It Is Time for the Pentagon’s PLA Report to Grow Up
by Richard Fisher, Jr.
Published on March 22nd, 2008
ARTICLES
For the first time in many years, on March 3 the Pentagon issued its annual China Military Power report prior to the March 15 deadline called for by the 1997 Congressional authorization language.[1] One apparent reason for the early delivery was to use the report as part of an intensified effort to convince China to relax its deeply ingrained resistance to “military transparency.” However, the key requirement for this annual report as mandated by the Congress was that the Department of Defense report “on the future pattern of military modernization of the People's Republic of China.” The 2008 report offers some interesting new data, even as it prompts new and old questions. Responding fully to its Congressional mandate and serving better to convince China to reveal more about its capabilities and intents will require more. The time has come to greatly expand and upgrade the China Military Power report.
China’s Foreign Ministry replied to this latest PLA Report by urging the U.S. to “abandon its Cold War mentality.”[2] It also accused the U.S. of playing up the “China Military Threat Theory.” The fact remains, however, that the annual China Military Power report is the most authoritative statement concerning China’s military power and intentions made by any government.[3] No other government seeks to make such an assessment and China’s annual condemnation nicely reflects its fear of even 66 pages of “transparency.”
Cold War Mentality: On March 4, 2008 Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang offered the annual reply to the PLA Report by urging the U.S. drop its “Cold War mentality.” Source: People’s Daily
The China Military Power report is nevertheless not a wholly satisfactory document. While guided by Congressional demands it is also the product of compromises between the demands of policy and intelligence security. But there is apparently scope for creativity. For 2008 the report’s drafters apparently chose to add a chapter length “Special Topic” on “Human Capital in the PLA Force Modernization” which examines the PLA’s progress in creating a more professional and capable personnel core. Other topics might be at least as informative and relevant: for example, “China’s Continued WMD Proliferation and How Chinese Leaders Profit,” but not surprisingly, that nettle was left un-grasped.[4]
As with previous versions this review will focus on threat-related concerns.
Space Warfare Concerns
For 2008 the Pentagon’s PLA Report places a new stress on China’s space and counter-space capabilities, due largely to the “unannounced test” on January 11, 2007 of the PLA’s SC-19 direct ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) interceptor. Regarding future direct ascent ASAT weapons, the PLA Report notes curiously that “Beijing’s efforts to develop small, rapid reaction space launch vehicles currently appears to be stalled.” (2008, p. 27) It is not clear whether this is a reference to China’s intention to build mobile space launch vehicles out of the DF-31 ICBM family, known as the KT-2 and KT-2A. In terms of other “rapid reaction” vehicles the PLA may be working on two air-launched space launch vehicles that could be used to deploy ASAT weapons. The first is similar to the U.S. Orbital Sciences Pegasus air launched vehicle revealed at the 2006 Zhuhai Airshow. The second may be based on larger version of the Shenlong space plane vehicle first revealed in December 2007.[5] Air launched ASAT carriers are far more flexible than ground-mobile systems like the SC-19 or a potential future KT-2 based system.
Possible Air Launched SLVs: A Pegasus-like space launch vehicle and the Shenlong space place form two possible air launched “rapid reaction” space launch vehicles for the PLA. Source: Chinese Internet
Regarding China’s manned space program the 2008 PLA Report notes “The majority of the technology used in China’s manned space program is derived from Russian equipment, and China receives significant help from Russia with specific satellite payloads and applications.” (2008, p. 3) In October 2008 China will likely fly its Shenzhou-8, its third manned mission and the first to exercise a space-walk. The below image from a Chinese government website indicates that China’s extravehicular activity (EVA) suit is substantially derived from the Russian Orlan-D space suit. The PLA Report also notes “China’s goal is to have a manned space station and conduct a lunar landing, both by 2020.” (2008, p. 27) However, the PLA Reports have not noted how China has used all Shenzhou missions thus far to support military surveillance missions, which sets a precedent for the possibility of China using its future space stations and Moon program to support military goals.
