US military procurement practices and priorities

Lethe said:

Sortie rate is a bunch of wank with little relevance to the primary mission of Chinese carriers: sea control and airspace control. It comes up in USN carrier discussion because the most dreaded, real-world adversary of a USN carrier group is the United States Air Force. In the wake of the 1991 Gulf War, which was itself taken as a model of future conflicts, much was written about how USAF assets delivered far more munitions far more affordably than USN did. That criticism of the carrier group is what drove the design priorities of Ford and its emphasis on sortie rate, which is about maximising the level of sustained firepower delivered on target.

When you appreciate that, especially over the post-Cold War generation of "unipolar dominance", the US armed services chief rivals have been each other, much that was inexplicable becomes clear, particularly on USN's side as it attempted to create and maintain a rationale for its own existence in the absence of a conventional threat. Zumwalt, LCS and Ford all go back to this "relevance deficit". Today you can see the same thing with the US Marine Corps throwing ideas around to maintain their relevance and budgetary allocations in the present and coming era of confrontation with China in which USN is undeniably the most important service with USAF a strong second. The Marine Corps is suddenly coming out with ideas for small-scale intrusion teams, anti-submarine warfare utility helicopters, ground-based anti-ship missiles, etc.

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Indeed, and this is a perfect example of the value and benefit of Chinese opsec in real world action.

The likes of the F35, Ford, Zummy were all conceived in an era where US air and naval dominance was guaranteed by merely showing up. The idea that anyone could seriously challenge said air and naval dominance was simply unthinkable to anyone in the US.

That is the root cause for a lot of highly stupid (in hindsight) decisions that will continue to plague the US military for the foreseeable future. The best/worst examples include:

- Drastically cutting back and then cancelling Cold War era, performance-oriented principle frontline combat assets like the F22 and Seawolf to make way for more ‘cost effective’ alternative (aka more profit making) gravy train pork barrel projects like the F35 and Virginia.

- fatally conceptually flawed designs like the LCS, F35 and Zimmies (both now effectively canned) that takes air as sea control for granted and thus bring nothing to the table in those regards and leaves gaping holes in the USN order or battle that they are now forced to introduce a new frigate and fighter classes to deal with.

- massive design conceptual errors and project-management priority misalignment with ‘crown jewel’ projects like Zimmies, Fords and F35B, where deliverability and timeframes were effectively ignored in favour of packing in theoretical and experimental weapons and systems to achieve the required ‘wow’ and ‘cool’ factor to secure budget approval, and then basically trying to reply on ‘too big to fail’ already committed price tag to keep the gravy train running.

Now that all of those errors are baked in and too late to easily row back, you see China strategically revealing key capabilities that have the US scrambling to try to address. That will fundamentally influence next gen US combat asset design and procurement, which I have no doubt that China has again factored into its future planning.

plawolf said:

Indeed, and this is a perfect example of the value and benefit of Chinese opsec in real world action.

The likes of the F35, Ford, Zummy were all conceived in an era where US air and naval dominance was guaranteed by merely showing up. The idea that anyone could seriously challenge said air and naval dominance was simply unthinkable to anyone in the US.

That is the root cause for a lot of highly stupid (in hindsight) decisions that will continue to plague the US military for the foreseeable future. The best/worst examples include:

- Drastically cutting back and then cancelling Cold War era, performance-oriented principle frontline combat assets like the F22 and Seawolf to make way for more ‘cost effective’ alternative (aka more profit making) gravy train pork barrel projects like the F35 and Virginia.

- fatally conceptually flawed designs like the LCS, F35 and Zimmies (both now effectively canned) that takes air as sea control for granted and thus bring nothing to the table in those regards and leaves gaping holes in the USN order or battle that they are now forced to introduce a new frigate and fighter classes to deal with.

- massive design conceptual errors and project-management priority misalignment with ‘crown jewel’ projects like Zimmies, Fords and F35B, where deliverability and timeframes were effectively ignored in favour of packing in theoretical and experimental weapons and systems to achieve the required ‘wow’ and ‘cool’ factor to secure budget approval, and then basically trying to reply on ‘too big to fail’ already committed price tag to keep the gravy train running.

