There are technically some controls regarding drones and drone parts going from China to Russia and Ukraine but basically it cannot be stopped from going through places like Kazakhstan for Russia and Poland for Ukraine.
The War in the Ukraine
- Thread starter SampanViking
- Start date
Russian MoD reports an Iskander-M hitting a Patriot missile launcher in Dnipropetrovsk. According to the official statements,
" The crew of the «Iskander-M» operational-tactical missile system attacked the position of the «Patriot» air defense system near the village of Ordzhonikidze in the Dnepropetrovsk region.
As a result of a missile strike the multifunctional radar station «AN/MPQ-65», the combat control cabin and two launchers of the «Patriot» anti-aircraft missile system were destroyed."
" The crew of the «Iskander-M» operational-tactical missile system attacked the position of the «Patriot» air defense system near the village of Ordzhonikidze in the Dnepropetrovsk region.
As a result of a missile strike the multifunctional radar station «AN/MPQ-65», the combat control cabin and two launchers of the «Patriot» anti-aircraft missile system were destroyed."
Footage of a Russian FPV drone attacking a Ukrainian VAB armored personnel carrier, it is worth noting that there are fewer of them. The video was filmed in the Kharkiv region of Ukraine. The VAB armored personnel carrier was developed in France by Renault and Savier in 1976 and was produced in different versions. As a result of the attack by Russian FPV drones, the Ukrainian VAB armored personnel carrier was destroyed.
There appears to be a significant discussion of counterfactuals in this thread. "What if" the Russians did X in / before the war.
I wonder if there's any value in a thread "Counterfactual Russian Strategy" for decisions forum members would have made contrary to the Russians.
Subjective factors, such as Russians underestimating Chinese equipment, undoubtedly played a role.
However, from internet posts I have seen from Russians and supporters, economics were a large factor. Russian defense industry seemed to want people outside Russia to see Russian equipment being bought by China, and not vice-versa.
Trying to hold on to what military sales they have is important.
It's partly an unconscious desire to maintain a kind of colonial relationship with China by the one-way sales of arms, reinforcing what you are saying. And Russian defense industry was in need of any help it could get. But also, if people see Russia buying up Chinese equipment, the perception among some Russians was that it would lead to growth of Chinese military exports at the expense of Russia.
There was also a recognition that Russia has to "eat its own dog food," in the regrettable vernacular of U.S. corporations. This meant refining and expanding its own military production, even if foreign (e.g. Chinese) alternatives were available.
Of course, this attitude did not extend so much to European countries before the conflict - witness the Mistral debacle. Russia stupidly allowed countries like France and Ukraine to have a role in important military projects. Conversely, Russia seemed uneasy about relying on Chinese weapons, which were always poised to compete with Russia especially in developing countries. Maybe Russia was more concerned about China scooping up business in regions like West Asia and Latin America, introducing a new competitor to Russian exports. (Whereas France was already established in some markets.)
At the same time, again reinforcing what you said, the desire to "be European" prior to 2022 was a factor in Russian procurement, which did not favour China. So, the economics of the arms trade, and the geopolitics of European integration, were likely factors in the non-procurement of Chinese weapons, in addition to unwarranted subjective denigration of Chinese arms.
It looks like there was a more detailed exploration of this topic in a February post:
Russia needed to invest in its own MIC. Purchasing Chinese equipment would not have helped that goal.
Lethe argues that the Mistral deal was about rejuvenating Russia's shipbuilding capability, and I've seen that asserted before. The main problem was the geopolitics, which prevented the deal from being completed as intended.
Yet was there not another country Russia could have turned to for rejuvenating its shipbuilding sector?
Shenyang next gen combat aircraft thread
Indeed a good one! by the way, can we please stop call this one the J-50? There is nothing that supports this name and the only "source" that claimed this designation was (per my understanding) one with rather dubious credibility. Shall we settle on J-XS then?
www.sinodefenceforum.com
Russia needed to invest in its own MIC. Purchasing Chinese equipment would not have helped that goal.
Lethe argues that the Mistral deal was about rejuvenating Russia's shipbuilding capability, and I've seen that asserted before. The main problem was the geopolitics, which prevented the deal from being completed as intended.
Yet was there not another country Russia could have turned to for rejuvenating its shipbuilding sector?
Footage of a strike by a Russian, presumably 300mm Tornado-S MLRS missile on a Ukrainian airfield near the village of Barkovo, Dnipropetrovsk region of Ukraine. The airfield housed An-2 aircraft, reportedly used for logistical purposes and to intercept Geranium drones. It is possible that they were simply used for agricultural purposes. Judging by the accuracy of the strike, a Tornado-S missile with GLONASS guidance was used. As a result of the missile strike, the An-2 aircraft received shrapnel damage.
Miragedriver
Brigadier
I honestly believe we're at a major inflection point in warfare—similar to when tanks and aircraft first changed the battlefield forever. Back then, traditional infantry had no answer to these new machines… until they got some of their own. Then the fight became not just about the machine, but about how to manage, support, and counter them. We're seeing the same kind of shift now—but with drones.
Drones—particularly cheap FPV models and loitering munitions—are the new game-changers. They're saturating the battlefield, overwhelming traditional defenses, and forcing militaries to radically rethink force composition. But just like tanks and planes didn’t make everything else obsolete, drones won’t either. They’re exposing gaps that will be filled—likely with new tech and doctrine.
