055 DDG Large Destroyer Thread

[Lethe]

Why not? China intends to become a mature major global naval power by 2050 if we're going by their white papers. 140 is only halfway there.

This doesn't make any sense. USN has less than 100 surface combatants today and will almost certainly have fewer than 140 in 2030 and beyond, and yet it must surely be considered a "global naval power". Meanwhile, the construction plan outlined by Iron Man, if sustained, would eventually generate a fleet of 210-280 surface combatants, and that's without adding in the 056s (or rather, whatever follows on from 056), which would likely push numbers to the 300-350 range. Such a construction plan is one calculated to bury USN, not achieve rough parity by mid-century.

 

[latenlazy]

This doesn't make any sense. USN has less than 100 surface combatants today and will almost certainly have fewer than 140 in 2030 and beyond, and yet it must surely be considered a "global naval power". Meanwhile, the construction plan outlined by Iron Man, if sustained, would eventually generate a fleet of 210-280 surface combatants, and that's without adding in the 056s (or rather, whatever follows on from 056), which would likely push numbers to the 300-350 range. Such a construction plan is one calculated to bury USN, not achieve rough parity by mid-century.

I'm not endorsing Iron Man's construction plan per say, just questioning the basic presumption that 140 surface combatants is unreasonable. China won't have as many aircraft carriers as the USN and may take a while before it has as many SSNs. Furthermore, the current US fleet size we're looking at are peace time numbers. If China has to split their needs between defending their long coastline in a more crowded neighborhood while still needing to maintain a significant presence abroad maybe we should expect them to end up with a larger fleet.

 

[Lethe]

You expect a 12,000 ton cruiser to replace a 7,500 ton destroyer as the mainstay production unit for large surface combatants going forward? You are even more optimistic than I am.

It is not that I am optimistic, only that I am not stuck in the past.

Going from a 7500 ton destroyer to a 12000 ton destroyer is no larger than the leap from 053 to 054 was, or the leap from 051 to 052C/D, and much less than the leap from 037 to 056. Moreover, it is a leap in keeping with contemporary trends evident in Europe, India, Aust

 

[Lethe]

I'm not endorsing Iron Man's construction plan per say, just questioning the basic presumption that 140 surface combatants is unreasonable [....] maybe we should expect them to end up with a larger fleet.

I don't think 140 major surface combatants is necessarily an unreasonable number for PLAN, and I do expect them to end up with a larger fleet of such vessels than USN, for reasons I have gone into previously. But I do not expect it to happen by 2030, and in any case what I am objecting to is the incongruity between the stated objective (parity with USN by mid-century) and the actual results of the schedule advocated to achieve that objective (which actually attains parity in surface combatants by 2030 and promises to bury USN in that respect if extended to mid-century).

 

[Lethe]

Deleted.

 

[PiSigma]

Can a admin move the last 10 pages on non-55 future fleet size to the appropriate thread.

 

[latenlazy]

I don't think 140 major surface combatants is necessarily an unreasonable number for PLAN, and I do expect them to end up with a larger fleet of such vessels than USN, for reasons I have gone into previously. But I do not expect it to happen by 2030, and in any case what I am objecting to is the incongruity between the stated objective (parity with USN by mid-century) and the actual results of the schedule advocated to achieve that objective (which actually attains parity in surface combatants by 2030 and promises to bury USN in that respect if extended to mid-century).

I actually think in order for the PLAN to reach its mid century goals it needs to reach its intended fleet size earlier to allow for training and other aspects of fleet development, and to facilitate the phase out of older designs and hulls. The mid century objective isn't just a number. Furthermore we should probably account for the possibility of an accelerated pace when factoring in the potential for heightening security tensions.

