No just blockade, infrastructures on the island like airports, seaports, fuel depots, transformer stations, gas stations, etc should be bombed as well.
PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency
- Thread starter pugachev_diver
- Start date
Yup, blockade must be complemented by sustained joint fire bombardment coordinated by PLAGF, PLARF, PLAN and PLAAF, as well as supported by cyber attacks and cutting of undersea cables. Pretty much everything except amphibious assault (boots on the ground). Otherwise the Taiwanese and Americans would simply ignore the blockage and gamble the China Coast Guard vessels executing the blockade wouldn’t dare to fire at blockade runners. This is why an arsenal of digit long-range FPV drones, loitering munitions, and long range rocket artillery is critical. And they must be able to last for weeks and neutralise 90% of Taiwan’s industrial capacity and infrastructure. Ideally for the PLA, following days of joint attacks, the Taiwan military would run out of most heavy equipment and suffer casualties in the six digits. Also, PLA units must be able to withstand and absorb counterattacks by Taiwan’s own missile force.
so you finally understand why i said PRC leaving taiwan rich as hell for decades was a big freaking mistake ?
you can't take over some place easy if the population living there don't suffer and actually want a better master who offer better deal , better life
as right now the so called peaceful reunification between china and taiwan is a laughable joke dream
PRC don't have anything better , can't offer anything better for the taiwan population , no way in hell taiwan population gonna accept CCP as new master peacefully
just look at iran right now . i bet US invasion of iran gonna be cakewalk easy just like venezuela .
population suffer , no one have any kind of interest to defense the nation , the gov anymore , 1000% willing to betray doesn't matter how many good weapon iran military have they gonna get curb stomp easy just like venezuela
That’s not how Taiwanese feel when they visit China *shrug*. Maybe go touch some grass dude.
At the end, we should ask if xi has any resolve to play hard or not.
And apparently, the rebel army is planning to deploy those HIMARS on Penghu and Dongyin Islands.
Wait, whose genius idea is this lmfao
Penghu are expected.
Dongyin... well, expected too, just won't live long even with fortification.
I guess the intent/meaning is a threat of preemptive salvos.
Best use of MLRS is to have them drive around in tiny circles on a small island to evade being attacked of course.
The Taiwan Strait and the geographic separation that it provides is a double-edged sword for both China and Taiwan.
While the Strait makes a Taiwan campaign logistically challenging for China, it also acts as a buffer against Taiwanese missile raids aimed at China. If we are to assume that ROC's land-attack and anti-ship missiles are meant to be used in a defensive or counteroffensive role, the following would need to occur for any missile attack to be viable:
So, perhaps surprisingly, the best chance that these missiles could get at striking targets on the mainland would be via a pre-emptive attack, taken place in a world where China would not be expecting a conflict with Taiwan.
Of course, the calculus changes if the United States is involved, but that would mean a whole new level of conflict with a different set of goals and operating parameters.
While the Strait makes a Taiwan campaign logistically challenging for China, it also acts as a buffer against Taiwanese missile raids aimed at China. If we are to assume that ROC's land-attack and anti-ship missiles are meant to be used in a defensive or counteroffensive role, the following would need to occur for any missile attack to be viable:
- The missiles would need to survive the initial barrage of PLA fires in addition to the sustained around-the-clock "Scud-hunting"-type patrols carried out by PLAAF/PLANAF aircraft.
- However many missiles that remain would need to cross the Taiwan Strait, where they would almost certainly be detected and fired upon by a mix of sea-based PLAN assets, shore-based long-range SAMs, and patrolling aircraft.
- If the missiles somehow make it through Chinese airspace, they would need to survive multiple layers of air defenses ranging from the HQ-29 to the HQ-17.
- All of the above assumes that there would be no such thing as PLA electronic interference/disruption. Of course, in a real conflict this would not be the case.
So, perhaps surprisingly, the best chance that these missiles could get at striking targets on the mainland would be via a pre-emptive attack, taken place in a world where China would not be expecting a conflict with Taiwan.
Of course, the calculus changes if the United States is involved, but that would mean a whole new level of conflict with a different set of goals and operating parameters.
Penghu isn't all that small.
Dongyin is, but it's the only place where HIMARS is in range of anything valuable.
It's also fortified(throughly tunneled).
I think you overestimate how valuable those launchers are. Ukrainians made them almost symbols, but the vehicles themselves are cheap and mostly redundant.
It's ultimately rocket artillery. If they could afford to lose 240mm howitzers before, they can do it with few trucks and 229mm rocket boxes.