Take active protection systems (APS). If we reach a point where a tank can field thousands of micro-interceptors to take down small drones, while also countering missiles, rockets, and even optically-guided munitions with directed energy weapons and blinding lasers, then armor could very well make a comeback. Add to that integrated sensor suites capable of detecting drone operators through emissions or thermal/radar signatures, and you start imagining tanks as mobile drone-hunters rather than just gun platforms.
Sure, drone swarms are hard to stop—just like insect swarms in nature—but as always, military tech evolves. Some countermeasures will work, others will fail. It’s trial by fire, and the side that learns faster wins—at least until the other side adapts again.
Look at recent conflicts: In Nagorno-Karabakh, TB2s dominated against weak air defenses. Fast forward to Ukraine, and those same drones are being shredded by competent air defense networks. That’s pushed recon drones to get smaller, cheaper, and harder to detect—forcing air defense to adapt again with new tech to engage tiny, low-signature targets economically.
Lasers, jammers, advanced APS, and swarms of friendly hunter-killer drones will all play a part in leveling the field.
And frankly, I think Western forces are more vulnerable in the near term. Most NATO countries have let their air defense capabilities atrophy, while their drones are often too expensive to use at scale. Meanwhile, Russia and China are pumping out cheap, mass-producible systems that thrive in contested environments.
We’re not just watching the future of warfare unfold—we’re in it. The question is: who’s adapting fast enough to survive it?
Drones—particularly cheap FPV models and loitering munitions—are the new game-changers. They're saturating the battlefield, overwhelming traditional defenses, and forcing militaries to radically rethink force composition. But just like tanks and planes didn’t make everything else obsolete, drones won’t either. They’re exposing gaps that will be filled—likely with new tech and doctrine.
Take active protection systems (APS). If we reach a point where a tank can field thousands of micro-interceptors to take down small drones, while also countering missiles, rockets, and even optically-guided munitions with directed energy weapons and blinding lasers, then armor could very well make a comeback. Add to that integrated sensor suites capable of detecting drone operators through emissions or thermal/radar signatures, and you start imagining tanks as mobile drone-hunters rather than just gun platforms.
Sure, drone swarms are hard to stop—just like insect swarms in nature—but as always, military tech evolves. Some countermeasures will work, others will fail. It’s trial by fire, and the side that learns faster wins—at least until the other side adapts again.
Look at recent conflicts: In Nagorno-Karabakh, TB2s dominated against weak air defenses. Fast forward to Ukraine, and those same drones are being shredded by competent air defense networks. That’s pushed recon drones to get smaller, cheaper, and harder to detect—forcing air defense to adapt again with new tech to engage tiny, low-signature targets economically.
Lasers, jammers, advanced APS, and swarms of friendly hunter-killer drones will all play a part in leveling the field.
And frankly, I think Western forces are more vulnerable in the near term. Most NATO countries have let their air defense capabilities atrophy, while their drones are often too expensive to use at scale. Meanwhile, Russia and China are pumping out cheap, mass-producible systems that thrive in contested environments.
We’re not just watching the future of warfare unfold—we’re in it. The question is: who’s adapting fast enough to survive it?
It's drones, it's networked / distributed strike, it's system-of-systems.
As long as somebody can see something, someone in the network may be able to strike it.
AI could potentially be used to reduce vehicle crew requirements. So you could have a large number of affordable tanks and IFVs with 2 or so crew members. Tanks with automated, lightly-armoured turret and small crew leading to a smaller vehicle with protection centered around the crew. With an army / air force of drones supporting them.
U.S. tried to develop some of these concepts in FCS, but it seems that only China might have the budget to coherently implement them. U.S. is still deciding what kinds of battlefield drones it wants to manufacture. Western AFVs are seemingly designed for gladiatorial combat with other AFVs, whereas that has not been the primary threat to AFVs in Ukraine.
U.S. and friends spent the last 20+ years occupying desert. Now, Ukraine is running out of personnel and NATO countries may have to introduce conscription. That's the immediate future we're facing: instead of high-tech, next-generation warfare, NATO will expand the meatgrinder.
As long as somebody can see something, someone in the network may be able to strike it.
AI could potentially be used to reduce vehicle crew requirements. So you could have a large number of affordable tanks and IFVs with 2 or so crew members. Tanks with automated, lightly-armoured turret and small crew leading to a smaller vehicle with protection centered around the crew. With an army / air force of drones supporting them.
U.S. tried to develop some of these concepts in FCS, but it seems that only China might have the budget to coherently implement them. U.S. is still deciding what kinds of battlefield drones it wants to manufacture. Western AFVs are seemingly designed for gladiatorial combat with other AFVs, whereas that has not been the primary threat to AFVs in Ukraine.
U.S. and friends spent the last 20+ years occupying desert. Now, Ukraine is running out of personnel and NATO countries may have to introduce conscription. That's the immediate future we're facing: instead of high-tech, next-generation warfare, NATO will expand the meatgrinder.
An episode of the use of the Russian BMP-3 in combat operations in Ukraine. The location of the shooting is not reported. In the video, the Russian BMP-3 delivers an assault group and provides cover for it during landing. After the assault group lands, the BMP-3 retreats to its original positions. In this version, the BMP-3 is equipped with homemade protection like the Tsar-mangal. At the end of the video, an episode with the storming of one of the houses is added.