055 DDG Large Destroyer Thread

[Blitzo]

One of your claims about the benefits of carriers was that they provided more endurance/range for a sensor platform at extended distances from the mainland, but as others have also pointed out, the cost/benefit math just doesn't work out for you. Carriers would hardly even be expected to perform CAP for land-based assets anyway, unless under very unusual circumstances. This is simply not any kind of "benefit" of carriers worth mentioning.

I don't think anyone has demonstrated that the cost/benefit doesn't work out. At best I think we can say that the cost/benefit is under contest and would vary depending on how much we interpret differing aspects of China's strategic as well as operational priorities.

A contingency is not a use. Your deployment pattern would have carriers sitting at pierside with nothing to do for significant periods of time, waiting for a worst-possible case scenario/contingency that will almost certainly never arrive. Meanwhile what does the crew do? Do you have to pay them and house them in barracks near the docks? I'm not sure if you know this but I have mentioned before that "surgeable" for the USN means a carrier is ready to sail in under 30 days, while for you it sounds like surgeable is far more compressed a timeline than that. Maintaining a higher state of readiness invariably means more money. And of course it's not just the carrier, but also all the escorts and the replenishment ship that need to be ready to go at a moment's notice, but are really doing nothing more than sailing either a short jaunt in the near seas or even worse, doing literally nothing at all, and all the time being maintained at a high level of readiness for a worst-case scenario. You have also not delineated whether maintenance for a shorter deployment is significantly less cumbersome or time-consuming than for a longer deployment. That is why you need to make more than just a "proposal" because these claims are in my view outlandish and out of the normal experience of carrier operations. Carriers throughout history get used for deployments, they don't wait around at pierside for "contingencies".

Let's put it this way, I do believe that having the majority of the carriers remain at home is a sensible strategy, and that is contingent upon a number of premises being true, including but not limited to that a near seas deployment pattern like what I described will result in a significantly shorter maintenance period for each short deployment or being able to maintain near seas surge readiness, relative to if they were seeking to be able to do near seas surge readiness while oriented with a peacetime blue water deployment pattern.

Come one, let's be honest, you don't really have any details beyond simply claiming that you think you your "proposed peacetime deployment pattern is the most effective use of resources", to speak nothing of discussing the extent of any details. I mean, literally you don't have anything more than this statement.

I could come up with some speculative/hypothetical scenarios with the premises for why certain decisions would be done, but you'd really be asking me to pump out an imaginative battle plan to a significant level of detail.

We'd also have to be able to know what the details of alternative peacetime deployment patterns are, if we are to compare the effectiveness of my deployment plan in terms of use of resources. Simply put, it's near impossible to do with the use of my resources.
However, despite that, I think I do not need to produce anywhere near the level of detail you are requesting for because I think the premises of my argument are not hard to logically stomach.


If you're really serious about this, then we could try to break down the basis of the positions in terms of various premises, like how much we think China should prioritize near seas contingency versus blue water contingency, how much we think the cost of one deployment pattern will be versus another for their primary contingency versus their secondary contingency, how we think the opportunity cost of seeking carriers for a contingency might take a chunk out of the other military capabilities of the Chinese military and the consequences of that -- and even to talk about just one of these fairly basic questions in any great depth would be essay or even thesis worthy by itself, to talk about all of them with the level of detail they deserve we'd need something like a year or two as a paid analyst at RAND or something.

I didn't say it's unreasonable, I said the COMPARISON is unreasonable. Just because you are scaling up on a similar relative level in terms of tonnage doesn't mean the analogy necessarily extends from one size to another. Costs don't necessarily scale from one size to another, even for the PLAN. And yes absolute numbers DO in fact matter for the very reason that few navies build ships in the kinds of numbers that we're throwing around. I have no idea why you think this is some kind of disqualifier when in fact it is a major part of the reason the comparisons don't even remotely translate.

I agree that the analogy doesn't necessarily extend from one size to another, but I think one could make an argument that it does.
That is to say, I personally wouldn't choose such an argument to push forward as "definitely true" but I do see some merits and flaws in such a comparison.

I brought up the Perrys and the LCS program to demonstrate that it wasn't the intent of the USN to go mostly heavy in the last decade, and that yes it has only been a recent phenomenon.

Whether the USN intended to go mostly heavy in the last decade is immaterial to the discussion. The point is that the USN has become a very unreasonable orbat yet it appears to be generally accepted by commentators and observers (more on this below).

