054/A FFG Thread II

Russia does not lack for small surface combatants the size of 054A or thereabouts. It is the 7-8,000+ ton sized surface combatants that it is lacking and will soon be severely lacking, despite making noise about building the so-called "Lider" class superdestroyer.
here's the most recent ... development:
Russian Military News, Reports, Data, etc. Yesterday at 8:26 PM
Jan 25, 2017

only LOL now: put off to November of 2017
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Blackstone

Brigadier
here's the most recent ... development:
Russian Military News, Reports, Data, etc. Yesterday at 8:26 PM
It seems Russia isn't looking to build ships larger then 6,000-7,000 tons, as a Jamestown article claims. It also lists problems causing delays in their FFG production. Which gets back to my original question, what came of Russia's supposed interest in the 054A to supplement their own frigate production?

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A major military defeat can unexpectedly turn into a victory. Indeed, the actions of the Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov operating off the Syrian coast could easily be qualified as a failure (see EDM,
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;
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). The ship inched around the coast of Europe on its way to Syria, desperately puffing thick, black smoke due to a problem with its power plant. Then, during training operations in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Kuznetsov lost two warplanes, which fell into the sea due to technical faults, without any opposition from the enemy. However, the Navy won a decisive victory—they earned the sympathy of President Vladimir Putin. After the return of the aircraft carrier to its home port in Murmansk, the Russian president took full responsibility for the fact that the ship was sent to perform tasks for which it was not intended: “The [defense] minister and the chief of the General Staff know that your mission, and the preparations for it, are my personal initiative. I would like to thank the defense minister and the chief of the General Staff, representatives of the industry who, upon receiving the instruction a year ago, promptly prepared the equipment, the materiel for you; and you, in turn, prepared your subordinates and brilliantly executed the tasks that were set forth,” Putin said, while meeting with a group of sailors of the Kuznetsov back in February (
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, February 23).

Since the Russian president is essentially politically infallible domestically, the Kuznetsov’s failure was ultimately declared a victory. Moreover, the Navy was victorious in the battle. Hence, the Navy will most likely obtain maximum funding under the next rearmament program (see
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, March 14). A few months ago, experts assumed that the Navy would be the main victim of the inevitable reductions in the military budget in conditions of economic crisis. But Putin unexpectedly said, at the meeting of the military-industrial Commission, in Rybinsk, in late April, “By the end of 2016, the share of modern weapons and equipment in the Navy was about 47 percent. At the same time, the total share of modern equipment and weapons in the Armed Forces as a whole is 58.3 percent […] we must solve the problem: within the next three years, by 2020, the share of modern weapons and equipment both in the Army and Navy should rise to 70 percent… The Navy must have a balanced ship fleet capable of carrying out the full range of peacetime and wartime tasks in the near and far maritime zones, ensuring Russia’s naval presence in all strategically important regions of the World Ocean” (
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, April 25).

However, hopes that the Kremlin will invest in hugely ambitious projects such as the construction of a new aircraft carrier will most likely prove mistaken. Just days before Putin’s speech, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu expressed a more modest approach: that frigates similar to the Admiral Gorshkov will become the mainstay of the Russian Navy. “Such multi-purpose frigates, equipped with long-range precision weapons, should become the Navy’s main combat ships in the near future,” Shoigu told the defense ministry’s board meeting (
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, April 21).

According to the former commander of the Russian Navy, Admiral Igor Kasatonov, the defense minister’s words indicate a revision to the Russian concept for how to use its naval fleet. Frigates will be the Navy’s main ships, Kasatonov explained, because major sea battles are unlikely in the future. “The main task [of the Navy] is to attack shore facilities with cruise missiles. Our ships, submarines and aircraft strike Islamic State targets in Syria with Caliber [Kalibr] missiles from a long distance. So the validity of the [frigate-centric] concept is confirmed,” Kasatonov said (
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, April 21).

