在去年禁止台湾菠萝之后，我对菠萝与凤梨之间的区别做了一些研究。公平地说，他们的凤梨在很多方面都优于菠萝，所以如果条件允许，进口并尝试种植凤梨是有意义的。
问题是在海南，我相信真正在那里买凤梨耕种的人实际上是台湾农民，他们看到了省政府提供的优惠条件，并决定自愿过去。如果他们带来了幼苗，那么就是这样。
中国显然把所有重创的农业基因工程资源都投入到了西瓜中。和去年一样，我看到一张韩国前总统文在寅吃西瓜的照片，我的第一反应是到底是什么水果：
View attachment 111308
这显然更接近野生西瓜。相反，如果你的西瓜有薄皮/无籽/超级多汁/黄色果肉或某种组合，这意味着一些科学家已经付出了一些努力来改善它。
这解释了为什么北京冬奥会上的西瓜如此受韩国人欢迎。
Not sure why people still argue that India isn't a lost cause. From Mao to now, China has always tried but failed to reason with India. The reason is logic and reason and rationality don't apply to India.
I hope that China will resolve the question of Taiwan province before 2027. I believe it is better to act sooner than later while Taiwanese military is still in disarray and Americans haven't had enough time to completely brainwash and radicalize the inhabitants of Taiwan province. Russia commited a grave mistake by hesitating and not making the move in 2014. Hopefully China doesn't repeat the same mistake.
First of all, judging from China's foreign policy and practice toward Taiwan in recent decades, there is no clear timetable for China's high-level relations with Taiwan.
After 2005, the "Anti-Secession Law" was promulgated, legally ambiguously stipulating the scope of application of armed unification.
Its eighth article stipulates that in the following three situations, it is necessary to initiate war means to solve the problem:
1. Separatist forces have caused Taiwan to separate from China in any name and in any way.
2. A major event occurs that will result in the secession of Taiwan from China.
3. Or the possibility of peaceful reunification is completely lost.
Article 1: There is limited space for interpretation of the law, which can be interpreted as various legal principles of Taiwan independence, including the Taiwan authorities' legislation for Taiwan independence, Taiwan's referendum for Taiwan independence, and other countries' cooperation with the Taiwan authorities to pass domestic legislation to recognize Taiwan independence. It is a passive activation mechanism.
Article 2: Compared with Article 1, the interpretation space is wider, including but not limited to military conflicts, internal coups, and chaos and anarchy caused by large-scale humanitarian crises (earthquakes, famines, nuclear accidents, biochemical accidents, etc.) .
Article 3: Active activation mechanism reserved by the Chinese government. There is more room for interpretation than the second article.
We need to understand what specific situations these three expressions represent. What circumstances can passively activate war? Which situations are different according to the situation and the balance of power, and what flexible interpretation space is there?
Then combine future detailed measures including the "Anti-Secession Law" and other relevant policy bills, and fully consider the possible trends and changes in the military, economic, political, and diplomatic spheres of influence on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, the Pacific Ocean, and even the world in the next few years. Only in this way can we calmly analyze the timetable of military reunification, instead of arbitrarily making judgments based on the balance of military power and unquantifiable changes in public opinion.
We cannot understand the high-level internal decision-making mechanism, and it is difficult to establish a large-scale probability quantitative model for calculation through reliable intelligence like "Patch_Chimera". But we can at least make good use of public constraints and make reasonable conservative reasoning.
According to my understanding, the so-called degree of brainwashing of Taiwanese does not play a large role in decision-making. Taiwanese are actually very realistic people, and they will fall to the side that is beneficial to them at critical moments.