So basically you are comparing your OrBat to a ridiculous OrBat and saying "look it's less ridiculous than that OrBat". Therefore what? Your structure is awesome, or reasonable, or rational? No, it's simply less ridiculous, it doesn't somehow become the opposite of ridiculous just because it's less so. That's essentially identical to comparing your child to a mentally retarded child and saying "see, my boy is less retarded than that kid, so my boy must be a genius". No, he's just less retarded; nothing further can be implied. Sorry, you got nothing here. You really shouldn't have compared your OrBat to the USN OrBat and then claim that you actually come out of the comparison on top somehow. It's a rather low bar and you're really not saying much here.

I'm alright with such logic from you, if you also agree that the USN's recent and present orbat is very ridiculous, outlandish and basically more ridiculous than what lethe and I have proposed for the 055's proportion within the Chinese Navy's orbat.

 

[Iron Man]

I don't think anyone has demonstrated that the cost/benefit doesn't work out. At best I think we can say that the cost/benefit is under contest and would vary depending on how much we interpret differing aspects of China's strategic as well as operational priorities.

Oh come one, you could even just do some basic gorilla math and you would realize there is no comparison between more fighters and a carrier.

Here's some gorilla math for a CSG:
1x Nimitz carrier: $4.5 billion
48x F/A-18E/Fs: $4.7 billion
5x E/A-18Gs: $0.341 billion
4x E-2Cs: $0.704 billion
2x C-2s: $0.080 billion
8x MH-60S: $0.225 billion
11x MH-60R: $0.472 billion
1x Ticonderoga cruiser: $1.1 billion
2x Arleigh Burke destroyers: $3.6 billion
1x Virginia SSN: $2.7 billion
1x Henry J. Kaiser AOR: $0.2 billion
total cost = $18.622 billion
Let's just totally ignore the crew, maintenance, and fuel costs, which would skew the cost even more against you.
Note that this is the bare minimum escort force that a carrier would travel with.

For that same price you can purchase 180 F/A-18E/Fs and 2 full squadrons of 24 KC-135 tankers, with some spare change left over. Note that all this is ON TOP of the already available land-based fighters and tankers that could provide escort to this notional sensor platform flying at 500km from shore. Note that missiles from either the Tico or the ABs would not be able to provide cover for your sensor platform unless it chose to fly a tight pattern right around the location of the CSG, so for the purposes of this sensor platform the rest of the relatively massive CSG costs are essentially useless dead weight. So if what I wanted was to escort a sensor platform at 500km distance from shore, would I want to spend extra money on a CSG or 180 more fighters and 24 more tankers? The answer is unambiguous here.

According to Global Security, the combat endurance of an F/A-18E/F fitted for maritime air superiority (6x AAMs + 3x 480gal drop tanks) at 150nm/278km is 2 hours and 15 minutes. In order for the math to work in your favor you have to somehow believe that 48 fighters with 3 drop tanks each and no tankers is going to outlast 180 fighters with 3 drop tanks but also with 24 tankers, by 3.75 times longer (180/48), just because of the fact that the land-based fighters have to fly 1,000-556=444km further out from shore and back than the naval fighters have to fly out from the carrier and back. Unfortunately for you 444km is less than 24 minutes of flight time at mach 0.9, giving the land-based fighter an endurance of 1 hour and 51 minutes at 500km from shore. And there's 3.75 times more of them than there are of the naval fighters available, and that's not even including all the tankers. Sorry, but the math just doesn't work out for you at all. In fact any comparison of fighters that gives you greater than 135/111= 1.22 ratio in prices is going to favor the land-based option. That means for a 48-fighter naval air wing, I only need 59 land-based fighters to have the same endurance @ 500km as the naval air wing. Can you buy a carrier with 11 fighters?

Let's put it this way, I do believe that having the majority of the carriers remain at home is a sensible strategy, and that is contingent upon a number of premises being true, including but not limited to that a near seas deployment pattern like what I described will result in a significantly shorter maintenance period for each short deployment or being able to maintain near seas surge readiness, relative to if they were seeking to be able to do near seas surge readiness while oriented with a peacetime blue water deployment pattern.

But all you have is a belief with nothing to back it up with. Not even a semblance of an attempt.

I could come up with some speculative/hypothetical scenarios with the premises for why certain decisions would be done, but you'd really be asking me to pump out an imaginative battle plan to a significant level of detail.

