US Military News, Reports, Data, etc.
- Thread starter tphuang
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Brumby
Major
RAND actually published a research analysis on base defense against missile attacks a few years ago. The state of degradation and ability to recover is a function of many things like the number of aim points; CEP of attacking missiles; probability of intercepts by missile defense; hardening features and recovery capability. From memory the research article demonstrated that an air base can recover to operational status very quickly but the issue is the ability to sustain operations from repeated barrages. On the other hand, the attacking side can also run out of their inventory of PGMs very quickly and then what do they do. I will try to dig up that document.
POAs do significantly affect the number of PGMs needed to do the job.
Brumby
Major
John Stillion and David Orletsky at RAND conducted the first detailed analysis of the effects of more-accurate ballistic- or cruise-missile attacks on airfields. Their 1999 report assessed the vulnerability that aircraft parked in the open had to attacks by TBMs armed with unitary warheads or submunitions. They focused on the threat to aircraft in the open because, from ODS on, the U.S. military often parked large numbers of aircraft relatively close together on open ramps without even revetments for protection. Their analysis used USAF spacing guidelines to estimate parking densities as inputs for a Monte Carlo simulation.
Figure 4.1 is reproduced from the Stillion and Orletsky report and shows several striking features. First, note, in the lower left corner, the small circle showing the lethal area for an M-9 (now called the DF-15) missile carrying a single 500-kg unitary warhead, which would damage only six aircraft. In contrast, consider the largest circle in the figure.56 This is the lethal radius for the M-9 (DF-15) ballistic missile if, instead of a single 500-kg warhead, its payload was used to carry 825 1-lb. submunitions. For relatively soft targets, such as aircraft on a large parking ramp, many small submunitions are vastly more efficient in creating lethal effects than a single big warhead. In this case, the bomblets damage 82 out of the 95 aircraft parked on the notional ramp (compared with six aircraft damaged by the single 500-kg warhead).
Figure 4.1 is reproduced from the Stillion and Orletsky report and shows several striking features. First, note, in the lower left corner, the small circle showing the lethal area for an M-9 (now called the DF-15) missile carrying a single 500-kg unitary warhead, which would damage only six aircraft. In contrast, consider the largest circle in the figure.56 This is the lethal radius for the M-9 (DF-15) ballistic missile if, instead of a single 500-kg warhead, its payload was used to carry 825 1-lb. submunitions. For relatively soft targets, such as aircraft on a large parking ramp, many small submunitions are vastly more efficient in creating lethal effects than a single big warhead. In this case, the bomblets damage 82 out of the 95 aircraft parked on the notional ramp (compared with six aircraft damaged by the single 500-kg warhead).
Brumby
Major
A subsequent subject related RAND report published in 2015.
Table 3.1 outlining Chinese missiles CEP and inventory
Table 3.2 outlining US bases likely subject to missile attacks.
An illustration using the Kadena airbase.
Runway Attacks
Destroying portions of a runway to deny its use by enemy aircraft requires that the attacker “crater” it such that no minimum operation surface (MOS) is left. MOS requirements vary by aircraft size and performance characteristics and indicate the minimum length and width of unbroken runway that a fighter, tanker, or bomber requires to take off and land. To illustrate the runway targeting problem, we take the case of Kadena AB. Kadena AB has two runways, each roughly 12,000 feet long. One is 200 feet wide and the other 300 feet wide.
First, consider the case of fighter operations from Kadena. The nominal MOS for a fighter is 5,000 feet long and 50 feet wide. Thus, if an attacker can destroy enough of the runway that there is no undamaged 5,000- by 50-foot section, then the attacker has shut the air base to fighter aircraft operation until repair crews can reopen the runway. Given that Kadena’s has 12,000-foot-long runways, the attacker would need to cut each runway in two places, for a total of four cuts. (An illustrative overlay of these cuts is depicted in Figure 3.2.) Further, given the width of the runways (200 and 300 feet), each lengthwise cut would require several craters across the runway, with the exact number depending on their size and exact position.
Large aircraft, such as tankers, required a larger MOS. As with fighters, the precise MOS required for a tanker depends on a host of factors, including the fuel load of the tanker and weather conditions. A commonly used planning MOS for tankers is 7,000 feet by 147 feet. This larger MOS yields fewer potential operating surfaces, requiring fewer aim points for an attacker to destroy to shut down the base. In this case, a single cut point on each runway could, if properly placed, close Kadena to tankers.
Given these parameters, the question then becomes whether a given inventory of Chinese missiles can destroy two to four sections of runway, and, if so, how many times they can re-attack sections of runway after they are repaired. The effectiveness of a Chinese attack on a runway depends primarily on five variables: the number of missiles, the accuracy of the missiles, the time it takes U.S. forces to repair a destroyed section of runway, the effectiveness of U.S. missile defenses, and the quality of Chinese intelligence.
