South China Sea Strategies for other nations (Not China)
- Thread starter PanAsian
- Start date
Phenomenal is the precise word. The English translation for phenomenal is remarkable or extraordinary.
This definition does not carry either a positive or negative connotation...it simply points out that they have done a remarkable thing. Something that is extraordinary.
Clearly there are issues with it from many perspectives. Other claimants are alarmed by it. There certainly is impact to the reefs there. Clearly the Chinese people are proud of it.
They have literally created islands where there were none before, and are now improving those islands with structures, bases, housing, piers, harbors, etc. To not acknowledge the extraordinary nature of these things would be also to deny the major things that have been done...whatever side of the SCS issue you may be on.
There are vast areas of the desert southwest and western United States where similar types of reclamation have occurred...but on land, reclaiming desert spaces and making them arable and suitable for agriculture.
I work for the Agency that makes that happen. Huge construction projects of large dams, vast canal systems, underground waterways, waterways through mountain ranges, etc. It too is phenonimal. It too has people on both sides of the issue. Most are happy for more food...more water available for yards, trees, etc. Some are not happy, saying to leave nature as they were so they can enjoy hiking in the "natural" environment, or allowing desert animals more habitat...even as those same people enjoy the food that is grown, and the irrigated lands that allow them to comfortably live there.
But to not acknowledge the extraordinary nature of these things would be also it is to deny the major things they have been done...whatever side of the issue you may be on.
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Blackstone
Brigadier
The ecology will recover quickly after China completes its work.
shen
Senior Member
moved from China SCS thread.
US already lost economic supremacy in Asia, and ...
>> Speculative, unsupported, nationalistic and inflammatory statements removed <<
Vietnam is interested in economic cooperation. Economic development is more important than anything else for Vietnam, just like it is for China. Vietnam made that decision when it initiated Chinese style market reforms, settled land border dispute with China, and delimited Gulf of Tonkin maritime border. but it also want to drive a hard bargain regarding its claims to be in the best position when it comes time for the eventual negotiations. The Vietnam Communist Party can't ignore domestic nationalist sentiment, just like CCP can't.
Philippines is beset by domestic disagreement on how to deal with the SCS dispute. The previous Arroyo administration decided cooperation is the best way, signed the trilateral joint resource development treaty with China and Vietnam.
>> Speculative, unsupported, nationalistic and inflammatory statements removed <<
US already lost economic supremacy in Asia, and ...
>> Speculative, unsupported, nationalistic and inflammatory statements removed <<
Vietnam is interested in economic cooperation. Economic development is more important than anything else for Vietnam, just like it is for China. Vietnam made that decision when it initiated Chinese style market reforms, settled land border dispute with China, and delimited Gulf of Tonkin maritime border. but it also want to drive a hard bargain regarding its claims to be in the best position when it comes time for the eventual negotiations. The Vietnam Communist Party can't ignore domestic nationalist sentiment, just like CCP can't.
Philippines is beset by domestic disagreement on how to deal with the SCS dispute. The previous Arroyo administration decided cooperation is the best way, signed the trilateral joint resource development treaty with China and Vietnam.
>> Speculative, unsupported, nationalistic and inflammatory statements removed <<
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Shen, you simply have to stop making such bombastic, unsupported and purely speculative and subjective statements.
"...and the US military is on the way out of Asia in the long run as well. Everyone knows that, including the American elites and Japan. But it is doubtful Japan will play that role once the American occupation finally ends."
Pure wistful thinking...but not in either of our lifetimes, Shen.
See? There, we can go back and forth all day. But we will not.
Stay on topic. Do not speculate and make unsupported statements that are inflaming, or purely nationalistic.
Such statements will be deleted...and if such continues, the thread will be closed and posters warned, suspended, etc.
DO NOT RESPOND TO THIS MODERATION
shen
Senior Member
This is an article by STEPHEN PETER ROSEN, a hawk when it comes to SCS police. Even he see a time limit on American military presence in Asia.
How America Can Balance China’s Rising Power in Asia
Beijing’s neighbors need about 25 years to catch up. The U.S. security umbrella will be crucial in the interim.
By STEPHEN PETER ROSEN
June 1, 2015 6:56 p.m. ET
Defense Secretary Ash Carter on Saturday called for “an immediate and lasting halt” to China’s territorial expansion in the South China Sea. In Singapore for the annual Shangri-La Dialogue with Asian nations, Mr. Carter voiced U.S. concerns about the “prospect of further militarization as well as the potential for these activities to increase the risk of miscalculation or conflict among claimant states.”