 

[Blitzo]

Instead of "freeing up" land based fighters to defend the near seas, you could just buy more land based fighters in the first place. Instead of supplementing land-based sensors, you could buy more land-based sensors in the first place. The point of carrier-based fighters isn't to supplement land-based fighters, nor is it to supplement land-based sensors, except as a necessary and less than ideal compromise of the primary role of a carrier. Defending the homeland from an attack is in general less than an ideal use of carriers. And land-based fighters are plenty enough to protect UAVs and MPAs patrolling in the near seas. A naval air wing certainly doesn't guarantee air superiority just because it's flying from a carrier. And we're not talking about these UAVs flying thousands of km from shore; they are flying hundreds of km from shore where land-based fighters have plenty enough endurance to escort them around. There would also certainly be more of them available for escort duties than a carrier air wing.

The primary role of a carrier is to be able to deploy organic, mobile, naval air power at sea. Merely calling the role of a carrier in this case as "defending the homeland" I think undersells their utility.

I believe carrierborne air power is able to allow a far more persistent military aviation presence at longer ranges than only relying on land based fighters and aviation, whose endurance and/or combat radius are significantly less than that of carrier based fighters.
I beleive the geography of a near seas high intensity war means China will likely desire ISR plastforms like UAVs and MPAs to be able to operate at least beyond 500km from China's coast with relative safety, so the ability of carriers to control and secure the airspace through organic carrierborne fixed wing aviation deployed at that kind of range I think is invaluable, and is one of the many uses of carriers in a high intensity local war.

I don't tend to think of buying carriers primarily for home defense as a "balanced" investment, so much as it is a just plain "bad" investment, even in these pseudo-power projection scenarios where they supposedly force multiply land-based assets that could instead be force multiplied by other land-based assets that could be gotten for much cheaper. Pierside carriers for home defense is a concept I've never read anywhere else on the internet except on this very forum in this very thread.

Well they won't primarily be for "home defense" (which I think can better be called westpac high intensity warfare), but also be used for distant blue water power projection during peacetime and the ability to operate in near water surge/high intensity contingencies, or if there is a greater blue water contingency they need to respond to with extra carriers.

 

[Iron Man]

This doesn't make any sense. USN has less than 100 surface combatants today and will almost certainly have fewer than 140 in 2030 and beyond, and yet it must surely be considered a "global naval power". Meanwhile, the construction plan outlined by Iron Man, if sustained, would eventually generate a fleet of 210-280 surface combatants, and that's without adding in the 056s (or rather, whatever follows on from 056), which would likely push numbers to the 300-350 range. Such a construction plan is one calculated to bury USN, not achieve rough parity by mid-century.

The "incongruity" that you feel is purely a feeling of your own making. I have already pointed out to you (and you have chosen to ignore) the fact that comparability in terms of numbers of cruisers, destroyers, and frigates is not the same as comparability in terms of overall naval capability. The USN will still have 11 carriers with their attendant 50+ fighter air wings in 2030 compared to PLAN's likely 4 carriers, with all 4 of them having significantly less capability and fighters than US carriers. The US will still have 50ish SSNs and 3 out of 4 remaining SSGNs. Alongside these are 9 LHAs and 10 LPDs that could easily be used for ASW or even antishipping roles, a multitude of long range fixed wing MPA and ASW assets along with supporting ISR and satellites, and you have in 2030 in no way, shape, or form a PLAN that is comparable to the USN. So you can limit your comparisons to only cruisers, destroyers, and frigates and claim equality or near-equality if you want, but you would be deliberately creating a totally false narrative about actual strengths of the PLAN vis a vis the USN.

It is not that I am optimistic, only that I am not stuck in the past.