There is little open-source information about MRBM warheads, but given the PLA’s emphasis on attacking air bases and the reported development of high-explosive submunitions for the DF-21C, it is likely that the missile has runway attack capabilities. Indeed, as a ballistic missile with high terminal velocity, it would be well suited to this task. For modeling purposes, we assume that the submunition characteristics are similar to those used in the U.S. Air Force’s BLU-67 anti-runway bomb—specifically, a 4.5-kg penetrating submunition carrying 2.75 kg of high-explosives. According to Air Force planning documents, a warhead with these characteristics would create a five-foot-diameter crater in a runway. A ballistic missile capable of carrying 82 of these anti-runway submunitions could dispense them at a height and velocity such that they would land within a circle with a radius 300 feet distributed around the missile impact point. The resulting density of craters inside this 600-foot-diameter area is sufficient to damage the runway to the point that no 50-foot-wide section remains clear, so long as the submunition footprint covers the entire width of the runway.
Table 3.1 outlining Chinese missiles CEP and inventory
Table 3.2 outlining US bases likely subject to missile attacks.
An illustration using the Kadena airbase.
Runway Attacks
Destroying portions of a runway to deny its use by enemy aircraft requires that the attacker “crater” it such that no minimum operation surface (MOS) is left. MOS requirements vary by aircraft size and performance characteristics and indicate the minimum length and width of unbroken runway that a fighter, tanker, or bomber requires to take off and land. To illustrate the runway targeting problem, we take the case of Kadena AB. Kadena AB has two runways, each roughly 12,000 feet long. One is 200 feet wide and the other 300 feet wide.
First, consider the case of fighter operations from Kadena. The nominal MOS for a fighter is 5,000 feet long and 50 feet wide. Thus, if an attacker can destroy enough of the runway that there is no undamaged 5,000- by 50-foot section, then the attacker has shut the air base to fighter aircraft operation until repair crews can reopen the runway. Given that Kadena’s has 12,000-foot-long runways, the attacker would need to cut each runway in two places, for a total of four cuts. (An illustrative overlay of these cuts is depicted in Figure 3.2.) Further, given the width of the runways (200 and 300 feet), each lengthwise cut would require several craters across the runway, with the exact number depending on their size and exact position.
Large aircraft, such as tankers, required a larger MOS. As with fighters, the precise MOS required for a tanker depends on a host of factors, including the fuel load of the tanker and weather conditions. A commonly used planning MOS for tankers is 7,000 feet by 147 feet. This larger MOS yields fewer potential operating surfaces, requiring fewer aim points for an attacker to destroy to shut down the base. In this case, a single cut point on each runway could, if properly placed, close Kadena to tankers.
Given these parameters, the question then becomes whether a given inventory of Chinese missiles can destroy two to four sections of runway, and, if so, how many times they can re-attack sections of runway after they are repaired. The effectiveness of a Chinese attack on a runway depends primarily on five variables: the number of missiles, the accuracy of the missiles, the time it takes U.S. forces to repair a destroyed section of runway, the effectiveness of U.S. missile defenses, and the quality of Chinese intelligence.
There is little open-source information about MRBM warheads, but given the PLA’s emphasis on attacking air bases and the reported development of high-explosive submunitions for the DF-21C, it is likely that the missile has runway attack capabilities. Indeed, as a ballistic missile with high terminal velocity, it would be well suited to this task. For modeling purposes, we assume that the submunition characteristics are similar to those used in the U.S. Air Force’s BLU-67 anti-runway bomb—specifically, a 4.5-kg penetrating submunition carrying 2.75 kg of high-explosives. According to Air Force planning documents, a warhead with these characteristics would create a five-foot-diameter crater in a runway. A ballistic missile capable of carrying 82 of these anti-runway submunitions could dispense them at a height and velocity such that they would land within a circle with a radius 300 feet distributed around the missile impact point. The resulting density of craters inside this 600-foot-diameter area is sufficient to damage the runway to the point that no 50-foot-wide section remains clear, so long as the submunition footprint covers the entire width of the runway.
Jura The idiot
General
Jura The idiot
General
in real world
The Pentagon has long worried about the multi-billion dollar price tag that comes along with building a new interceptor field and its infrastructure. Influential lawmakers want a permanent site built that will support close to 1,000 jobs in their districts.
The Pentagon has long worried about the multi-billion dollar price tag that comes along with building a new interceptor field and its infrastructure. Influential lawmakers want a permanent site built that will support close to 1,000 jobs in their districts.
it's
Jura The idiot
General
Jura The idiot
General
Dec 20, 2018
USAF to Award Light Attack Contract This Fall
5/10/2019
EDIT
Light Attack Acquisition Enters Notification Phase dated May 8, 2019
:
now
USAF to Award Light Attack Contract This Fall
5/10/2019
EDIT
Light Attack Acquisition Enters Notification Phase dated May 8, 2019
:
Last edited:
Jura The idiot
General
DARPA cancels ARES cargo drone project with Lockheed Martin
10 May, 2019
context:
Apr 24, 2018