Event at the same cost, you’ll still need a lot more time and facilities to build two LSTs than one with a CIWS. I’d rather allocate these resources to surface combatants.
075 LHD thread
- Thread starter nosh
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Don't forget, there are a lot more mouths to feed during the peace time. 30 more captains, plus 600 more officers, are not cheap nowadays in China.
This is not how engagement math works.
Right analogy is Ukrainian MLRS salvoes in one certain conflict, or even Palestinian salvoes against Israel.
In either case, if AA is up and doesn't sleep, most incoming missiles are likely engaged and hit (which isn't the same as shot down btw).
Yet even one leaker - which often passes simply due to being obscured by debris, or being unverifiably unsuccessfully engaged, and other such stuff - leads to unacceptable consequences - kaboom in the first case, missiles falling on your civilians in the second one.
Given that landing ships are packed with humans and explosives themselves - both are true for you.
Right answer then is obviously to add in spaces and deck strengthening for modular CIWS installations.
Pretty much a standard approach for vessels with mobilization in mind.
You're talking about rockets which don't manoeuvre and can only hit fixed targets. That is why AA is so effective.
If an amphibious ship is already stationary, it means they're already reached the beach and only need minutes for the vehicles to drive off.
Then the ship can get moving again
But the Chinese Navy is facing slow subsonic antiship missiles. If detected at the radar horizon, there should be at least 3 full-length engagement cycles to occur from medium-range SAMs at a minimum.
But one of the benefits is that small landing ships like LSTs are more difficult targets. Plus they are unattractive targets because of how few people and vehicles they carry.
Then you need to add IFF, CEC or an engagement radar as well, plus potentially a CIC to manage everything.
And you have to be able to retrofit CIWS in a week and also have personnel already fully trained to do this.
But the point is that the RoRos are commercial ships (like hundreds of other cargo ships).
With the new increase in tensions and the increase likelihood that China would be drawn into an armed reunification in the coming months or years by the actions both of outsiders and the political landscape within China itself, I think that these vessels in particular and vessels like them in general will probably be receiving more and more investment, research, and development in the coming future. I'll be really interested to see what direction Chinese naval architects take these particular designs though. I think we might be seeing more of vessels similar to the type 075 that are built, more specifically, for landings and generating infantry and armored divisions on the beachhead in the event of a Taiwan contingency.
That does make me wonder, though, if there's a large need to keep pumping out more and more of these 075 vessels. These type 075 can generate both infantry forces on beachheads and support such landings with rotary airframes. That said, I can't help but think that this might be putting too many eggs in one basket. I am not exactly an expert at force design, so it's hard for me to say either way, but it does seem to me like China would be better served by creating vessels that are built more specifically for anti-submarine roles on one hand and for amphibious assault tasks on the other. Frigates and destroyers are capable of functioning as ASW platforms more effectively, are able to travel more quickly, and can also perform other tasks. Vessels that are built, specifically, to break beachheads like the type 072 seem more suited for the tasks of actually assaulting amphibiously, and are likely cheaper than the type 075 to boot. Does the type 075 still have a place in the PLA doctrine and will we see more of these vessels being built in the future to any significant scale? What do the people here think?
That does make me wonder, though, if there's a large need to keep pumping out more and more of these 075 vessels. These type 075 can generate both infantry forces on beachheads and support such landings with rotary airframes. That said, I can't help but think that this might be putting too many eggs in one basket. I am not exactly an expert at force design, so it's hard for me to say either way, but it does seem to me like China would be better served by creating vessels that are built more specifically for anti-submarine roles on one hand and for amphibious assault tasks on the other. Frigates and destroyers are capable of functioning as ASW platforms more effectively, are able to travel more quickly, and can also perform other tasks. Vessels that are built, specifically, to break beachheads like the type 072 seem more suited for the tasks of actually assaulting amphibiously, and are likely cheaper than the type 075 to boot. Does the type 075 still have a place in the PLA doctrine and will we see more of these vessels being built in the future to any significant scale? What do the people here think?
I am talking about probability theory.
It almost ensures that big salvoes will produce leakers. Furthermore, experience shows that actual combat conditions almost always give more leakers than expected - thus making individual last-line defenses for valuable ships essential.
They don't cost that much - if you apply US equipment prices, measure them against US weapons and systems, too.
They aren't engaging you in this case. Nor they're engaging a seriously networked unit - only unit that at some point obscures defender's line of sight, and adds complications that naval SAM systems don't really like.
Thus expect a way more messy situation.
Any landing ship heading towards invasion beachhead is an attractive target.
Not only it's full of war material - it is often that this material(pr person) represents something important for the whole landing, or some particular parts of it.
Simple self-defense unit is full plug-in.
And you won't be able to add CEC just like this.
HQ-10 is likely more attractive than Type-730 on LSTs and modified civilian ships. So your price estimate of $15 million is probably off as it's based on the assumption PLAN will use Type-730. Without the need for feeding/reloading/storage system of gun-based CIWS HQ-10 should have smaller footprint and easier to fit on civilian ships. It's probably cheaper to maintain (and store) as well since there are fewer moving parts. Look at Type 056, when there's only one CIWS, PLAN's choice is HQ-10 and not Type 730.
In any case, automated point defense is so radically different in both purpose and operation from additional air defense ships, I really don't see them as competitors. And when China is actually ready to land on Taiwan, spending additional few billion dollars on automated systems that require no additional crew to operate is just a no-brainer. I really don't see how this can be controversial.
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Yes, I'm thinking an 8-cell HQ-10 launcher for each 072A. With the recent transfer of the 056, PLAN should have 20 launchers at hand. Why waste them? Why not just use them to improve the 072A. PLAN so far has only 15 072As.
Because to make use of the HQ-10, you need to install proper air search radars to find incoming missiles so you can point the HQ-10 at their directions.
The original number is unchanged. 20 054A changed to 12 054A and 8 054B.