Spartan95
Junior Member
Spartan95,
Your arguments sound good. There is only one question I still have. Manchuria has mostly firm ground, where armor can maneuver easily. On the map I see manly canals between Shanghai and Nanking, suggesting that the area is wet and therefore less suitable for armor. If I'm right it will take very little from the value of your arguments.
I'll be the 1st to concede that I'm no expert on the Battle of Shanghai. I only know some of the brief facts of the battle.
As regards your question on Japanese armour, they are a rather unique "breed" of armour as compared to their western contemporaries at that time. The Japanese Imperial Army's tanks were mostly light and medium tanks designed to overrun infantry and not so much to fight other armour (they didn't face armoured resistance most of the time in Manchuria and the Korean Peninsula). As demonstrated later in the Pacific War and the Malayan Campaign, Japanese tanks have no/little issues operating in wet areas, islands, jungles and crossing rivers/canals (there are a heck of a lot of such river crossings in the Malayan Campaign alone).
Also, when bridges are blown to slow down the Japanese advance, their combat engineers are often able to get floating bridges up in a matter of hours that are able to get their tanks across. This is well chronicled in the Malayan Campaign.
Just to add on to my earlier points on why it is more beneficial to fight in Shanghai instead of a fighting retreat to Nanjing (just came across these):
1. The January 28 Incident (一·二八事變) aka Shanghai Incident of 1932 saw Nationalist China's army fight the Imperial Japanese Army to a near standstill in Shanghai. With this experience, Chiang Kai-Shek was convinced that it is possible to fight the Japanese to a standstill again in the Battle of Shanghai in 1937.
2. Nationalist China needed time to shift her factories from the coastal areas to the interior. Hence, fighting in Shanghai will buy them this time and prevent the Japanese from capturing Nationalist China's industries.
3. Nationalist China was hoping that the foreign powers present in Shanghai will intervene during the Battle of Shanghai and get both sides to a ceasefire so that their commercial interests and investments will not be affected further.
4. As the Japanese essentially controlled all the waterways, including the Yangtze river, they can make amphibious assaults anywhere on the Yangtze river to outflank Nationalist China's army should they attempt to conduct a fighting retreat. This was what actually happened during the retreat from Shanghai to Nanjing historically. Thus, a fighting retreat strategy is unlikely to be effective due to the various flanking manouevres that the Imperial Japanese Army carried out.