AUKUS News, Views, Analysis.

[sndef888]

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1950316812564123952

I fully support America first

 

[Lethe]

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1950316812564123952

This is a de facto extension of the current review from the previously announced timeframe.

It's a strange world indeed where Australia is relying on the grasping whims of Donald Trump and the hard-nosed realism of Elbridge Colby to save us from our own craven follies.

Reading Hugh White's latest novella in Quarterly Essay 98, "Hard New World: Our Post-American Future", one of the points that feeds into his broader argument struck me with more force than it has previously, namely that there is little material evidence that the United States is actually committed to maintaining military superiority over China. Budgets are flat, there are no more carriers with additional air wings in the offing, no more ships, no more submarines. That last item being most relevant to the present discussion. USN's SSN inventory has shrunk considerably since the end of the Cold War and is likely to shrink further in the near-term. In times past, it was possible to explain Washington's lack of urgency as emerging from a failure to comprehend the scale of the developments that are underway in China and their implications for the balance of power. Yet in recent years, many of those illusions borne of hubris and ideology that were unable to conceive of China as a serious challenge to American global hegemony appear to been, if not eliminated, then at least attenuated, such that there is now a greater and more widespread appreciation of the scale of China's growth and its implications. Yet that dawning realisation has not translated into commitments to significantly increased spending or significantly expanded force structures.

Even if US SSN production can be increased to 2.33 units per year, something that remains very much up in the air at this point, it's not clear why the US shouldn't just keep those additional submarines. Realistically, the United States can obtain the benefits of AUKUS (basing rights and maintenance facilities) without actually selling us those submarines. We will inevitably accept whatever scraps are left on the table, in part because our past follies have left us with no other choice, and also because we remain incapable of envisioning a future for ourselves that is not anchored in dependence on the United States.

 

[Blitzo]

This is a de facto extension of the current review from the previously announced timeframe.

It's a strange world indeed where Australia is relying on the grasping whims of Donald Trump and the hard-nosed realism of Elbridge Colby to save us from our own craven follies.

Reading Hugh White's latest novella in Quarterly Essay 98, "Hard New World: Our Post-American Future", one of the points that feeds into his broader argument struck me with more force than it has previously, namely that there is little material evidence that the United States is actually committed to maintaining military superiority over China. Budgets are flat, there are no more carriers with additional air wings in the offing, no more ships, no more submarines. That last item being most relevant to the present discussion. USN's SSN inventory has shrunk considerably since the end of the Cold War and is likely to shrink further in the near-term. In times past, it was possible to explain Washington's lack of urgency as emerging from a failure to comprehend the scale of the developments that are underway in China and their implications for the balance of power. Yet in recent years, many of those illusions borne of hubris and ideology that were unable to conceive of China as a serious challenge to American global hegemony appear to been, if not eliminated, then at least attenuated, such that there is now a greater and more widespread appreciation of the scale of China's growth and its implications. Yet that dawning realisation has not translated into commitments to significantly increased spending or significantly expanded force structures.

Even if US SSN production can be increased to 2.33 units per year, something that remains very much up in the air at this point, it's not clear why the US shouldn't just keep those additional submarines. Realistically, the United States can obtain the benefits of AUKUS (basing rights and maintenance facilities) without actually selling us those submarines. We will inevitably accept whatever scraps are left on the table, in part because our past follies have left us with no other choice, and also because we remain incapable of envisioning a future for ourselves that is not anchored in dependence on the United States.

I think there is not a small amount of people in Australia, who if asked, would view that prospect (bolded) to still be "not bad".

Betting/hoping that the US will come to Australia's aid by being a continent sized forward operating base for the US is not a bad idea in of itself -- and if they happen to get a few nuclear submarines out of it, that is probably realistically seen as a nice bonus. But ultimately it is the hope that US determination to continue to project power in the western pacific by way of Australia as useful of a staging ground, and trying to be as useful of a staging ground as possible, that forms the basis of current Australian strategy imo even if Australian politicians may not all fully realize it yet.

 

[gelgoog]

Oh the US did want to build more submarines. It is just that the MIC can't do it.
At one point they were building two Virginia submarines a year, but ever since they switched to the longer Virginias with VLS they cannot do more than one a year.
Because of that overall sub fleet size is shrinking as the Los Angeles subs are put to pasture.

 

[4Tran]

I think there is not a small amount of people in Australia, who if asked, would view that prospect (bolded) to still be "not bad".

Betting/hoping that the US will come to Australia's aid by being a continent sized forward operating base for the US is not a bad idea in of itself -- and if they happen to get a few nuclear submarines out of it, that is probably realistically seen as a nice bonus. But ultimately it is the hope that US determination to continue to project power in the western pacific by way of Australia as useful of a staging ground, and trying to be as useful of a staging ground as possible, that forms the basis of current Australian strategy imo even if Australian politicians may not all fully realize it yet.

