Three main points:
1. Whether something is "pork barrel" or "profit driven" has nothing to do with the capabilities of the resulting system.
The F-35 could be the result of a clean contest and be a failure or be the result of a corrupt process and be a success. The reason why F-35 is "profit driven" and "pork barrel" is because the primary goal of the JSF program was to establish a Lockheed monopoly in the fighter market with the F-22 and F-35 and concurrency in development which would lock all sub-systems under Lockheed's contractual rights. Establishment of monopolies is always profit driven. To achieve this and to ensure that the program was politically unassailable Lockheed created the world's most extensive pork spending campaign which resulted in the world's most complex production chain. It is a fact and it has nothing to do with the capabilities of adversaries' aircraft. It also explains why the F-35 is a failure and why USAF wants to cut the production as soon as the "pork barrel" is shifted into NGAD and MR-X because JSF was largely successful in establishing a Lockheed monopoly - hence Lockheed as "lead contractor" on NGAD. There's a reason why USAF wants the B-21 also for air superiority roles - and not just Offensive Counter Air - read CSBA's white paper on future trends in warfare.
Note that the JSF could be profit-driven and be an exampl of pork-barrel spending and could still deliver. That it didn't is on Lockheed being an incompetent manufacturer.
Lockheed has not built any fighters prior to F-22 other than F-104 which was similarly a disaster. They were only the lead contractor for the ATF and had to acquire GD's production lines to build basic capacity. Then they amassed every possible sub-program under "concurrency" as they were acquiring companies in other areas of the industry growing into the company they are today - and leveraging themselves in the process. They said "we can do it" when they couldn't. The failure of the F-35 is the result because there's nothing particularly wrong with the plane. It's everything else. Which is why every other aircraft somehow manages - including Gripen - and the world's largest and best funded program is a failure on its own terms.
2. F-35 and Virginia are the exact opposite in terms of procurement concept and results
Virginia is textbook example of how to do procurement properly. It used only tested solutions from Seawolf and from other areas (Dassault's CAD/CAM process) to build a series of Blocks with incremental increase of capabilities based on the current state of available tech. Because of cuts to shipbuilding it had to rationalize delivery and production chains which is why now additional investments are necessary to increase production rate above 2 per year. No concurrency. No market grab. No pork barrel. As a result Virginia has excellent performance, the delivery rate is consistent despite cuts to overall funding and most importantly the cost of the submarine came under budget already in Block 2. In 2010 the ships cost below $1,8 bn. To compare Los Angeles cost $0,9 bn in 1990 which is $1,5bn in 2010 and $1,87bn in 2021. So Virginia being significantly more capable than Los Angeles and future-proof thanks to modular design (Virginia Payload Module) was only 20% more expensive. Virginia is a success story. The equivalent of F-35 in naval procurement is the LCS.
I mentioned Virginia and Seawolf because they were completely different doctrinal concepts and should not be considered natural replacements - much like F-22 and F-35.
3. You have the wrong idea about how air combat works (and it's Lockheed's fault).
Kinematics is describing kinetics and dynamics of the system without considering forces. Kinematics is space, time and energy and their rates of change. When I say "kinematics of an aircraft" I mean its movement and energy from the moment it takes off from the airstrip to the moment it lands.
Kinematics comes first because kinematics determines the tactical logistics of your operation and the physical battlespace. It is about being able to determine what battlespace is and what isn't. It is about time from point A to point B. You can have perfect information on the enemy and if you can't get the aircraft in time to launch the missiles it doesn't matter.
For example the Russian MiG-31 is the extreme opposite of LO design but has kinematics - maximum ceiling at 24km and cruise speed at 2,3 Ma. That alone trumps almost all other considerations because when MiG-31 is used properly the only aircraft that can reach it is the F-22, and it can't do it without getting close to enemy airspace where it can be threatened or at least its missions can be disrupted.
Situational awareness comes second and in large portion due to the fact that integrated information about battlespace has been the standard of C2 since the 1980s. The first example of that is 1982 and the Beqqa Valley (Mole Cricket 19) then comes Desert Storm in 1991. What you are claiming is Lockheed's PR intended to push Lockheed's product as the only solution not how air combat works in reality. And that is completely neglecting strategic and operational logistics which decides the outcome.
Consider that modern ARH or long range IR AAMs can be guided to their targets with the help of AEW aircraft. That's how Turkey shot down Syrian Su-24s last year - F-16s only launched AIM-120s which were directed and guided by E-7 all the way. If you have an integrated sensor network you are not going to use your aircraft's own sensors outside of what they can contribute to the network - that's because due to the inverse square law the emission of the signal is always working to the defender's advantage.
