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• Published on September 29, 2017

“Amphibious flexibility is the greatest strategic asset that a sea power possesses” B.H. Liddell Hart Deterrence or Defense, 1960

I have struggled to keep this response to Sir Humphrey’s magnum opus on why the Royal Marines are good for ‘absolutely nothing’ brief – I just didn’t have the time to edit it down to the 4500 characters allowed for a response on his blog! (see

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). I thought I might try to keep the debate strategic and only focus on the factual errors in the original post where they are germaine – or misleading.

Policy and Strategy

Let’s start with policy and strategy, which is sort of where Sir Humphrey finishes up. The key question is really about what kind of a power the United Kingdom wishes to be. There has been no existential threat to the UK since Adolf Hitler postponed Operation SEALION on 17th September 1940. That is not to say that Russian and other Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles would not cause significant damage if fired at the UK, merely that there is no associated likelihood of an invasion of UK territory. The consequent focus of UK defence and security strategy is been on safeguarding the diaspora, alliance commitments and on prosperity through the protection of trade. Keeping ‘sea lanes…open and the arteries of global commerce… free flowing’. In current policy the non-discretionary missions of the Armed Forces are: defence of the UK mainland and overseas territories and maintenance of the nuclear deterrent. The discretionary missions are: humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), strike operations, operations to restore peace and stability and major combat including NATO Article V. Putting the deterrent to one side, the core thread running through these missions is the ability to ‘project power’ alone, or with allies. Put simply, we plan to play a series of ‘away games’ and ideally we want to be able to get in and out without getting stuck. In playing these games, we want to be able to achieve the maximum strategic impact – to enhance our status as a global power and implicitly, for the smallest possible investment.

Why Amphibious?

There are around 80 nations worldwide that boast an amphibious capability. These range in size from around an infantry company (120 personnel) to a corps of around 182,000 in the case of the United States. There are only four or five nations in the world that are currently able to deploy and sustain combat configured force over strategic distance, these are: the US, Russia, France and the UK. Many other nations are close to developing capability, or have the capacity to combine with allies to generate a strategic power projection capability. Principal among these are: Australia (Canberra Class LHD), Spain (Juan Carlos Class LHD), Egypt (Mistral Class LHD), Turkey (Juan Carlos Class LHD), Singapore (Endurance Class LPD), Netherlands (Rotterdam Class LPD), China (Type 071 Amphibious Transport Dock), Philippines (Tarlac Class LPD), Chile (Foudre Class), Italy (San Giorgio Class LPD) and Republic of Korea (Doko Class LPH).

So why amphibious? Aside from the obvious fact that 71% of the surface of the earth is covered in water, 72% of all the countries in the regions of the world designated as of interest in UK policy are accessible from the sea. In the Gulf and North Africa this rises to 100%, in the Near East 80%, in South Asia 67% and in sub-Saharan Africa 62%.

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and 75% of all mega cities (population over 10 million) are in the littoral –within 100km of the sea at an elevation of less than 10m.

At the same time, defence planning and recent experience recognises that access basing and overflight (ABO) might not be a given in times of crisis. So being able to exploit the maritime commons confers advantage for the movement and positioning of forces. Even with a guarantee of ABO, the deployment of an infantry battalion with Chinook and Apache Helicopters would need over a month and around 200 C17 and Antonov 124 equivalent loads to move anywhere (according the Army Field Manual Vol 1 Part 12). In the same amount of time, a fully configured brigade (-) sized amphibious force could have loaded and sailed from the UK to Sumatra and critically would be able to sustain itself on arrival.

Sir Humphrey contends that “it is often forgotten these days that the role of amphibious warfare isn’t something that really took off until WW2, (sic) and that the RM have only been leading on it for around 70 years. I think it would be more accurate to say that amphibious operations have been a feature of warfare since the early Mediterranean civilisations and that the army were only really engaged in them during WW2, after which the lead returned to the marines. The Greeks and Romans both expanded their empires using amphibious operations. The Vikings and later the Normans also conducted amphibious operations – including the invasions of Britain. The European powers all raised regiments of marines as they expanded their colonial territories: Spain (1537), Portugal (1618), France (1622), Great Britain (1664), Holland (1665); followed closely by the USA (1776). While World War Two saw the birth of modern amphibious warfare, notable amphibious operations in the preceding centuries include Gibraltar (1704), Belle Isle (1761), Quebec (1775), Walcheren (1809), The War of 1812 and the Second Opium War (1856 – 60). It's no coincidence that the painting of James Cook raising the flag at Botany Bay shows a guard of marines. The two major operations in World War One were Gallipoli (1915) and Zeebrugge (1918). It was only in 1954 that the Chiefs of Staff decided that there was no longer a requirement for the army as a whole to be trained in amphibious operations, recommending that the Royal Marines should become the parent arm for such operations and maintaining the requirement for a brigade assault group (Speller). Since WW2 the UK has conducted hundreds of amphibious operations, many as a part of the retreat from Empire, but including significantly; Malaya (1948-1958), Korea (1950 – 1952), Cyprus (1954-1959), Suez (1956), Indonesia (1962-1967), Falklands (1982), Hong Kong (1997), Congo (1997), Sierra Leone (1998 and 2000), Indian Ocean (2001-2002), Iraq (2003).

