Why are we even talking about PLAN projecting power to distant shores and Chinese CVBG on permanent deployment in the Indian Ocean when PLAN doesn't even have local superiority in its home water yet?
History is full of incidences when great powers may not attain full military superiority in their own local region but have the capability to project power in blue water.
The European naval powers of past centuries all tussled with each other in the atlantic, mediterranean, while also projecting power abroad whether it was attacking each other's merchant fleets, protecting or creating colonies, etc.
Another example is the ROKN -- they are nowhere near having local naval supremacy in the western pacific -- they have JMSDF, PLAN and even ROCN all stuck in the same region, but ROKN is still seeking blue water power projection capability despite that.
Therefore, we can see that local naval supremacy is not a prerequisite for blue water power projection. There are few powers in history who have attained local naval supremacy before attaining blue water power projection -- the USN is possibly the only navy in recent history who can wholly make that claim, and that is a result of its geography and Canada and Mexico's friendliness to the USA.
When foreign warships can't routinely cruise close to Chinese shores, can't routinely disrupt PLAN exercises, maybe then we can talking about PLAN projecting power. Forward deploying a squadron that doesn't have overwhelming superiority over the opposition doesn't deter, it just becomes a target. Think Prince of Wales and Repulse, think German East Asia Squadron.
I disagree that local naval superiority is a prerequisite for blue water power projection. It is preferable, but geography simply makes that an untenable proposal -- because for China to obtain local naval superiority over pacific USN+JMSDF+ROKN+ROCN+SCS navies before trying to aim for a blue water navy, they would need a navy larger than the entire USN.
If China concentrated all its naval forces at home, it would leave their SLOCs wide open and literally defenseless to state actors.
The only logical route is therefore to sensibly balance their local defenses with as comprehensive a blue water force as they can.
I agree that forward deploying a force without overwhelming superiority may not deter a comprehensive attack by a highly competent foe -- and in this case, a forward deployed PLAN CVBG's only real threat would really just be the USN. (In which case, a USN attack on a PLAN taskgroup would mean something close to WWIII anyway)
Even if a PLAN forward deployed naval group is somewhat vulnerable, that forward deployed presence may be changed according to the threat level.
But that doesn't mean the PLAN can afford to leave their SLOCs undefended during peacetime, or leave their interests in africa be left without a close naval force in case things go south.
(And by 2030, the balance of power in the western pacific should only be more in china's favour anyway)
Also, note that not all of China's potential foes may be the USN+JMSDF. That is to say, other weaker foes may seek to attack chinese shipping and chinese interests as well, so the PRC should naturally be ready for such contingencies especially as China increases its investments in africa and becomes more embedded in global sea trade.
PLAN major combat assets should be concentrated in home water. Train, build up capabilities, achieve local superiority, that's how you deter aggression. Forward deployments should be carried out with self sufficient ships, attract the maximum attention with the minimum resources, tie down as much oppositional resources as possible to help the home fleets gain local superiority.
Simply concentrating forces in your local region is not a viable strategy if your distant SLOCs are vulnerable to attack.
You may deter local aggression, but you'll invite aggression to your more distant points of weakness.
You see PLAN forward deployments as a means to tie down enemy resources so China has a more favourable force balance in a localized westpac conflict.
I see PLAN forward deployments as a protective, stabilizing force during peacetime, and during crises they act as a ready intervention/deterrence force. During a full scale conflict with a near peer state actor, forward deployed naval forces will certainly be vulnerable, but will also have the capacity to give the PRC more military options and to draw the enemy beyond China's shores.
Furthermore, in the PRC's westpac doctrine I see PLAAF and 2nd artillery as arguably more important than the PLAN, so in future they can spare a CVBG for blue water actions anyway.
Note: this entire scenario is one where the PLAN have a force of 5 carriers, associated escorts, and a similarly proportional number of amphibious assault ships.
Unless something goes really wrong with the PRC economy or the PLAN has a dramatic shift in mission, I see a forward deployed PLAN as inevitable.
With their economic interests and shipping/energy vulnerabilities in the west indian ocean region, I don't understand how anyone can think they
wouldn't seek to deploy a permanent naval presence to guard them.
It actually isn't too different to what they're currently doing.
They've had at least 2 DDG/FFGs + 1 AOR in the gulf of aden permanently for the better side of three, four years now.
What I'm suggesting is simply that they double that force and add on a carrier and an SSN.
Considering how large the PLAN is projected to grow in coming years, such an idea is hardly preposterous, especially if we consider how small the PLAN was just four years ago when they started their anti piracy mission.
Heck, with their naval growth in the last few years, they now probably have the capacity to send four surface combatants and 2 AORs there if they really want to.
By 2030 they should be able to manage a carrier, four DDG/FFGs, 1-2 AORs, and an SSN without much sweat.
