054B/new generation frigate

[totenchan]

TLAM blk.Va onwards, i.e. production from 2021 on. (main USN LACM).

A saturation attack with nonstealthy, slow, and large cruise missiles? That doesn't sound like a particularly challenging scenario even for the Type 54A's admittedly dated systems. Cruise missiles are within spec for the main gun IIRC.

First boat (USS Arizona) will be launched this year, will reach service ca. 2027, two years from now. Likely two more around 2028; if additional 4 unit rumors will realise, likely more or less around the same time 054B numbers will start making impact.
Also, mr. officer, do i get a lawyer?

And the hypersonics?

HHQ-16F(latest and best) is active seeker. It takes time for it to scan and find assigned (important) target. In SARH mode it may be faster, but saturation attack at close range can easily confuse SARH illumination, due to engagement geometry.

We've seen no evidence that HHQ-16F exists to my knowledge.

Relevance is that attack cycle of VL SAMs include several seconds in launch, acceleration, and aiming; the larger missile, the more the time.
In general it's a dead zone measuring several kilometers; seconds matter.

How close are you assuming the incoming missiles are going to be before being detected?

By comparison, something like HHQ-10(no staging, direct launch, LOBL capability) may be effective almost right after arming itself. And of course, in 054B it by default will be under unified integrated CMS, i.e. different systems won't interfere with each other.

Why are you comparing a short range missile meant exclusively for terminal defense to a full size air defense missile?

I.e., it may not be obvious, but switch from arm launchers to VLS isn't as straightforward an advantage as it seems(and arguably just a large of a reason is lack of maintenance, not just rate of fire).

No actually I do think its fairly straightforward considering magazine size, the size and weight of the arm launchers and the many horrible accidents, often caught on film, related to the reload process of said arm launchers.

But 054B, despite on paper being 054a with better radar suit, is in fact significantly more capable.

That is not what I am arguing here, though I do agree.

 

[Gloire_bb]

A saturation attack with nonstealthy, slow, and large cruise missiles? That doesn't sound like a particularly challenging scenario even for the Type 54A's admittedly dated systems. Cruise missiles are within spec for the main gun IIRC.

it is challenging enough for combatants with just 4 illumination channels (0.7-.8 pK) and single dated 3D S-band radar.

11356s with comparable capabilities defeated small neptune attacks by hair margin (splinter damage from close misses).

6-9 bandits, even if larger tomahawks, are likely to produce a leak. When frigate(s) try to defeat attack on defended vessels, leaks are very probable.

And the hypersonics?

C-HGB are slated for 2028 on the same boats. Otherwise should enter service with Zumwalts this year.

We've seen no evidence that HHQ-16F exists to my knowledge.

It was assumption that PLAN introduced or is introducing those missiles.
If this is not the case, speaking bluntly, whole 054 family is in a very tough spot, as illumination, instead of fast way to ensure right lock, turns into a locked channel.

How close are you assuming the incoming missiles are going to be before being detected?

They pop over the horizon at ca. 24-25 km. 382 will likely detect them soon enough, but tracks, ID and engagement (especially in the rear with FF procedures) will take time. After some time they'll go low enough for S band radar to start encounter interference from clutter.

Overall, you may consider they're being engaged from 15-20km out, and from around 4 km HHQ-16 no longer be effective.
Notez that proper light ASCMs can be detected and engaged even later(plus they like very nasty high G maneuvers), perhaps from 12-15 km mark. Stealthy ASCMs with esm and nasty engagement algorithms, such as LRASM and JSM, can be detected and prosecuted even later still.

Why are you comparing a short range missile meant exclusively for terminal defense to a full size air defense missile?

In our conversation terminal defense matters a whole lot.
HHQ-10 is very swift fire and forget system(especially against ARH bandits such as TLAM, because passive secondary channel hugely amplifies rof and target discrimination), working to the last moment.

