You're all getting the B-21 wrong.
US military is a business servicing the security market that underpins the US economic empire. It has three main competing branches (departments): Army, Navy and Air Force. The diagram of their services and overlapping areas of direct competition regarding offered service (type of kinetic response) looks like this:
Army and Navy are main domains of warfare divided by land and sea logistics. Air Force's existence as a separate branch, rather than Army Aviation is a product of industrial lobbying. It continues to exist purely due to its political value of allowing Washington to wage wars of aggression without problematic troop deployment.
The primary consideration in anything that USAF does is preserving its political and economic position within the military-industrial complex.
To do so it needs to preserve its position vs competitors which means always contesting two out of three areas. "Persistent" is guaranteed by Key West (and related) agreements vs the Army and Navy can't build persistence without sacrificing the other two which are more traditional and more important to it. What remains for USAF is "rapid and flexible" and for that it needs both tactical and strategic aviation.
Bombers are currently USAF's only tool for global power projection that doesn't involve ICBMs. That is unlikely to change in the near future because results of programs like Prompt Global Strike will be shared by US Army and USN thus yielding no competitive advantage.
For USAF strategic bombers are primarily not a strategic tool but a political tool. It's about the place at the table which is also why there was (and still is) a lot of fighting about the Space Force which was traditionally USAF's domain.
For PLAAF bombers are primarily a tactical tool and will be expanded into a genuine strategic tool when H-20 enters service. This is why any direct comparison between B-21 and H-20 in terms of their impact is incorrect. H-20 is a solution to a tactical/strategic problem of "how do we defend/deter a threat". B-21 is a solution to a political/strategic problem of "how do we create/control a threat". It is about having ways of attacking China kinetically without committing to full-spectrum warfare first.
The bombers are also as much a demonstration and intimidation factor against other countries as they are against China (if not more), and that explains the choices with regards to B-52 and B-21.
----
The planning aspect.
as of 30/9/21, from Air Force Almanac 2022:
for comparison:
MCR determines nominal availability:
B-1B is prioritized for retirement because it's good for nothing. B-2 will be retired as soon as B-21 provides sufficient capability to close the gap because it's too expensive. Contract for new F130 engines for B-52 was signed in 2021. It covers a ~30 year period from 2028-2035 (upgrades) to late 2050s. B-52 are also slated for radar upgrade with AN/APG-79 (Super Hornet) derivative in the same timeframe as new engines. Those upgrades are making B-52 functional and viable for "low threat environments" i.e. intimidation of countries other than China - Latin America and Africa and propaganda overflights elsewhere.
----
Each bomber has a theoretical maximum payload. Reduce it to approx. 50% and 25% for scenarios requiring greater combat radius.
In 1989 USAF had approximately 90 B-1B and 234 B-52G/H with primary use being nuclear and not conventional.
For effective use of strategic bombing using conventional means a much greater number of airframes is necessary as statistical analysis of past conflicts shows. Russian bombing raids in Ukraine demonstrate that effective employment of such tool in present day is a problem a scale of magnitude more complex than the psychological effect of the bombing would indicate - especially considering the emotionally unstable people infesting online spaces.
Air power doesn't win wars but it allows them to be waged at a much lower cost in "American lives". For more I recommend the lesson in history from 1930s on the development of strategic bombing doctrine, its purpose and the first think tanks funded by aerospace manufacturers. "Bomber gap", "missile gap" etc were marketing devices utilizing the newly created Bretton Woods money printer.
B-21 won't be any more of a strategic challenge than other VLO aircraft including the existing B-2A. "Order of magitude more stealthy" is just a mathematical parameter with increasingly diminishing returns at distances below 100km. VLO will make long-range launches harder to detect from greater distances but there the problem is still range. (I've seen several analyses suggesting that "best long-range fighter is a VLO bomber" and I certainly see the logic of the argument in specific conditions - and that might have applications for B-21 as well). VLO is only a solution making bombers more viable in the context of modern day radar and missile technology.
