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[CasualObserver]

"Not this again"? This is actually the first time I've raised this point.

I meant no disrespect; it's just that these points get brought up so often by people who don't really follow these topics that it becomes exhausting having to correct them all the time.

Defense priorities evolve with budgets, governments & changing threat perceptions.

This is already addressed in my post. Regional threats facing Turkey continue to increase, and the current plan of the Air Force is to support a manned fighter fleet of ~350 aircraft with a large number of unmanned force multipliers such as fighter UCAVs and flying-wing deep-strike UCAVs.

Throughout its entire history, TurAF has always maintained a minimum fighter force of around 350 aircraft. The past decade was merely an exception to that, not the new norm.

I simply think the return of the F-35 introduces strategic & budgetary pressures that didn't exist while Turkey was excluded.

1) The US and European NATO arguably need Turkey operating the F-35 more than Turkey needs the F-35 now, for the reasons I outlined above.

2) Which is exactly why these are long-term procurement programs. Turkey, as a $1.6T+ economy, hasn't had a new fighter aircraft enter its inventory in 16 years!

 

[Black Wolf]

I meant no disrespect; it's just that these points get brought up so often by people who don't really follow these topics that it becomes exhausting having to correct them all the time.

Fair enough & I appreciate the clarification.

I meant no disrespect; it's just that these points get brought up so often by people who don't really follow these topics that it becomes exhausting having to correct them all the time.


This is already addressed in my post. Regional threats facing Turkey continue to increase, and the current plan of the Air Force is to support a manned fighter fleet of ~350 aircraft with a large number of unmanned force multipliers such as fighter UCAVs and flying-wing deep-strike UCAVs.

Throughout its entire history, TurAF has always maintained a minimum fighter force of around 350 aircraft. The past decade was merely an exception to that, not the new norm.


1) The US and European NATO arguably need Turkey operating the F-35 more than Turkey needs the F-35 now, for the reasons I outlined above.

2) Which is exactly why these are long-term procurement programs. Turkey, as a $1.6T+ economy, hasn't had a new fighter aircraft enter its inventory in 16 years!

My point isn't that Turkey lacks the economic capacity or operational requirement to field both platforms. My concern is more about long-term strategic autonomy & external dependencies.

KAAN is still dependent on US-origin F110 engines until Turkey's indigenous powerplant matures & enters production. Until then, the program remains reliant on a foreign supplier for one of its most critical components. History has shown that export approvals, licensing & supply-chain decisions can influence fighter programs, even when there is no intention to stop them completely.

If Turkey re-enters the F-35 ecosystem, it gains an immediate capability boost, but it also increases reliance on U.S.-controlled technologies during KAAN's critical development phase. That creates another strategic variable that Ankara will need to manage carefully.

My point is not that KAAN will fail or that the F-35 automatically replaces it. It is that maintaining the momentum & strategic independence of KAAN becomes more challenging until Turkey achieves full control over its own engine technology.

 

[Gloire_bb]

1) The US and European NATO arguably need Turkey operating the F-35 more than Turkey needs the F-35 now, for the reasons I outlined above.

This is honestly a very controversial take.
Hostile Israel and Greece didn't disappear anywhere - these are Turkish problems that the US and European NATO don't need Turkey to solve. There's also an active war in the north, though for now it seems to be contained in the north.

Against this environment, as of today, TAF still has exactly zero modern fighter aircraft, zero operational a2a drones, and all that. Granted, the first modern non-stealth aircraft will come very soon. Granted, first a2a drones will also come relatively soon. But this is future, and future means that capabilities will take time to grow.
Finally, neither of these are edge capabilities. They won't match top end capabilities fielded by TAF active opponents (5th generation fighters) right now.

There's every possible Turkish interest in the world to get F-35 ASAP. Kaan is not an operational capability within a short to medium-term perspective.

 

[CasualObserver]

@Black Wolf

All of Kaan's sensors and major subsystems (except for the engine -- which is still in CDR phase) have already matured beyond what you imagine.

