The War in the Ukraine

pevade

Junior Member
Registered Member
A number issues to consider here.

Firstly, NATO ISR are not some magical all-seeing eye, and are subject to the same limitations of range, endurance, availability, geography and weather as everyone else’s. Not even bring in decoys, deception, jamming and good old fashioned camouflage etc.

Range and time are probably most relevant here because thus far, NATO ISR has always operated from neighbouring NATO countries’ airspace or international airspace. Never Ukrainian airspace. As the battlefront moves further east, that degrades the capabilities of the bulk of NATO ISR operating over NATO member states.

As with all live battlefield intel gathering operations, you will never get a complete picture from one or even several passes of recon satellites or recon planes. The successful Ukrainian offensives were made possible by relatively static frontlines that allowed NATO to gradually build a comprehensive picture over weeks or months. The current far more fluid situation massively degrades the completeness and accuracy of NATO’s battlespace awareness and understanding, especially under constant time pressure due to the need to continue pushing ahead and not loose momentum

ISR are most effective at spotting big things. Big columns of troops and armour are next to impossible to hide, but troops dug into defensive positions, especially in or around population centres, are far harder to accurately and comprehensively assess. This is one of the reasons a lot of NATO and Ukraine fanboys are getting their undies in a twist about Russia evacuating civilians - it makes it much much harder for NATO space based ISR to get a good understanding of what’s going on. Are those buses and troop trucks leaving town full of civilians or soldiers? Are the same trucks and buses coming back empty or full of troops and supplies? Not impossible to tell of course, but hard and eats up finite and precious analytical and recon assets’ time and bandwidth.

In the past, it was Russia that was struggling with this when they were on the offensive, and their big troop concentrations were very obvious and easy to find and track by NATO ISR. But now it’s the Ukrainians who are on the move, so the burdens have been flipped and even Russia’s bare bones ISR should have little trouble finding and tracking the bulk of the Ukrainian forces while NATO ISR now not only need to track the retreating Russian forces, but also assess and map out defences of new frontline settlements as well as keep tabs on Russian reinforcement.

Also worth considering is that even with perfect tactical battlefield awareness, it is still possible to be lured into untenable strategic level positions or even traps if your supply lines become overstretched and bad weather hamstrings the mobility that was key to your current successful strategy.

All of this is also assuming that NATO has Ukraine’s best interests at heart, and are not at all swayed by domestic considerations and demands and are above using Ukrainian blood to buy domestic political capital. I mean that’s totally unprecedented and it’s not like the US President has been conducting foreign policy, economics policy and managing the US strategic oil reserves with the upcoming midterm elections as the main and only consideration.
One idea I had was that NATO recon satellites can track and report aircraft and troop movement by combining it with AI object recognition/movement detection. Wouldn't this effectively allow every single recon/spy satellite to track everything? (even flying aircraft) If so, why isn't Russia also doing this? They could quite easily track Ukrainian troop movement though this.
 

wilhelm

New Member
Registered Member
suggests it’s Russian artillery and Ukrainians on the receiving end.

Volume of fire and inaccuracy of said fire strongly suggests it’s Russian artillery and Ukrainians on the receiving end.
There are graphic pictures on other sites, with plenty of dead, which show this to be a Ukrainian unit that was mauled badly.
 

plawolf

Lieutenant General
One idea I had was that NATO recon satellites can track and report aircraft and troop movement by combining it with AI object recognition/movement detection. Wouldn't this effectively allow every single recon/spy satellite to track everything? (even flying aircraft) If so, why isn't Russia also doing this? They could quite easily track Ukrainian troop movement though this.

With infinite resources, easy, with real world available resources, no.

Optical satellites can either take a lower res image of a large area or a higher res image of a small area. If you only got a 10m res blob, no amount of AI can tell you what that blob is.

To take high enough res images of a battlefield as big as Ukraine with EO satellites and have quick enough refresh rates to be operational relevant for tracking everything like you described would require many times more satellites than there are in orbit.
 

Atomicfrog

Major
Registered Member
Sorry but that’s sugar coating things. Against a tree line where the enemy is dug in and you can’t see obvious targets, sure, area fire and blanket that entire grid reference, multiple times. But against columns of advancing enemy tanks and armour, a few guided rounds would have deleted the entire advance while all the troops were embarked or closely clustered around the vehicles without the need to hit tree lines.

The Russians obvious have laser guided artillery rounds, but they are so infrequently used they might as well not exist in Ukraine.

So massed artillery area bombardment is basically the only option the Russians have most of the time, so it’s a little pointless listing the benefits of dumb artillery like the Russians had a host of actual options and chose that based on its merits for the situation at hand.
Sweetening or not the situation, that advance got screwed. It's surely weight a lot more on logistic to launch that many ammunitions when a couple guided ones would have made the day. There's not perfect situation in war, you use what you have.