No actually I do think its fairly straightforward considering magazine size, the size and weight of the arm launchers and the many horrible accidents, often caught on film, related to the reload process of said arm launchers.

But even guaranteed Rmin is whole km less. And there is famous footage in Ukrainian war with buks (remote elder system in law of hq-16 family) engaging air targets within 2 km(4-6 sec flight time) from launch point.
If HQ-16F is not a thing, this difference may very well mean one additional engagement.

That is not what I am arguing here, though I do agree.

My position here is that while type 054a is relevant enough to produce last units(and they in their current form will be useful enough until their MLU), overall threat situation very much calls for 054B.
054A is a dated design.

 

[Iron Man]

Why?
You're assuming for your opponent; it's absolutely normal for MRF to conduct reconnaissance strike or interdiction missions in small formations (2-4 ship).

Also, F-35B operations in SCS, for example, are almost by default going to be in no more than few planes. Gather too many dispersed planes together, and you get to sign a cluster of gifts by PLARF.

F-35 operations in the SCS will be from USN LHD/LHA flattops, and they will not be coming in 2s or 4s, but in squadrons. That little stunt with the Philippines military means less than nothing, as no American assets will actually be operating on the Philippines land mass unless there is a massive US presence there able to defend those assets from a Chinese attack, and only if the filipinos agree to let them do this in the first place. We will not be seeing any 2, 4, or 6 F-35s based anywhere in the Philippines unless those F-35s are suicidal.

Virginia easily can offload saturation attack that 054A can't handle, even now; it's a salvo measured in seconds.

Soon, block V Virginia's with Yasen-level VLS counts will go operational.
Furthermore, soon it(as well as other US units at sea and on shore) will also get capability to launch something hypersonic.
Those are not kinds of tracks you engage with Fregat.

It's not clear to me that Virginias will get any antiship Tomahawks anytime soon, if ever. These missiles are totally wasted on submarines, which do not have access to OTH targeting and in any case have not been a part of USN submarine doctrine, like ever. USN subs use their VLS to launch LACM attacks against fixed land targets from hundreds of km away where they are in little danger of detection even if they launch a massive salvo of LACMs. Whatever they could launch in terms of ASCMs would not work against a SAG or CSG, and exposing themselves launching a missile against a smallish target like a nearby frigate or corvette seems very much not worthwhile, and definitely not worthwhile if there are a few such ships in the area.

Torpedo range may be point blank, torpedo range can be in order of 50 miles...

On a still target, maybe. Maybe not even. But certainly against an unwilling target at 50 miles distance, the target can just laugh at the torpedo as it leaves the torpedo's range for good. There's no torpedo in the world that can close 50 miles on a receding target before it runs out of fuel.

HHQ-16 is a heavy, cold-launched ARH missile. it by default imposes significant duty cycle, especially down low. Not as bad as multistage missiles, but it isn't exactly point defense weapon; 054a lacks HHQ-10, having only gun CIWS (single engagement channel), I.e. solution preferable against single, high speed leakers.

382 by itself is a rather dated and basic S-band radar, with origin dating back to 1980s. LRASM will be a hard catch, both due it's stealth (which is very high), and it's nasty ESM habits (which will be especially effective on dated radars); no, it is not impossible; quite the opposite, but it will most probably require concentration and professionalism of crew. Second is a basic must(a shame it is one of the musts humans struggle with for all our history), but first one can be expected only if crew was notified of attack(and that they're the target) in time.
Getting warning is thus crucial, and best and cheapest way to be warned in time(as well as get solution as early as possible) is to have modern 054B around.

HHQ-16 is hot launch, not cold launch, and is not restricted to whatever duty cycle penalties you think apply to cold launch missiles. It's also not a multistage missile; it's single stage. Also, I believe we are talking about the Type 364, not the Type 382, and is a more modern version of the previous surface search radars, though it seems to also have been superseded by whatever's sitting on top of the 054B these days. In any case the Type 382 (aka Chinese Top Plate) is an air and surface (but mostly air) search radar, a typical VSR that serves a similar function to the more modern Type 346 series, not a dedicated surface search radar.