Now that all of those errors are baked in and too late to easily row back, you see China strategically revealing key capabilities that have the US scrambling to try to address. That will fundamentally influence next gen US combat asset design and procurement, which I have no doubt that China has again factored into its future planning.

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This is off topic, but I have to address this.

I feel very strongly that you should not be grouping all of those systems together, and there should not be too much exaggeration of the supposed failure or poor performance of recent US defense efforts.

You are correct to say that PLA opsec will certainly prove to have significant strategic effects going forwards.

But it is far too much to group programs/projects like LCS, Zumwalt, F-35/B together, or to deride F-35 and Virginia as pork barrel or profit making projects.

Certainly, comparing the F-35 and Virginia in an unfavourable way to the F-22 and Seawolf, is very very confusing, considering the F-35 and Virginia very much arguably offer similar if not superior capabilities to the F-22 and Seawolf (respectively) at significantly lower cost, which was a reflection of the budgeting realities of the US at the time.

In particular, the F-35 program as a whole -- F-35B included -- has proven to be massively successful, and will be the defining 5th generation fighter of its era, through a combination of the sheer scale of its production, the inherent capability of the individual platform and the synergies they will have with fellow F-35s as well as their friendly enabling sensor/shooters.
It would not be an exaggeration to say that the F-35 fleet will be the most serious air superiority challenge in the world and the pacing threat for the PLA to have to contend with, not only in terms of sophistication and stealth, but also in terms of scale. For the PLA, I imagine they would be many times more concerned at the fleet of F-35s that they will have to contend with than the F-22s that the US fields.

The same goes for the Virginia class -- while it doesn't have the sheer hull diameter and weapons load of the Seawolf class, it features much of the same stealthiness, with more modern combat management systems and sensors, and with further blocks offering SSGN scale VLS loads that will be multirole in nature that the original Seawolf class could only dream of.


While the LCS and the Zumwalt can very much be derided as "misses," and the Ford class can be argued to have integrated a few too many new technologies whose maturity had yet to be proven as much as they would've liked, the F-35 and Virginia class are very much successful programs that have led, and will continue to result in, a large fleet of deadly products of their types, and not "pork barrel" projects.
Or putting it another way -- if the sheer capability and success of programs like F-35 and Virginia are meant to be examples of inefficient "pork barrel" projects, then that's saying if the US chose to be a bit more focused then they would have resulted in even more stupendously more capable products than how capable and world leading the F-35 and Virginia already are.


/off topic over, though if we want to continue this conversation it is fine to do so in another thread, if you reply, I'll just move everything to a new thread.

Bltizo said:

F-35 fleet will be the most serious air superiority challenge in the world and the pacing threat for the PLA to have to contend with, not only in terms of sophistication and stealth, but also in terms of scale.

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That argument mostly works for weaker powers (which, admittedly, currently includes China).
If and when China will become a direct&equal challenge - this may very well become a liability, precisely because of the scale of the project.

The same is even more crucial for aligned powers - while F-35 may be a good choice of aircraft in "end of history"-type collective bullying, in other scenarios it becomes highly suboptimal. If it will come to the worst, US can always supplement its strike fighter fleet by NGAD by 2030s.

For smaller partners, this isn't an option.

Bltizo said:

The same goes for the Virginia class -- while it doesn't have the sheer hull diameter and weapons load of the Seawolf class, it features much of the same stealthiness, with more modern combat management systems and sensors, and with further blocks offering SSGN scale VLS loads that will be multirole in nature that the original Seawolf class could only dream of.

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As far as we currently know about future US sub, they plan to essentially revert back from VLS.
VLS at the expense of the primary mission set is a bad tradeoff.

Bltizo said:

This is off topic, but I have to address this.

I feel very strongly that you should not be grouping all of those systems together, and there should not be too much exaggeration of the supposed failure or poor performance of recent US defense efforts.

You are correct to say that PLA opsec will certainly prove to have significant strategic effects going forwards.

But it is far too much to group programs/projects like LCS, Zumwalt, F-35/B together, or to deride F-35 and Virginia as pork barrel or profit making projects.