We'd also have to be able to know what the details of alternative peacetime deployment patterns are, if we are to compare the effectiveness of my deployment plan in terms of use of resources. Simply put, it's near impossible to do with the use of my resources.
However, despite that, I think I do not need to produce anywhere near the level of detail you are requesting for because I think the premises of my argument are not hard to logically stomach.

If you're really serious about this, then we could try to break down the basis of the positions in terms of various premises, like how much we think China should prioritize near seas contingency versus blue water contingency, how much we think the cost of one deployment pattern will be versus another for their primary contingency versus their secondary contingency, how we think the opportunity cost of seeking carriers for a contingency might take a chunk out of the other military capabilities of the Chinese military and the consequences of that -- and even to talk about just one of these fairly basic questions in any great depth would be essay or even thesis worthy by itself, to talk about all of them with the level of detail they deserve we'd need something like a year or two as a paid analyst at RAND or something.

But you have yet to come up with ANYTHING. Here's you so far: "I believe short (or no) deployments are worthwhile reasons to spend billions and billions on carriers just for them to wait for possible contingencies". That's it. No other navies have to justify why they are keeping their carriers in port, mainly because they're not in port. They are deployed. So you are alone here. There is no navy that acts like you are proposing the PLAN to act. None. Maybe you can name one other navy in history that as a matter of policy routinely kept its carriers from deployment just to wait for a catastrophic contingency. Maybe I haven't been thinking of all the possible navies that had carriers that could have acted this way. Prove me wrong.

I agree that the analogy doesn't necessarily extend from one size to another, but I think one could make an argument that it does.
That is to say, I personally wouldn't choose such an argument to push forward as "definitely true" but I do see some merits and flaws in such a comparison.

I think you have been trying to make one, but I don't agree that you have successfully made one so far.

Whether the USN intended to go mostly heavy in the last decade is immaterial to the discussion. The point is that the USN has become a very unreasonable orbat yet it appears to be generally accepted by commentators and observers (more on this below).

I'm alright with such logic from you, if you also agree that the USN's recent and present orbat is very ridiculous, outlandish and basically more ridiculous than what lethe and I have proposed for the 055's proportion within the Chinese Navy's orbat.

Yes, quite. But just note that the more outlandish you portray the USN's current force structure, the deeper the cesspool you have to dig your and Lethe's PLAN force structure out of, since you made the comparison.

 

[Blitzo]

Oh come one, you could even just do some basic gorilla math and you would realize there is no comparison between more fighters and a carrier.

Here's some gorilla math for a CSG:
1x Nimitz carrier: $4.5 billion
48x F/A-18E/Fs: $4.7 billion
5x E/A-18Gs: $0.341 billion
4x E-2Cs: $0.704 billion
2x C-2s: $0.080 billion
8x MH-60S: $0.225 billion
11x MH-60R: $0.472 billion
1x Ticonderoga cruiser: $1.1 billion
2x Arleigh Burke destroyers: $3.6 billion
1x Virginia SSN: $2.7 billion
1x Henry J. Kaiser AOR: $0.2 billion
total cost = $18.622 billion
Let's just totally ignore the crew, maintenance, and fuel costs, which would skew the cost even more against you.
Note that this is the bare minimum escort force that a carrier would travel with.

For that same price you can purchase 180 F/A-18E/Fs and 2 full squadrons of 24 KC-135 tankers, with some spare change left over. Note that all this is ON TOP of the already available land-based fighters and tankers that could provide escort to this notional sensor platform flying at 500km from shore. Note that missiles from either the Tico or the ABs would not be able to provide cover for your sensor platform unless it chose to fly a tight pattern right around the location of the CSG, so for the purposes of this sensor platform the rest of the relatively massive CSG costs are essentially useless dead weight. So if what I wanted was to escort a sensor platform at 500km distance from shore, would I want to spend extra money on a CSG or 180 more fighters and 24 more tankers? The answer is unambiguous here.