Going from a 7500 ton destroyer to a 12000 ton destroyer is no larger than the leap from 053 to 054 was, or the leap from 051 to 052C/D, and much less than the leap from 037 to 056. Moreover, it is a leap in keeping with contemporary trends evident in Europe, India, Aust

Assuming that cruiser construction is the new norm for the PLAN IMO is more wishful thinking than forward thinking IMO. You can call a 12,000t warship a "destroyer" if you want, but this is about as logic-bending as the Japanese calling the 27,000t Izumo a "helicopter carrying destroyer". The role played by the 055 will almost certainly be that of an air warfare command ship, a capability that the PLAN has hitherto been notably lacking in. And most definitely there are no trends in Europe, India, or Australia that could be comparable to switching from a 7,500t high volume construction to a 12,000t high volume construction. AFAIK there are no frontline surface combatants under construction or planned to be under construction in any of these countries greater than 7,400t with India's Project 15B being the highest at 7,400t; Australia's is the Hobart at 7,000t and Europe's is the (Italian) FREMM at 6,700t. Trying to compare the conversion of a 6,200t class destroyer to a 7,400t class destroyer (Project 15 to 15B) and saying this is somehow the same comparison as the PLAN (fancifully) switching from a 7,500t class destroyer to a 12,000t class cruiser (052D to 055) is like saying switching from mass-producing a scooter to mass-producing a motorcycle is somehow the 'same' comparison as switching from mass-producing a motorcycle to mass-producing a Lamborghini. Like somehow the costs are bearable, reasonable or justified because the tonnage increase is roughly "comparable" to what other navies are doing. Really the only way your dream will come true is if the 055's full displacement is actually closer to something like 10,000t (and this is still a very real possibility). More likely IMO is that the PLAN will have a full hierarchy of cruiser with cruiser roles in the form of the 055, a destroyer workhorse in the form of the 052C/D/E, and an ASW/local air defense frigate in the form of the 054A/B. A 052E upsized to 8,500 or 9,000t would certainly be more in keeping with current naval trends around the world. A mixed 12kt CG + 7-9kt DDG + 4-5kt FFG structure with more ships on the lower end would certainly be a balanced force IMO. If the 055 is closer to 10,000t full, an interim mix of 10,000t CG + 7-7.5kt DDG + 4-5kt FFG would have to see the PLAN waiting for a true cruiser design to appear.

The primary role of a carrier is to be able to deploy organic, mobile, naval air power at sea. Merely calling the role of a carrier in this case as "defending the homeland" I think undersells their utility.

The primary role of a carrier is to be able to deploy organic, mobile, naval air power at sea for the purpose of distant power projection beyond the reach of its land-based forces. Otherwise what's the point? If you don't intend to regularly sail your mobile fighter base far beyond the reach of your own land-based fighters, then you've just wasted all of your money.

I believe carrierborne air power is able to allow a far more persistent military aviation presence at longer ranges than only relying on land based fighters and aviation, whose endurance and/or combat radius are significantly less than that of carrier based fighters.

LOL what?

I beleive the geography of a near seas high intensity war means China will likely desire ISR plastforms like UAVs and MPAs to be able to operate at least beyond 500km from China's coast with relative safety, so the ability of carriers to control and secure the airspace through organic carrierborne fixed wing aviation deployed at that kind of range I think is invaluable, and is one of the many uses of carriers in a high intensity local war.

The combat radius of a J-11B is 1,500km and there are plenty of land-based fighters to go around, so no need to worry about escorting those MPAs or UAVs from the ranks of land-based fighters

Well they won't primarily be for "home defense" (which I think can better be called westpac high intensity warfare), but also be used for distant blue water power projection during peacetime and the ability to operate in near water surge/high intensity contingencies, or if there is a greater blue water contingency they need to respond to with extra carriers.

You just flatly contradicted your own statements right here. Your clear indication earlier was in fact that they WOULD be intended mostly for NON-distant operations and would mostly stay at home or would just play a little in the front yard and then go back to sitting inside. A more unbefitting and ignominious role for such powerful ships I simply cannot imagine.

 

[Blitzo]

The primary role of a carrier is to be able to deploy organic, mobile, naval air power at sea for the purpose of distant power projection beyond the reach of its land-based forces. Otherwise what's the point? If you don't intend to regularly sail your mobile fighter base far beyond the reach of your own land-based fighters, then you've just wasted all of your money.