Furthermore low observability is a variable that depends on many factors including the aspect of the illuminated plane. F-35 is not "VLO" when painted from the side by a radar at 20km or on the ground. It is not "VLO" when IRST detects the plume of the engine and missile launch flare at distances of somewhere between 100 and 150km. Until F-35 carries a long range AAM that will be able to engage targets from 200km it is not a serious. It will also be able to only carry 2 of them on long range missions - hence a separate "penetrating counter-air" program. F-35 doesn't have the kinematics.
As for everything else China is catching up fast in terms of radars, EW and information networks. The only remaining advantage for the US is LO but it is not a decisive advantage once China closes in terms of numbers, readiness and other systems. China is more worried about disruption to their global economic system caused by some military intervention led by the US that they can't readily counter if it occurs away from China. Right now China is more worried about Super Hornets because they can be deployed anywhere in the world at excellent mission rates. Right now the biggest problem for China isn't F-35s but its own readiness and logistics. The focus on F-35 is the consequence of two decades of Lockheed's propaganda and Pentagon trying to shift attention away from its actual problems onto something that is of little consequence like F-35's delays.
F-35 is a plane that was intended to give Lockheed the market at a very unique time in history. That time has passed before F-35 entered service properly. What's worse F-35 was designed using the requirements of European than Pacific theater. The F-35 is still a decent fighter against Russia but against China it is limited by geography. You can have the best fighter in the world and it is useless if you can't reach the enemy.
People forget that F-35 is something very specific - an airframe with a contractual bind on systems integration and maintenance. You can't say AN/APG-81 is F-35 because AN/APG-81 equivalent can be put on another platform. Similarly the updated avionics and combat systems and sensors. The reason why it didn't happen was political - because F-35 was meant to be the solution for political (profit-driven and pork-barrel) reasons. This is why F-35 is still chasing Block 4 and F-16 are flying with AN/APG-68(v)9 - and according to present plans they are to remain in service until mid 30s (in the ANG mostly).
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If the forum did not limit posts to 10k and 5 images I'd post something I wrote in another place with regards to Desert Storm and how it really went vs how it was presented for the purpose of capturing markets. Unfortunately it's a long write-up that would take some 20 posts. I can give you the link to the original material but you'll just have to translate the text into English. If you are interested in the basis for my arguments it might be worth it because of the data I collected to support it from official USAF and GAO documents. Let me know if you're interested.
1. Whether something is "pork barrel" or "profit driven" has nothing to do with the capabilities of the resulting system.
The F-35 could be the result of a clean contest and be a failure or be the result of a corrupt process and be a success. The reason why F-35 is "profit driven" and "pork barrel" is because the primary goal of the JSF program was to establish a Lockheed monopoly in the fighter market with the F-22 and F-35 and concurrency in development which would lock all sub-systems under Lockheed's contractual rights. Establishment of monopolies is always profit driven. To achieve this and to ensure that the program was politically unassailable Lockheed created the world's most extensive pork spending campaign which resulted in the world's most complex production chain. It is a fact and it has nothing to do with the capabilities of adversaries' aircraft. It also explains why the F-35 is a failure and why USAF wants to cut the production as soon as the "pork barrel" is shifted into NGAD and MR-X because JSF was largely successful in establishing a Lockheed monopoly - hence Lockheed as "lead contractor" on NGAD. There's a reason why USAF wants the B-21 also for air superiority roles - and not just Offensive Counter Air - read CSBA's white paper on future trends in warfare.
Note that the JSF could be profit-driven and be an exampl of pork-barrel spending and could still deliver. That it didn't is on Lockheed being an incompetent manufacturer.
Lockheed has not built any fighters prior to F-22 other than F-104 which was similarly a disaster. They were only the lead contractor for the ATF and had to acquire GD's production lines to build basic capacity. Then they amassed every possible sub-program under "concurrency" as they were acquiring companies in other areas of the industry growing into the company they are today - and leveraging themselves in the process. They said "we can do it" when they couldn't. The failure of the F-35 is the result because there's nothing particularly wrong with the plane. It's everything else. Which is why every other aircraft somehow manages - including Gripen - and the world's largest and best funded program is a failure on its own terms.
2. F-35 and Virginia are the exact opposite in terms of procurement concept and results
Virginia is textbook example of how to do procurement properly. It used only tested solutions from Seawolf and from other areas (Dassault's CAD/CAM process) to build a series of Blocks with incremental increase of capabilities based on the current state of available tech. Because of cuts to shipbuilding it had to rationalize delivery and production chains which is why now additional investments are necessary to increase production rate above 2 per year. No concurrency. No market grab. No pork barrel. As a result Virginia has excellent performance, the delivery rate is consistent despite cuts to overall funding and most importantly the cost of the submarine came under budget already in Block 2. In 2010 the ships cost below $1,8 bn. To compare Los Angeles cost $0,9 bn in 1990 which is $1,5bn in 2010 and $1,87bn in 2021. So Virginia being significantly more capable than Los Angeles and future-proof thanks to modular design (Virginia Payload Module) was only 20% more expensive. Virginia is a success story. The equivalent of F-35 in naval procurement is the LCS.