According to Global Security, the combat endurance of an F/A-18E/F fitted for maritime air superiority (6x AAMs + 3x 480gal drop tanks) at 150nm/278km is 2 hours and 15 minutes. In order for the math to work in your favor you have to somehow believe that 48 fighters with 3 drop tanks each and no tankers is going to outlast 180 fighters with 3 drop tanks but also with 24 tankers, by 3.75 times longer (180/48), just because of the fact that the land-based fighters have to fly 1,000-556=444km further out from shore and back than the naval fighters have to fly out from the carrier and back. Unfortunately for you 444km is less than 24 minutes of flight time at mach 0.9, giving the land-based fighter an endurance of 1 hour and 51 minutes at 500km from shore. And there's 3.75 times more of them than there are of the naval fighters available, and that's not even including all the tankers. Sorry, but the math just doesn't work out for you at all. In fact any comparison of fighters that gives you greater than 135/111= 1.22 ratio in prices is going to favor the land-based option. That means for a 48-fighter naval air wing, I only need 59 land-based fighters to have the same endurance @ 500km as the naval air wing. Can you buy a carrier with 11 fighters?

I give you much credit for taking the time to do the maths, but your analysis rests on a few flawed premises.

The way you write, makes it sound like it is a question of only land based fighters versus carriers in terms of the utility of a near seas war. However, the question is less about how only land based fighters (with tankers) compare with carriers in a near seas war (or indeed what you describe in a much more specific role -- escorting MPAs at a given distance), but rather how the Chinese Navy will look to deploy its six available carriers during peacetime most effectively. In other words, for this mental exercise the carriers themselves are already there, they've already bought them and they already have them, the question is how best to deploy them given the strategic priorities that China faces?

Secondly, if we were to compare land based fighters and carriers only in the specific sense... About your maths -- the two numbers of interest for this specific example should be looking at what the endurance of a land based fighter is, when operating at a 500km combat radius, compared with what the number of interest is for a land based fighter operating at a substantailly lower combat radius of let's say a few dozen km, considering the carrier is already sailing at the 500km area of interest away from the mainland. In other words, the question should be what is the endurance of a fighter launched from a carrier operating at say a combat radius of 48km is, versus a fighter from land operating at a combat radius of 500km. If we want to talk about the endurance of a carrier based aircraft operating at a combat radius of 500km, then we should talk about what the endurance of a land based aircraft is operating at 500km+500km is. Of course, that entails certain differences in geographic flexibility as a 1000km combat radius from a land base as a greater area that it can potentially cover if they so wish compared to a fighter operating at a 500km radius at a carrier that's operating at 500km from the mainland, but seeing as we're talking about escorting an MPA/providing air control for an MPA to operate in, then we're talking about a rather well delineated area of operations anyway.

Thirdly, the purpose of the carrier isn't just to escort a sensor platform out to 500km. That was one role put forward as an example. Other roles include providing its own organic ISR and AEW&C capabilities some of which can be a greater endurance/distance than what can be achieved from the mainland. It also provides a greater reach of combat aviation power beyond what can be achieved from the mainland as well as providing organic air defence and faster reaction air-to-maritime strike capability for the naval task group as well which land based fighters cannot provide as effectively at long distances. Then there is also the naval role of a carrier and its escorts in providing sea control which land based aircraft also have the ability to fulfill to a degree but again it depends on how effective utilizing them in that role will be. I believe it is the totality of being able to fulfill all of those functions which may mean carriers will be a useful if not critical asset in China's near seas warfighting strategy of the medium term.

But all you have is a belief with nothing to back it up with. Not even a semblance of an attempt.

I know that even making an attempt will lead to a whole trail of debate and counter debate about all the individual premises and logical divergences that we will make, whether it's about the context in which certain numbers may apply or whether it's about what we determine to be China's strategic priorities. Every detail will basically be fair game to contest and know both of us we will both contest them.

In the end the conclusion will just be one of agreeing to disagree again after another 20 or 30 pages.

So I can't say I'm super keen on getting lost in the details.

But you have yet to come up with ANYTHING. Here's you so far: "I believe short (or no) deployments are worthwhile reasons to spend billions and billions on carriers just for them to wait for possible contingencies". That's it. No other navies have to justify why they are keeping their carriers in port, mainly because they're not in port. They are deployed. So you are alone here. There is no navy that acts like you are proposing the PLAN to act. None. Maybe you can name one other navy in history that as a matter of policy routinely kept its carriers from deployment just to wait for a catastrophic contingency. Maybe I haven't been thinking of all the possible navies that had carriers that could have acted this way. Prove me wrong.

Actually, this is me so far: "I believe a near seas deployment pattern during peacetime for the carriers that China will have, is more appropriate given China's strategic priorities in the medium to long term, than a blue water deployment pattern."

