Based on the RAND papers I've read, it's not easy to shut down an airbase for more than a day or two by aerial bombardment. The damage to the runway can be quickly repaired and new aircraft flown in. The attacker needs to keep bombing the airbases continuously to keep them out of the fight.
Ukrainian War Developments
- Thread starter james smith esq
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If the Europeans continue to buy gas or oil from Russia ...
What gives them the right to say to others, that others cannot do business with Russia, while the Europeans still can?
still wait for the reports, there is no idea of what EW systems or equipment they used and even than they would be cautious about using their good shit without U.S. operatives monitoring their capabilities.
This has me convinced that the degree of western support relies heavily on how well your own forces are doing, and to always remember that past performance is not indicative of future performance. This post goes into the political problems of this intervention and why it is not going according to Russian ideal:
Point 1:
On day 1-3, western public opinion was of no intervention, condemnation, sanctions, but essentially abandonment of Ukraine because of Russian quick gains, gaining air superiority, and destruction of Ukrainian supply lines with long range standoff fire. Russia was making unprecedented (literally, without historical precedent) gains.
After day 3, Russians are getting bogged down by surprising Ukrainian resistance, air superiority was not converted into air supremacy, they are failing to control the narrative, and they made mistakes. Yes, Russians are holding back (more on that in point 2) but that only represents a political mistake rather than a purely military mistake. This emboldened foreign adversaries of Russia which decided to do weapons sales, sending 'volunteers' and even talk of direct intervention.
The problem with Russia is that they're on a ticking clock due to foreign intervention. They have a dilemma: do they carpet bomb/shell for a few weeks to soften the enemy, or do they risk heavy casualties, a PR failure and foreign intervention?
This reminds me of when KMT tried doing this in the Battle of Shanghai. They failed because they did not slow down the Imperial Japanese Army sufficiently, foreigners were uninterested and thus KMT simply wasted their German equipped divisions. Same is true for KMT resistance against CPC. There was little pro-KMT intervention because despite all their intervention they were still doomed, foreigners lost interest, and that was their end.
Point 2:
Russia got too arrogant by its previous successes in Georgia, Syria and Ukraine. They thought a little carpet bombing, some PGM strikes and wiping out encircled units with tanks, combined with propaganda, is enough to get the rest to surrender on contact. This is a good strategy against confused, divided enemies to reduce the cost of military adventure. However, they did not consider what Ukraine has been doing since 2014.
Since 2014, Ukraine has been getting more and more radicalized. Unfortunately, by taking Crimea and splitting Donetsk and Luhansk, Russia actually lost popular support from the rest of Ukraine by taking away mobile Russian speaking minorities. So Ukraine lost territory, but they gained political advantage by now demographically consolidating around the pro-west Ukrainian speaking right. It also gave Russia a false sense of security by making them think they had enough popular support to disintegrate opposition on contact. Actually, they themselves got rid of all the weak units that would disintegrate on contact... and left only the hardened ones.
The other part is, they are unable to defend their narrative and are still allowing enemy points of view to shape the discussion. They have neither been able to promote their own point of view or silence the enemy point of view. This is a total loss on the information front which again, results in problems from point 1: going from tepid opposition and condemnation to active resistance.
Lessons for the future:
1. Winning or losing is snowballing. If you win hard, it keeps foreign opinion down and shuts up opposition. But if you start losing even a little, you will soon find foreign weapons, insurgents or even a no fly zone near you.
2. Do not assume adversaries are going to surrender upon attaining mere air superiority and a little carpet bombing. Only air supremacy and total devastation will do. This is going to result in bad PR but...
3. Media control is absolutely vital. If your side has no hope of shaping the narrative then don't even try to, just go for it. Holding back means failure because they sure won't hold back and you'll be demonized just the same.
4. Prior success could harden enemy resolve which is important when considering foreign intervention. Russian past successes set them up for bigger obstacles today.
5. Never underestimate nationalism. Do not assume that a democracy is actually a democracy, it could simply be a fascist state in disguise, and while fascist states often fail over the long run, they can still deal significant damage before going down.
Point 1:
On day 1-3, western public opinion was of no intervention, condemnation, sanctions, but essentially abandonment of Ukraine because of Russian quick gains, gaining air superiority, and destruction of Ukrainian supply lines with long range standoff fire. Russia was making unprecedented (literally, without historical precedent) gains.
