(The 800th post here. Woohoo!)
Compare and contrast to CV construction (post-war supercarriers only):
Name: Laid/Launched/Commissioned. Duration.
Name | Laid | Launched | Commissioned | Duration (Laid-Commission) |
Forrestal | 14 July 1952 | 11 December 1954 | 1 October 1955 | 3 years, 2 months |
Saratoga | 16 December 1952 | 8 October 1955 | 14 April 1956 | 3 years, 3 months |
Ranger | 2 August 1954 | 29 September 1956 | 10 August 1957 | 3 years |
Independence | 1 July 1955 | 6 June 1958 | 10 January 1959 | 3 years, 5 months |
Kitty Hawk | 27 December 1956 | 21 May 1960 | 29 April 1961 | 4 years, 4 months |
Constellation | 14 September 1957 | 8 October 1960 | 27 October 1961 | 4 years, 1 month |
America | 9 January 1961 | 1 February 1964 | 23 January 1965 | 4 years |
JFK | 22 October 1964 | 27 May 1967 | 7 September 1968 | 3 years, 11 months |
It is obvious that CVs are built
much faster (~50%-100% decrease in build time) than CVNs.
They're also much easier to mass produce: Forrestal, Saratoga, Ranger and Independence were all laid before the others were finished. The same is true for Kitty Hawk and Constellation. On the other hand, Nimitz CVNs were all built sequentially because only 1 drydock could handle building them.
The 3-4 year period between laying down and launching means at minimum, the current US CBG fleet is 40 years of embedded work, while the 1960's US fleet was only 10 years of embedded work despite having 8 modern CVs and 1 CVN in the modern part of the fleet and 3 surviving WW2 era fleet carriers (Midway class)
Therefore, if there is a high probability of a high intensity conflict between 2027-2035, CVNs should be researched but not emphasized. Instead at least 4 more CVs should be built at the same time, reminiscent of the US buildout in the 50's and 60's.
Maintenance period is much shorter for conventional carrier and can be delayed if necessary. They can be put back into service fairly quickly when they are in maintenance as well. Readiness rate is higher too.
While the anticipation of China building several carriers at once in light of recent geopolitical developments, there is one important factor which I believe should be factored in -
Crew Resources.
The thing is - While using the Forrestal-class as template of how China could've proceeded with their carrier program after CV-18 Fujian based on how more than one CVs can be built at the same time versus only one Nimitz-class can be built at any one time (and therefore, must be built sequentially) is certainly a good guide - The Forrestals were constructed in the
1950s.
The 1950s is - For sake of perspective -
Within 10 to 15 years of the end of WW2.
By September 1945 (i.e. when WW2 formally ended in the Pacific), the US Navy had around
19 fleet carriers (CV), 8 light carriers (CVL), and 100+ escort carriers (CVE) in active service.
Needless to say, that
huge fleet of flat-decks required a
massive pool of sailors and officers to operate. From that pool of sailors and officers, there was a huge portion of the pool that got freed from their posts and duties as those CVEs and CVLs were rapidly decommissioned in the months and years immediately following the conclusion of WW2. This meant that if the US wants to build, say, 10 or 20 United States and/or Forrestal-classes of supercarriers in the 1950s, the amount of manpower required to fill up the posts on those supercarriers were pretty much readily available from the get-go.
In contrast, China basically
had to start from scratch with Liaoning in the late-2000s and early-2010s. The PLAN didn't have a massive pool of sailors and officers from previous carriers to pull from, since
there were none to begin with. Even with the 2nd carrier Shandong in active service since 2019, China still doesn't have a large enough carrier fleet to train and familiarize the necessary size of the pool of sailors and officers that would be operating on newer Chinese CVs and CVNs into the future.
Then, there're also tens of thousands designers, engineers, shipyard workers, naval base workers, etc etc required to design, construct, host, maintain, repair and refuel those CVs. Let alone the other type of warships and all the land-based facilities and infrastructures required for a larger CV fleet.
This constitutes as one of the major factors on why China hasn't embarked on a massive CV construction spree, even today. While I believe that we will see a surge of CV construction eventually, just that the surge isn't likely to be seen today, and likely not going to be the case for the foreseeable future until the late-2020s at the earliest.