would be available to surge alongside other 1 surge LHD (of 2 LHDs at home), which I think would be a more comfortable deterrence force than 1 LHD and 2 LPDs.

That said, this is all getting very nitty gritty and the difference of 1 or 2 LPDs available at home to surge is not that big of a deal. It's more my own reasoning for why/how I think having an LST component in a forward stationed ARG (if China decides on such a deployment doctrine) could make sense.

First of all, why does a PLAN ARG need to be on station in the West Indian Ocean? Which beach is it going to land on over there? Maybe you are mixing up CSGs with ARGs here, because there is really just no good reason to have a PLAN ARG in this region of the world, while there is certainly good reason to have a CSG stationed there. Second, even traveling from (e.g.) the West Indian Ocean to the SCS is a matter of days, not weeks. At a sustainable 40km/hr (21.6 knots) your hypothetical ARG can make this ~5,700km trip in under 6 days. Having an LST in this "forward-stationed" ARG will most definitely not afford you either this speed or this range; they would positively be an outright liability in such a scenario. There is really only one good place for China to have an active PLAN ARG, and that is along China's periphery, in which case travel times between all potential hot spots are somewhere between 0 and 3 days.

 

[Blitzo]

First of all, why does a PLAN ARG need to be on station in the West Indian Ocean? Which beach is it going to land on over there? Maybe you are mixing up CSGs with ARGs here, because there is really just no good reason to have a PLAN ARG in this region of the world, while there is certainly good reason to have a CSG stationed there. Second, even traveling from (e.g.) the West Indian Ocean to the SCS is a matter of days, not weeks. At a sustainable 40km/hr (21.6 knots) your hypothetical ARG can make this ~5,700km trip in under 6 days. Having an LST in this "forward-stationed" ARG will most definitely not afford you either this speed or this range; they would positively be an outright liability in such a scenario. There is really only one good place for China to have an active PLAN ARG, and that is along China's periphery, in which case travel times between all potential hot spots are somewhere between 0 and 3 days.

I see their role in the Africa/Middle East region as deploying rapid reaction/limited scale stabilizing intervention ground forces, to provide an SOF platform to operate from, to provide an ability to rapidly evacuate Chinese citizens, as well as to provide MOOTW operations in the region, and of course anti piracy. It is the flexibility of the ARG and the scale of Chinese interests and Chinese population in the region (and its volatile nature) which makes me think an ARG there would be sensible.

I think a CSG would also have a role in the west Indian Ocean, however I think an ARG makes sense as well, and if I had to come up with one region where forward deploying an ARG could have the most realistic effects for Chinese interests, it would be the Middle East/Africa region, given ARGs are known for being "multi-tools". I don't think China would be seeking to actually be constantly ready to conduct an amphibious assault with ARGs in its periphery during normal peacetime, whereas having them in the Middle East/Africa region to support and reassure Chinese citizens and Chinese economic interests there and to conduct some MOOTW, humanitarian missions, and partner exercises with nations in the area is something which will be feasible and likely during peacetime.

If China is deploying an ARG in a forward station that is only in China's periphery (say, 2nd island chain), then I would agree that having "only" 3 LHDs and 6 LPDs in total would be much less of a "risk".


To build on this a little, I think as the Chinese Navy becomes larger and more powerful and blue water oriented, one of its concerns will be how to deploy its assets -- i.e.: how many to deploy near its periphery where their role will likely be responding to any high intensity conflict that may occur but which will likely have a low likelihood of happening during "peacetime" -- vs how many to deploy in blue water (likely near Africa/Middle East) where China has many economic interests and citizens abroad in volatile countries where any operations will likely be limited scale and low intensity but will probably be more likely to occur during "peacetime".

