would MLRS and PGMs be a deterrent force in the taiwan strait against carrier group?

Re: would MLRS and PGMs be a deterrent force in the taiwan strait against carrier gro

What I understand is that you say because a SM-2 is no better in ABM than a PAC-3 the -2s interception range is just as limited.
That would for sure not be true. I do believe a SM-2 IV could intercept a TBM at several tens of km out, or even more. The SM might be less accurate / effective in the task. But then again in this scenario of defending a small and moving object (in relation to a stationary airfield a CVN at 30kts becomes really small) it might pretty well just be enough to slightly knock the incoming warhead off course.

Re: would MLRS and PGMs be a deterrent force in the taiwan strait against carrier gro

Sorry for the one liner here but I still am not terribly convinced of a ballistic missile's capability to reliably hit a moving ship. This might be simply because I am ill-informed on this subject though.

Re: would MLRS and PGMs be a deterrent force in the taiwan strait against carrier gro

Scratch said:

I do believe a SM-2 IV could intercept a TBM at several tens of km out, or even more. The SM might be less accurate / effective in the task. But then again in this scenario of defending a small and moving object (in relation to a stationary airfield a CVN at 30kts becomes really small) it might pretty well just be enough to slightly knock the incoming warhead off course.

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This is clearly wrong. You are hypothesizing a scenario where the intercepting missile would "slightly" impact the incoming warhead and knock it slightly off course. If this took place over a land base, it might still be a successful hit. But if it took place over a CVN, it would be a close miss.

This probability of this scenario is infinitesimal. You are talking about an object that moves at mach 6, two kilometers per second. It is not like a football game where the defender just slightly knocks the football off course, missing the goal. You haven't gotten your head around the geometry and the physics yet.

The blast radius of the interceptor itself is only about 5 or 10 meters (rather small, compared to 2 kilometers covered in one second). If the blast radius catches the the warhead, it's not just going to be a near miss, it will miss by a wide wide margin (at that velocity). If the blast radius doesn't catch the warhead, then the warhead will impact.

The chances of "whoa I just barely skimmed that incoming warhead with the blast radius and now it lands a few meters off the starboard, bearly missing the ship" is infinitesimally minute.

Finn McCool said:

Sorry for the one liner here but I still am not terribly convinced of a ballistic missile's capability to reliably hit a moving ship. This might be simply because I am ill-informed on this subject though.

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I have no idea how the terminal guidance would be done. I would say it's an unproven system for now.

But the point is... if it works as advertised, there is no defense since endo-atmospheric interception of it is not possible using today's technology, or even near future technology.

Re: would MLRS and PGMs be a deterrent force in the taiwan strait against carrier gro

delete please

Re: would MLRS and PGMs be a deterrent force in the taiwan strait against carrier gro

Have you considered PLA SAM coverage from the mainland right up to Taiwan's coast?

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They're more likely to hit the ROCAF, indeed more likely to hit their own F-18's, then any PLAAF. And no ROCAF nor any aircraft can do illumination for the SM-2.

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If that is true than the PLA will suffer from the same problem. The types of planes used will all have distinct RCS... for example J-8 and J-11 will be signifcantly larger than any other aircraft. Also, the radar signatures are all very different from one another so it'll be easy to identify the radars on US platforms.

But the point is... if it works as advertised, there is no defense since endo-atmospheric interception of it is not possible using today's technology, or even near future technology.

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Shooting down a SRBM will be like shooting down SCUDs. There are multiple systems capable of doing that. SRBMs never leave the atmosphere. If it was an ICBM, then that is different. Even the US navay acknowledges that currently has no countermeasures against a guided anti-ship ICBM. If such a weapon existed there would be no US naval intervention to Taiwan period. If a guided SRBM existed, then there are countermeasures to deal with that.

I disagree. China is very advanced in electronics, as you can see from the huge range of AWACS / AEW aircraft it has.

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Well as of now the PLAAF doesn't have a single aircraft deploying AESA, nor PESA; although they are reportedly working on the latter. On the other hand, the US has been able to install AESA on the F-16, F-15, and F-18. The advantage might not be as large as it was a few years ago, but it still exists and will exist for at least a few more years. Also very, very little is known about the PLAAF's datalink capabilities and combat management systems; although it is possible that these systems are on par with the very best Western systems.

Re: would MLRS and PGMs be a deterrent force in the taiwan strait against carrier gro

FriedRiceNSpice said:

If that is true than the PLA will suffer from the same problem.

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Wrong. SAMs can be used if the combat aircraft are merely transiting through the Taiwan straits. They can fly through a pre-arranged corridor.

SAMs cannot be used when both PLAAF and ROC aircraft are engaging each other over Taiwan.

FriedRiceNSpice said:

The types of planes used will all have distinct RCS... for example J-8 and J-11 will be signifcantly larger than any other aircraft. Also, the radar signatures are all very different from one another so it'll be easy to identify the radars on US platforms.

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Irrelevant. SM-2's are semi-active.

FriedRiceNSpice said:

Shooting down a SRBM will be like shooting down SCUDs. There are multiple systems capable of doing that.

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Capable of trying to shoot down SRBM's. Actually succeeding is a whole different ball game.

Besides, I've already pointed out the fact that even the "best" endo-atmospheric interceptor, the PAC-3, has a serious range problem.

FriedRiceNSpice said:

Well as of now the PLAAF doesn't have a single aircraft deploying AESA, nor PESA; although they are reportedly working on the latter.

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LOL. What do you think is installed on the Chinese AWACS? What do you think is on the Type 051C?