People don't seem to remember that B-2 was developed because B-52 and B-1 were considered unsurvivable vs 1980s Soviet air defense. Due to further advancements in technology bombers have extremely limited application vs peer enemy which results in their payload and range being wasted. VLO is restoring the viability of range and payload.
What will change the bomber equation is the numbers of available bombers which will happen no sooner than by mid 2030s assuming a fleet of 80-100 aircraft when at 70% MCR USAF will have 56-70 bombers available and at 60% 48-60 bombers. This hower gives over a decade to develop counter-measures which are in no way revolutionary considering that it has existed for 20 years. It's a quantity and optimization issue not a capability issue.
The one (and possibly only) game-changing factor it is the ability of VLO bombers to cross airspace of third countries without being noticed thus allowing USAF plausible deniability. That option is however limited geographically and can be countered. At worst it will require PLA to develop the same strategy as USSR had. VLO is not magic. It only introduces another factor into regular time/space calculation that described traditional bomber vs air defense scenario.
B-21 is not about USAF acquiring a decisive advantage over PLA. It is about USAF being able to factor itself into the strategic equation at all thus giving the generals a seat at the table and ability to sell their influence for the industry and other special interest. But the only way to do it is to get public funding for a weapon system that gives USAF that seat. In order to get that funding the weapon system must be a Wunderwaffe. And so media and PR makes it seem like it is even though it absolutely isn't.
For propaganda reasons B-21 will be the main star of operations that are enabled by the entire system already in place much like F-117A in 1991.
US military is a business servicing the security market that underpins the US economic empire. It has three main competing branches (departments): Army, Navy and Air Force. The diagram of their services and overlapping areas of direct competition regarding offered service (type of kinetic response) looks like this:
Army and Navy are main domains of warfare divided by land and sea logistics. Air Force's existence as a separate branch, rather than Army Aviation is a product of industrial lobbying. It continues to exist purely due to its political value of allowing Washington to wage wars of aggression without problematic troop deployment.
The primary consideration in anything that USAF does is preserving its political and economic position within the military-industrial complex.
To do so it needs to preserve its position vs competitors which means always contesting two out of three areas. "Persistent" is guaranteed by Key West (and related) agreements vs the Army and Navy can't build persistence without sacrificing the other two which are more traditional and more important to it. What remains for USAF is "rapid and flexible" and for that it needs both tactical and strategic aviation.
Bombers are currently USAF's only tool for global power projection that doesn't involve ICBMs. That is unlikely to change in the near future because results of programs like Prompt Global Strike will be shared by US Army and USN thus yielding no competitive advantage.
For USAF strategic bombers are primarily not a strategic tool but a political tool. It's about the place at the table which is also why there was (and still is) a lot of fighting about the Space Force which was traditionally USAF's domain.
For PLAAF bombers are primarily a tactical tool and will be expanded into a genuine strategic tool when H-20 enters service. This is why any direct comparison between B-21 and H-20 in terms of their impact is incorrect. H-20 is a solution to a tactical/strategic problem of "how do we defend/deter a threat". B-21 is a solution to a political/strategic problem of "how do we create/control a threat". It is about having ways of attacking China kinetically without committing to full-spectrum warfare first.
The bombers are also as much a demonstration and intimidation factor against other countries as they are against China (if not more), and that explains the choices with regards to B-52 and B-21.
----
The planning aspect.