 

[Gloire_bb]

F-35 operations in the SCS will be from USN LHD/LHA flattops, and they will not be coming in 2s or 4s, but in squadrons. That little stunt with the Philippines military means less than nothing, as no American assets will actually be operating on the Philippines land mass unless there is a massive US presence there able to defend those assets from a Chinese attack, and only if the filipinos agree to let them do this in the first place. We will not be seeing any 2, 4, or 6 F-35s based anywhere in the Philippines unless those F-35s are suicidal.

You're talking for americans, what you want them to do... Almost directly contrary to USMC established doctrine, which directs to operate from ships only when there is no other choice.
They - USMC, and quite likely USAF too, - specifically invest a lot of money into Philippines military infrastructure, including dispersal(and dispersed operations are specifically a goal). As they're investing in heavy bomber interditction, and more.
p.s. also, dispersed F-35Bs are way more difficult to clean out when compared to LHD/LHAs in SCS.

It's not clear to me that Virginias will get any antiship Tomahawks anytime soon

They have them right now, as their standard payload. Unlike in 1980s, TASM and TLAM are not separate, it's one common missile.
USN (and USMC) required specifically to make it so, even at cost of some range.

On a still target, maybe. Maybe not even. But certainly against an unwilling target at 50 miles distance, the target can just laugh at the torpedo as it leaves the torpedo's range for good. There's no torpedo in the world that can close 50 miles on a receding target before it runs out of fuel.

Torpedo triangle was invented long time ago...
Also, strictly speaking there are such torpedoes, just not for submarines(UAE deploys those on a few surface ships as a deterrence mechanism against Iran).

HHQ-16 is hot launch, not cold launch, and is not restricted to whatever duty cycle penalties you think apply to cold launch missiles.

Any vertical launch system is. Not pointing nose at the target during launch costs time. The larger the missile, the more time.

 

[ACuriousPLAFan]

Two news from @勤劳朴实罗素历 on Weibo (the latter of which is also quote-posted by Ayi):

#1 - China has successfully developed a 8MW marine diesel engine (attached photo in the post for illustration purpose only); and

#2 - There are sufficient information/evidences to indicate that the 054B FFGs has a combined (propulsion) power output that is 97.6% that of the Iver Huitfeldt FFGs, likely through the usage of the aforementioned marine diesel engines.

The Iver Huitfeldt FFG features a CODAD propulsion system, comprising of 4x 8.2MW MTU8000 marine diesel engines with a combined propulsion power output of 32.8MW.

The 054B FFG also utilizes a CODAD propulsion system. From above, 97.6% of that value equals 32.0128MW of combined propulsion power output, meaning an individual power output of 8.0032MW for each marine diesel engine.

For comparison:
- Iver Huitfeldt FFG is 138.7 meters long, 19.75 meters wide and displaces 6645 tons at full load. Top speed is 28 knots.
- 054B FFG is ~150 meters long, ~16.8 meters wide and displaces ~5000 (+500 at max) tons at full load. Even without touching 30 knots, 28-29 knots should be easily achievable.

Moreover, if the propulsion system has very good vibration and noise reduction/isolation capabilities, the 054B FFGs could be using it for quite a very long while.

 

[SunlitZelkova]

F-35 operations in the SCS will be from USN LHD/LHA flattops, and they will not be coming in 2s or 4s, but in squadrons. That little stunt with the Philippines military means less than nothing, as no American assets will actually be operating on the Philippines land mass unless there is a massive US presence there able to defend those assets from a Chinese attack, and only if the filipinos agree to let them do this in the first place. We will not be seeing any 2, 4, or 6 F-35s based anywhere in the Philippines unless those F-35s are suicidal.