Those are not new systems. China has long been working with AESA. It's rumored that the modified J-10 with AESA will enter service soon. :china:

Re: would MLRS and PGMs be a deterrent force in the taiwan strait against carrier gro

Roger604 said:

The chances of "whoa I just barely skimmed that incoming warhead with the blast radius and now it lands a few meters off the starboard, bearly missing the ship" is infinitesimally minute.

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When stated balst radius of a handgranate with 0.4kg explosives is 13m and lethal radius 5m, I would assume the blast radius of a 50kg warhead is a little bit more, especially at great altitude.
Early PAC-2 GEMs in Desert Storm seemingly came close enough to SCUDs to sometimes knock them off course. I would also assume todays electronics work a little faster than they did 15 years ago. And even back then reaction time was less then 1s. I think changes are a bit higher than infinitesimall.
Anyway, my main point was to object the statement that SM-2 would be restriceted as much as PAC-3 range wise, wich I thought you implied.

Re: would MLRS and PGMs be a deterrent force in the taiwan strait against carrier gro

Scratch said:

When stated balst radius of a handgranate with 0.4kg explosives is 13m and lethal radius 5m, I would assume the blast radius of a 50kg warhead is a little bit more, especially at great altitude.
Early PAC-2 GEMs in Desert Storm seemingly came close enough to SCUDs to sometimes knock them off course. I would also assume todays electronics work a little faster than they did 15 years ago. And even back then reaction time was less then 1s. I think changes are a bit higher than infinitesimall.
Anyway, my main point was to object the statement that SM-2 would be restriceted as much as PAC-3 range wise, wich I thought you implied.

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Okay let me run through this whole thing again:

For endo-atmospheric intercepts, the PAC-3 is recognized as the premier system, not the SM-2 Block IV

The PAC-3 suffers from very limited range. Using it against an ASBM is going to mean you have one last prayer before impact.

Your argument is that a carrier is less vulnerable to BM than a ground structure, because you can knock the BM slightly off-course and it will miss a carrier, but a ground structure is big enough it will still hit it.

I pointed out that in fact there is no difference between the two because if the interceptor succeeds, the energy of the missile will mean it misses its target by a huge margin. It is extremely unlikely for the incoming warhead to be just barely affected by the blast radius and land a few dozen meters off target, like you are imagining.

So the conclusion is that defending a ground structure is the same as defending a carrier -- if you successfully knock the incoming warhead, it will miss both. You do not have a higher chance of causing a near miss in a carrier scenario than in a ground scenario.

Therefore, SM-2 Block IV cannot possibly be more effect at BMD than PAC-3, even for carriers. Therefore you cannot get around the fact that any endo-atmospheric interception is a last minute prayer at best.




Finally, the whole point of the MaRV is that it can do mid-course adjustments, so you can't really use the example of scuds from GW1.

Re: would MLRS and PGMs be a deterrent force in the taiwan strait against carrier gro

Roger604 said:

For endo-atmospheric intercepts, the PAC-3 is recognized as the premier system, not the SM-2 Block IV

The PAC-3 suffers from very limited range. Using it against an ASBM is going to mean you have one last prayer before impact.

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I didn't mean to imply anything different, if that was the case, I'm sorry about it.

Furthermore, I'll drop the point about carrier vs fixed field and just say as long as I knock it I'm fine.

Therefore, SM-2 Block IV cannot possibly be more effect at BMD than PAC-3, even for carriers. Therefore you cannot get around the fact that any endo-atmospheric interception is a last minute prayer at best.

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This is exactly the point I'm trying to object.
At first, last minute prayer is to hope for a miracle. I believe it doesn't take a miracle for a PAC-3 MSE to intercept a terminal BM warhead. Even a MaRV as to stick to it's course in terminal phase to hit the target. And if interception is then only 5-10km from target, who cares anyway, it's a kill.
However, the PAC-3 point is rather moot since it's not navalized (yet). So the SM-2 IV is the primary western naval endo-atmospheric TBM interceptor. And that particular missile is probably least restricted by range. Even though hit rate will perhaps not be that great, but I guess considerably greater than 0 non the less.

Re: would MLRS and PGMs be a deterrent force in the taiwan strait against carrier gro

Scratch said:

This is exactly the point I'm trying to object.
At first, last minute prayer is to hope for a miracle. I believe it doesn't take a miracle for a PAC-3 MSE to intercept a terminal BM warhead. Even a MaRV as to stick to it's course in terminal phase to hit the target. And if interception is then only 5-10km from target, who cares anyway, it's a kill.
However, the PAC-3 point is rather moot since it's not navalized (yet). So the SM-2 IV is the primary western naval endo-atmospheric TBM interceptor. And that particular missile is probably least restricted by range. Even though hit rate will perhaps not be that great, but I guess considerably greater than 0 non the less.

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Ah... good thing you mentioned this because that reminds me...

All BMD systems do the detection and targeting way before the missile comes crashing down on its target. It takes time to scan air and space to detect, then to narrow down and find the missile, then to correctly pinpoint its location and vector.

There is simply no way for the radar on the ship carrying the SM-2 (or put a radar close to the PAC-3 launchers) to do these sort of thing because by the time it detects the missile, the missile would have almost hit its target.

That means you can't use SM-2 block IV as BMD unless you have a separate ship much closer to the launch site of the ballistic missile to do the detection and targeting.

And it means any slight adjustments that an ASBM makes as it descends would render the previous targeting solution incorrect. By then, the radar doesn't have the time or range to accurately scan for the ASBM and calculate a new solution.