Nobody plans (as Sir Humphrey suggests) to conduct an opposed landing. Modern amphibious forces plan to use the sea as a manoeuvre space in order to place their landing force in a position of advantage relative to the enemy. In ideal circumstances the force will not land at all, but if it has to, it will avoid landing on a beach and will prefer to land on, or as close to their objective as possible (Ship to Objective Manoeuvre). The objective will be carefully chosen to ensure that success delivers operational or strategic rather than tactical effect. The RAND Corporation looked at

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in May 2017 and concluded that “amphibious forces provide useful capability in environments that require some level of force but not necessarily complete A2AD suppression””, noting that Marine Corps aviation – specifically the F35B “… is on the path to significantly alter what even ARG-MEUs are capable of doing”. So all is not lost in an A2AD environment and by the way, if an amphibious force cannot find a way in – which other force is more likely to be able to succeed?

To quote General Colin Powell “Lying offshore, ready to act, the presence of ships and marines sometimes means much more than just having air power, or a ship’s fire, when it comes to deterring a crisis. And the ships and marines may not have to do anything but lie offshore. It is hard to lie offshore with a C-141 or a C-130 full of airborne troops”. The mere threat of the presence of a relatively small amphibious force exerts strategic effect while embarked. In Kuwait in 1991, the presence of the USMC embarked in the Gulf was sufficient to shape Saddam Hussein’s defensive plan. In short an amphibious force allows deployment of largely self-sustaining force over strategic distance without commitment and the ability to poise; raising or lowering profile to match diplomatic and other efforts. Far from being “a highly specialised role that is unlikely to be used in anger” history demonstrates that this type of force has been continuously deployed and employed since WW2.

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The Money Pit

Sir Humphrey asserts that the RM and implicitly the amphibious capability is a money pit that cost the RN a significant amount of time, money and platforms, but which delivered very little for the RN itself. I think that the operational record of the Royal Marines speaks for itself, both in the core amphibious role and in the land environment. So how big a money pit?

The plan for the recapitalisation of the amphibious fleet following the Falklands War of 1982 was laid down in CDS 11/85 Future Amphibious Capability - Costed Options. The plan was to acquire two landing Platform Dock (LPD), two Landing Platform Helicopter (LPH) and six Landing Ships Logistic (LSL) to meet the endorsed capability requirement (CDS 10/85). The acquisition plan was subsequently modified as a result of pressures on the Long Term Costings (LTC) programme. One LPH was deleted (LTC 93) and one LSL taken at risk (LTC 94) and a complete deck removed from the LPD design. Cost comparison between the Ships Life Extension Programme (SLEP) for the LSLs demonstrated that replacement with the Alternative LSL (ALSL) would be cheaper. Risk in the ALSL programme reduced hull numbers from five to two, before finally settling on four hulls, re-christened Landing Ship Dock Auxiliary (LSD(A)). The final build programme delivered HMS Ocean (1999), HMS Albion (2003), HMS Bulwark (2004), RFA Largs Bay (2006), Lyme Bay (2007) Mounts Bay (2006) and Cardigan Bay (2006) – (not a total of 6 LPDs and the RORO ferries were purchased to service the Army in Cyprus and Germany, not as part of the amphibious capability). The cost of this programme (in 2010 GBP £) was per platform: LPH £215m, LPD £225m, LSD(A) £149m a grand total £1.26bn. This compares to a unit cost of around £230m for a Type 23 Frigate, >£1.1bn per hull for the Type 45 destroyer and over £3bn for a Queen Elizabeth Class carrier.

In crewing terms, the RN will need to find around 1400 officers and ratings to man the two carriers, while the RN manning bill for the whole amphibious fleet (if all platforms were operational) would be around 950 (including the RM detachments) for 2 x LPD and 1 x LPH. And the other two services have willingly gone along with the deception of

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as it has provided them with leverage in annual savings rounds. The carriers are neither optimised for, nor likely ever to be used for amphibious operations and to suggest that they will replace the LPH capability once HMS Ocean is decommissioned is laughable.