It should be noted, however, that Moscow is not foregoing its plans to build up capabilities to take on “potential enemy” aircraft carrier strike groups. Illustratively, Russia is carrying out repairs and modernization of its nuclear cruiser Admiral Nakhimov, which, like the cruiser Peter the Great, is slated to receive Onyx and Granite anti-ship missiles designed to destroy carrier-sized warships. Russian media also writes that soon cruisers will be equipped with Zircon hypersonic cruise missiles (
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, April 25, 2016; see EDM,
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,
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, 2017). However, it is indicative that Moscow is apparently refusing to build new warships with a displacement of more than 6,000–7,000 tons.

With the emphasis now on frigates, the vessel Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Gorshkov becomes the navy’s lead warship. This Russian frigate was laid down in 2006 and first floated in 2010. The warship started its tests on November 2014. The final stage of the Gorshkov’s sea trials was started on March 20, 2017. Project 22350 warships like the Gorshkov displace 4,500 tons and can develop a speed of 29 knots. They are specifically armed with Onyx and Caliber cruise missiles and Poliment-Redut anti-aircraft missile systems (
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, April 21, 2017;
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, July 15, 2016).

However, this project has serious problems. Only the lead ship of the series managed to obtain a gas turbine engine constructed at the Ukrainian Zorya-Mashproekt manufacturing plant. As the result of Russia’s war against Ukraine, starting in early 2014, all sales of Ukrainian-built military components to Russia were stopped. At the end of April 2017, the Russian government announced that it was able to start naval ship engine production at the Saturn plant in Rybinsk. The newspaper Vedomosti, quoting a source “close to the defense ministry” announced that the first М90FR engine for new frigates can be expected in 2019 (
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, April 21).

Another problem afflicting project 22350 frigates is that the defense enterprise Almaz-Antey still has not managed to finalize the sale of its advanced Poliment-Redut air-defense system to the Navy. A source in the Russian Military-Industrial Commission stated that Almaz-Antey broke the state defense order “because of its catastrophic backlog of the Poliment-Redut, mainly associated with the failure of the technical characteristics of the 9M96, 9М96D and 9М100 anti-aircraft guided missiles” (
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, July 15, 2016). “Because of Almaz-Antey’s failure to meet its development work on the Poliment-Redut and Shtil [naval version of the Buk anti-air missile], meeting the delivery dates of the project 22350 Admiral Gorshkov and project 11356 Admiral Makarov ships are now also under threat,” Deputy Defense Minister Yuri Borisov said in late March (
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, March 24).

Thus, it is not particularly likely that Russia will have a “balanced” fleet within the next two years. However, that will probably not prevent military spokespeople from prematurely declaring that such a fleet exists—just as the Syrian campaign of the Admiral Kuznetsov was declared a major military victory.
 

Lethe

Captain
I doubt there was ever any serious prospect of Russia ordering 054As given the impending availability of domestically comparable platforms. The far more precarious state of Russian domestic suppliers means that Russia cannot afford the luxury of importing foreign equipment for less than highly compelling reasons. If domestic industry can do it, then domestic industry must do it.

That does not mean that there is zero opportunity for Russia to buy platforms or subsystems from China in future. I think Russia should keep an open mind about this and evaluate each proposal on its merits. But we must acknowledge that for strategic-industrial reasons it is much more difficult for Russia, as the smaller nation, to buy from China than it is for China to buy from Russia, and that opportunities for win-win cooperation in this direction will therefore be limited.
 
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Engineer

Major
Even if the entire Russian fleet rusts and sinks, Russia would still not order ships from China. To do so means Russians have to admit China being ahead, and the Russians simply have too much pride to let that happen.
 

Lethe

Captain
What is known about HHQ-16 as fitted to 054A?

Most sources indicate that it is a variant of either the Russian 9M38 or 9M317 missiles and place its weight in the range of 600-700kg.

The only variation on this that I have encountered is GlobalSecurity.org which claims that HHQ-16 weighs only 165kg.

The former seems far more likely, yet one is then left with the question of why a missile that bears far more resemblance to SM-2 (750kg) than it does ESSM (280kg) apparently has performance characteristics that more closely resemble the latter, i.e. range of 40-50km.
 
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Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
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What is known about HHQ-16 as fitted to 054A?

