US Military News, Reports, Data, etc.

Monday at 6:35 AM
here's DefenseNews story:
Navy F/A-18E Super Hornet shoots down Syrian jet after it attacks US allies
source:
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but How did a 30 year-old Su-22 defeat a modern AIM-9X?
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At approximately 18.43hrs local time on June 18, a US Navy F/A-18E Super Hornet operating over Syria shot down a Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF) Su-22M4 ‘Fitter’ fighter-bomber near Tabqah, Syria.

The F/A-18E (reported as BuNo 168914/AJ304) was assigned to Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 87 ‘Golden Warriors’ (also known as ‘War Party’), which is assigned to Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 8.

Its pilot engaged the ‘Fitter’ and initially fired an AIM-9X Sidewinder close-range heat-seeking missile from a range of about half a mile, which was defeated by flares launched by the Su-22 pilot. The Super Hornet then re-engaged and fired an AIM-120 AMRAAM (Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile), which hit the ‘Fitter’ despite being fired from relatively close range.

The pilot was able to eject and was later recovered safely, according to local sources.

It marked the first shootdown of a manned fighter by a US aircraft since May 4, 1999, when Lt Col Michael ‘Dog’ Geczy, US Air Force, downed a Serbian MiG-29 with an AIM-120 fired from his F-16CJ during Operation ‘Allied Force’.



However, the engagement poses some interesting questions, not least; how was a 1980s-era ‘Fitter’ able to defeat a cutting-edge US air-to-air heat-seeking missile?

Our good friend and contributor Angad Singh Tweeted this morning a fascinating feature he recalls, written by the great Bill Sweetman.

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The linked feature Tweeted by Singh quotes John Manclark, who was the commander of the famous 4477th Test & Evaluation Squadron ‘Red Eagles’ from 1985-87, a top secret unit flying Soviet fighters to train US pilots and evaluate new equipment.

One particular exerpt makes fascinating reading:

“We had 210 maintainers,” Manclark recalled. “They were dedicated, just unbelievable, tech sergeants and master sergeants. The CIA gave us a flare dispenser from a Frogfoot [Su-25] that had been shot down in Afghanistan. We gave it to maintenance – it was just a thing with wires coming out of it. Four hours later they had it operational on a MiG-21.”

That proved to be a very important test. “In 1987 we had the AIM-9P, which was designed to reject flares, and when we used US flares against it would ignore them and go straight for the target. We had the Soviet flares – they were dirty, and none of them looked the same – and the AIM-9P said ‘I love that flare’.

“Why’d that happen? We had designed it to reject American flares. The Soviet flares had different burn time, intensity and separation. The same way, every time we tried to build a SAM simulator, when we got the real thing it wasn’t the same.

“I use the AIM-9P because it is out of the system and I can talk about it. The same thing happened to a lot of things that are still in the system and that I can’t talk about.”

The Syrian ‘Fitter’ in the latest incident appears to have had success with flares against the AIM-9X. There are also reports that the SyAAF ‘Fitters’ had received upgraded flare packs.

From 1979–82 40 new Su-22Ms were delivered to Syria. They flew around 40 sorties during the Lebanon War of 1982: while Israel claimed no fewer than eight shot down, Syria confirmed the loss of only one example.vAdditional batches including 20 Su-22M3Ks were delivered in 1983, followed by no fewer than 42 Su-22M4Ks delivered between 1984 and 1985, while all surviving Su-22Ms were locally upgraded to Su-22M2K standard.

However, the fleet was depleted and by 2014 only around a dozen Su-22M4Ks soldiered on. Iran donated 10 ex-Iraqi Su-22M4Ks to Syria, early in 2015. Tom Cooper wrote recently in Air Forces Monthly: Prior to the recent US strike on Shayrat, the SyAAF included around 30 Su-22M-3, Su-22M-4K and Su-22UM-3K jets with three squadrons; this number is now down to around ten aircraft, just five or six of which are operational.

Ultimately, having defeated the AIM-9X, the ‘Fitter’ wasn’t as successful against the radar-guided AMRAAM. However, this engagement will surely have a few Top Gun and Weapons School graduates scratching their heads and trying to understand exactly how and why a 30 year-old ‘Fitter’, probably in a poor state of condition, beat-off America’s best close-range missile.
 

Jeff Head

General
Registered Member
Monday at 6:35 AM

but How did a 30 year-old Su-22 defeat a modern AIM-9X?
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The sidewinder, is still a heat seeking missile.

If the OPFOR aircraft had decent anti-heat capabilites with good flares, and used them correctly...there is always the possibility that the missile will "take the bait."

In this case it dd, and a radar guided AIM-120 then finished him off.

Nothing fatal or fancy or even wrong here. N weapon system is perfect. And a good defense with smart deployment...and yes, sometimes just plain old luck...can beat the fancy stuff sometimes.

