Since news and analysis is available on websites that everyone considers reliable, I will limit myself to some personal considerations.
The eventual fall of Soledar would be a defeat, certainly more symbolic and propagandistic than having real strategic value, but certainly a defeat given the forces Ukraine has put up to defend it (excessive, according to some analysts).
The same can be said of the possible fall of Bakhmut. Although the attackers almost always take more casualties than the defenders, and in part it is also a nasty war of attrition. However, it is on the Donbass front where the fighting has been concentrated over the last month and conclusions should be drawn/adopted accordingly. I wouldn't shake my head until it's broken. Obviously, those shaking their heads are the troops on the battlefield, not me or others sitting in their chairs, i.e. sofa experts. That is why although I comment a lot, I at least try to keep myself informed and not stick my head in the sand. I am not a decision maker and I am not a current military expert.
On the other hand, German political and military leaders leave me, to put it mildly, somewhat bewildered.
Compared with a certain sobriety in the comments of our government, however strongly it condemns the invasion of Ukraine, the actions are sluggish. All of Germany's actions are to me a belated and rather stingy help.
In place of Surovikin, who had only been appointed on 8 October and who admittedly seemed more capable than his predecessors (at least he avoided another massacre of Russians in Kherson), comes Gerasimov, notoriously untalented. Surovikin himself, however, remains among the deputies. Lapin, who, according to Russian millbloggers, is somewhere between incompetent, like Cadorna, and a pure coward, is promoted.
Prigozhin claims exceptional success for Soledar with his Wagnerian goons.
Other rabble-rousers like Girkin or the Chechens are pawing at the background.
All of these men would be happier to slaughter each other (in the past their subordinates have done so materially) than to fight the Ukrainians.
The lack of coordination between the various units of the regular Russian army, the Wagner, the separatist territorial forces and others like the Chechen thugs and above all the little man in Kremlin has already led to several defeats and tens of thousands of casualties among the motley crew.
As a rule, when internal factions start fighting each other (a situation which has happened very often in the past), it is the beginning of the end.