After day 3, Russians are getting bogged down by surprising Ukrainian resistance, air superiority was not converted into air supremacy, they are failing to control the narrative, and they made mistakes. Yes, Russians are holding back (more on that in point 2) but that only represents a political mistake rather than a purely military mistake. This emboldened foreign adversaries of Russia which decided to do weapons sales, sending 'volunteers' and even talk of direct intervention.
The problem with Russia is that they're on a ticking clock due to foreign intervention. They have a dilemma: do they carpet bomb/shell for a few weeks to soften the enemy, or do they risk heavy casualties, a PR failure and foreign intervention?
This reminds me of when KMT tried doing this in the Battle of Shanghai. They failed because they did not slow down the Imperial Japanese Army sufficiently, foreigners were uninterested and thus KMT simply wasted their German equipped divisions. Same is true for KMT resistance against CPC. There was little pro-KMT intervention because despite all their intervention they were still doomed, foreigners lost interest, and that was their end.
Point 2:
Russia got too arrogant by its previous successes in Georgia, Syria and Ukraine. They thought a little carpet bombing, some PGM strikes and wiping out encircled units with tanks, combined with propaganda, is enough to get the rest to surrender on contact. This is a good strategy against confused, divided enemies to reduce the cost of military adventure. However, they did not consider what Ukraine has been doing since 2014.
Since 2014, Ukraine has been getting more and more radicalized. Unfortunately, by taking Crimea and splitting Donetsk and Luhansk, Russia actually lost popular support from the rest of Ukraine by taking away mobile Russian speaking minorities. So Ukraine lost territory, but they gained political advantage by now demographically consolidating around the pro-west Ukrainian speaking right. It also gave Russia a false sense of security by making them think they had enough popular support to disintegrate opposition on contact. Actually, they themselves got rid of all the weak units that would disintegrate on contact... and left only the hardened ones.
The other part is, they are unable to defend their narrative and are still allowing enemy points of view to shape the discussion. They have neither been able to promote their own point of view or silence the enemy point of view. This is a total loss on the information front which again, results in problems from point 1: going from tepid opposition and condemnation to active resistance.
Lessons for the future:
1. Winning or losing is snowballing. If you win hard, it keeps foreign opinion down and shuts up opposition. But if you start losing even a little, you will soon find foreign weapons, insurgents or even a no fly zone near you.
2. Do not assume adversaries are going to surrender upon attaining mere air superiority and a little carpet bombing. Only air supremacy and total devastation will do. This is going to result in bad PR but...
3. Media control is absolutely vital. If your side has no hope of shaping the narrative then don't even try to, just go for it. Holding back means failure because they sure won't hold back and you'll be demonized just the same.
4. Prior success could harden enemy resolve which is important when considering foreign intervention. Russian past successes set them up for bigger obstacles today.
5. Never underestimate nationalism. Do not assume that a democracy is actually a democracy, it could simply be a fascist state in disguise, and while fascist states often fail over the long run, they can still deal significant damage before going down.
-They provoked the destruction of that country.
-They made themselves look weak.
-If the Chinese are able to offset most Western sanctions to Russia it could establish an alternative financial system to those of the West, meaning that the West could lose even more soft power, a think that concern a lot of anti-China Westerners given the fact the China has become the go country for loans in most of the world and the best thing is that China will have access to the best of the both worlds.
-It give China more cheaper resources in a time when world is heading towards stagflation.
-It could give China access to some game changing Russian weapons that they could use in the pacific.
-And for the U.S. they now have to accept the reality that for the Europeans their battlefield is in Europe not Asia, throwing cold water to the U.S. China strategy.
-And the list go on.
For a trap, its looks like they trapped themselves.
Could’ve been done more “artistically”!
I certainly hope your rationale with Ukraine and western/American behavior can be applied to Taiwan.
This is the tweet, and you know this tweeter does not represent TASS by looking at its name?
Even this tweet did not say "Putin disappointed".
This is your post
Holy shit they’re admitting that Putin himself is disappointed. Not something I would’ve expected from TASS.
So how could you have reached your conclusion that TASS has admitted that Putin is disappointed? Don't make up another "someone says".
[Edit]
Now I realize that there may be some misunderstanding on my part. But I still hold my opinion for the following reasons.
- The source of that "screen dump" is an anti-Russia fanatic, what ever it post should be put with tons of salt, non of its tweet should be put in this forum before cross checking.
- Anyone can make a screen dump like that. Simply just type something in MS word and copy/paste a TASS logo in 5 minutes. Unless cross checked on the official source, these "screen dumps" are fake news and missinformation warfare.
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Very well said.
No need to wait.
One side is surrounded, cut off, running out of ammo, and outgunned.
Logic always dictates the inevitable here.
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