Most sources indicate that it is a variant of either the Russian 9M38 or 9M317 missiles and place its weight in the range of 600-700kg.

The only variation on this that I have encountered is GlobalSecurity.org which claims that HHQ-16 weighs only 165kg.

The former seems far more likely, yet one is then left with the question of why a missile that bears far more resemblance to SM-2 (750kg) than it does ESSM (280kg) apparently has performance characteristics that more closely resemble the latter, i.e. range of 40-50km.

I believe the missile's weight is similar if not identical to the export LY-80 which is listed as 690kg

As for its range, well range (assuming they are against a common type of target) is a function of many things, not only size. The quality of its propellant, the flight profile/control it uses, the sort of seeker and capability of the seeker it has are all big factors.

I wouldn't be surprised if the HHQ-16 missile itself is substantially cheaper than SM-2 and maybe even ESSM and that it was a conscious decision to develop a missile using subsystems that were probably relatively inexpensive but which resulted in a larger missile. In the end you get what you pay for.

Of course, the relatively large size of HHQ-16 means it has a lot of room for growth in the airframe itself. A newer variant of HQ-16 sometimes called HQ-16B seems to be adopted on land said to have a longer range of 70km, so I wouldn't be surprised if 054As are fielding a naval variant of it as well.
 

Iron Man

Major
Registered Member
The range of the FCR is also a limitation. This may be especially relevant in this case because the Front Dome/MR-90 on which the 054A FCR is based is said to be the limiting factor in the Buk's range.
 

zaphd

New Member
Registered Member
What is known about HHQ-16 as fitted to 054A?

Most sources indicate that it is a variant of either the Russian 9M38 or 9M317 missiles and place its weight in the range of 600-700kg.

The only variation on this that I have encountered is GlobalSecurity.org which claims that HHQ-16 weighs only 165kg.

The former seems far more likely, yet one is then left with the question of why a missile that bears far more resemblance to SM-2 (750kg) than it does ESSM (280kg) apparently has performance characteristics that more closely resemble the latter, i.e. range of 40-50km.
Factors like specific impulse of the rocket motor and payload weight (warhead + seeker) have a huge impact on missile weight. If we look at the SA-2 it weights a whopping 2300 kg and still performs probably worse than an ESSM.
 

Lethe

Captain
As for its range, well range (assuming they are against a common type of target) is a function of many things, not only size. The quality of its propellant, the flight profile/control it uses, the sort of seeker and capability of the seeker it has are all big factors.

I wouldn't be surprised if the HHQ-16 missile itself is substantially cheaper than SM-2 and maybe even ESSM and that it was a conscious decision to develop a missile using subsystems that were probably relatively inexpensive but which resulted in a larger missile. In the end you get what you pay for.

I could understand the discrepancy being a function of significant technological inferiority, as the best that Russia (and therefore China) could do at the time, but the notion of such inferiority being a deliberate choice in order to reduce the cost of the weapon is one I find rather implausible.

Even if it were actually cheaper to produce a large missile with X range than a smaller one (which I have doubts about in the first place), I expect any such benefits would be overwhelmed by logistical considerations. Both land vehicles and warships have weight and volume constraints. If capabilities are the same, a smaller missile would allow for a given launch vehicle or ship to carry more of them, both directly increasing the effectiveness of the platform and reducing the need for supply vehicles carrying reloads.

If the figures given for HHQ-16 are correct (and they seem reasonable in light of specifications for Russian Buk system and 054A's VLS compatibility with Yu-8) then it weighs 50% more than Aster 30 yet is credited with less than half the range. Either the technology gap between HHQ-16 and its western contemporaries is enormous, or there is something else going on here.

Factors like specific impulse of the rocket motor and payload weight (warhead + seeker) have a huge impact on missile weight. If we look at the SA-2 it weights a whopping 2300 kg and still performs probably worse than an ESSM.

The 9M38 missile is said to have a 70kg warhead which is significantly larger than the 40kg warhead on ESSM, but I find it difficult to imagine that this could account for even half of the discrepancy between the two weapons.
 
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