China’s EVA Suit: This is the first image of China’s manned space suit, which will likely be used during the Shenzhou-8 mission planned for this October; it shows a marked similarity to the Russian Orlan-D suit. Source: Chinese Internet
More Missile Data Prompts Old Questions
The 2008 PLA Report provides interesting updates from 2007 regarding the PLA’s increasing nuclear missile forces. While the 2007 report noted that that the 7,200km range solid-fuel and road-mobile DF-31 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) had “achieved initial threat availability in 2006” (2007, p. 9), the 2008 report asserts that DF-31 deployment is now less than 10 (2008, p. 66). The 2007 report also noted that the larger 11,200km range DF-31A “is expected to reach initial operational capability (IOC) in 2007” (2007, p. 3), and indeed, the 2008 reports that fewer than 10 are now considered deployed. This could suggest an annual production rate of 5 to 10 missiles for both types. Chinese Internet images of what is likely the DF-31A ICBM show that is it is much larger than the DF-31 and is carried by a 16-wheel transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) similar to the MAZ-7916 used by the Russian SS-27 ICBM. A 1996 reported noted that U.S. satellite had detected a large MAZ TEL outside a Chinese factory,[6] indicating that Belarus or Russian firms have cooperated with China’s development of these new large TELs.
Recent DF-31 ICBM Images: Appearing in mid-2007, this image show that recent production DF-31 ICBMs now have a four-door truck cab. In July 2007 China for the first time revealed a model of the DF-31 ICBM. The Pentagon reports close to 10 may be deployed. Source: Chinese Internet
Regarding nuclear missile submarines (SSBNs), the 2008 PLA Report states that by 2010, the PLA could have “up to five JIN-class SSBNs, each carrying between 10 and 12 JL-2 SLBM.” (2008, p. 25). This formalizes an estimate revealed by the U.S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence in late 2006 that Type 094 SSBN (JIN-class) production could reach five. Fairly clear Chinese Internet-source images of the Type 094 show that this second-generation Chinese SSBN carries 12 SLBMs. Provided that subsequent Type 094 do not carry more than 12 missiles, this points to a new Chinese SLBM force of 60 missiles. Might China build more? Again, Beijing is not revealing its intentions. Concern about the future numbers of PLA ICBMs and SLBMs is heightened for three reasons.
12 SLBMs Per 094: This image of the Type 094 SSBN clearly shows it carries 12 SLBMs. However, Chinese Internet sources suggest that future 094 versions could carry 16 or 18 SLBMs. Source: Chinese Internet
No.1: How many nuclear missiles will China build? The 2002 PLA Report contained an estimate that China could deploy 60 ICBMs by 2010 (2002, p. 27). With the deployed number of upgraded DF-5Mod2 missiles remaining at 20, and an annual production rate of 5 to 10 DF-31 and DF-31A ICBMs, it is thus possible that the PLA could possibly triple its land-based long range nuclear ICBM force to 60 missiles by some time in 2009. But will the PLA stop at a force of 60 or so ICBMs or continue building additional DF-31 and DF-31A units? Will there be follow-on more capable ICBMs? At least one recent unconfirmable Chinese Internet source asserts there will be an initial DF-31A force of 60 missiles.[7] Such an assertion might be easy to dismiss. However, the Chinese government is unwilling to reveal its planned ICBM numbers. The variance is significant: Is China moving toward a nuclear missile force of 60 ICBMs and 60 SLBMs or a force of 100 ICBMs and 60 SLBMs?