I think it would be quite reasonable to argue that sending an entire ARG to Africa/Middle East for only low intensity contingencies and MOOTW is overkill, which I would appreciate, but at the same time I think having some sort of ARG like presence there -- with the SOF deployment capability, helicopter and ground force deployment capacity, and large multipurpose role of an LHD or LPD ship -- would be invaluable.
Having a 40k ton LHD and 2 25k ton LPDs there with escorts might be too much, and it may be wiser to keep them close to home for high intensity contingencies. But in that case I think the Navy should look into building a small number of 22k ton LHDs like the export pattern LHD that we've seen, both to supplement the larger 40k ton LHDs in high intensity operations, but they are small enough to be spared for low intensity blue water deployments near Africa/Middle East, yet will retain the same flexibility inherent of an LHD to be useful for the kind of contingencies in that area China may need to respond to.

 

[Iron Man]

I see their role in the Africa/Middle East region as deploying rapid reaction/limited scale stabilizing intervention ground forces, to provide an SOF platform to operate from, to provide an ability to rapidly evacuate Chinese citizens, as well as to provide MOOTW operations in the region, and of course anti piracy. It is the flexibility of the ARG and the scale of Chinese interests and Chinese population in the region (and its volatile nature) which makes me think an ARG there would be sensible.

None of these require a full ARG, as you yourself admitted. A single LHD or even LPD would suffice for any of these scenarios. In fact, whatever forces could be afforded by the presence of a CSG would already be sufficient to provide for any of these scenarios except for possibly a "rapid reaction/limited scale stabilizing ground forces" (a scenario I can't imagine would actually even apply to China), and a CSG has far more reason to operate in this region than an ARG. A standard anti-piracy task force of an oiler, a frigate/destroyer, and an LPD or LHD of the kind we have already seen deployed to the ME countless times would also be sufficient for any of those scenarios.

I think a CSG would also have a role in the west Indian Ocean, however I think an ARG makes sense as well, and if I had to come up with one region where forward deploying an ARG could have the most realistic effects for Chinese interests, it would be the Middle East/Africa region, given ARGs are known for being "multi-tools". I don't think China would be seeking to actually be constantly ready to conduct an amphibious assault with ARGs in its periphery during normal peacetime, whereas having them in the Middle East/Africa region to support and reassure Chinese citizens and Chinese economic interests there and to conduct some MOOTW, humanitarian missions, and partner exercises with nations in the area is something which will be feasible and likely during peacetime.

Again, a PLAN ARG has no business being in the ME, especially when a PLAN CSG has far more business being there, and when even a mere anti-piracy task force has far more reason to be there. If the PLAN is so concerned about deploying troops on the ground somewhere over there for whatever (currently unimaginable) future limited rapid ground combat scenario, you could always just deploy an LHD/LPD with the rest of the CSG just in case.

As for being constantly ready to conduct an amphibious assault, that's what ARGs actually are for. Constantly being ready to conduct an amphibious assault. What you're essentially saying here is that PLAN ARGs have no reason to exist, but yet you posit the future existence of them nonetheless. If you merely want a "force" of amphibs that are held in reserve to be ready to attack Taiwan, DYT or SCS with some degree of preparation, then you don't need a permanent organizational structure like an ARG. An ARG is for the very purpose of being actively deployed to provide on-demand beach assault at a moment's notice, not for rusting at the docks waiting for that one fateful call to reunite Taiwan with the motherland, and certainly not for rescuing citizens that a frigate could perform (and has performed), or for gunning down pirates off Somalia that smaller lesser task forces have already accomplished. If the PLAN decides to form ARGs in the future, it will mean that the PLAN feels there is a need for the capability to assault an enemy beach on demand.

 

[Blitzo]

None of these require a full ARG, as you yourself admitted. A single LHD or even LPD would suffice for any of these scenarios. In fact, whatever forces could be afforded by the presence of a CSG would already be sufficient to provide for any of these scenarios except for possibly a "rapid reaction/limited scale stabilizing ground forces" (a scenario I can't imagine would actually even apply to China), and a CSG has far more reason to operate in this region than an ARG. A standard anti-piracy task force of an oiler, a frigate/destroyer, and an LPD or LHD of the kind we have already seen deployed to the ME countless times would also be sufficient for any of those scenarios.