It is also worth noting that across defence there is a tacit recognition of a ‘rule of three’ in platform and force generation. It takes three ballistic missile submarines to guarantee one at sea, likewise, three army brigades generate one at high readiness, three destroyers guarantee the availability of one for operations. The amphibious capability is a notable exception to this rule; wherein, one LPH generates one LPH, one LPD generates one LPD and one commando brigade generates one commando brigade. Any genuine comparison of return on investment would need to look at how the amphibious force has managed to generate so much capability without a ‘rule of three’ based force generation cycle. All of this suggests that Sir Humphrey’s assertion that “these ships are immensely expensive” is poorly founded, noting of course that the defence did take up his suggestion to place an LPD at extended readiness and sell one LSD(A) following SDSR 2010.

One small afternote. While the Royal Marines constitute less than 4.5% of the regular manpower of the British Armed Forces, they generate around 47% of the total ‘badged’ ranks of the UK Special Forces (the Parachute regiment generates >50% of the Special Air Service Regiment).

Royal Marines Identity

Sir Humphrey asserts that the RM have “not worked alongside matelots at sea…” and that they have become increasingly focused on just the land part of the littoral”. While it is true to say that the Royal Marines were heavily engaged in Afghanistan between 2002 and 2013, the Brigade deployed three times: Herrick V (Oct 06-Apr 07), Herrick IX (Nov 08-Apr 09) and Herrick XIV (May – Oct 2011). Brigade deployments alternated with commando group deployments Herrick VII (Nov 07 – Apr 08), Herrick XII (May – Oct 2010) and Herrick XVII (Nov 12 – Apr 13). However, against this background, the RM continuously maintained a Lead Commando Group with annual amphibious deployments including notably: Operation CALASH/Operation MONOGRAM 2005-6 (elements of 40 Cdo RM and HMS Bulwark),

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,

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,

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and then the Response Force Task Group (RFTG) and more recently the Joint Expeditionary Force (Maritime)

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. To address Sir Humphrey’s various observations on the pressing need to marinize the RM again. Firstly, I think that the RM have striven continuously to maintain the maritime and amphibious edge at the same time as forming a significant part of the Royal Navy’s contribution to operations over the last 15 or so years. Yes, the RM do focus on the land part of the littoral – they are ‘sea soldiers’, it is what the navy pay them for. On the other hand, while there are plenty of light infantry brigades in the Army, the Royal Marines have demonstrated and have to continue to demonstrate that they can play their part in carrying their share of the weight of land operations at the same time as maintaining their core competence. Light infantry brigades cannot switch as seamlessly in the other direction – ask the Australian Army.

Royal Marines Paranoia

Why would the Royal Marines feel a “deep sense of persecution and vulnerability”? The Royal Marines were on the verge of being disbanded in 1981, but were ‘rescued’ by the Falklands war. Since then, the Corps has been engaged in a sometime bitter fight for survival with the army. The requirements for shipping identified post Falklands were traded in the LTC and slipped in the programme until the last safe moment. What had been a self-contained joint force in being in 1996, was partly fractured to create the ‘joint’ forces of the 1997 SDR with the loss of the Naval Air Commando Squadrons and 3 Commando Brigade Air Squadron to the Joint Helicopter Command. Naval ‘grey’ helicopters being a part of the weapons system of their host platforms in a way that green helicopters were not. SDR new chapter and the associated Medium Term Workstrands re-examined the validity of the assumptions underpinning the amphibious capability. It also reallocated finance from the Support Amphibious Battlefield Rotorcraft (SABR) programme to the Future Rotorcraft programme – and in doing so, removed all of the marinisation requirements; as well as re-examining the cost of Royal Marines training and the size and shape of commando units compared to infantry battalions. A whispering campaign led by Chief of the General Staff raised the profile of the amphibious capability sufficiently that it was Identified by the then Vice Chief as one of a number of areas for additional scrutiny in SDSR 2010. At the Future Character of Conflict (FCOC) experiment, a disingenuous comment by the Director Concepts and Doctrine to the effect that it seemed like an awful lot of money to land two companies by air and two companies by surface was all it took to seal the fate of the brigade level capability and its associated shipping. There was a simple counter to this argument – that these four companies constituted only the first assault wave and that the capability could land a brigade minus in a cycle of darkness. But nobody that knew this was in a position to speak and those that were in a position to speak didn’t know, or worse could not articulate this. This led to the reduction of the level of amphibious capability from brigade – where it had been since WW2, the sale of an LSD(A) and the mothballing of an LPD with concomitant reductions to the artillery, engineer and logistic support. Of note, neither parachute, nor air assault capabilities were subject to the same level of scrutiny. More recently, the failure to expose during both SDSRs the true manning cost of the carriers has forced the Navy to ‘consume its own smoke’ at least partly at the expense of the Royal Marines and 42 Commando. The last of the historic barracks will be disposed of in 2018 as part of consolidation onto naval estate.