Certainly, comparing the F-35 and Virginia in an unfavourable way to the F-22 and Seawolf, is very very confusing, considering the F-35 and Virginia very much arguably offer similar if not superior capabilities to the F-22 and Seawolf (respectively) at significantly lower cost, which was a reflection of the budgeting realities of the US at the time.

In particular, the F-35 program as a whole -- F-35B included -- has proven to be massively successful, and will be the defining 5th generation fighter of its era, through a combination of the sheer scale of its production, the inherent capability of the individual platform and the synergies they will have with fellow F-35s as well as their friendly enabling sensor/shooters.
It would not be an exaggeration to say that the F-35 fleet will be the most serious air superiority challenge in the world and the pacing threat for the PLA to have to contend with, not only in terms of sophistication and stealth, but also in terms of scale. For the PLA, I imagine they would be many times more concerned at the fleet of F-35s that they will have to contend with than the F-22s that the US fields.

The same goes for the Virginia class -- while it doesn't have the sheer hull diameter and weapons load of the Seawolf class, it features much of the same stealthiness, with more modern combat management systems and sensors, and with further blocks offering SSGN scale VLS loads that will be multirole in nature that the original Seawolf class could only dream of.


While the LCS and the Zumwalt can very much be derided as "misses," and the Ford class can be argued to have integrated a few too many new technologies whose maturity had yet to be proven as much as they would've liked, the F-35 and Virginia class are very much successful programs that have led, and will continue to result in, a large fleet of deadly products of their types, and not "pork barrel" projects.
Or putting it another way -- if the sheer capability and success of programs like F-35 and Virginia are meant to be examples of inefficient "pork barrel" projects, then that's saying if the US chose to be a bit more focused then they would have resulted in even more stupendously more capable products than how capable and world leading the F-35 and Virginia already are.


/off topic over, though if we want to continue this conversation it is fine to do so in another thread, if you reply, I'll just move everything to a new thread.

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Well, let’s stick with the F35 to try to keep it somewhat on topic.

I’m just gunna leave this here which shows Lockmart gross profit more than tripled from 2005 to 2020 and let people make up their own minds in terms of profiteering behaviour, since that’s a comparatively minor side point in any case.


The core issue with the F35 isn’t really from a project management or unit cost spiral prospective, but rather from one of performance and the underlying assumptions which fed those original requirements.

The F35 was meant to focus on strike, as the name suggests. That’s all fine any good expect for a couple of pretty major environmental changes since those requirements were originally laid down.

Initially, the JSF was meant to focus on strike because the F22s were meant to sort out the air dominance part, so F35s weren’t even supposed to encounter opfor air units. And even when they did, no one else was supposed to have operational 5th gens until US 6th gen F22 replacements were already flying. So F35s could get away without needing IRAAMs and anaemic kinetic performance because they were only meant to face legacy enemy fighters that they were meant to be able to easily hand in BVR and never should even get into WVR unless to sneak up on an unsuspecting foe for an ego stroke.

The problem with the F35 debacle was that they killed off the F22 programme in its infancy, and starved the fleet that was built of upgrades so there aren’t remotely enough F22s to achieve air dominance, nor are they remotely as dominant in that role due to said lack of upgrades.

Sure, today an F35 might not be a sure kill for an F22, but that is very much due to the F22’s decades old radar and avionics. Would you honestly suggest the F35 would still be able to stand up to the F22 if the F22 has F35 level radar and avionics?!

The core assumptions making the F35 programme viable in the first place was that air dominance was assured.

Partly due to internal power struggles and partly due to good Chinese opsec on the J20; the US dismantled and hobbled the means by which air dominance was supposed to have been achieved and now find themselves in the unfortunate position of potentially needing to reply on numbers to achieve air superiority rather than rely on sheer performance dominance as they had since the end of WWII.

The F35 might be the most challenging opponent for China now and in the near future, but it could and should have been a far more formidable opfor that China needed to contend with had F22 production continued until a reasonable number (like 300) had been built, and that fleet had been properly upgraded like every other premier air superiority US fighter programme before it.

Why is this relevant to the J35? Well it’s because I don’t think China would have made the same mistakes as America in making the J35 a bomb truck first and foremost.

