Not sure I agree with that.The only big mistakes was the hesitation during the initial offensive in 2022 and constantly seeking a negotiated resolution until around early fall. There wouldn’t be a Russia if they went all in during 2014 because of Western influence over the Russian financial system.
MIR system (VISA/Master card alternative) and the SPFS (SWIFT alternative) didn’t start heavy development and implementation until 2014. It took until 2016 for MIR to be widely used within Russia and the first SPFS transaction to occur on late 2017. In 2017, MIR was legally required to be used for pension and welfare payments since they used western systems before.
Now imagine the same 2022 sanctions during a 2014 Russian economy except this time their payment system has been completely paralyzed and their financial system is in a full scale crisis since they can’t process transactions.
Russia had an unique window of opportunity in 2014 where Ukraine was in chaos, Russian loyalty among the population was stronger, and most importantly, NATO training & support had yet to materialize on the ground. If, instead of fighting a proxy war with NATO in eastern Ukraine for eight years, it simply pulled off a Crimea with those regions, it likely would be in a much stronger position today.
Of course, we are not aware of what communications happened behind closed doors behind the US and Russia, at the time. Perhaps Putin struck a deal with the US that he'd stop at Crimea, in exchange for just "moderate" sanctions. We don't know. But it wouldn't surprise me if the strength of the 2022 sanctions was also the consequence of the eight years the West has had to develop contingencies against further Russian aggression. In that event, Russia would have been better off taking more the first time.
Fact is, in the eight years since 2014, Ukraine became much more hardened as a political and military opponent due to NATO training, equipment support, internal purges within the Ukraine political establishment to create an unified cause against Russia, and continued media and intellectual consensus building to secure the population's hostility towards Russia. So that, by the time 2022 rolled around, Russia faced an entrenched, fortified, and battle-hardened Ukraine that was firmly in the Western camp and which could count on the general loyalty of its military officers and main population groups.
I am of the strong belief, in this sense, that Russia's 2022 invasion was an act of desperation and not from a position of strength. They were well aware that the Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine were getting their teeth kicked in by a new, more powerful Ukraine and that further NATO support in the form of a de facto alliance was just on the horizon. Putin knew that status quo meant the defeat of the Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine and the continued build up of a modernized, combined arms force by US military trainers, which could soon threaten to take back Crimea and possibly push even further into Russia's back yard.
In this respect, once his proxy in Washington - Trump - lost the election, Putin knew that the writing was on the wall - it was now or never.