Possible DF-31A Images: These images, two revealed in early 2007, and a new side view first seen on March 8, show a much larger 16- wheel TEL similar to the MAZ-7916 used by the Russian SS-27 mobile ICBM. This could be the DF-31A mobile ICBM. Source: Chinese Internet
No.2: Is China arming its new missiles with multiple warheads? While one might prefer to temper concern about even 160 new Chinese nuclear ballistic missiles compared to the nuclear missile arsenals of the United States (500 ICBMs and 336 SLBMs) and Russia (452 ICBMs and 172 SLBMs), what if China is arming these new missiles with multiple warheads? The 2002 PLA Report noted that “perhaps” China would develop multiple warheads, most likely for the new DF-5Mod2, as a means of countering U.S. National Missile Defenses (2002, p. 28). Now after six years, the 2008 PLA Report revives the matter of possible Chinese multiple warheads by noting countermeasures to U.S. missile defenses that “China is researching.” It is worth quoting the entire passage:
“The addition of nuclear capable forces with greater mobility and survivability, combined with ballistic missile defense countermeasures which China is researching—including maneuverable re-entry vehicles (MaRV), multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV), decoys, chaff, jamming, thermal shielding and ASAT weapons—will strengthen China’s deterrent and enhance its capabilities for strategic strike.” (2008, p. 25)
The 2008 PLA Report does not make any statement that Chinese missiles have multiple warheads now, but having revived this issue, the report then fails to explain how the potential for multiple warhead missiles could impact China’s nuclear weapon capability. The author, however, has previously cited estimates of other Asian military officials, which include: DF-5Mod2: 8 warheads; DF-31A: 3-4 warheads; JL-2: 3-4 warheads.[8] As before, the author cannot verify if these numbers are true. However, after six years it is reasonable to question whether the PLA not only has such programs, but also have they made progress? The 1999 Cox Report, which was based on broad U.S. Intelligence Community testimony before a Select Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, noted that if China were to aggressively develop multiple warheads for its missiles it could have 1,000 by 2015.[9] The chart below shows estimates for China’s nuclear missile force based on low and high estimates for missile numbers and for potential multiple warhead configurations.
MaRV and MIRV Indications: The top Chinese television image from 2005 suggests a maneuverable warhead that could potentially be used by the single warhead DF-31 ICBM. The second image from December 2007, from the display table of a Chinese hypersonic research institute, shows a blunt-nose missile at the back of the table, a configuration that could indicate multiple warhead carriage. This missile may represent the DF-31A or the JL-2 SLBM. Source: Chinese Internet
More clarity is required from either from U.S. government or Chinese government sources regarding future numbers of Chinese nuclear missiles and warheads. The U.S. and Russia are now in the process of reducing their nuclear warhead count to about 2,200-1,700 by 2012 as part of the May 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) with Russia. The U.S. is also in the process of reducing the warhead load of most of its 500 fixed-silo Minuteman-III ICBMs from three to one.
No.3: Is China’s ASAT program tied to an ongoing strategic missile defense program? The issue of nuclear warhead numbers becomes even more critical if one considers the indications that China may also be working on a new strategic missile defense program. Successive Pentagon reports have not spoken directly to this possibility. However, the listing of China’s ASAT capability in the above quoted list of “ballistic missile defense countermeasures which China is researching,” can be interpreted as an indication that some in the U.S. Intelligence community are concerned with China’s potential development of missile defenses. After all, the technological capabilities needed for intercepting satellites and ballistic missile warheads are basically the same, as the U.S. demonstrated on February 21 by using U.S. Navy ship-based SM-3 ballistic missile interceptors to prevent an errant U.S. reconnaissance satellite from causing harm on earth. From 1963 to 1980 China pursued its 640 Program missile defense project, which was intended to produce short and long-range missile interceptors, new long range radar, and also had an off-shoot ASAT project. Chinese sources also mention a possible strategic defense program with the numerical designator “863-8XX,” meaning it is under China’s famous “863 Program” started in 1986 to mobilize technological resources to achieve a broad range of military modernization goals.
640 Program ABM Precedent: The FJ-1 and FJ-2 anti-ballistic missile interceptors, though never fully developed and produced, were two products of the 640 Program. These set a precedent for China’s potential current interest in strategic missile defense, in stark contrast to its long-standing harsh rhetoric against such systems. Source: Chinese Internet
The future configuration of China’s strategic offensive, and potential strategic defensive capabilities should be of critical concern to the United States, which unlike Russia and China, extends its nuclear deterrent to treaty allies in Europe and Asia. The U.S. does this because it believes that it is in America’s strategic interest that many of its allies not do so themselves—a point perhaps not sufficiently appreciated in Beijing and Moscow. Precisely because China has used its current limited nuclear arsenal to attempt to “intimidate” or “coerce” the United States from aiding Taiwan in the event of a Chinese military strike, several U.S. allies in Asia, themselves not yet nuclear, are quite sensitive to U.S.-Chinese-Russian nuclear balance.[10] Should a much larger Chinese nuclear offensive and defensive nuclear force come to be judged as “neutralizing” the American strategic deterrent in Asia, or worse, come to aid a hostile Chinese conquest of Taiwan, some may see little choice but to pursue their own strategic or even nuclear deterrent.