Of course it is fair to say that other capabilities have drifted into and out of the spotlight of scrutiny during this same period, but Sir Humphrey wonders why the Royal Marines might feel persecuted and vulnerable?

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So Where Next for the Royal Marines?

I agree with Sir Humphrey, there should be more Royal Marines at sea for more of the time. I also agree that they should be focusing on raiding and other operations to relieve pressure on the Special Forces, so moving closer in structure and capability to the Australian style commandos – going back to their WW2 roots. Does this mean that they should abandon the brigade level of amphibious theatre entry capability? Emphatically not. As Sir Stuart Peach says, the British Military needs to adapt to face a darkening security landscape. I think that the likelihood of the UK needing to, being called to intervene, or to join an intervention at distance from the home base is increasing. I also think that the availability of access basing and overflight, the likelihood of contested airspace and the absence of a friendly third country on which to lean for support are increasing rather than decreasing. At the same time, the frequency and intensity of severe weather events will call more rather than less often for forces with similar characteristics. A quick look at the operational history of HMS OCEAN is informative. Maintenance of this capability is also good news for the wider Royal Navy, the second task group will need escorts, counter mine, air defence and anti-submarine capabilities. The ability to project force and deliver effect without entanglement is going to become more rather than less relevant – and there are not going to be enough special forces. Don’t just take my word for it, I stole at least some of the thinking from Army Chief of Staff

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.

To Finish

The size of capabilities within defence have long since ceased to be determined by national security requirements; they have been driven principally by the skill and adroitness of the resource and plans staffs in the Ministry of Defence in their defence. Both the former CDS (Richards) and First Sea Lord (Zambellas) have recently suggested that numbers and capability in defence have been reduced too far. I agree with Sir Humphrey that for all the spin of a rising defence budget other nations seem to be able to generate a lot more bang for their buck. There are some obvious and some less obvious reasons why the UK MoD gets less for its ‘rising defence budget’ than perhaps it should. Firstly, the MoD has had to cope with the growing costs of pensions, secondly it has had to also accommodate the full cost of the deterrent and thirdly, since Brexit, the carefully costed programme has gone out of the window because of the GBP/USD exchange rate. Perhaps, while unsympathetic, the Treasury should recognise the reality of the UK MoD inability to control these factors - most particularly the rising cost of pensions compared to the reducing size of the current force in being.

Should the Royal Marines and the amphibious capability face scrutiny as part of the ongoing battle to preserve the vestiges of UK defence capability; of course they should. However, is it as simple to suggest as Sir Humphrey does that the Royal Marines have “… a highly specialised core role that is increasingly unlikely to be used in anger”. I think the evidence suggests that the Royal Marines are among the best trained, most flexible, capable and deployable forces in the world. So much so that others (UAE, Philippines, Australia, Singapore, China, India) are trying to create similar capabilities. I think that evidence will also show that they are among the most cost effective. Let’s just hope that decisions will be driven by evidence.

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Defence Infrastructure Organisation (DIO) has completed the resurfacing of the intersection of the 2 runways at RAF Marham as part of a larger programme of investment.

The work forms part of a £250 million DIO programme, which is part of the major investment by the Ministry of Defence to ready the station for the arrival of the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force’s new F-35 Lightning fast jet aircraft.

Construction of this kind on an active air field required a ‘no fly’ period to be agreed with the station. In the 3 weeks that flying was halted, DIO’s contractors, a joint venture between Galliford Try and Lagan Construction, had to complete the entire construction of this element of works. The resurfacing forms the third of 9 phases of work on the project, which will also provide hangars for 12 aircraft and an air crew feeding facility.

This phase included removing more than 13,000 tonnes of existing asphalt and installing 23 pits and 1.2km of ducting for aeronautical ground lighting. To resurface the runway, more than 18,000 tonnes of asphalt were laid over an area of nearly 38,000 square metres, equivalent to more than 5 rugby pitches. To achieve this within the required timescale the contractors worked in multiple shifts, 7 days a week.