The Obama administration’s “pivot” to Asia notwithstanding, tensions are clearly on the rise as Beijing becomes more assertive in the Asia-Pacific region. Less clear is what should be done about it. Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong called for a “stable regional balance.” Meanwhile, the Chinese government expands the land around disputed islands and deploys ground forces to them, while prominent Chinese academics discuss the need to end the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.
How can a “stable regional balance” be achieved? China’s relative economic and military power will continue to grow. Asia is far from North America. Washington can stand up today for freedom of navigation and multilateral diplomacy, but some argue that geography and the steady shift in power toward China stacks the deck against the U.S. If China continues to build islands in disputed waters, what can the U.S. do?
The message, always there but seldom articulated, is that the U.S. should concede gracefully to the inevitable and make the best deal it can before it is even relatively weaker. This is a superficially appealing argument, but it is shortsighted and self-centered. It looks only at the U.S. But the question of what to do about a rising China cannot be answered by America alone.
China’s ascendance became apparent toward the end of the 1980s. What is forgotten is how unusually favorable to China the Asian environment was from 1990 until 2010. All of Beijing’s important enemies and rivals were neutralized during those 20 years. Soviet rule collapsed along with Russia’s sphere of influence in the region, eliminating what had been China’s main continental rival since the 18th century. Japan was constrained militarily and diplomatically by the consequences of its wars of aggression.
The U.S. became the ally of China during the Cold War and was actively supporting the growth of the Chinese economy and even of its military. When Washington started having second thoughts about this strategy at the turn of this century, they were soon subordinated to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The rise of China was thus neither motivated nor hindered by foreign hostility. It was facilitated by the most benign Asian security environment that China had experienced for 200 years.
China’s rise also took place when its Asian economic rivals were stunted. The so-called Asian Tigers—Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan—grew rapidly but were small. Japan was crippled by its financial crisis. India was hobbled by 40 years of socialist mismanagement and only began its slow journey toward economic reform in the early 1990s, some 15 years after China rejected Maoist economic policies. Vietnam, now a unified country of more than 93 million people, was recovering from 30 years of war. Russia suffered from a succession of kleptocracies. The countries that could provide investments, markets and exports to rival China in Asia were not there.
There are signs that this period has ended. Chinese economic growth has slowed. Japan is emerging as an independent military power; it is investing abroad, and its economy may be recovering from its long stagnation. India’s economic growth is now more rapid than China’s and is likely to remain so. Indian military spending is making up for decades of inattention. Indonesia and Vietnam have achieved modest rates of economic growth.
Russia is likely to remain a nuclear superpower with a decaying society. Moscow’s anxiety about Beijing is real but has been suppressed, if only for the time being, by President Vladimir Putin’s need to find a friend after his Ukraine excursion. Russia’s national anxiety will re-emerge when he goes.
Does this mean that all is well and the U.S. can turn away from Asia? Hardly. It will be at least a generation before other Asian countries have, in the aggregate, enough economic and military power to create some kind of equilibrium relative to China.
The period in which they catch up with China is likely to be dangerous. Facing multiple rising Asian powers that are divided and smaller, Beijing will try to woo, thrash or thwart them one by one. Only the U.S. can provide the security umbrella within which the balance of Asia can be safely restored.
But unlike the postwar struggle with the Soviet Union, Washington is not facing a choice between an endless Cold War with China or negotiations in which the only question is how much regional influence the U.S. gives up. If Washington is able to deny Beijing the opportunity to achieve easy coercive gains for about 25 years—the amount of time since the Cold War ended—Asia is likely to change in ways that make China a strong country among other strong countries. This would be a satisfactory outcome for Asian countries and the United States. And it ought to be satisfactory to a Chinese leadership that does not seek hegemony.
Mr. Rosen is a professor of national security and military affairs at Harvard.
How America Can Balance China’s Rising Power in Asia
Beijing’s neighbors need about 25 years to catch up. The U.S. security umbrella will be crucial in the interim.
By STEPHEN PETER ROSEN
June 1, 2015 6:56 p.m. ET
Defense Secretary Ash Carter on Saturday called for “an immediate and lasting halt” to China’s territorial expansion in the South China Sea. In Singapore for the annual Shangri-La Dialogue with Asian nations, Mr. Carter voiced U.S. concerns about the “prospect of further militarization as well as the potential for these activities to increase the risk of miscalculation or conflict among claimant states.”