But the trick is to have more and better tools in your bag of tricks, with better training too. In the end, that will all come together and win out.
 
found inside
Communicating
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it sure looks close to me:
Intercept.jpg

A Russian Su-27 Flanker intercepted a USAF RC-135U flying in international airspace over the Baltic Sea on June 19, 2017. "Due to the high rate of closure speed and poor control of the aircraft during the intercept, this interaction was determined to be unsafe," said US European Command in a
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.
 

FORBIN

Lieutenant General
Registered Member
Aegis Intercept Test

The Missile Defense Agency yesterday conducted an intercept test of the
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(SM-3 IIA), a relatively new interceptor designed for use in the
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(BMD) program. Something appears to have gone wrong, however, and the interceptor did not destroy its target. The type or cause of failure is not yet known, nor will it likely be known for some time. The June 21 test was the fourth flight test and the second intercept attempt of the SM-3 IIA configuration. The
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in February 2017, by contrast, had been successful in intercepting a medium-range ballistic missile target.

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Jun 6, 2017
Feb 28, 2017
and Government rejects Glock protest; Army's new handgun will be a Sig Sauer
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now Dismissal of Bid Protest Clears Way for New Army Sidearm
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The dismissal earlier this month of a bid protest by firearms maker Glock, Inc. -- over a $480 million handgun contract -- clears the way for the
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to begin using its newest version of a sidearm in more than 20 years.

On Friday, the Government Accountability Office, which reviews protests to federal contract awards, announced that on June 5 it had dismissed Glock's claims that, among others things, the Army improperly evaluated the firearm maker's proposal and that the solicitation intended that multiple contracts be awarded.

In January, the Army announced that New Hampshire-based Sig Sauer would supply its standard sidearm for the next decade, replacing the Beretta M9 9mm pistol, which has been in service since 1995.

"Overall, despite the evaluation errors uncovered in the course of this protest, we have no basis to conclude that Glock would have a substantial chance at an award," the GAO's decision concluded. "Even when the errors are considered together, we find no prejudice to Glock."

The award had followed an industry-wide competition, with nine manufacturers submitting bids, including Beretta and FN America.

The proposals by Glock and Sig Sauer were considered the two finalists, the GAO decision said.

Sig Sauer's bid of $169 million was roughly $100 million less than Glock's, but what put it ahead, as far as the Army was concerned, was the "outstanding" rating Sig Sauer received for its manufacturing plan and ammunition licensing, the GAO said.

The Army sidearm to be supplied by Sig Sauer is based on the firm's P320 pistol, using a modular system with interchangeable grips and caliber sizes. The contract also includes accessories and ammunition.

Soldiers were expected to begin using the Sig Sauer pistols this year, though the bid protest likely delayed that timeline.

The P320-model pistol was first marketed three years ago. It is striker-fired, meaning it has no external hammer. Its internal polymer spring-loaded firing pin is a highly sophisticated version of the launcher on a pinball machine that propels the ball into play.

The Army version of the P320 -- capable of being fit with silencers -- will be produced at the Sig Sauer's New Hampshire facilities.
 
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The Spin on this is thick as a milkshake.
  1. Although Spec4ce Afghan Forest is labeled as a forest pattern it's actually intended more for night operations.
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that's what you say, but

"The Pentagon has not disputed the gist of findings by its special inspector general for Afghanistan, John Sopko, that the U.S. spent as much as $28 million more than necessary over 10 years on uniforms for Afghan soldiers with a camouflage "forest" pattern that may be inappropriate for the largely desert battlefield. In a report released this past week, Sopko's office said the Pentagon paid to license a propriety camouflage pattern even though it owns patterns it could have used for free. The choice, it said, was based on the seemingly offhand fashion preference of a single Afghan official."

War and waste: Cautionary tales as US ponders Afghan boost
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One shirt, one pair of pants.

Those are the basics for outfitting an Afghan soldier. But in that simple uniform combination are the threads of two troubling stories — one about the waste of millions in American taxpayer dollars, the other about the perils of propping up a partner army in a seemingly endless war.

Together these tales help explain why some in Congress question the wisdom of investing even more resources in Afghanistan, nearly 16 years after the United States invaded the Taliban-ruled country in response to the al-Qaida attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. The Army general who runs the U.S. war effort in Afghanistan calls it a stalemate. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis says the U.S. is "not winning," and he vows to "correct this as soon as possible."

The Trump administration is searching for an improved approach to achieving the goal it inherited from the Obama administration: to get the Afghan government to a point where it can defend itself and prevent its territory from being a haven for extremists. Mattis has said he expects to have that revised strategy ready for Congress by next month. This coming week he will be consulting with NATO allies in Brussels on troop contributions and other Afghan issues.