Rob Dawson, DIO Lightning principal project manager, said:

This was a crucial part of the works being undertaken by DIO and was a vast amount to complete in such a short space of time. It couldn’t have been achieved without the cooperation of the teams from DIO, our contractors, the Galliford Try and Lagan Construction joint venture, our consultants AECOM and RAF Marham. It has been an integrated team effort and fills me with confidence for the hard work ahead of us.

Despite the short space of time available to design, plan and complete the work as well as some poor weather, it was completed a day early. This allowed flying operations to recommence on Friday 29 September.

Wing Commander Phil Marr, Officer Commanding Operations Wing, RAF Marham, said:

This was an immense task to complete in three weeks. With both runways out of action, any failure to deliver within the prescribed timeframe would have directly impacted flying operations at RAF Marham. This added significant pressure to an already taught construction task. In light of this, it was highly impressive to have been handed back such an immaculate new runway intersection, allowing the Station to recommence flying activities ahead of schedule. An excellent achievement all round.

Group Captain Ann Gibson, Lightning Basing Team Leader, RAF Marham said:

I am delighted that all of the teams have risen to the challenge to deliver the intersection in a 3 week period thereby minimising disruption to Tornado and RAF Marham operations.

Notes to editors
The F-35B Lightning II is the world’s most advanced, fifth generation aircraft that the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy will jointly operate from both land and sea. It will form an integral part of the UK’s carrier strike capability from both Queen Elizabeth Class aircraft carriers.

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Jura said:

I've been following that site for three years and I think discussions there used to generally optimistic, which seem to be changing:
Further cuts to the fleet in “the year of the Royal Navy” ? October 6, 2017

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The Royal Navy could lose its ability to assault enemy held beaches, under plans being considered in the Ministry of Defence, BBC Newsnight understands.

Two specialist landing ships - HMS Albion and Bulwark - would be taken out of service under the proposals.

The plan - part of a package of cost-cutting measures - has caused alarm among senior Royal Marine officers.

The MoD told the BBC that no decisions have been made yet and that discussion of options was "pure speculation".

It is understood the head of the Royal Navy, Admiral Sir Philip Jones, formulated the move as part of a package designed to balance the books and free up sailors for the service's two new aircraft carriers.

Critics say the proposal would deprive the Royal Marines of its core mission.

Among other cuts envisaged are a reduction of 1,000 to the strength of the Royal Marines and the early retirement of two mine-hunting vessels and one survey vessel.

A senior Royal Marine officer blamed the introduction of the new carriers for exacerbating the senior service's financial and manning problems.

He told the BBC: "This is the worst procurement decision of the past half century - that's what the Royal Marines are being sacrificed for."

The proposed cuts are part of a raft of "adjustments" being considered by all three services - the Royal Navy, the Army and the Royal Air Force - as the Ministry of Defence struggles to balance its books.

The Royal Air Force could slow down orders of its new F35 fighter, and the Army could lose dozens of helicopters as part of their efforts towards the same goal.

In 2015 there was a

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, a paper intended to act as a blueprint for the coming five years.

However the depreciation of sterling has made big buys of foreign equipment more expensive and the armed forces have crammed the programme with too many projects, creating a hole in the budget.

The government announced "additional work to review national security capabilities" in July - a review by stealth - under the leadership of its national security adviser Mark Sedwill.

The proposed cuts to the Royal Navy have been put forward as part of this exercise.

Under the 1997 defence review, a group of ships was created to improve the UK's ability to land its commando brigade, even in the face of opposition.

The helicopter carrier Ocean, two specialist landing ships - Albion and Bulwark - and four logistic support ships were to be acquired to allow the 5,000 strong force to continue performing operations such as the 1982 Falklands landing, or the one on the Faw peninsula during the 2003 Iraq conflict.

With the retirement of HMS Ocean already announced, and the new plans to lose the two landing ships, the Royal Marines' ability to use landing or hovercraft to get ashore would be drastically curtailed.

In recent years, as an economy measure, the Royal Navy has only been crewing Albion or Bulwark alternately - they are big ships, each requiring a complement of 325.

While the government has dubbed 2017 "the Year of the Royal Navy" and emphasised its commitment to a new national shipbuilding strategy, observers at the MoD noticed that this blueprint contained no commitment to renew the amphibious warfare fleet.

The service is already committed to putting its two new carriers into service, replacing Trident, buying a new class of hunter-killer submarines, and two new types of frigate.

"The Royal Navy has got us into this mess", said a senior MoD figure, referring to the department's budgetary black hole, "so it's up to them to take the pain necessary to get us out of it".

With budgetary responsibility devolved to service chiefs, it fell to the head of the Navy Admiral Sir Philip Jones, to come up with proposals for how he could run the fleet within the financial and personnel limits he has been set.

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