The Obama administration’s “pivot” to Asia notwithstanding, tensions are clearly on the rise as Beijing becomes more assertive in the Asia-Pacific region. Less clear is what should be done about it. Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong called for a “stable regional balance.” Meanwhile, the Chinese government expands the land around disputed islands and deploys ground forces to them, while prominent Chinese academics discuss the need to end the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.
How can a “stable regional balance” be achieved? China’s relative economic and military power will continue to grow. Asia is far from North America. Washington can stand up today for freedom of navigation and multilateral diplomacy, but some argue that geography and the steady shift in power toward China stacks the deck against the U.S. If China continues to build islands in disputed waters, what can the U.S. do?
The message, always there but seldom articulated, is that the U.S. should concede gracefully to the inevitable and make the best deal it can before it is even relatively weaker. This is a superficially appealing argument, but it is shortsighted and self-centered. It looks only at the U.S. But the question of what to do about a rising China cannot be answered by America alone.
China’s ascendance became apparent toward the end of the 1980s. What is forgotten is how unusually favorable to China the Asian environment was from 1990 until 2010. All of Beijing’s important enemies and rivals were neutralized during those 20 years. Soviet rule collapsed along with Russia’s sphere of influence in the region, eliminating what had been China’s main continental rival since the 18th century. Japan was constrained militarily and diplomatically by the consequences of its wars of aggression.
The U.S. became the ally of China during the Cold War and was actively supporting the growth of the Chinese economy and even of its military. When Washington started having second thoughts about this strategy at the turn of this century, they were soon subordinated to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The rise of China was thus neither motivated nor hindered by foreign hostility. It was facilitated by the most benign Asian security environment that China had experienced for 200 years.
China’s rise also took place when its Asian economic rivals were stunted. The so-called Asian Tigers—Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan—grew rapidly but were small. Japan was crippled by its financial crisis. India was hobbled by 40 years of socialist mismanagement and only began its slow journey toward economic reform in the early 1990s, some 15 years after China rejected Maoist economic policies. Vietnam, now a unified country of more than 93 million people, was recovering from 30 years of war. Russia suffered from a succession of kleptocracies. The countries that could provide investments, markets and exports to rival China in Asia were not there.
There are signs that this period has ended. Chinese economic growth has slowed. Japan is emerging as an independent military power; it is investing abroad, and its economy may be recovering from its long stagnation. India’s economic growth is now more rapid than China’s and is likely to remain so. Indian military spending is making up for decades of inattention. Indonesia and Vietnam have achieved modest rates of economic growth.
Russia is likely to remain a nuclear superpower with a decaying society. Moscow’s anxiety about Beijing is real but has been suppressed, if only for the time being, by President Vladimir Putin’s need to find a friend after his Ukraine excursion. Russia’s national anxiety will re-emerge when he goes.
Does this mean that all is well and the U.S. can turn away from Asia? Hardly. It will be at least a generation before other Asian countries have, in the aggregate, enough economic and military power to create some kind of equilibrium relative to China.
The period in which they catch up with China is likely to be dangerous. Facing multiple rising Asian powers that are divided and smaller, Beijing will try to woo, thrash or thwart them one by one. Only the U.S. can provide the security umbrella within which the balance of Asia can be safely restored.
But unlike the postwar struggle with the Soviet Union, Washington is not facing a choice between an endless Cold War with China or negotiations in which the only question is how much regional influence the U.S. gives up. If Washington is able to deny Beijing the opportunity to achieve easy coercive gains for about 25 years—the amount of time since the Cold War ended—Asia is likely to change in ways that make China a strong country among other strong countries. This would be a satisfactory outcome for Asian countries and the United States. And it ought to be satisfactory to a Chinese leadership that does not seek hegemony.
Mr. Rosen is a professor of national security and military affairs at Harvard.
There is nothing in the article about US Military "presence" ending, or having a time limit.
To the contrary he voices an absolute need for American Security to be very strong for the next 25 years. After that, it may not need to be as strong...but there is no talk in the article whatsoever, or even an implication that it will "end."
As I have said...let's move on from such implications.
The US is a critical Pacific nation with strong alliances in the western Pacific. Those are not going anywhere in the forseeable future and prof. Rosen's article, if anything, underscores that.
Shen...it's enough. Nothing in the article you posted indicated any such thing.
I have indicated to you on several occasions now to stop with the this notion that the US is "done," militarily in the Western Pacific and going to "withdraw.". It is simply, and completely off base. Stuff right out of far left lala land.
We are not going to debate it here. If you want to go to another forum and debate it...knock yourself out.
I already indicated it was enough...get the message.