It's not only beyond the "reach" of land based air power but rather a carrier provides a greater persistent presence of organic, mobile, naval air power at greater distances from land, compared to what land based air power can provide.

LOL what?

The combat radius of a fighter from China's land air bases wanting to operate at say, 500km away from China's coast will have a significantly lower endurance at that range than a carrier that's sailing at that location 500km away from China's coast and able to deploy a fighter directly at that location.
Similarly, the endurance of a fighter from China's land air base wanting to operate at the same kind of endurance that a carrier sailing at that location 500km away from China's coast will not be able to attain a similar reach to that location 500km away as operating at that combat radius would reduce its endurance.

That's why I wrote endurance "and/or" combat radius, because I see the two as fundamentally connected depending on whether one's prioritizing endurance (at a given combat radius) or combat radius (at a given endurance).

The combat radius of a J-11B is 1,500km and there are plenty of land-based fighters to go around, so no need to worry about escorting those MPAs or UAVs from the ranks of land-based fighters

Yes, the combat radius of J-11B and other flankers and J-20s and even J-10s in some configurations is quite impressive yes, but I do not think escorting an MPA is enough, optimally you would have the ability to patrol airspace independent of your escorted MPA and optimally to be able to contest or control a volume of airspace beyond which your vulnerable (even if escorted) MPA is patrolling.

But MPA/ISR escort/defence is of course just one rather specific example of what a carrierborne aviation can provide.

I see the value of carrierborne fixed wing aviation in being able to allow Chinese combat aviation to operate at greater distances from China's mainland fighter bases with greater associated endurance, to extend China's overall air defence, air strike, and air contesting capability much further beyond China's mainland than what only land based fighters can provide.

You just flatly contradicted your own statements right here. Your clear indication earlier was in fact that they WOULD be intended mostly for NON-distant operations and would mostly stay at home or would just play a little in the front yard and then go back to sitting inside. A more unbefitting and ignominious role for such powerful ships I simply cannot imagine.

Actually I didn't contradict myself -- what I wrote in this part of my post is talking about their potential to respond to contingencies overall.

The purpose of my suggested peacetime deployment pattern would be so they could conduct to high intensity short duration surge operations at China's near seas, but I've never excluded the possibility as well as to have the capability to provide additional blue water carrier presence in a crisis, beyond the normal peacetime blue water single carrier deployment.
That said, over the last few pages, the issue of the overall flexibility of deployment for my proposed depoyment pattern has never really come up and has mostly been focused on their primary role in near seas surge operations. However, now that we've broached this topic I would like to clarify that my deployment pattern also leaves open the possibility to allow another carrier to deploy in blue water and support the other single blue water carrier as well for a period of time.

But during peacetime, the available 6 carrier fleet will only have 1 carrier continuously at sea in blue water while the other 5 are more or less at home.


Let's look at it this way... for a 6 carrier fleet:
My proposal is for peacetime to have 1 at sea/bluewater for extended continuous period, 5 at home. IMO, this allows them to either be able to surge at least 3 additional carriers for near seas operations during a regional contingency, OR in a blue water crisis, it allows them to surge at least 1 more carrier for blue water operations to support the carrier that is normally in blue water during peacetime.
The other idea is to for peacetime to have 2 at sea/bluewater/or near seas for extended continuous period, 4 at home. For this idea, I think they would only be able to surge 1-2 additional carriers for near seas operations during a regional contingency, OR in a blue water crisis they might be able to surge another 1 more carrier for blue water operations to support the 2 carriers which have already been at sea continuously during peacetime when the crisis occurred.

That's why I think it's a bit flawed to say my proposal is primarily for "home defense". Instead I think it's better described as a deployment pattern that allows for response to contingencies both at near seas and for blue water, but it is a deployment pattern which favours the ability to respond to a near seas contingency a bit more than the ability to respond to a blue water contingency.