Again, a PLAN ARG has no business being in the ME, especially when a PLAN CSG has far more business being there, and when even a mere anti-piracy task force has far more reason to be there. If the PLAN is so concerned about deploying troops on the ground somewhere over there for whatever (currently unimaginable) future limited rapid ground combat scenario, you could always just deploy an LHD/LPD with the rest of the CSG just in case.

I think an ARG in the ME/Africa area is quite sensible given the very flexible nature of an ARG, and the presence of a CSG doesn't preclude the presence of having an ARG there.
That said I wouldn't be opposed to having ARG components deployed along with a CSG for some kind of standing Chinese Navy ME/Africa task force that can integrate elements of an ARG and CSG and to share resources like escorts.

As for being constantly ready to conduct an amphibious assault, that's what ARGs actually are for. Constantly being ready to conduct an amphibious assault. What you're essentially saying here is that PLAN ARGs have no reason to exist, but yet you posit the future existence of them nonetheless. If you merely want a "force" of amphibs that are held in reserve to be ready to attack Taiwan, DYT or SCS with some degree of preparation, then you don't need a permanent organizational structure like an ARG. An ARG is for the very purpose of being actively deployed to provide on-demand beach assault at a moment's notice, not for rusting at the docks waiting for that one fateful call to reunite Taiwan with the motherland, and certainly not for rescuing citizens that a frigate could perform (and has performed), or for gunning down pirates off Somalia that smaller lesser task forces have already accomplished. If the PLAN decides to form ARGs in the future, it will mean that the PLAN feels there is a need for the capability to assault an enemy beach on demand.

No I'm not saying ARGs have no reason to exist -- I think they very much do have both low intensity and high intensity roles, and for China the low intensity role will likely be in ME/Africa and high intensity will be in China's periphery.

I am also saying that ARGs are inherently very flexible, and range from actually storming a beach to humanitarian actions, to SOF deployment and evacuation. I don't believe that ARGs are deployed only because they are meant to storm a hostile beach -- that is definitely one of their key requirements, but in the USN they are rarely actually used in the high intensity warfare form and instead used more often for low intensity warfare and MOOTW/humanitarian missions as well.

In the foreseeable future, the likelihood of conducting the sort of high intensity mission near China's peripheries will not be constantly very high whereas the likelihood of having to conduct lower intensity missions will probably be higher and more persistent. The Navy will have to calculate whether they want to have ARG assets deployed closer to home for a high intensity contingency that probably won't occur (until it occurs), or to deploy some ARG assets further from home for low intensity contingencies.


So while I can see the logic behind seeing ARGs as a force which is only meant to conduct amphibious assault missions, I think they are really a much more flexible force (arguably more so than CSGs) especially for MOOTW and humanitarian missions and low intensity contingencies. The question is whether the Navy will see those roles as a useful part of the job description for their ARGs, and if they do consider it as part of the job description, then how often should they be deployed for it and where should they be deployed.

 

[Iron Man]

I think an ARG in the ME/Africa area is quite sensible given the very flexible nature of an ARG, and the presence of a CSG doesn't preclude the presence of having an ARG there.
That said I wouldn't be opposed to having ARG components deployed along with a CSG for some kind of standing Chinese Navy ME/Africa task force that can integrate elements of an ARG and CSG and to share resources like escorts.

The elements required for the MOOTW scenarios that you specified are already present in a CSG except for one scenario, which could be filled by the presence of a LHD or an LPD attached to the CSG. Or it could even be filled by an anti-piracy task force that includes an LPD or an LHD that is independently operating in the ME area. Again, both of which preclude any need for an actual ARG to be present at any time in the ME/West Indian Ocean area.