I mentioned Virginia and Seawolf because they were completely different doctrinal concepts and should not be considered natural replacements - much like F-22 and F-35.
3. You have the wrong idea about how air combat works (and it's Lockheed's fault).
Kinematics is describing kinetics and dynamics of the system without considering forces. Kinematics is space, time and energy and their rates of change. When I say "kinematics of an aircraft" I mean its movement and energy from the moment it takes off from the airstrip to the moment it lands.
Kinematics comes first because kinematics determines the tactical logistics of your operation and the physical battlespace. It is about being able to determine what battlespace is and what isn't. It is about time from point A to point B. You can have perfect information on the enemy and if you can't get the aircraft in time to launch the missiles it doesn't matter.
For example the Russian MiG-31 is the extreme opposite of LO design but has kinematics - maximum ceiling at 24km and cruise speed at 2,3 Ma. That alone trumps almost all other considerations because when MiG-31 is used properly the only aircraft that can reach it is the F-22, and it can't do it without getting close to enemy airspace where it can be threatened or at least its missions can be disrupted.
Situational awareness comes second and in large portion due to the fact that integrated information about battlespace has been the standard of C2 since the 1980s. The first example of that is 1982 and the Beqqa Valley (Mole Cricket 19) then comes Desert Storm in 1991. What you are claiming is Lockheed's PR intended to push Lockheed's product as the only solution not how air combat works in reality. And that is completely neglecting strategic and operational logistics which decides the outcome.
Consider that modern ARH or long range IR AAMs can be guided to their targets with the help of AEW aircraft. That's how Turkey shot down Syrian Su-24s last year - F-16s only launched AIM-120s which were directed and guided by E-7 all the way. If you have an integrated sensor network you are not going to use your aircraft's own sensors outside of what they can contribute to the network - that's because due to the inverse square law the emission of the signal is always working to the defender's advantage.
Furthermore low observability is a variable that depends on many factors including the aspect of the illuminated plane. F-35 is not "VLO" when painted from the side by a radar at 20km or on the ground. It is not "VLO" when IRST detects the plume of the engine and missile launch flare at distances of somewhere between 100 and 150km. Until F-35 carries a long range AAM that will be able to engage targets from 200km it is not a serious. It will also be able to only carry 2 of them on long range missions - hence a separate "penetrating counter-air" program. F-35 doesn't have the kinematics.
As for everything else China is catching up fast in terms of radars, EW and information networks. The only remaining advantage for the US is LO but it is not a decisive advantage once China closes in terms of numbers, readiness and other systems. China is more worried about disruption to their global economic system caused by some military intervention led by the US that they can't readily counter if it occurs away from China. Right now China is more worried about Super Hornets because they can be deployed anywhere in the world at excellent mission rates. Right now the biggest problem for China isn't F-35s but its own readiness and logistics. The focus on F-35 is the consequence of two decades of Lockheed's propaganda and Pentagon trying to shift attention away from its actual problems onto something that is of little consequence like F-35's delays.
F-35 is a plane that was intended to give Lockheed the market at a very unique time in history. That time has passed before F-35 entered service properly. What's worse F-35 was designed using the requirements of European than Pacific theater. The F-35 is still a decent fighter against Russia but against China it is limited by geography. You can have the best fighter in the world and it is useless if you can't reach the enemy.
People forget that F-35 is something very specific - an airframe with a contractual bind on systems integration and maintenance. You can't say AN/APG-81 is F-35 because AN/APG-81 equivalent can be put on another platform. Similarly the updated avionics and combat systems and sensors. The reason why it didn't happen was political - because F-35 was meant to be the solution for political (profit-driven and pork-barrel) reasons. This is why F-35 is still chasing Block 4 and F-16 are flying with AN/APG-68(v)9 - and according to present plans they are to remain in service until mid 30s (in the ANG mostly).
---------------------------------------------------------------------
If the forum did not limit posts to 10k and 5 images I'd post something I wrote in another place with regards to Desert Storm and how it really went vs how it was presented for the purpose of capturing markets. Unfortunately it's a long write-up that would take some 20 posts. I can give you the link to the original material but you'll just have to translate the text into English. If you are interested in the basis for my arguments it might be worth it because of the data I collected to support it from official USAF and GAO documents. Let me know if you're interested.
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