The two questions that should immediately arise from this, are:
1) what do we think China's strategic priorities will be
2) based on 1), how many carriers will China have at this period in time, as well as what does the rest of China's force structure look like (land based aviation, missile forces, etc)

Then from there, if we can agree on 1 and 2, then we can consider talking in more detail about how a near seas deployment pattern may compare to a blue water deployment pattern in terms of being able to achieve 1).



As for no navies -- well, there is no navy that will face quite a similar peacetime strategic and geopolitical situation that China will face in the medium term, unless we want to go back to the age before carriers and aircraft.

I think you have been trying to make one, but I don't agree that you have successfully made one so far.

There are very few cases where I would argue something is "definitely true," and I definitely am not suggesting such a comparison is "definitely true" (or "definitely logical"/fully logical) in this case.

Yes, quite. But just note that the more outlandish you portray the USN's current force structure, the deeper the cesspool you have to dig your and Lethe's PLAN force structure out of, since you made the comparison.

That depends on how much less ridiculous you and I think the Chinese Navy's force structure is relative to that of the USN. You seem to think it is only a little bit less ridiculous whereas I think it is substantially less ridiculous and in fact quite reasonable.

 

[AndrewS]

I think it is conclusive that for the cost of a carrier strike group, you can get more than 3x the number of land-based fighters (supported by tankers) on station at a range of 1000km, which is pretty much all of the First Island Chain.

So why bother deploying carriers inside this area?

In peacetime, they are better deployed far away, eg. Pacific Ocean or Indian Ocean. It would only take them 2weeks maximum to redepoly to any contingency anyway

 

[Blitzo]

I think it is conclusive that for the cost of a carrier strike group, you can get more than 3x the number of land-based fighters (supported by tankers) on station at a range of 1000km, which is pretty much all of the First Island Chain.

You mean a combat radius of 1000km? I don't think that has been conclusively demonstrated at all, and especially if we're talking about cumulative time on station at a given area of operations.
Such a comparison is also only comparing a rather specific operational requirement, that of conducting escort of land based MPA/ISR platforms and/or CAP, it does not include the many other sea control, sea surveillance, and air surveillance capabilities that the entirety of a carrier strike group (including its escorts not only its air wing) is capable of conducting which land based aircraft do not fulfill in the same manner.

So why bother deploying carriers inside this area?

In peacetime, they are better deployed far away, eg. Pacific Ocean or Indian Ocean. It would only take them 2weeks maximum to redepoly to any contingency anyway

Because I think carriers would allow a combination of sea control and air control and extending the defensive perimeter around China more further and with greater presence than could only be achieved with land based fighters.
A high intensity war for China in the near seas will involve naval, air and missile domains primarily. They will all have to operate together.
And I see China's priority as being able to completely dominate the immediate near seas (let's say up to 500km from China's coast) and to have the ability to contest the more distant near seas (let's say over 500km to around 1000km) from China's coast, and in both distances China will face a combination of opposing land based air power, naval power, carrier based air power, and likely land based missile power as well.
When operating closer to China's near seas they can rely more on land based fighters, but the further out you get the more scarce your land based fighters become in terms of cumulative endurance and time on station.


As for peacetime deployments, that is a matter of strategic priority. I consider the chief strategic priority for China to be able to respond with rapid and overwhelming force in a near seas contingency, while having a peacetime blue water presence that can be enhanced if the contingency arises. IMO the priority is with being able to respond to a near seas contingency but I envision them as being able to respond to a blue water contingency as well if it arises, it just means the response won't be as immediate as if they had two blue water deployed carriers continuously at sea.
In such a comparison, the issue of fighters versus carriers doesn't really come up because in this case the navy already has its six available carriers, so the issue is to seek what the best way to deploy those already existing assets are rather than what the opportunity cost of different procurement (i.e, buy one CSG versus buy 180 fighters and associated tankers or something).

Therefore, it becomes a simple question of strategic priority if one is able to agree on the maintenance and crewing requirements between the two deployment patterns -- do you want to have two carriers at sea continuously during peacetime which allows for more peacetime blue water presence and ability to immediately respond to blue water contingencies, with only four carriers at home of which up to two can be rapidly surged to operate in the near seas and where your two other at sea carriers have to make the potentially hazardous trip home if they want to take part in a near seas war... or do you want to have only one carrier at sea continuously during peacetime which allows for more limited peacetime blue water presence and more limited ability to immediately respond to blue water contingencies, but with five carriers at home of which at least three can potentially be surged to operate in the near seas and where your other at sea carrier will also have to make the potentially hazardous trip home to take part in the near seas war.

