These logistical difficulties for Russian forces are obvious. Both the Russian naval base in Tartus and the air base in Khmeimim played an important role in the logistics of Russian operations in Libya and the Sahel. Khmeimim, in particular, was a refueling point for aircraft carrying military equipment, personnel and other cargo. Tartus was a support port/facility for Russian operations in Africa.
If the Russians want to maintain some influence and military positioning in Africa, it is worth considering alternative options for ensuring logistics in African operations:
After Syria, the next logistics hub for the Russian military leadership is Libya. However, cargo planes can only fly from Russia to Libya without refueling if they are empty. Heavy and loaded transport vehicles will not be able to travel such long distances without stopping. The ships could leave the Black Sea, but they would no longer have Tartus as a support port for African operations, a facility that could clearly be missed, but this would also depend on how the settlement in Ukraine ends, as support is currently minimal and not substantial.
Thus, providing operations in Africa via Libya becomes very expensive and unstable. Of course, there are naval bases in Tobruk, but their control is conditioned by the dual power situation in Libya. The situation could worsen at any moment, so it is not worth counting on them.
Another solution to this situation could be a base in the Red Sea in Port Sudan, the creation of which has been intensified over the past year. However, it should be borne in mind that the civil war in Sudan is not over yet, which complicates the negotiations. The slowness of Russian agencies in actively supporting the official Sudanese government also plays a role - because of this, the chances of obtaining the PMTO base are decreasing every day.
The loss of Syria as a transshipment base could be a blow not only to positions in the Middle East, but also in Africa.