as of 30/9/21, from Air Force Almanac 2022:
type | total aircraft inventory | average age | mission capable rate [%] | breaks [%] | 12-hour fix [%] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
B-52H | 76 | 59.8 | 59.5 | 45.9 | 32.9 |
B-1B | 45 | 34.4 | 40.7 | 27.7 | 15.8 |
B-2A | 20 | 26.3 | 58.6 | 27.7 | 60.6 |
for comparison:
type | total aircraft inventory | average age | mission capable rate [%] | breaks [%] | 12-hour fix [%] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
C-5M | 36 | 34.3 | 57.4 | 12.0 | 43.3 |
C-17A | 146 | 19.0 | 80.1 | 2.6 | 57.2 |
KC-135R | 138 | 59.5 | 50.6 | 11.0 | 71.2 |
KC-10A | 48 | 36.8 | 47.4 | 2.8 | 54.7 |
E-3G | 21 | 41.4 | 60.6 | 47.1 | 45.0 |
MCR determines nominal availability:
- B-52H - 45
- B-1B - 18
- B-2A - 12
B-1B is prioritized for retirement because it's good for nothing. B-2 will be retired as soon as B-21 provides sufficient capability to close the gap because it's too expensive. Contract for new F130 engines for B-52 was signed in 2021. It covers a ~30 year period from 2028-2035 (upgrades) to late 2050s. B-52 are also slated for radar upgrade with AN/APG-79 (Super Hornet) derivative in the same timeframe as new engines. Those upgrades are making B-52 functional and viable for "low threat environments" i.e. intimidation of countries other than China - Latin America and Africa and propaganda overflights elsewhere.
----
Each bomber has a theoretical maximum payload. Reduce it to approx. 50% and 25% for scenarios requiring greater combat radius.
- B-52H - 30t / 15t / 8t
- B-1B - 34t + external / 17t+ / 9t
- B-2A - 23t / 10t / 6t
In 1989 USAF had approximately 90 B-1B and 234 B-52G/H with primary use being nuclear and not conventional.
For effective use of strategic bombing using conventional means a much greater number of airframes is necessary as statistical analysis of past conflicts shows. Russian bombing raids in Ukraine demonstrate that effective employment of such tool in present day is a problem a scale of magnitude more complex than the psychological effect of the bombing would indicate - especially considering the emotionally unstable people infesting online spaces.
Air power doesn't win wars but it allows them to be waged at a much lower cost in "American lives". For more I recommend the lesson in history from 1930s on the development of strategic bombing doctrine, its purpose and the first think tanks funded by aerospace manufacturers. "Bomber gap", "missile gap" etc were marketing devices utilizing the newly created Bretton Woods money printer.
B-21 won't be any more of a strategic challenge than other VLO aircraft including the existing B-2A. "Order of magitude more stealthy" is just a mathematical parameter with increasingly diminishing returns at distances below 100km. VLO will make long-range launches harder to detect from greater distances but there the problem is still range. (I've seen several analyses suggesting that "best long-range fighter is a VLO bomber" and I certainly see the logic of the argument in specific conditions - and that might have applications for B-21 as well). VLO is only a solution making bombers more viable in the context of modern day radar and missile technology.
People don't seem to remember that B-2 was developed because B-52 and B-1 were considered unsurvivable vs 1980s Soviet air defense. Due to further advancements in technology bombers have extremely limited application vs peer enemy which results in their payload and range being wasted. VLO is restoring the viability of range and payload.
What will change the bomber equation is the numbers of available bombers which will happen no sooner than by mid 2030s assuming a fleet of 80-100 aircraft when at 70% MCR USAF will have 56-70 bombers available and at 60% 48-60 bombers. This hower gives over a decade to develop counter-measures which are in no way revolutionary considering that it has existed for 20 years. It's a quantity and optimization issue not a capability issue.
The one (and possibly only) game-changing factor it is the ability of VLO bombers to cross airspace of third countries without being noticed thus allowing USAF plausible deniability. That option is however limited geographically and can be countered. At worst it will require PLA to develop the same strategy as USSR had. VLO is not magic. It only introduces another factor into regular time/space calculation that described traditional bomber vs air defense scenario.
B-21 is not about USAF acquiring a decisive advantage over PLA. It is about USAF being able to factor itself into the strategic equation at all thus giving the generals a seat at the table and ability to sell their influence for the industry and other special interest. But the only way to do it is to get public funding for a weapon system that gives USAF that seat. In order to get that funding the weapon system must be a Wunderwaffe. And so media and PR makes it seem like it is even though it absolutely isn't.
For propaganda reasons B-21 will be the main star of operations that are enabled by the entire system already in place much like F-117A in 1991.