 

[latenlazy]

This discussion is becoming more complicated than it needs to be. Modern carriers are portable air bases. If there's a need for portable air bases then there's a need for carrier groups. The US has air bases all around East Asia, and even then it feels the need to station two or three carrier groups in the region at all times, and this is during peace time. This is very straight forward. If China wants to effectively contest the first island chain, short of acquiring its own air bases around all parts of the chain, it will need aircraft carriers.

 

[Iron Man]

I give you much credit for taking the time to do the maths, but your analysis rests on a few flawed premises.

The way you write, makes it sound like it is a question of only land based fighters versus carriers in terms of the utility of a near seas war. However, the question is less about how only land based fighters (with tankers) compare with carriers in a near seas war (or indeed what you describe in a much more specific role -- escorting MPAs at a given distance), but rather how the Chinese Navy will look to deploy its six available carriers during peacetime most effectively. In other words, for this mental exercise the carriers themselves are already there, they've already bought them and they already have them, the question is how best to deploy them given the strategic priorities that China faces?

I don't know what you're talking about "it is a question of only land based fighters versus carriers in terms of the utility of a near seas war". Don't muddy the waters here. Here we are specifically talking about escorting a sensor platform at 500km from shore, something which YOU brought up as a benefit of carriers over land-based fighters.

Secondly, if we were to compare land based fighters and carriers only in the specific sense... About your maths -- the two numbers of interest for this specific example should be looking at what the endurance of a land based fighter is, when operating at a 500km combat radius, compared with what the number of interest is for a land based fighter operating at a substantailly lower combat radius of let's say a few dozen km, considering the carrier is already sailing at the 500km area of interest away from the mainland. In other words, the question should be what is the endurance of a fighter launched from a carrier operating at say a combat radius of 48km is, versus a fighter from land operating at a combat radius of 500km. If we want to talk about the endurance of a carrier based aircraft operating at a combat radius of 500km, then we should talk about what the endurance of a land based aircraft is operating at 500km+500km is. Of course, that entails certain differences in geographic flexibility as a 1000km combat radius from a land base as a greater area that it can potentially cover if they so wish compared to a fighter operating at a 500km radius at a carrier that's operating at 500km from the mainland, but seeing as we're talking about escorting an MPA/providing air control for an MPA to operate in, then we're talking about a rather well delineated area of operations anyway.

Yes, let's compare land based fighters and carriers in the specific sense of escorting a sensor platform at 500km from shore, since that was a scenario that you brought up. Now I see you want to muddy the waters some more with a sensor platform that does not fly a typical coverage route but rather is winding its way around and around the CSG tighter than a boa constrictor around a goat so that fighters only have to fly out 48km(!) to escort this sensor platform. LOL why so specific a number like "48" km? Why not 50? Or 100? Or 0? And why should we talk about this queer scenario, except that you just want to randomly throw out all kinds of new scenarios that favor your CSG rather than the scenario which you originally envisioned, since it's obvious that one didn't work out for you? It doesn't even remotely help you anyway. "48km" operating distance gets you only a net decrease in total distance traveled to/from of 460km. That's less than 25min at mach 0.9, translating into only a few additional land-based fighters needed to provide the same endurance. And now I see you also want to talk about "500km+500km" LOLOLOL Why not just say "1,000km", except that you want to make it somehow appear remotely relevant to your original scenario of 500km? Now you want to double the distance of this sensor platform to make it more favorable for your CSG, forgetting that no sensor platform out there in the world has a range of 1,000km detection distance meaning there would be massive gaps in detection from shore to several hundred km out. And now you've also just doubled or even tripled your coverage requirements if you want to plug those gaps with sensors flying closer to shore. In that case yes I admit defeat, if you want to queerly have a sensor platform fly out to 1,000km from shore for some queer reason that you want to protect that badly, then you should probably just have an entire CSG dedicated to that one sensor platform. LOL Or maybe you should just use the CSG's sensor platform.

Thirdly, the purpose of the carrier isn't just to escort a sensor platform out to 500km. That was one role put forward as an example. Other roles include providing its own organic ISR and AEW&C capabilities some of which can be a greater endurance/distance than what can be achieved from the mainland. It also provides a greater reach of combat aviation power beyond what can be achieved from the mainland as well as providing organic air defence and faster reaction air-to-maritime strike capability for the naval task group as well which land based fighters cannot provide as effectively at long distances. Then there is also the naval role of a carrier and its escorts in providing sea control which land based aircraft also have the ability to fulfill to a degree but again it depends on how effective utilizing them in that role will be. I believe it is the totality of being able to fulfill all of those functions which may mean carriers will be a useful if not critical asset in China's near seas warfighting strategy of the medium term.

