We went from your argument that the CCP got very little aid from the soviet union; to now that the CCP got a lot of aid from the soviet union in the last stage of the war, to Lin baio's troops only receiving the aid and southern units didnt.
I have from the beginning said that the PLA received large amount of weapons in Manchuria from the Soviet.
And I have at the beginning, said, that however, that it benefitted mostly of Lin Biao's units, when Huaihai kicked off, the majority of the PLA units involved did not benefit that much from the supplies.
They did start receiving the supplies at the latter stages, but numerous battles have already been won before significant supplies from the North East arrived.
What the soviet archive have said differently than the CCP version of the story is:
Japanese arms were captured by the USSR and given to the CCP; The CCP didn't just aquire the Japanese arms from surrendering Japanese. Also, soviet block weapons and aid were sent in large quantity to the CCP.
The CCP version of the story clearly stated that they obtained the Japanese weapons and supplies FROM THE SOVIETS. Which were that of the Kwantong army supplies the soviets captured along with Manchuria. And I have been repeating this to the death... I am not sure which version of the CCP account were you looking at.
As far as I have been able to see, there is really nothing significant that from the Soviet archives that differs or are new from the CCP official version of events.
The Soviet block weapons given to them were much less in quantity, and it had been reported that they had not been in the best of conditions. The PLA soldiers generally preferred captured KMT weapons over the soviet or Japanese ones.
There were NO orders issued PLA wide on standardising arms until the Korean war. This was because they still relied heavily on captured arms, and all arms sources they could find or get their hands on.
There was NO evidence of large amount of Soviet bloc weapons being used by units in the Huaihai campaign, or in fact most of the CCP's major battles with the KMT---and I have said that before in the previous post.
Chin-Doihara agreement forbade KMT troops to Hebei, i.e. next to Beijing. i.e. it is outside Manchuria. if you know the Geography of China, the only defensible pass is north of Beijing in Hebei; the next one is the Yangtze river. i.e. the KMT was not in northern China as the defense against the Japanese would be at the Yangtze; as the Song/Ming had done against the Mongols/Manchus.
Chin-Doihara agreement stopped to apply when China and Japan went on fully fledged at killing each other. And certainly stopped applying when China formally declared war in 42.
What you do not seems to get, is that when the KMT pulled back from Northern China, the CCP was not much present in much of the region either. They were basically trapped in couple of pockets. Yes, Yanan was in North China, and because of that, you seems to reason that the CCP was already very much owning North China --- the size of half of Europe.
The reality is that, there was power vacuum in Chinese politics in the Japanese occupied regions. Independent guerrilla groups had formed everywhere, and BOTH CCP and KMT were directing guerrilla operations there. However, the CCP managed to win over more guerrilla groups and local population and establish a solid power base there, while the KMT lost hearts and minds. I really do not want to repeat myself again.
But honestly, does it matter? you want the KMT to be there with a strong force to be defeated by the CCP with peasants; well, why not show which unit were there? what training had they have? does the Nationalist Archive in Taipei colaborate with the Communist Archive in Beijing?
Seriously I do not understand what you mean. Which part of "winning over hearts and minds" did you not understand? See above.
Also, I have no idea why you keep arguing about pre 1945? I have stated many times that I am looking at post 1945. Why does it matter that the CCP was able to survive when the Japanese were giving the KMT a spanking and that the Americans/Soviets forced the KMT to not fight the CCP or they withdraw aid? That's a fact.
It is like talking about the last 10 minutes of a 90 minutes game, and say you have seen the whole game.
And the rest of the 80 minutes did matter, because the CCP had gone from 4:0 down, to 4:3 in that time.
The CCP did not just "survive", they thrived and expanded, and built the foundation for the the 45--49 show down. And it had to do a lot more than just "luck".
So sure, the CCP was able to smuggle in some arms, but that wasn't sufficient to wage offensive war. There is a reason why the CCP wasn't able to repel the 5th encirclement and spawn the long march.
No, as I have said, again, before, it was the medical supplies that they lacked the most, and relied heavily on smuggling.
Arms was mostly obtained from captures, at least, up until the much touted "Soviet supplies". They have survived through the 30s, the WW2 and won many battles against the KMT forces before they got any much touted soviet supplies. When fighting with the Japanese, they concentrated on raiding Japanese logistic lines and supply routes. I do not understand why you think that they will have logistic issues because of this. They were not fighting and capturing arms of 10 different armies with different standards all in one place.
CCP was unable to repel the 5th encirclement because they were suffering from a string of wrong strategies, and their numbers and morale had been exhausted by the leadership insisting on fighting with the KMT square on, and adopting some orthodox communist policies.
They had made corrections to their strategies and grown in strength since and after the long march, and was in a much healthier situation at 45.
And you think that the soviet union would give the KMT supplies had they been in northern China? I don't see how you can argue that because of brilliant leadership, the CCP was next to the soviet union when the hostilities resumed and thus received the supplies.
What? No, the Soviet union will only supply KMT arms if KMT ditched the Americans. I don't get your line of logic.
I was referring to, if I guessed correctly what you actually meant, that CCP having established a power base in northern China, adjacent to Manchuria, had given them the advantage in accessing Manchuria, and establishing physical links with the USSR, ahead of the KMT could do, which would block the link with USSR from happening.
"Brilliant leadership" was evident in how the CCP manoeuvred politically to the position it had in north of China before the Soviets were announcing their handover of Manchuria. I am repeating myself again, north China was not CCP's by right, they had to win it, and KMT had every chance and opportunity to do the same, and in terms of resources it even had an advantage, but they failed to do so. The CCP political skills, strategies and organisation made the situation it was.
Anyhow, I agree that we disagree.
I think the main difference between us is that:
I believed that human factors: strategy, organisation and support are more important in winning a conflict, especially a civil war. I believed that with these fundamentals correct, others, like manpower, outside support, arms, supplies etc. would soon follow.
While you believed that arms is the largest determining factor in any conflict. Therefore, you refuse to believe that the CCP won the Chinese civil war ultimately because of clearer, more realistic and better strategies and superior organisation, but must depend on the arms factor.