As it did in 2007, the 2008 PLA Report repeats doubts about China’s oft-state “No First Use” policy for nuclear weapons, in light of “periodic PRC military and academic debates” which question this policy. For example, in January 2008 Chai Yuqiu, a vice principal with the Nanjing Army Command College, told the Ta Kung Pao newspaper that China’s no-first-use nuclear policy is not unlimited, saying,
"The policy of not to use nuclear weapons first is not unlimited, without conditions, or without premises,” Chai also noted, “China will never use nuclear weapons first, especially not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries…When big powers equipped with nuclear arms disregard the completeness of sovereignty and territory of Chinese people and make frequent moves that are unconventional and hurt the fundamental interests of Chinese people, however, it is not impossible to break such a strategy on tactical issues.”[11]
This is apparently the latest reference, albeit veiled, that China could use nuclear weapons against the United States in an offensive manner in the event of a full conflict over the future of Taiwan. It follows previous threatening statements made by former General Staff Second Department (Intelligence) Director General Xiong Guangkai in late 1995 and then National Defense University professor General Zhu Chenghu in July 2005.[12]
To diminish China’s capacity for nuclear coercion, it is necessary that the U.S. maintain a sufficient nuclear weapons capacity to deter nuclear attack against itself and against regional allies. If China is indeed building up toward a nuclear force of 500 or more warheads, then it is logical that the U.S. reconsider whether SORT warhead numbers and the current limited National Missile Defense posture are sufficient to sustain the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. There may or may not be a need for the U.S. to alter its planned nuclear missile and defensive missile posture. But at a minimum, it would be a necessary hedge against uncertainty and retain, as the U.S. has reportedly decided, 25 of its Minuteman-III ICBMs armed with multiple warheads[13] and to fully fund the Reliable Replacement Warhead program to ensure a credible U.S. nuclear deterrent.[14]
Despite China’s potential for pushing the U.S.-China nuclear competition in the direction of a new “Cold War,” not all this is necessarily bad news. China’s interest in strategic missile defenses, within a political context that does not exist today, offers the potential to achieve negotiated offensive-defensive limits that could form the basis for global weapon reductions. This is one of many reasons to press hard, as the Bush Administration has been doing, for a real dialogue with the PLA on nuclear weapon related issues. But it is likely that any lasting progress toward a verifiable nuclear stability with China will require 1) a significant resolution of the ideological-strategic conflicts between Communist China and the community of Democratic nations, especially as regards Taiwan; and 2) a sea-change in China’s longstanding resistance to the levels military transparency needed to foster real military confidence with other countries.
Update on Threats to Taiwan
A key reason why a Communist Party led China is not going to evolve positively in these two areas of concern for some time is China’s strengthening commitment to force “unification” on a democratic Taiwan that wants preserve its democratic freedoms as it decides, on its own, the future of its relationship with China. Taiwan itself poses no military threat to China and Taiwanese appear willing to pursue greater economic integration with China. Ultimately it is Taiwan’s free-wheeling multi-party democracy which most threatens the dictatorship of the Chinese Communist Party. But in recent years Chinese military scholars have begun formulating geostrategic justifications for the conquest of Taiwan, as the PLA Report has repeatedly noted, is but a stepping stone toward greater strategic ambitions. While the PLA Reports for 2007 and 2008 have quoted a useful passage from the The PLA National Defense University (NDU) textbook The Science of Military Strategy (2008, p. 29), it is worth quoting additionally from this government-approved textbook:
“The reunification of China’s mainland and Taiwan not only is something that concerns China’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity…buy also will exert impact upon the survival and development of the Chinese nation and the rejuvenation of the great nation of China in this century…If Taiwan should be alienated from the mainland, not only our maritime defense system would lose its depth, opening a sea gateway to the outside forces, but also a large water area and rich reserves of ocean resources will fall into the hands of others. What’s more, our line of foreign trade and transportation, which is vital to China’s opening up and economic development will be exposed to the surveillance threats of separatist and enemy forces, and China will be forever locked on the west side of the first chain of islands of the West Pacific…”The independence of Taiwan” means the start of war…Although this is something undesirable for China, we have to face it. Taiwan issue is the largest and the last obstacle which we must conquer in Chinese people’s path to rejuvenation in the 21st Century…”[15]
From this PLA perspective, control of Taiwan would “rejuvenate” Chinese power by causing a geostrategic shift in China’s favor. Far more important than the territorial or resource benefits to be gained, it would also give the PLA an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” astride the sea lanes vital to the economic security of South Korea, Japan, Australia, India and the Southeast Asian economies which depend on unhindered commerce. For sure, these sea lanes are just as important to China’s economy, and the PLA Navy could be almost as disruptive from its current bases. But Taiwan’s East Coast offer one advantage not allowed by bases on the mainland: immediate access to very deep water patrol areas for nuclear ballistic missile submarines.