Umm, no. The purpose of a carrier ISN'T AT ALL to escort a sensor platform out to 500km. That was one role put forward as an "example" by you, but which has now been thoroughly repudiated by the numbers.

I know that even making an attempt will lead to a whole trail of debate and counter debate about all the individual premises and logical divergences that we will make, whether it's about the context in which certain numbers may apply or whether it's about what we determine to be China's strategic priorities. Every detail will basically be fair game to contest and know both of us we will both contest them.

In the end the conclusion will just be one of agreeing to disagree again after another 20 or 30 pages.

So I can't say I'm super keen on getting lost in the details.

Try. It's not that hard, since we don't need to muddy the waters with the whys, but only the hows.

Actually, this is me so far: "I believe a near seas deployment pattern during peacetime for the carriers that China will have, is more appropriate given China's strategic priorities in the medium to long term, than a blue water deployment pattern."

The two questions that should immediately arise from this, are:
1) what do we think China's strategic priorities will be
2) based on 1), how many carriers will China have at this period in time, as well as what does the rest of China's force structure look like (land based aviation, missile forces, etc)

Then from there, if we can agree on 1 and 2, then we can consider talking in more detail about how a near seas deployment pattern may compare to a blue water deployment pattern in terms of being able to achieve 1).

Again, no need to get into the whys of a deployment pattern, I just want to know if you can even remotely justify the HOW of your "unique" deployment pattern, unknown to the rest of the world until a few days ago.

As for no navies -- well, there is no navy that will face quite a similar peacetime strategic and geopolitical situation that China will face in the medium term, unless we want to go back to the age before carriers and aircraft.

That's a cop out, since Lethe specifically referenced supposedly relevant comparisons to Europe, Australia, etc. Now you're essentially saying yes the size transition is somehow a relevant comparison but the numbers, well let's just not go there.

There are very few cases where I would argue something is "definitely true," and I definitely am not suggesting such a comparison is "definitely true" (or "definitely logical"/fully logical) in this case.

Ummm..... what? Never mind LOL

That depends on how much less ridiculous you and I think the Chinese Navy's force structure is relative to that of the USN. You seem to think it is only a little bit less ridiculous whereas I think it is substantially less ridiculous and in fact quite reasonable.

LOL then why even make the comparison in the first place, since it's obvious you are now trying as hard as possible to distance your force structure from that of the USN's as much as possible?

 

[Iron Man]

This discussion is becoming more complicated than it needs to be. Modern carriers are portable air bases. If there's a need for portable air bases then there's a need for carrier groups. The US has air bases all around East Asia, and even then it feels the need to station two or three carrier groups in the region at all times, and this is during peace time. This is very straight forward. If China wants to effectively contest the first island chain, short of acquiring its own air bases around all parts of the chain, it will need aircraft carriers.

Uhh, no. You are talking about something completely different. Nobody disagrees that China needs carriers to accomplish any major strategic military goals in the future, including "effectively contesting the first island chain", but OTOH that is not even remotely what Bltizo and I are talking about. We are talking about the best use of Chinese carriers as reflected by their future deployment patterns.

 

[latenlazy]

Uhh, no. You are talking about something completely different. Nobody disagrees that China needs carriers to accomplish any major strategic military goals in the future, including "effectively contesting the first island chain", but OTOH that is not even remotely what Bltizo and I are talking about. We are talking about the best use of Chinese carriers as reflected by their future deployment patterns.

My response covers deployment patterns.

 

[Blitzo]

I don't know what you're talking about "it is a question of only land based fighters versus carriers in terms of the utility of a near seas war". Don't muddy the waters here. Here we are specifically talking about escorting a sensor platform at 500km from shore, something which YOU brought up as a benefit of carriers over land-based fighters.

The waters were pretty indistinct to begin with...

