I have nothing more to add, I guess. If you said it is not a neutral but it is a realpolitik argument.You are still not engaging the core inconsistency in your framing.
This is not about demanding Israel “be punished first” or insisting on some perfect moral sequencing before non-proliferation is applied elsewhere. That is a mischaracterization of the argument.
The point is simpler: you are treating Israel’s nuclear capability as a permanently absorbed feature of the system — a “managed reality” — while treating any potential capability in its adversaries as a unique escalation threshold that must be prevented at all costs. That is not a neutral risk assessment; it is an asymmetry in how the same risk is interpreted depending on who holds it.
Saying “it has existed for 60 years, therefore it is contained” is not proof of stability, it is just a description of duration under one configuration. It does not logically follow that expanding deterrence in the same environment automatically becomes uncontrollable catastrophe, unless you assume that asymmetry itself is inherently stabilizing.
And the argument that “more nuclear states = inevitable disaster” is not self-evident. Nuclear deterrence theory, whether one agrees with it or not, is built on the opposite premise: that even multiple hostile nuclear powers (i.e. Pakistan/India) can be prevented from direct nuclear war through mutual deterrence. You cannot selectively invoke proliferation risk while ignoring how existing deterrence already functions.
So yes — the perception is not accidental. What you're framing consistently does is justify Israel’s nuclear status as an accepted baseline while expressing strong alarm about any potential counterbalance. That is why it reads as trying very hard to justify Israeli nukes while raising concern about nuclear proliferation among its adversaries, rather than applying a consistent principle of non-proliferation.
If the position is simply that preserving the current nuclear imbalance is preferable to any change because change introduces uncertainty, that is a coherent realpolitik argument. But it is not a neutral or evenly applied non-proliferation principle.
If all 193 countries in United Nations get nuclear weapons, it is not creating a balance but multiplying the points of failure.
When the stakes are human survival, preventing the next country with nuclear weapon is probably the correct choice, regardless of how unfair the baseline is.