CIMSEC has just published one of the better qualitative (vice quantitative) analyses for
It is one of the few to actually address China's PLAN-CCG-MM coordinated operational capabilities that I've continuously (and tiresomely I'm sure) argued with be used at the boundary of the First Island Chain. Plus it cites the effectiveness of my favorite PLAN vessel.
Agreed. I would add though that I expect Chinese state-owned commercial shipping to even be used offensively, for surveillance, or other disruptive purposes in a war scenario. The US and their vassals will not have the luxury of preserving their best firepower to use on formal military threats, because anything and everything will be utilized against them in any way possible. This will be a huge drain on their reserves of munitions, as well as their sensory and decision-making bandwidth. What's to stop China from hiding guided missile launchers on mid to large-sized civilian ships?
Would be great if the CCG and MM can conduct ISTAR, strike and S&R missions within and along the entire First Island Chain (FIC) "Belt" (as I would like to describe the region of seas bounded by the FIC and the Chinese coastline) using these containerized missiles.
In addition, it would be even more preferable should the CCG and MM capable of executing the above missions, either through:
1. Coordination and cooperation with the PLA; or
2. Independent initiatives with reduced/minimal support from the PLA.
This can be achieved by first having CCG and MM cutters, patrol crafts and "fishing boats" spread across the entire FIC Belt. Being closely integrated and knitted with the PLA networking systems, the CCG and MM definitely will bring enormous advantages to the PLA CMC war-planning that surrounding countries can only dream to have.
Alongside would be containerized land attack or anti-ship missiles which will be stationed onboard state-owned civilian cargo ships dotted along the Belt for concealment beforehand as they awaiting for orders to launch their missiles.
In the meantime, I believe that having a mere 80+ Type 22 missile boat-fleet isn't be enough to saturate and overwhelm enemy defenses stationed along the entire length of the FIC (i.e. South Korea, Kyushu, Ryukyu, Taiwan, Luzon, Mindoro and Palawan) at affordable costs to the PLA, simply because there will be too many targets to aim at. To address this issue, China certainly can print out more modified Type 22 missile boats that can load both AShMs and LACMs - Or even unmanned equivalent USVs in order to reduce strain on crew resources.
Another option would be for the CCG and MM can also introduce marginally faster but smaller crafts that can be disguised as large fishing boats and small cargo vessels to house one or two of these missile or rocket containers. These crafts should be:
1. Minimally-manned,
2. Able to be built quickly in huge numbers by most Chinese shipyards,
3. Deployable at any point along the entire Chinese coastline and all Chinese-controlled SCS islands,
4. Able to reach islands along the FIC from the Chinese coastline and return; and
5. Expendable in war.
CCG and MM cutters, patrol crafts and "fishing boats" would then scout the entire Belt, provide targeting information to allied units, command launch of these containerized missiles, plus guide these missiles towards their land-based or sea-based targets, while hiding amongst the huge fleets of civilian cargo shipping sailing in and around the Belt.
Last but not least, suicide drones that can be made and deployed dirt-cheap and en-masse (e.g. Shahed-136) should also be viable against weakly-defended enemy targets using the aforementioned methods.
Time for those enemies located along the FIC to experience the 21st-century version of the People's War, first-hand...