No I'm not saying ARGs have no reason to exist -- I think they very much do have both low intensity and high intensity roles, and for China the low intensity role will likely be in ME/Africa and high intensity will be in China's periphery.

I am also saying that ARGs are inherently very flexible, and range from actually storming a beach to humanitarian actions, to SOF deployment and evacuation. I don't believe that ARGs are deployed only because they are meant to storm a hostile beach -- that is definitely one of their key requirements, but in the USN they are rarely actually used in the high intensity warfare form and instead used more often for low intensity warfare and MOOTW/humanitarian missions as well.

In the foreseeable future, the likelihood of conducting the sort of high intensity mission near China's peripheries will not be constantly very high whereas the likelihood of having to conduct lower intensity missions will probably be higher and more persistent. The Navy will have to calculate whether they want to have ARG assets deployed closer to home for a high intensity contingency that probably won't occur (until it occurs), or to deploy some ARG assets further from home for low intensity contingencies.


So while I can see the logic behind seeing ARGs as a force which is only meant to conduct amphibious assault missions, I think they are really a much more flexible force (arguably more so than CSGs) especially for MOOTW and humanitarian missions and low intensity contingencies. The question is whether the Navy will see those roles as a useful part of the job description for their ARGs, and if they do consider it as part of the job description, then how often should they be deployed for it and where should they be deployed.

Nobody including me said that ARGs are "only" meant to conduct amphibious assault missions. What I am saying is that if this exact mission does not exist as a possibility for the PLAN, then there is no reason for a structure like an ARG to exist, and it will therefore not exist. As long as there is such a possible mission for the PLAN, then it will exist, and it will also as a (side benefit) be available to conduct MOOTW. This is precisely because MOOTW is easily doable by forces other than ARGs; we have already seen the present-day PLAN perform many such operations without any need of ARGs at all. So while ARGs are variably useful, they will simply not exist, even as useful as they are, if they do not also have the principle mission of on-demand amphibious assault in their repertoire.

 

[Blitzo]

The elements required for the MOOTW scenarios that you specified are already present in a CSG except for one scenario, which could be filled by the presence of a LHD or an LPD attached to the CSG. Or it could even be filled by an anti-piracy task force that includes an LPD or an LHD that is independently operating in the ME area. Again, both of which preclude any need for an actual ARG to be present at any time in the ME/West Indian Ocean area.

I don't quite agree with carriers being able to perform by a CSG -- a carrier does provide some MOOTW capabilities via their helicopters, but they are unable to bring large amounts of supplies in one go like a ship to shore connector can (whether it be an LCAC or a LCU), not to mention engineering/construction vehicles and equipment, and medical facilities, which the ships of an ARG are able to do, and is quite important during disasters especially like hurricanes/typhoons or tsunamis where ports/docks are often heavily damaged or gone completely.
Not to mention a carrier's helicopter complement is generally more oriented for ASW, SAR and maybe carrying just a few transport helicopters, whereas MOOTW would require larger numbers of cargo carrying helicopters like airborne assault/transport helicopters that an LHD or LPD would tend to field.

And as I said in my last reply, I have no issue with the idea of deploying elements of an ARG alongside a CSG rather than an entire ARG.

Nobody including me said that ARGs are "only" meant to conduct amphibious assault missions. What I am saying is that if this exact mission does not exist as a possibility for the PLAN, then there is no reason for a structure like an ARG to exist, and it will therefore not exist. As long as there is such a possible mission for the PLAN, then it will exist, and it will also as a (side benefit) be available to conduct MOOTW. This is precisely because MOOTW is easily doable by forces other than ARGs; we have already seen the present-day PLAN perform many such operations without any need of ARGs at all. So while ARGs are variably useful, they will simply not exist, even as useful as they are, if they do not also have the principle mission of on-demand amphibious assault in their repertoire.

I never said that you claimed ARGs are only meant to conduct amphibious assault missions.

