With 055 to rely on, the future PLAN would be better off without 052E and 054B. Instead, an unified hull/propulsion platform might be a better solution. Say 5500 tons, with perhaps 2 variants, one more geared towards ASW and one more geared towards AAW. And even that's only if a single unified variant is simply not possible on such a displacement. Which I'm not so sure about.
So basically we're talking about similar looking ships. AAW variant could feature an additional long range radar. And more VLS cells, perhaps some extra ones at the back, where it houses just one helicopter hangar. As opposed to two hangars for the ASW variant. Main gun, CIWS, rest of sensors would be the same, save for perhaps non-existant variable depth active sonar for ASW variant. Main difference in VLS arsenal would be that ASW variant would carry more rocket powered torpedoes and that it wouldn't carry HQ9, but instead multi-packed smaller AAW missiles.
I like some of the ideas here regarding differing equipment fits, but I'm not sure you could get an AAW design into a hull much smaller than 052D/E. What would you cut?
If anything I think there could be well a call for an ASW-focused 052 series to provide a long-range, high-performance counterpart to the smaller 054Bs, akin to the Spruance and Knox/Perry combo. Of course the 052 hull may not actually be suitable for a dedicated ASW ship, but something in that general size region.
The larger ASW ships would primarily accompany carriers, amphibs, supply ships, and other high value units on longer deployments. High speed and high endurance. The smaller ASW ships would operate mostly within the first two island chains, or independently on long-range "show the flag" deployments that don't call for high speed transit.
Broadly speaking I don't think people take ASW seriously enough relative to the threat, when even just a few short years from now it will clearly be
the predominant threat to China's ability to secure its waters (and protect its HVUs). In the late 1980s USN operated 90 blue water ASW frigates (Knox/Perry) and 30 ASW destroyers (Spruance). China today confronts an undersea threat of similar magnitude and requires a response of similar magnitude. The stuff that other nations around the world are doing
today is irrelevant because it is occurring in an entirely different context (i.e. basically an absence of threat and very limited funds resulting in sub-optimal decisions regarding design and fleet structure). One needs to look to the Cold War for guidance.