Even with the J20, air superiority is very much not guaranteed for China either, due to the sheer number of F35s that they may need to face. That’s where the J35 comes in, it is meant to be a cheaper partner to the J20, but which will still overwhelmingly be focused on air superiority/dominance, with strike very much a distant secondary and incidental added nice-to-have, feature but only so far as it does not materially detract from the J35’s primary designed purpose or kicking F35 butts in AA combat.

Very interesting discussion going on here; my compliments!

plawolf said:

unfortunate position of potentially needing to reply on numbers to achieve air superiority rather than rely on sheer performance dominance as they had since the end of WWII.

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Disclaimer: this post isn't meant to be an contrargument, more of a side argument. In general I support your view. With this mentioned, back to the post. ;p

(1)It isn't an unfortunate position: USAF has never shied away from using overwhelming numbers (as, frankly speaking, any sane fighting organization would do). Vietnam, for example, is noteworthy precisely because this air superiority didn't bring desired results (and even managed to bite back).

The problem is actually the opposite, it's that numbers in foreseeable future may become quite equal. China Inc can produce stuff.
Nothing like this has existed since the downfall of the Eastern Block.
It's in this particular situation where 1:10 ratio of 5th gen (heavy)air superiority/interceptor to (light)strike instead of more usual 1:2...1:3 starts to become a liability because the dedicated air superiority force is just too small, and can't even be fully deployed where necessary(for example, F-22s are necessary for Alaska because of NORAD duties).

"Secondary" air forces being struck with same fighter doesn't help the matter either. In an "American" era they could (and still can) simply perform world policing together, sharing costs with the US; in a competitive one - while they still can do the same, they (1)burden smaller economies with an expensive 30t-class platform,
(2)leave them more vulnerable(uncomfortable). F-35 is excellent, good, or at least reasonable in most things, but gosh it is no interceptor.

plawolf said:

but it could and should have been a far more formidable opfor that China needed to contend with

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While I, again, don't argue against your point, it's worth noting, that F-35 itself is fully relevant for "China" scenarios (and more so - for "Russia" ones); Air Force are not some shiny knights in the air, they're meant to deliver effects to the enemy; yes, Lighting II is a product of "American decades" - but reasonably similar Vietnam-era F-105 (not a slouch in a2a either!) was born in the midst of the CW, and has proven itself perfectly useful.

Problem is not the aircraft, problem is its numbers, which are excessive for a fighter. Furthermore, while they're supposed to be light- realistically, they are not. This puts excessive financial weight on US block and US themselves in particular.

US are already on a way to address this - but only on a way to do so - so for the 2020s, their stake in F-35s is already irreversible.

weig2000 said:

but at least there is consensus, and that is F-35 will achieve air dominance by sheer number/quantity superiority. I've read before the argument that the US can dominate PLAAF simply by attrition in view of the ratio between F-35 and J-20 that the USAF and PLA can deploy respectively.

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Number and capabilities of fighters are only two variables in the battle for air superiority.

Gloire_bb said:

That argument mostly works for weaker powers (which, admittedly, currently includes China).
If and when China will become a direct&equal challenge - this may very well become a liability, precisely because of the scale of the project.

The same is even more crucial for aligned powers - while F-35 may be a good choice of aircraft in "end of history"-type collective bullying, in other scenarios it becomes highly suboptimal. If it will come to the worst, US can always supplement its strike fighter fleet by NGAD by 2030s.

For smaller partners, this isn't an option.

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If and when China becomes a direct and equal challenger, perhaps the scale of the project of the F-35 might offer some vulnerabilities given the structure of the program.

However, relative to what?

In an alternate universe where the US still underwent the same budget cuts as they did in our universe, what would the best optimal alternative procurement method have been if they did not pursue the F-35?
This is somewhat a rhetorical question, because obviously the possibilities are endless -- like continued production of the F-22 in variants, or perhaps a less ambitious F-35-esque program involving fewer variants and fewer partner nations, or something in between.... and all of this is ignoring the fact that a possible non-F-35 procurement program might have been less successful than F-35 as well.