What I said was that they are not deployed with only amphibious assault missions in mind.


Obviously amphibious assault will be a mission that the Chinese Navy will want to be able to conduct and that is why they will eventually seek ARG like capabilities, but I think it should be acknowledged that the actual requirement for their future ARGs to conduct amphibious assault during peacetime is relatively low. So the question is what should do they do during peacetime when they are not doing actual amphibious assault, apart from training? What sort of deployments should they be looking to do, and what geopolitical and military purpose should they achieve during peacetime?

 

[Iron Man]

I don't quite agree with carriers being able to perform by a CSG -- a carrier does provide some MOOTW capabilities via their helicopters, but they are unable to bring large amounts of supplies in one go like a ship to shore connector can (whether it be an LCAC or a LCU), not to mention engineering/construction vehicles and equipment, and medical facilities, which the ships of an ARG are able to do, and is quite important during disasters especially like hurricanes/typhoons or tsunamis where ports/docks are often heavily damaged or gone completely.
Not to mention a carrier's helicopter complement is generally more oriented for ASW, SAR and maybe carrying just a few transport helicopters, whereas MOOTW would require larger numbers of cargo carrying helicopters like airborne assault/transport helicopters that an LHD or LPD would tend to field.

And as I said in my last reply, I have no issue with the idea of deploying elements of an ARG alongside a CSG rather than an entire ARG.

Well I think you're repping a requirement for an ARG that doesn't actually exist in order to set a high enough bar to fail a CSG. "Large amounts of supplies in one go" is not any kind of requirement anywhere for any disaster relief. I have absolutely no doubt whatever victim country of whatever disaster has in the past (and will in the future) appreciate any assistance provided, whether it's high volume at high speed or somewhat less volume at less speed. The USN has used both amphibious ships as well as carriers to provide exactly such disaster relief countless numbers of times already. I can confidently state not having done any research at all that no country has ever said to the USN: "what, you brought your carrier instead of your LHD??? Please GTFO and don't come back until you have the right tools to help us." The point is that while there is certainly a role for a CSG in almost any scenario in the ME, and while there may also be a role for a single LHD or LPD, there is no vital role for a full-on ARG in the ME that cannot already be filled by something else.

I never said that you claimed ARGs are only meant to conduct amphibious assault missions.

What I said was that they are not deployed with only amphibious assault missions in mind.


Obviously amphibious assault will be a mission that the Chinese Navy will want to be able to conduct and that is why they will eventually seek ARG like capabilities, but I think it should be acknowledged that the actual requirement for their future ARGs to conduct amphibious assault during peacetime is relatively low. So the question is what should do they do during peacetime when they are not doing actual amphibious assault, apart from training? What sort of deployments should they be looking to do, and what geopolitical and military purpose should they achieve during peacetime?

Well obviously MOOTW. Does that mean they need to have 2 active ARGs so that at least one of them can be on-station in the ME? No, certainly not. They don't need even a single ARG for this purpose. The purpose of an ARG is to be ready to hit an enemy beach on very short notice. If you are in peacetime, you still need to be ready to hit an enemy beach on short notice. Hitting enemy beaches is not anything an ARG needs to be able to do in the ME region, all of that potential action is right around China's periphery. For this reason whatever MOOTW a PLAN ARG does will be in the same areas. If the PLAN wants to perform MOOTW in the ME region, a lesser force, a CSG, an anti-piracy task force, anything other than a full-on ARG, can handle it. If a PLAN ARG happens to be in the ME to show the flag or perform some MOOTW or whatever, it would certainly be on an extremely short leash to steam back to near-Chinese waters (and it would certainly not include LSTs in its roster), unlike a ME-based CSG, which would certainly have a counterpart locally as well. I have consistently said in the past that I expect something like 6-7 CSGs for the PLAN with 2 CSGs on station at all times, something I certainly do not expect for ARGs because of the lack of need.