Still, i'm not sure that only unguided artillery shot was used, we see two disabled MBT and one cooking off. Picture of the tanks don't look like they were direct it from above. We see hit from bullets on the road too. Russians troops had a direct line of sight on the advancing troops, you can spare your guided ammunition when the confrontation is bagged anyway.
 

sheogorath

Colonel
Registered Member
With troops going in the middle of an open field withouth much cover or support, blanketing the entire area is more cost effective than wasting precisión ammo in each of the targets.

If anything, it would have worked better to fire several salvo of cluster Grads.
 

pevade

Junior Member
Registered Member
With infinite resources, easy, with real world available resources, no.

Optical satellites can either take a lower res image of a large area or a higher res image of a small area. If you only got a 10m res blob, no amount of AI can tell you what that blob is.

To take high enough res images of a battlefield as big as Ukraine with EO satellites and have quick enough refresh rates to be operational relevant for tracking everything like you described would require many times more satellites than there are in orbit.
Both are from Jilin-1 Satellites (commercial satellites)
They both look quite capable
 

Stealthflanker

Senior Member
Registered Member
Both are from Jilin-1 Satellites (commercial satellites)
They both look quite capable

They're capable. however for real military purpose commercial satellite lacks the persistence (so does Mil-sat tho unfortunately) and the fact they are scheduled by God and Kepler.. you may not necessarily have their coverage at the time and place where you want it to.
 

abc123

Junior Member
Registered Member
Most of these drones Russia uses for spotting do not have a laser rangefinder to paint targets. Only some Orlan-10 drone variants (not all) can do that. The alternative would be for a forward deployed infantry unit to lase the targets but that is much more dangerous. Krasnopol rounds are also a lot more expensive than standard ones.

Supposedly a regular artillery shell costs around 1000 USD, a Krasnopol round 35000 USD, and an Excalibur round 70000 USD.
So all that volume of regular artillery shells might look like a waste but it is actually way cheaper than firing guided rounds.

Yes, but to destroy one target with guided rounds you need a few of them, while with unguided you need a crapton of them. Now, guess what's easier for your logistics?
 

plawolf

Lieutenant General
Yes, but to destroy one target with guided rounds you need a few of them, while with unguided you need a crapton of them. Now, guess what's easier for your logistics?
Indeed, in addition, this is a near-peer conflict where the other side can and do shoot back.

Typical traditional area fire involves lobbing rounds down range as fast as possible and then packing up and moving on.

The Russians have started to use DJI drones to do forward artillery spotting to vastly increase their effectiveness. But they are finding out to their cost that there is a downside to their current rudimentary organic fire correction methods - that it means Russian artillery are staying put while they try to finesse rounds on target, making themselves much more vulnerable to Ukrainian counter-battery efforts.
 

MarKoz81

Junior Member
Registered Member
Nice fantasy.

Thank you for your kind words. And since you - and others - liked it so much... here's more!

The comparison of VKS condition at the beginning of the war and after eight months.

Approximate numbers of aircraft delivered to active service with VKS at the end of 2020 best represent the number in available for operations in Ukraine. Peacetime conditions with chronic underfunding characteristic of VKS make it impossible to train pilots on new aircraft within less than a year, even if that pilot has previous experience. While in emergency situation such pilots might be ordered to fly a combat mission their performance will be insufficient and will result in a combat loss in relatively short time.

key:
  • W, S, N, C, E - military districts
  • type - 90-00s tech, capable of matching 4-4,5 gens, loses to F-22A or F-35A
  • type - 80-90s tech, obsolete but functional, matches F-16C but loses to F-15C upg/ EF-2000 Tr 2-3/Rafale F3R
  • type - 70-80s tech, obsolete and overmatched, loses to F-16C/Mirage 2000-5.

Aircraft in VKS service - end of 2020:

interceptor:
  • 130 MiG-31BM/BSM (W: 24, N: 20, C: 50, E: 36)
air superiority:
  • 24 Su-27SM3 (S: 24)
  • 42 Su-27SM (W: 18, S: 24)
  • 18 Su-33 (N: 18)
  • 19 MiG-29K (N: 19)
multirole (air superiority + ground strike)
  • 72 Su-35S (W: 36, E: 36)
  • 92 Su-30S (W: 32, S: 32, E: 30)
frontal bomber:
  • 122 Su-34 (W: 24, S: 36, C: 36, E: 26)
  • 66 Su-24M2 (W: 10, S: 31, N: 13, C: 12)
CAS:
  • 123 Su-25SM/SM3 (S: 63, C: 12, E: 48)
additionally:
  1. 4th and 185th Training centre have a small number of aircraft of each type.
  2. A total of 98 Su-35S was delivered to VKS at the end of 2020 but not all were introduced into service
  3. The number of MiG-31 in regular service is lower - approx. 80-90, modernization didn't improve capabilities
  4. Su-30M2 in VKS service has no meaningful combat potential and is used as training aircraft replacing Su-27UB
  5. MiG-29A/SMT and older Su-27P are listed as in service but are in reserve and in unknown technical state
  6. Su-34 is technically capable of BVR but only since 2020 pilots included that as part of their training
  7. Su-57 was ignored because its current purpose is testing and propaganda
Also multiplier assets should be considered:

AEW:
  • 12 A-50M
  • 3 A-50U
aerial refueling:
  • 18 Il-78M
Now let's correct those figures to reflect better the condition of VKS after eight months of war.

Confirmed losses in 2022:
  • 1 MiG-31BM
  • 1 Su-35S
  • 11 Su-30SM
  • 16 Su-34
  • 7 Su-24M2
  • 19-22 Su-25SM/SM3
Any losses due to wear need to be estimated through comparison with other conflicts but it is plausible to expect 20-30% of aircraft to be unavailable due to long-term maintenance after eight months of continuous use. Combined with combat losses that would reduce the available numbers to approximately:
  • 80 MiG-31BM/BSM
  • 17-19 Su-27SM3
  • 30-34 Su-27SM
  • 66-77 Su-35S (+new built in 2021-22)
  • 57-65 Su-30SM
  • 73-84 Su-34 (+ new built in 2021-22)
  • 41-47 Su-24M2
  • 73-83 Su-25SM/SM3
This is what VKS has nominally at current moment. Number of available machines due to short-term maintenance (mission capable rate) is difficult to estimate but at 50-60% it will match average MCR of NATO countries so can be ignored.

The number of available pilots is difficult to estimate. Even more so is the number of pilots who have received sufficient training in modern tactics which was impossible before introduction of Su-30SM, Su-35S and Su-34. You can't train modern tactics with a Su-27 using SARH missiles and radar capable of tracking a single target.

This is table of deliveries from 2000 onward with projection to 2030 per 2020 plans:
1280px_RuAF do 2030 v 1.jpg

Modern combat training in VKS was impossible before 2012-2013 which means that at first the instructors had to gain experience before the rest of the pilots were trained. This was the main purpose of Syrian campaign. This also means that VKS pilots are not sufficiently trained while in NATO it is standard training since 2000s. This should not be misunderstood as NATO having all pilots properly trained but as NATO having their trained pilots fully familiar with modern tactics while VKS trained pilots are fully familair with Russian/Soviet tactics and depend on individual skill to match the opponent. NATO has therefore a decisive skill overmatch on average.

This explains the abysmal performance of VKS in Ukraine:
  1. The pilots have more modern machines (and more capable compared to UAF) but rely on obsolete tactics because they haven't had the time to develop appropriate ones.
  2. The logistical system of VKS approaches critical failure because Russia has never learnt to sustain air operations of this intensity and duration and must improvise.
  3. Russia has limited ability to pool assets from other districts due to insufficient aerial refueling capability and lack of relevant training.
As for hypothetical conflict with NATO:
  1. With approx. 80 Su-35S, 70 Su-30SM and 80 Su-34 for all military districts - VKS has insufficient numbers. UK, Germany or France are not necessary to overmatch VKS. Poland, Czechia and Denmark have ~ 100 fighters. USAF has ~ 100 fighters in Europe and can easily deploy another 100. Finland and Sweden which in this scenario already function as part of NATO due to agreements with aforementioned countries signed in 2022 and EU defense clause have ~ 100 fighters.
  2. MiG-31 is a cruise missile hunter and won't be available for other roles in such scenario because of its deployment and tactics.
  3. Other aircraft are just targets as they are relative to NATO assets as Iraqi planes in 1991 vs USAF/USN.
  4. Russian EW systems on all aircraft have been captured four months ago. Counter tactics are being developed but the initial impression is that Russian EW is underwhelming, and would not be a major problem.
  5. Ground air defenses were a problem before February. Now they are well understood to the point where UAF Soviet-era planes are capable of countering them reliably in certain conditions. NATO/USAF knows SEAD. Russia doesn't.
  6. Destroying air bases - Russia had neither capacity or skill to destroy Ukrainian airbases similarly to how it had neither for SEAD. They don't have the munitions for anything other than a single strike and most of those will be shot down. NATO assets will operate from western Europe at +1000km distance enabled by USAF/NATO refuelers as per current doctrine.
  7. NATO has trained for this since 2014. Russia hasn't and focused on psyops with Wunderwaffen. Didn't work vs Ukraine. Won't work vs NATO.
Hope you liked this fantasy as well! Comment, like and subscribe!
 
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