This is something that I've never got about Australia. They're moving heaven and earth to get the Americans to help defend them, but who are they being defended against? Australia doesn't have any militarily powerful neighbors, and they're freaking far from everyone else. Sure, I get that this threat is supposed to be from China, but has anyone looked at a map? China is over 3000+ km away, and there are multiple countries in between. Moreover, China has never threatened Australian territory, and it has no reason to threaten Australia's trade, so where is this paranoia coming from? Is it just so is it just xenophobia? Racism? Something strange in Australia's drinking water? And as a related question, is New Zealand like this as well?

 

[ansy1968]

This is something that I've never got about Australia. They're moving heaven and earth to get the Americans to help defend them, but who are they being defended against? Australia doesn't have any militarily powerful neighbors, and they're freaking far from everyone else. Sure, I get that this threat is supposed to be from China, but has anyone looked at a map? China is over 3000+ km away, and there are multiple countries in between. Moreover, China has never threatened Australian territory, and it has no reason to threaten Australia's trade, so where is this paranoia coming from? Is it just so is it just xenophobia? Racism? Something strange in Australia's drinking water? And as a related question, is New Zealand like this as well?

A by product of Living down under.

 

[supersnoop]

Amazing, more submarines paper launched!

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THEY ARE COMING FOR SURES THIS TIME
How many reboots/reshuffles of US/UK/Australian alliances will they announce?
AUKUS, Five-Eyes, Quad, ANZUS, must be super annoying to play card games with these guys, never stops shuffling the deck and making a big deal about it.

 

[Lethe]

I think there is not a small amount of people in Australia, who if asked, would view that prospect (bolded) to still be "not bad".

Betting/hoping that the US will come to Australia's aid by being a continent sized forward operating base for the US is not a bad idea in of itself -- and if they happen to get a few nuclear submarines out of it, that is probably realistically seen as a nice bonus. But ultimately it is the hope that US determination to continue to project power in the western pacific by way of Australia as useful of a staging ground, and trying to be as useful of a staging ground as possible, that forms the basis of current Australian strategy imo even if Australian politicians may not all fully realize it yet.

I think that much of the decision-making apparatus in this country does recognise and embrace that reality, even if they are generally unwilling to speak about it publicly in those terms. The centrist response to the uncertainty of American commitment, an uncertainty that has been greatly magnified under Donald Trump, is that we need to support the US in maintaining and exercising its strategic footprint in the region, that we need to invest more heavily in a variety of capabilities to demonstrate our value as an ally for the United States, and we need to be more accommodating of American demands.

This conception that Australia's national security depends on progress towards a more perfect union with the United States makes sense within an underlying worldview that sees the United States as an essentially passive, benign, and effective shield against the potentially limitless predations of an essentially alien PRC. This is the establishment consensus.

It makes a lot less sense within a less ideologically polarized framework that views the USA and PRC as two extremely large physics objects that interact dynamically both with each other and with smaller physics objects in the system, such as Australia. In this conception, there are few obvious sources of organic conflict between China and Australia, but there is clearly great friction and potential for conflict between the United States and China, and also between China and other regional nations with contested territorial claims and/or historical grievances, where most such scenarios would also involve the United States. In this conception, our increasingly close association with the United States carries the risk of involving us in a potential conflict that we need not be involved in, potentially with catastrophic results, and may even increase the risk of that conflict occurring in the first place.

The basic choice is between attempting to reinforce an American-led system that has worked for us for the last seventy years, or departing significantly from that system to embrace an uncertain future. There are many reasons why we have chosen the former path rather than the latter, and discussion of racial and cultural dynamics and prejudices is not irrelevant to that discussion. Fundamentally one can observe that those favouring an extension or deepening of the status quo enjoy institutional advantages of incumbency that are difficult to overcome in the face of only incrementally changing circumstances. So long as it is possible to deny or downplay the changes that are occurring, or to offer a path forward that involves only modest adaptation, that will present as the path of least resistance. Radical changes tend only to occur following radical events, as with the fall of Singapore in 1942 occasioning the switch in Australia's basic allegiance from Britain to the United States.

I will close with an extract from the

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to Hugh White's latest essay:

America has strategic alliances with a lot of countries – over fifty, by one count. But the custodians of Australia’s alliance with America – political leaders, officials, commentators and assorted schmoozers – believe that ours is something very special. They are convinced that between Australia and America there is a unique intimacy and mutual commitment that lifts our alliance under the ANZUS Treaty to a different level, above the cool and sometimes cynical calculus of national interests where ordinary alliances operate. Faced with the prospect of a second Trump presidency, Penny Wong said last year that the US–Australia relationship “is bigger than the events of the day” and is “shaped by enduring friendship and timeless values.”

The claim is that we are more than allies, we are “mates.” Tony Abbott once went so far as to tell an audience in Washington that Australians did not really regard America as a foreign country. “We are more than allies, we’re family,” he said. Thus the proud boast that Australia has fought alongside America in every war it has fought since 1900. How else to explain America’s generosity in letting us share its most prized military assets under AUKUS?

