China's SCS Strategy Thread
- Thread starter lilzz
- Start date
I remember this incident. I didn't expect it to be DDG-164. This can explain a lot of things.
Several takes from this collision incident:
1. May the two or three CCG sailors who sacrificed in their lines of duty RIP, and may their families and friends find closure.
2. Several heads from the PLAN (and possibly also the CCG) will roll due to this incident.
3. The affected CCG cutter should be repaired and put back into service. There have been plenty of historical cases worldwide with damages similar or worse than that, and pretty much all of them made it back to base (and shipyard for repairs).
4. The procedure for dealing with intrusions and confrontations must be updated and overhauled. Communication and coordination between the CCG and PLAN from the top echelons down to the individual ship/cutter/boat level must be improved and further integrated.
5. The PLAN has no business engaging in cat-and-mouse chasing and ramming opposing ships/cutters/boats. Such jobs should only be left to the CCG. The only business that the PLAN should have (apart from staring down the opposing side) is to open fire at the opposing ships/cutters/boats from a distance in case things go lethal between both sides.
6. The need for multiple units of small and moderate-sized but very fast warships (for the PLAN) and cutters/boats (for the CCG) will only become more urgent than ever.
7. There is no need to escalate this into a lethal skirmish, let alone a war with the Philippines due to this incident.
1. May the two or three CCG sailors who sacrificed in their lines of duty RIP, and may their families and friends find closure.
2. Several heads from the PLAN (and possibly also the CCG) will roll due to this incident.
3. The affected CCG cutter should be repaired and put back into service. There have been plenty of historical cases worldwide with damages similar or worse than that, and pretty much all of them made it back to base (and shipyard for repairs).
4. The procedure for dealing with intrusions and confrontations must be updated and overhauled. Communication and coordination between the CCG and PLAN from the top echelons down to the individual ship/cutter/boat level must be improved and further integrated.
5. The PLAN has no business engaging in cat-and-mouse chasing and ramming opposing ships/cutters/boats. Such jobs should only be left to the CCG. The only business that the PLAN should have (apart from staring down the opposing side) is to open fire at the opposing ships/cutters/boats from a distance in case things go lethal between both sides.
6. The need for multiple units of small and moderate-sized but very fast warships (for the PLAN) and cutters/boats (for the CCG) will only become more urgent than ever.
7. There is no need to escalate this into a lethal skirmish, let alone a war with the Philippines due to this incident.
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It is very hard for PLAN sailors to get decorations during peace time and I wonder if that caused 164 to behave in such a manner.
Not sure about microwave weapons, but the CCG has employed lasers against the PCG in the past.
Can't imagine this being the first time a PLAN destroyer "played chicken" with the FCG: type 054A frigates have allegedly been in at least a of with the FCG in recent years.
So one would assume PLANS Guilin (164) was deployed to the area — with both the crew and the chain of command — fully cognizant of the potential need to ram adversarial vessels and the risks in play.
Yeah maybe we have a case of a hot-headed commander here.
this is the right take, sounds like someone was going on a glory chase.
around 2019, CCG 21612 and 21613, 600-ton high-speed water-jet patrol vessels, were commissioned. Ship 21612 conducted multiple operations near Huangyan in April of this year. Two larger 1,500-ton high-speed water-jet patrol vessels are nearing completion, with rumors suggesting the first batch will consist of 10 vessels.
For CCG, adding more high-speed vessels is more a matter of time and willingness than capability.
Yes. Though, given the VAST area of responsibility for the CCG across the SCS and ECS, more such units is definitely required.
There is probably a lot of leadership issues at play that has hitherto remained hidden. typically, military unit operating independently (a ship, or an small army unit on long range patrol etc) are given a lot of leeway to make decisions on the spot. This results in a maverick mindset in some units. the type of maneuver that led to this incident likely happened many times with some close calls but no significant consequences due to pure luck. PLA would be wrong to view this as a singular incident as a result of bad luck, better have a look at a whole bunch of things.