US doctrine does not involve using amphibious assault ships as aircraft carriers. They can be configured that way in an emergency, but preference is to not do so. Two of the America-class lack well decks to make more room for aviation operations, but the ships were found to be pretty poor in this role so the well deck has been restored on the vessels since then.

The USMC and USAF currently have overlapping strategies which call for developing their own small bases in Filipino and Japanese (Ryukyu) islands to operate from. It's not clear how many aircraft would operate from these bases, but one critique of the strategy notes that these planes will be forced to fight in penny packets that would prevent them from making much a difference on the battlefield. Existing airfields are already tiny and the plan is to disperse the planes to avoid making them easy targets for the PLARF.

Returning to 054A vs. 054B, and whether there is a need for a higher 054B production rate (the original point of the discussion I think). Realistically the 054s (whether A or B) will not be operating by themselves. For the types of missions in the 1IC it may fulfill (ASW, protection of shipping, extending SAM defense of coastal areas out to sea, etc.) it will be complemented by PLAAF aircraft maintaining air superiority anyways, while the PLAN's numerous diesel-electric subs will be a major contributor to ASW. The 054A's performance alone will not be the only factor in the wider battle.

Where the advantages of the 054B over the 054A would make a difference would be in the 2IC, where land-based air support will not really be available. Because US planning is calling for a "distant blockade" of China out at the 2IC anyways, the 054B wouldn't be running simple convoy escort; if the US was to execute this strategy the 2IC would become a major battleground involving proper PLAN CSGs and SAGs. However, while the 054A might be lacking compared to the 054B for such a mission, it would nonetheless be supported by 052Ds, 055s, and whatever carrier they are operating with. The support it would lack would be from SSNs. Whereas the 054B can at least be supplemented by the large number of 054As, the number of SSNs is fairly low outright.

Because of this, it may make more sense to construct 054Bs at a slower pace and put funding into SSN production. I am not claiming this is China's actual rationale, but this is how I would make sense of a low production rate of 054Bs. This theory of course hinges on 09IIIB production climbing in the coming years.

 

[HardBall]

You're talking for americans, what you want them to do... Almost directly contrary to USMC established doctrine, which directs to operate from ships only when there is no other choice.
They - USMC, and quite likely USAF too, - specifically invest a lot of money into Philippines military infrastructure, including dispersal(and dispersed operations are specifically a goal). As they're investing in heavy bomber interditction, and more.
p.s. also, dispersed F-35Bs are way more difficult to clean out when compared to LHD/LHAs in SCS.

Nah, that's far from any realistic scenario.

In terms of doctrine, not sure where exactly you are getting that from. You may be referring to USMC CIS during amphibious operations, based on a rough guess.

F-35B is actually the most logistic tail heavy of the variants. They will not be able to operate long term out of bases that have only limited presence, limited services and maintenance support, and no permanent shelters for VLO platforms.

 

[ismellcopium]

Is there actually no evidence the HHQ-16F exists? I can't imagine they'd still be building frigates with SARH SAMs so surely it is in service...

 

[antiterror13]

Is there actually no evidence the HHQ-16F exists? I can't imagine they'd still be building frigates with SARH SAMs so surely it is in service...

It is true, that I/we haven't seen HHQ-16F on the ship .. but this is China, lack of evidence means nothing whether it has or hasn't been commissioned

My bet is, it has been commissioned, I am sure it would be the case for 054B and likely on some later 054A+

 

[Stealthflanker]

Is there actually no evidence the HHQ-16F exists? I can't imagine they'd still be building frigates with SARH SAMs so surely it is in service...

Just look at Type-054B's apparent lack of Illuminator seen in earlier Type-054. SARH guidance requires radar illuminator. This is Type-345 radar seen in earlier Type-054.



That's for me a strong indication that 054B is using SAM with Active Radar Homing. No backward compatibility with earlier HHQ-16's.