However, whatever alternative "non-F-35" program we consider, we cannot ignore the fact that the F-35 is a replacement for many types of existing US aircraft in the USAF, USN and USMC, as well as key lynchpins for multiple major air forces in the world -- which by keeping them under the F-35 umbrella, the US essentially secures them even more as geopolitical client states which further strengthens their alliance system and is a geopolitical benefit that cannot be measured only in terms of the capabilities of the aircraft alone.


Putting this all another way -- IMO the real issue which you and plawolf are raising is not one inherent to the F-35 program itself, but rather to the overall extent with which the US considered its threat assessment and military budgeting in the post Cold War era.
If I were to put it colloquially or jokingly -- the "real issue" with the F-35 for the US, is that the US didn't also buy the original 750 F-22s that they mandated for the Advanced Tactical Fighter program at its initiation. If the US bought a large number of F-22s in addition to the large number of F-35s that they bought, then the F-35 would be viewed far less as a "poor choice".
However, the US military budget simply didn't allow it, so they had to cut things while choosing some other things to keep.

I truly believe that in the context of the limitations of the US military budget cuts in the post Cold War era and in the post GFC era, the US continuing to pursue F-35s and cutting F-22 production would have offered the best bang for their buck in terms of military aviation capability, geopolitical influence, and overall US national strategy.

Gloire_bb said:

As far as we currently know about future US sub, they plan to essentially revert back from VLS.
VLS at the expense of the primary mission set is a bad tradeoff.

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My point isn't to argue that the Virginia class is "better" than the Seawolf class, but rather that it offers additional capabilities that the Seawolf didn't both by virtue of having a longer (i.e.: current) production run and successive variants that significantly add in new capabilities --- all at lower cost than the Seawolf class as well. Therefore, I would not compare the Virginia class in an unfavourable manner relative to the Seawolf class.

Further, related to that, I think calling the Virginia class a "pork barrel" project or a profit driven project is absolutely insane given how capable the Virginia class is today in general.

weig2000 said:

@plawolf, @Bltizo, @Gloire_bb about F-35 although you guys argue about a number of things, but at least there is consensus, and that is F-35 will achieve air dominance by sheer number/quantity superiority. I've read before the argument that the US can dominate PLAAF simply by attrition in view of the ratio between F-35 and J-20 that the USAF and PLA can deploy respectively. This is indeed a challenge for China at least in short term, but it can be addressed or mitigated medium term as the production of J-20 ramps up with WS-10C.

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Replying to your post here.

You are close to what I'm thinking, but I think you give the F-35 insufficient credit.

When we talk about "numerical superiority," we often think that there is some form of inherent qualitative disadvantage in the numerically superior side.
However, the F-35 will boast world leading stealth, sensors, networking, payload flexibility, and range as well.
Sure, the F-35 may not have the supersonic performance or kinematic performance of J-20s (especially J-20s with WS-15s when they arrive), but the sheer number of the F-35s produced, as well as the inherent quality of their stealth/sensors/networking/payload/range, should lead one to question just how much of an advantage having marginally superior kinematic performance will be at the system of systems level.... this is especially the case, if the J-20s (and future J-XYs) are less capable in terms of key domains like stealth, sensors, networking and payload. For the purposes of discussion, let's assume J-20s and J-XYs are at rough parity in those domains.

Also, keeping in mind both sides will be striking at the other's air bases and trying to defend their own air bases, it is likely that the F-35s will still enjoy a significant numerical advantage in terms of 5th gen fighters available.

Therefore, we have to ask the question -- assuming that the J-20s (and future J-XYs) do have a marginal degree of kinematic superiority to the F-35 on an individual platform level.... and assuming the J-20s and J-XYs are not inferior in key domains like stealth/sensors/networking/payload.... just how many J-20s and future J-XYs will the PLA have to procure to allow them to even start to leverage said kinematic superiority to achieve a system of systems level of A2A parity, let alone trying to achieve air superiority, when we keep in mind the number of F-35s that the US will likely field???

plawolf said:

Well, let’s stick with the F35 to try to keep it somewhat on topic.

