PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

[Wrought]

Sorry, let me make a correction. 2027 is a modernization deadline: but Taiwan is not mentioned anywhere in PRC government publications. This is commentary added by foreign actors.
Here’s some relevant documents for the PLA centennial goal.

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

When it came up, according to an American official who later spoke to the press, Chinese leader Xi Jinping grew exasperated — not at the risk of war, but at the timeline.

“Xi basically said: ‘Look, I hear all these reports in the United States [of] how we’re planning for military action in 2027 or 2035,’ ” the official said.

“ ‘There are no such plans,’ ” Xi said in the official’s telling. “ ‘No one has talked to me about this.’ ”

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

 

[plawolf]

China is not Russia and Taiwan is not Ukraine, I completely agree with you on this point. With that said, Vietnam isn't Ukraine, as examples of quagmires, and Iraq (GF1) isn't Korea (before direct Chinese intervention) either, as examples of quick victories.

So what are the similaries between quagmire, and what are similarities between dominating victories in these fights between a smaller nation with a fairly strong military against a much larger nation with a at least near world-leading military? First is what you already mentioned, a land border with a supportive strong power. Second IMO is decisive deployment of large number of ground troops. In Iraq there was ~1 million allied soldiers deployed, and in Korea after Incheon and until Chinese intervention the allied forces far outnumbered North Korean ones.

I can distill that even further for you to two factors. Ability and will.

In a Taiwan scenario, between the US and China today, who has the far greater ability and will to see things through to total victory? I think the only serious question in terms of AR is not whether China will take Taiwan ultimately, but rather how wider the conflict will spread, thereby determining how much more it will take to achieve that victory.

 

[siegecrossbow]

China is not Russia and Taiwan is not Ukraine, I completely agree with you on this point. With that said, Vietnam isn't Ukraine, as examples of quagmires, and Iraq (GF1) isn't Korea (before direct Chinese intervention) either, as examples of quick victories.

So what are the similaries between quagmire, and what are similarities between dominating victories in these fights between a smaller nation with a fairly strong military against a much larger nation with a at least near world-leading military? First is what you already mentioned, a land border with a supportive strong power. Second IMO is decisive deployment of large number of ground troops. In Iraq there was ~1 million allied soldiers deployed, and in Korea after Incheon and until Chinese intervention the allied forces far outnumbered North Korean ones.

I’d agree if it weren’t the fact that there is no historic precedence for Taiwan successfully resisting an invasion from any power whether be Mainland dynasty, Imperial Japan, European, etc.

 

[dingyibvs]

I can distill that even further for you to two factors. Ability and will.

In a Taiwan scenario, between the US and China today, who has the far greater ability and will to see things through to total victory? I think the only serious question in terms of AR is not whether China will take Taiwan ultimately, but rather how wider the conflict will spread, thereby determining how much more it will take to achieve that victory.

My only concern with that is that the US's will should not be measured by its willingness to help TW, but its willingness to confront China. There's a certain segment within the American establishment who are itching to goad China into a conflict as they see that time may not be on their side. Of course, as the aggressor their will should still be at a disadvantage, as the will to gain more than what you already comfortably have cannot possibly be measured against the will to protect yourself from losing everything you have.

 

[plawolf]

My only concern with that is that the US's will should not be measured by its willingness to help TW, but its willingness to confront China. There's a certain segment within the American establishment who are itching to goad China into a conflict as they see that time may not be on their side. Of course, as the aggressor their will should still be at a disadvantage, as the will to gain more than what you already comfortably have cannot possibly be measured against the will to protect yourself from losing everything you have.

That’s why I said ability and willpower.

America might have the will to see China destroyed, but they lack the ability to make it so. Not without effective mass suicide themselves via nuclear MAD at least.

In a conventional war, China vs US is basically a replay of US vs Japan from WWII in terms of industrial capabilities and numbers. In fact, it’s far more lopsidedly against America today than it was against Japan in WWII.

If we take nukes out of the equation, in a total war between China and America today, the only realistic result is total conquest of the CONUS by China. It might take 10 years, but Chinese industrial dominance leaves no other realistic outcome.

And I think nukes is the main reason China is putting off AR. It wants to wait until technology has reached a point where it can take that final ace out of America’s deck as well to really exponentially raise the stakes for them to get involved.

 

[gelgoog]

where does that 2027 date even come from and why in the world are the Americans so fixated on it? It's not as if they're even trying to do anything by that date so why keep bringing it up?