They have either been already flying aboard Kızılelma in their downrated forms (IVDL datalink; downrated EOTS, DAS, IRST, radar, ESM/ECM, etc. -- all of which share substantial software and/or hardware commonality with the systems set to be integrated into Kaan by Q3 2026) or are set to begin flight testing later this year.

In fact, the day after tommorrow, the engine sale approval for Blocks 10 and 20 (i.e., 40 LRIP aircraft) of Kaan is going to pass the Congress.

I keep pointing this out, but apparently it doesn't register you: The Air Force has always maintained a minimum force structure of around 350 fighter aircraft and is now preparing to expand that posture to more than 500 manned and unmanned combat aircraft in the long term. That's hardly impossible for a country with a 1.6+T$ economy that hasn't procured a new fighter aircraft in 16 years.

Defense priorities indeed evolve - but in this case, they've evolved from a requirement for roughly 350 fighter aircraft back in 2018 to a future force structure that is planned to be even larger...

 

[Black Wolf]

@CasualObserver

No one is questioning KAAN's progress, Turkey's growing defense capabilities, or the requirement for a larger fighter fleet. My point is focused on a different aspect: strategic independence.

A fifth-generation fighter is not only about sensors, but avionics also & airframe development; the engine remains one of the most critical components. Until Turkey's indigenous powerplant is fully mature & enters production, KAAN will continue to rely on a foreign engine solution.

That creates a strategic dependency during the most critical phase of the program. Re-entering the F-35 ecosystem would provide an immediate capability boost, but it also increases reliance on US-controlled technologies until KAAN achieves full independence across all major components.

So, my argument is not that KAAN cannot succeed or that Turkey cannot operate both platforms. It is that maintaining strategic autonomy while balancing external dependencies will remain a key challenge.

 

[CasualObserver]

This is honestly a very controversial take.

Yet it's the truth -- they've been pushing Turkey to the edge for well over a decade, and now Turkey has more leverage than they do thanks to its hard-earned independence, America's unreliability, and Russia's invasion of Ukraine...

At some point, once the entire F-16 fleet has gone through Özgür, Turkey will still need a new aircraft for NATO interoperability and nuclear sharing -- much like Germany did with the F-35. Turkey is one of the very few countries that participates so extensively in NATO operations, and European NATO still relies heavily on Turkey's participation. And what multinationally operated aircraft fulfills those requirements better than the F-35?

Finally, neither of these are edge capabilities. They won't match top end capabilities fielded by TAF active opponents (5th generation fighters) right now.

Kaan is not an operational capability within a short to medium-term perspective.

Granted, first a2a drones will also come relatively soon. But this is future, and future means that capabilities will take time to grow.

Yep, I can't object to these points. But even if the NDAA and CAATSA were lifted today, and F-35 deliveries plus an additional sale were approved immediately, those aircraft still wouldn't begin arriving for at least another few years.

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The F-35 backlog is so massive that even newly built aircraft wouldn't realistically arrive before 2032 (even possibly w/o a radar) at the earliest if the US doesn't give up production slots. Additionally, those five aircraft built in 2018/19 and sitting in storage ever since would first need extensive overhauls and upgrades, while instructors would also have to be retrained.

The same applies to the Eurofighter. Newly built aircraft aren't expected before 2030, with their IOC unlikely before 2034. Even the lightly used Omani Tranche 3s would still require around two years of upgrades to reach the Qatari Tranche 3A standard.

Turkish personnel are already undergoing training, yes, but the war in the Gulf has significantly delayed the delivery of the immediately available second-hand aircraft from Qatar and Oman.

Meanwhile, the entire F-16 fleet of 230 aircraft is set to begin the Özgür-2 upgrade early next year, with completion targeted within roughly three years. Unexpected delays will inevitably occur of course, and it's not as though Turkey could field a substantial AESA-equipped F-16 force overnight capable of matching Greece's F-16V + Rafale fleet.