-edited for brevity-

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Okay, I understand where you are coming from, and my reply (and my view around the capability of the F-35) comes in four points, which I'll list here and expand on below:
Point 1: The realities of the US military budget post cold war and post GFC meant they had to pick the most important programs they wanted and ditch the ones of less value.
Point 2: The qualitative compromises of the F-35 aircraft as an individual platform should not overshadow the impressive (and in many cases world leading) qualitative capabilities of the aircraft that are relevant for modern air combat.
Point 3: The comparative quantity and geographical disposition/basing of the F-35 fleet must be assessed relative to competing fighter types of opposing air forces.
Point 4: The geopolitical considerations of US involving partner nations and export customers in the F-35 has a value of its own.


Point 1:
What I mean here, is that it's all well for us to say that the US would be in a more capable state if they bought more F-22s, like the 300 F-22s you floated. However, if we accept that the US military still had to operate on the budget that they ended up with in the last couple of decades, it inevitably means that whatever platforms and products they bought more of, meant they had to sacrifice something else.
We can't exactly consider an "alternative universe" national level procurement strategy in detail given the complexities of such an undertaking, however my overall point is that if they bought more of one thing, they would have to buy less of another.
In the case of the F-35, if they bought more of XYZ platform (let's say F-22s for the sake of discussion), the adverse effects on the F-35 could have been to such a degree that it may have resulted in a significant downgrading of the scale of the program, or perhaps cancellation of an entire F-35 variant, or perhaps outright cancellation of the F-35 program itself... all of which would have had significant consequences given the scale and success of the F-35 program we see today (which I will elaborate more on in Point 3 and Point 4).
So, Point 1 is basically asking how much of the F-35 program is one willing to sacrifice in pursuit of pursuing greater procurement of other platforms like F-22?

Point 2:
This relates to the qualitative performance of the F-35 itself, and the compromises that you (and many others) have listed in its characteristics. The F-35 is very much a multirole strike fighter, not a pure bred air superiority fighter like the F-22. It cannot supercruise in the same way the F-22 can, it lacks the F-22's maneuvrability. Its weapons bay are less oriented for the outright air to air mission like the F-22. These are all fair criticisms of the F-35.
However, these kinematic compromises of the F-35 also cannot ignore the qualitative capabilities of the platform. This includes, but is not limited to...
- More maintainable and less costly stealth while achieving similar VLO performance.
- Arguably the most capable sensor suite and networking suite of any tactical fighter in the world today.
- Having a payload bay that is capable of carrying larger diameter weapons than that of the F-22.... which enables larger diameter strike weapons of course, but also it enables it to be configured in a way to potentially match the F-22 in carrying BVR missile count, as well as enabling larger diameter air to air weapons as well if they are developed. In short, the weapons bay of F-35 is far more flexible than that of the F-22.
- The sheer range/combat radius of the F-35 is impressive, and in the F-35A and F-35C variants it is competitive if not superior to that of the F-22.
- And all of the above, comes in a series of three fighters with significant commonalities, in a program designed to be easier to upgrade and field avionics and computing improvements than past fighters.
In short, in terms of the qualitative capabilities of the individual platform, compared to the F-22, the F-35 offers similar stealth, similar range, greater payload bay flexibility, superior sensors and networking, while suffering from less blistering edge kinematic performance.
Now, one can argue that some of these above advantages could also have been true if the US had pursued continued procurement of the F-22, which might have seen F-35 level avionics and perhaps more maintainable stealth methods integrated into new F-22 variants.... but again, we have to consider Point 1 -- at what cost to the F-35 would that have been, especially in terms of cost and quantity?
So, I agree that "ideally" having supercruise and exceptional supermanevurability like the F-22 would be ideal, I also think that stealth, sensors, networking, range, payload flexibility are all very much important too, and in context of modern air to air trends, I would challenge whether the costs and compromises needed to achieve F-22 levels of supercruise and supermaneuvrability is worth it if you can achieve a sufficient baseline level of kinematic performance.
That is especially the case, if you are able to achieve a platform with world leading stealth/sensors/networking/range/payload that can also be produced in numbers that the enemy cannot match, as Point 3 would follow.

Part 1 of 2, continued below