I have heard two claims. One where supposedly Xi set a goal to have the armed forces ready by 2027. Another where it is claimed due to retirements and inductions 2027 is the year the US Navy will have the least ships. Supposedly giving the PRC an attack window.

But this is all BS. Because the long term trends all lead to the Chinese military advantage vs the US to grow not get narrower. And there is no reason for China not to wait longer. There is no deadline.
If anything it is the US that needs to hurry or lose its chance to damage China in a war. But I think, unlike these US military analysts, that their chance to win a war vs China is long gone. Maybe a decade ago it could have been done.

 

[Phead128]

I think a lesson from the current Israel -Iran conflict is that missile barrages aren't enough, and quickly lose their shock value.

The PLA needs to establish a beachhead and land forces as soon as possible after the initial air/missile assault. Ideally within hours, not days.

Agree, particularly the Ukraine war has shown that air strikes, missiles, drones is unable to win a war alone. Israel-Iran conflict reinforces this. It all comes down to boots on the ground, the beachhead and landing force is the deal breaker within first hours if not days, otherwise it's just an long drawn out attrition fest, which isn't ideal but I am sure China will eventually win.

 

[Wrought]

I think a lesson from the current Israel -Iran conflict is that missile barrages aren't enough, and quickly lose their shock value.

The PLA needs to establish a beachhead and land forces as soon as possible after the initial air/missile assault. Ideally within hours, not days.

No, the lesson is don't be like Iran and use the wrong tools for the wrong job. "Shock value" is nothing. The destruction of critical command, control, comms, etc, nodes is everything. This is

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

which predates the existence of the PLA Rocket Force as a branch. In 2015, it was still the Second Artillery Corps.

In the case of Iran and China, a stark contrast exists between how they have talked about the utility of conventional TBMs. Iran discusses them as a psychological deterrent with effects in excess of their physically destructive power while China’s doctrine views them as a war-fighting capability expected to destroy military targets and thus attain objectives as part of an integrated military campaign.

The lesson is simple. You can—out of weakness or stupidity—rely on convincing your enemy to decide they should give up. Or you can invest far more time and effort and resources into building the capabilities which ensure that it doesn't matter what your enemy decides to do, because their decision has no bearing on their physical inability to resist either way. I'll let you guess who chose what approach.

In other words:

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1934656780707000676

 

[FairAndUnbiased]

The air superiority requirement for China is actually very low. China doesn't even need air superiority over the beach, just the strait. The strategy to do so is simple: kick open the door with ballistic missiles and stealth strikers or point blank VLS launches from subs taking out SAMs, radar and any planes on the ground, then shoot anyone that takes off while they're still climbing in air to air.

But why not the beach? Because the PLA doesn't need to clear the beach to attack it. Once barges filled with FPVs can drop anchor within 5 km of the coast, its over. Everything down to individual infantry within 10 km of the coast gets cleared out by FPVs. Fiber optics or wired FPVs start off by kicking the door open against anti-drone soft kill, then RF controlled swarms go after the unprotected targets and calling rockets/missiles/airstrikes down on hard targets. Once the first 10 km is emptied of ATGMs and machine gun nests, a beachhead is secured and its done.

FPVs really are a game changer due to their massive volume and the PLAGF should be all in on FPVs of all variants: guided by RF, wired or AI, and with recon, HE and shaped charge payloads. They're the new artillery.

 

[Phead128]

The air superiority requirement for China is actually very low. China doesn't even need air superiority over the beach, just the strait. The strategy to do so is simple: kick open the door with ballistic missiles and stealth strikers or point blank VLS launches from subs taking out SAMs, radar and any planes on the ground, then shoot anyone that takes off while they're still climbing in air to air.

But why not the beach? Because the PLA doesn't need to clear the beach to attack it. Once barges filled with FPVs can drop anchor within 5 km of the coast, its over. Everything down to individual infantry within 10 km of the coast gets cleared out by FPVs. Fiber optics or wired FPVs start off by kicking the door open against anti-drone soft kill, then RF controlled swarms go after the unprotected targets and calling rockets/missiles/airstrikes down on hard targets. Once the first 10 km is emptied of ATGMs and machine gun nests, a beachhead is secured and its done.

FPVs really are a game changer due to their massive volume and the PLAGF should be all in on FPVs of all variants: guided by RF, wired or AI, and with recon, HE and shaped charge payloads. They're the new artillery.

has this been tried in Ukraine (FPV drones clearing 10km of enemy infantry) and how fast is this progress? If it takes weeks or months, then China shouldn't bother with AR. Taking and securing a beachhead should be a quick (hours, max days), not like Ukraine-style slogfest (weeks, months).