The long war has generated repeated examples of wasted funds, which may be inevitable in a country such as Afghanistan, where the military has been built from scratch, is plagued with corruption and relies almost completely on U.S. money for even the most basic things, including salaries and uniforms. Among the costs rarely noted publicly: The Pentagon has spent $1 billion over the past three years to help recruit and retain Afghan soldiers.

The money wasted on uniforms is small potatoes by comparison with other U.S. missteps in Afghanistan, but it is emblematic of broader problems.

The Pentagon has not disputed the gist of findings by its special inspector general for Afghanistan, John Sopko, that the U.S. spent as much as $28 million more than necessary over 10 years on uniforms for Afghan soldiers with a camouflage "forest" pattern that may be inappropriate for the largely desert battlefield. In a report released this past week, Sopko's office said the Pentagon paid to license a propriety camouflage pattern even though it owns patterns it could have used for free. The choice, it said, was based on the seemingly offhand fashion preference of a single Afghan official.

"This is not an isolated event," Sopko said in a telephone interview. The U.S., he said, has been "in a mad rush to spend money like a drunken sailor on a weekend furlough." It reflects a pattern, he said, of spending too much money, too quickly, with too little oversight and too little accountability.

Sopko's office is still investigating the camouflage uniform contract process, which it found "questionable."

"This was more than just a bad fashion move," he said. "It cost the taxpayer millions of dollars" more than might have been necessary.

Money is rarely part of the debate over what the United States should do differently or better in Afghanistan, and thus the accumulating costs are often overlooked.

Since 2002, the U.S. has spent $66 billion on Afghan security forces alone. In recent years this spending has grown, even though President Barack Obama's stated goal was to wean the Afghans from U.S. military help after he formally ended the American combat role there three years ago. U.S. spending on Afghan forces rose from $3.6 billion last year to $4.2 billion this year, and President Donald Trump's proposed 2018 budget asks for $4.9 billion.

Stephen Biddle, a professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University, said the money wasted on camouflage uniforms is symptomatic of a broader problem of official corruption that has sapped the strength and spirit of too many Afghan soldiers.

"The real problem in Afghanistan is not, 'Can we get a rational decision about which camouflage design it should be.' The real problem in Afghanistan is that cronyism and corruption in the government and the security forces saps the combat motivation of the soldiers," Biddle said in an interview.

"That's why they they're having such a problem holding onto a stalemate," he added. "That's why they can't retake ground, even though they have vastly more forces in the field than the Taliban does."

Even keeping Afghan troops in uniform — any uniform — is a problem. The army is chronically about 20,000 soldiers short of its authorized total of 195,000. The U.S. has about 8,400 troops there to train and advise the Afghans and to hunt extremist groups, down from a peak of 100,000 in 2010-2011.

Trump has delegated to Mattis the authority to decide how many troops the U.S. should have in Afghanistan, and Mattis is expected to send nearly 4,000 more this summer. That would be in line with a standing request by U.S. commanders, who say it would address a shortfall in troops to train and advise Afghans. A small percentage of the additional troops would be designated for a related U.S. mission of fighting al-Qaida and other extremist groups there.
 
How can old Woodland Battle Dress Uniforms cost that much? o_O
you may want to check what I posted 11 minutes ago
...

"The Pentagon has not disputed the gist of findings by its special inspector general for Afghanistan, John Sopko, that the U.S. spent as much as $28 million more than necessary over 10 years on uniforms for Afghan soldiers with a camouflage "forest" pattern that may be inappropriate for the largely desert battlefield. In a report released this past week, Sopko's office said the Pentagon paid to license a propriety camouflage pattern even though it owns patterns it could have used for free. The choice, it said, was based on the seemingly offhand fashion preference of a single Afghan official."

War and waste: Cautionary tales as US ponders Afghan boost
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TerraN_EmpirE

Tyrant King
that's what you say, but

"The Pentagon has not disputed the gist of findings by its special inspector general for Afghanistan, John Sopko, that the U.S. spent as much as $28 million more than necessary over 10 years on uniforms for Afghan soldiers with a camouflage "forest" pattern that may be inappropriate for the largely desert battlefield. In a report released this past week, Sopko's office said the Pentagon paid to license a propriety camouflage pattern even though it owns patterns it could have used for free. The choice, it said, was based on the seemingly offhand fashion preference of a single Afghan official."

War and waste: Cautionary tales as US ponders Afghan boost
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technically Afghanistan is not desert more forest. It's transitional depending on altitude and geography you have arborial you have arid you have alpine terrain. You can rapidly go from very dry to very wet. You can go from cold to baking.
Additionally I covered other reasons for cost. But if you want to ride the 28 million dollar waste it's a.drop in the bucket compared to the ABU,ACU and NWU of the services.
 
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