Even a few pages back, I made the point to say:

Yes, the combat radius of J-11B and other flankers and J-20s and even J-10s in some configurations is quite impressive yes, but I do not think escorting an MPA is enough, optimally you would have the ability to patrol airspace independent of your escorted MPA and optimally to be able to contest or control a volume of airspace beyond which your vulnerable (even if escorted) MPA is patrolling.

and to say:

Fortunately, my description of a carrier's utility in a high intensity near seas contingency is not limited only to using a carrier force to escort an MPA. In fact I think "escorting" MPAs isn't even an accurate descriptionfor what I envision, as it is more about being able to attain air superiority and control and being able to contest airspace at greater distances from China's coast than what land based aircraft alone can provide.

You're the one who interpreted my statement to only mean literally escorting an MPA across 500km despite the fact that I said the role of a carrier in relation to an MPA's patrol is not quite literally just escorting an MPA.

Yes, let's compare land based fighters and carriers in the specific sense of escorting a sensor platform at 500km from shore, since that was a scenario that you brought up. Now I see you want to muddy the waters some more with a sensor platform that does not fly a typical coverage route but rather is winding its way around and around the CSG tighter than a boa constrictor around a goat so that fighters only have to fly out 48km(!) to escort this sensor platform. LOL why so specific a number like "48" km? Why not 50? Or 100? Or 0? And why should we talk about this queer scenario, except that you just want to randomly throw out all kinds of new scenarios that favor your CSG rather than the scenario which you originally envisioned, since it's obvious that one didn't work out for you? It doesn't even remotely help you anyway. "48km" operating distance gets you only a net decrease in total distance traveled to/from of 460km. That's less than 25min at mach 0.9, translating into only a few additional land-based fighters needed to provide the same endurance. And now I see you also want to talk about "500km+500km" LOLOLOL Why not just say "1,000km", except that you want to make it somehow appear remotely relevant to your original scenario of 500km? Now you want to double the distance of this sensor platform to make it more favorable for your CSG, forgetting that no sensor platform out there in the world has a range of 1,000km detection distance meaning there would be massive gaps in detection from shore to several hundred km out. And now you've also just doubled or even tripled your coverage requirements if you want to plug those gaps with sensors flying closer to shore. In that case yes I admit defeat, if you want to queerly have a sensor platform fly out to 1,000km from shore for some queer reason that you want to protect that badly, then you should probably just have an entire CSG dedicated to that one sensor platform. LOL Or maybe you should just use the CSG's sensor platform.

See above

Umm, no. The purpose of a carrier ISN'T AT ALL to escort a sensor platform out to 500km. That was one role put forward as an "example" by you, but which has now been thoroughly repudiated by the numbers.

I've suggested it as a role for a carrier, I don't think I described it as "the purpose" of a carrier.

Try. It's not that hard, since we don't need to muddy the waters with the whys, but only the hows.

Again, no need to get into the whys of a deployment pattern, I just want to know if you can even remotely justify the HOW of your "unique" deployment pattern, unknown to the rest of the world until a few days ago.

When deploying only one carrier out at sea continuously in blue water, with five carriers left home at port for maintenance, training, and occasional short duration near seas patrols, I believe would allow for a greater surge capability of carriers during a near seas contingency, versus when deploying two carriers out at sea continuously with four carriers left at home at port for maintenance and training.

That's my argument, where the 1 to 5 deployment pattern allows for more surge capability in a near seas contingency, compared to a 2 to 4 deployment pattern. If you disagree then we can see if we can proceed forward from there.

That's a cop out, since Lethe specifically referenced supposedly relevant comparisons to Europe, Australia, etc. Now you're essentially saying yes the size transition is somehow a relevant comparison but the numbers, well let's just not go there.

Yes, Lethe did reference comparisons to Europe, Australia etc.
I interpreted that as meaning replacement of one class of ship type with a newer (and larger) class of ship type, like Australia's ANZACs with SEA5000 or Type 23 with 26.
I did not interpret that to mean that Lethe suggested any nation was building a class of ships that was similar in absolute number to the number of 055s that we were suggesting (like 24 or something), because there are obviously very few navies in the world who build a single class of surface combatant in such high numbers to begin with.

Ummm..... what? Never mind LOL

Your post made it seem like I was suggesting Lethe's argument was "definitely true".
I am saying that is not the position I took, but rather instead I see both merits and flaws in his argument.

LOL then why even make the comparison in the first place, since it's obvious you are now trying as hard as possible to distance your force structure from that of the USN's as much as possible?

By demonstrating how ridiculous the USN's force structure is, we get to see that the Chinese Navy's force structure proposed by Lethe and I to be very reasonable.