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Deterrence-wise, there are other ways to bridge that gap in the meantime. Turkey is already diversifying long range, heavy land-attack missions toward UAVs, investing heavily in its IADS and radar network coverage, and expanding its inventory of long-range strike systems -- all while these fighter procurement and modernization programs continue to mature.

Greece can't even fly its F-16 fleet half as much as it should at a bare minimum, nor do Rafale pilots average much more than 50 minutes per week (both are well documented through OSINT). Greece also won't be able to raise a full F-35 squadron before 2032, especially considering first deliveries have already slipped to 2029.

Israel has likewise demonstrated how destabilizing it can be to the region, while Trump and the U.S. government have somewhat surprisingly, demonstrated that they won't tolerate any military action against Turkey. (Qatar still got attacked before Bibi lost all credibility with the Iran war, but Turkey's at least an important NATO ally)

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Taken together, all of this points to the existence of a very narrow -- but still real -- path for Turkey to execute these procurement and modernization plans within a few years until a lasting deterrence against the combined Greek-Israeli coalition is ultimately reached.

 

[CasualObserver]

@CasualObserver

No one is questioning KAAN's progress, Turkey's growing defense capabilities, or the requirement for a larger fighter fleet. My point is focused on a different aspect: strategic independence.

A fifth-generation fighter is not only about sensors, but avionics also & airframe development; the engine remains one of the most critical components. Until Turkey's indigenous powerplant is fully mature & enters production, KAAN will continue to rely on a foreign engine solution.

That creates a strategic dependency during the most critical phase of the program. Re-entering the F-35 ecosystem would provide an immediate capability boost, but it also increases reliance on US-controlled technologies until KAAN achieves full independence across all major components.

So, my argument is not that KAAN cannot succeed or that Turkey cannot operate both platforms. It is that maintaining strategic autonomy while balancing external dependencies will remain a key challenge.

You're arguing against arguments I never made. I'd suggest rereading my posts, because having to rewrite everything from scratch would be a waste of everyone's time

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Anyway, that's it for me guys...

 

[temporary1]

In fact, the day after tommorrow, the engine sale approval for Blocks 10 and 20 (i.e., 40 LRIP aircraft) of Kaan is going to pass the Congress.

I would not hold high hopes. You can just see India's example with US shenanigans with their engines.

What US says, what Congress passes, what you agree with the US engine provider, and what's actually delivered (in agreed quantity) is often times different in each stage

 

[Black Wolf]

You're arguing against arguments I never made. I'd suggest rereading my posts, because having to rewrite everything from scratch would be a waste of everyone's time

---

Anyway, that's it for me guys...

I think there may be a misunderstanding of my argument. I am not arguing that F-35 replaces KAAN, that KAAN will be cancelled, or that Turkey cannot operate both platforms.

My point is simply that the return of F-35 introduces new strategic variables, especially while KAAN still relies on external solutions for critical components such as the engine. How that affects future priorities, procurement numbers, or timelines remains to be seen.

In any case, I agree that KAAN has made significant progress & will be an important capability for Turkey. Time will tell how the balance between indigenous development & foreign platforms evolves.

 

[Black Wolf]

I would not hold high hopes. You can just see India's example with US shenanigans with their engines.

What US says, what Congress passes, what you agree with the US engine provider, and what's actually delivered (in agreed quantity) is often times different in each stage

This is exactly the strategic concern I was referring to. The issue is not whether KAAN is progressing or whether Turkey has the resources to operate both F-35 & KAAN.

The question is that until a fully indigenous engine is available, KAAN still depends on an external supplier for a critical component. Fighter programs are long-term projects & even normal export controls, approvals, production capacity, or political changes can affect timelines.

That is why achieving engine independence is just as important as developing the airframe, sensors & avionics. A truly sovereign fifth-generation capability requires control over the entire ecosystem.