This is an illusion, and like many illusions it springs from anxiety. We are eager to claim that the alliance is built on foundations firmer than the shifting sands of national policies and interests precisely because we are unsure that policy and interests alone are enough to keep it alive. For all the sentimental talk of imperishable bonds, Australians have always been the most anxious of allies, and for good reason. No country in history has depended so much, and for so long, on allies so far away from us and to whom we matter so little for the defence of their most vital interests.

That is why for 150 years, since the splendour of Pax Britannica first began to fray, “Can we depend on our allies?” has always been one of the central questions of our national life. And what we have learnt, again and again, is that all alliances, without exception, are transactional. That is what we discovered when Singapore fell in 1942, when the vaunted imperial ties of history, language, values and kinship were outweighed by the demands of Britain’s own vital interests.

It was a lesson imprinted indelibly on the minds of the wartime and postwar generations, for whom the Fall of Singapore was a touchstone, reinforced by Britain’s final withdrawal east of Suez after 1968 and America’s uncertain support in regional crises of the early 1960s. But the lesson needs relearning today, as we emerge from the era we still call the “post–Cold War,” when American power and resolve appeared to be limitless and unchallenged – rather like Britain’s seemed at the height of its nineteenth-century imperial power. In a world with only one global power, an alliance with that power seemed to offer all we needed to make our way in the world. That era has now passed.

 

[Blitzo]

It makes a lot less sense within a less ideologically polarized framework that views the USA and PRC as two extremely large physics objects that interact dynamically and exert influence on smaller physics objects in the system, such as Australia. In this conception, there are few obvious sources of organic conflict between China and Australia, but there is clearly great friction and potential for conflict between the United States and China, and also between China and other nations with contested territorial claims and/or historical grievances. In this conception, our increasingly close association with the United States carries the risk of involving us in a potential conflict that we need not be involved in, potentially with catastrophic results, and may even increase the risk of that conflict occurring in the first place.

I think this bolded part is key.
I believe that there is a part of Australian leadership and military establishment that if Australia is not tied with the US, then if a conflict between the US and China occurs then there is a higher chance of the US coming off worse in that scenario, leaving Australia more "defenseless" and at the mercy of China.

That is to say, the lack of provision of Australia as a continent sized forward operating base for the US, may be detrimental to US warfighting capabilities and options against China, and it is in Australian interests to enable and support the US to win a conflict against China.


On the other hand, I do agree that Australia by aligning itself with the US and providing that kind of basing support in the first place does raise the likelihood of being seen by China as a target.

In Australia's defense, I suspect the Australian establishment did not accurately project what sort of timeline the PRC would advance in terms of military capability. Possibly if they had a more accurate grasp of things, then a less vocal and bellicose strategy may have been pursued.
(I consider that amusing, because some of the better PLA watchers in the public space I have found are from Australia such as yourself, but it seems Australian thinktank/establishment PLA tracking seem to have their heads stuck in the sand)

 

[4Tran]

I think this bolded part is key.
I believe that there is a part of Australian leadership and military establishment that if Australia is not tied with the US, then if a conflict between the US and China occurs then there is a higher chance of the US coming off worse in that scenario, leaving Australia more "defenseless" and at the mercy of China.

That is to say, the lack of provision of Australia as a continent sized forward operating base for the US, may be detrimental to US warfighting capabilities and options against China, and it is in Australian interests to enable and support the US to win a conflict against China.


On the other hand, I do agree that Australia by aligning itself with the US and providing that kind of basing support in the first place does raise the likelihood of being seen by China as a target.

In Australia's defense, I suspect the Australian establishment did not accurately project what sort of timeline the PRC would advance in terms of military capability. Possibly if they had a more accurate grasp of things, then a less vocal and bellicose strategy may have been pursued.
(I consider that amusing, because some of the better PLA watchers in the public space I have found are from Australia such as yourself, but it seems Australian thinktank/establishment PLA tracking seem to have their heads stuck in the sand)

I don't think that China will see Australia as much of a threat. It's simply too far away from the combat zones to make that much of a difference. The only way this changes is if Australia joins the US in combat activity. The sad thing about this is that Australia's sovereignty is even slightly threatened is because they're so closely stuck to the Americans in the first place.

It's painfully obvious to any outsider, that Australia has no business in a Western Pacific war, and that there's nothing for them to gain from such a conflict, and only heavy losses regardless of the outcome. So why can nobody in the country say that? It's because the political system is so broken there that it's political suicide to say it.

Of all the players that might participate in a Western Pacific war, the only ones I see being belligerents are Philippines and Australia. Philippines is easy to explain, Bongbong Marcos is owned by the Americans and he's morely likely to do what's good for himself than worry about the best interests of Philippines. For Australia, it's a lot harder to say and I think it can go either way. It's obviously in Australia's best interests to stay out, but they're also so willing to surrender their autonomy to the US, and the political momentum is weighed in that direction.