As Ross Munro noted in 1999, “In the eyes of PRC leaders, Taiwan is first and foremost a strategic target that must soon be subjugated if China is to realize its goal of becoming Asia's dominant and unchallenged power.”[16] For Taiwan, this suggests that policies that seek to ameliorate conflicts with China will not alter Beijing’s ultimate goal of controlling Taiwan, which would require the eventual subjugation of Taiwan’s democratic government by force. A PLA conquest of Taiwan would almost certainly require violation of Japanese territory which extends, through the Sakishima Island chain, to Yonaguni Island, which is inhabited, sixty miles east of Taiwan’s Pacific coast. Such violation would almost certainly lead to wider war. Even if China somehow managed successfully to conquer Taiwan, the result would be to place Chinese forces about 60km from Japanese territory, a potentially explosive situation.
Such an outcome tragedy would have to assume either the defeat of U.S. forces or their political or military neutralization, and would herald the beginning of an era of Asian conflicts. A crisis of confidence in its American alliance could move Japan to rearm and build nuclear weapons, and have a similar effect on South Korea. Such outcomes are unpalatable for our allies, as would be the prospect of Washington becoming enmeshed in a new era of Asian nuclear-military competition.
For these reasons it is necessary to continue with the wisdom of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act and continue to sell Taiwan the weapons it needs to deter a Chinese decision to attack. In addition to many campaign statements that he will seek new levels of understanding and tension reduction with China, presidential front-runner and Kuomintang (KMT) candidate Ma Ying-jeou has also stated he would raise Taiwan’s defense spending to 3 percent of GDP and pursue the purchase of modern “defensive” weapons to ensure Taiwan will not be vulnerable to Chinese coercion.[17] The 2008 PLA Report notes new threats to Taiwan that will serve to justify Ma’s intention to increase defense spending.
Missile Threats: China’s missile threats to Taiwan continue to accumulate; presenting a potential first-strike force that could devastate Taiwan’s air and naval defenses and diminish fixed army systems. The 2008 PLA Report notes a high estimate of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) at 1070 (2008, p. 56), an almost 10 percent increase over the 2007 high estimate of 975. DF-21 (CSS-5) medium range missile numbers have increased from high estimates of 50 to 80 in the last year. A new anti-ship variant of the DF-21 could account for this increase. The PLA Report for 2008 does not detail the new variants for these missiles, which include the DF-15C deep-penetrating SRBM, the DF-15B with an apparent maneuvering warhead, or a new medium range missile called “DF-25” by some, but which may also be a new variant of the DF-21. For the first time the 2008 PLA Report notes that new land-attack cruise missiles (LACM) could number up to 250. This number could only represent land-based “DH-10” LACMs, and thus this number could increase rapidly as the PLA Air Force builds LACM-carrying H-6K bombers and a naval variant of this LACM arms new PLA Navy nuclear attack submarines.
More LACMs: This artist’s illustration from a Chinese military magazine offers one indication that China’s new air-launched LACMs may benefit from the Russian Kh-55 LACM, obtained by China from the Ukraine via A.Q. Khan’s nuclear smuggling network. Source: Naval Weapons
As far as is known, Taiwan has no ballistic missiles or LACMs aimed at China. While Taiwan is developing both, these are opposed by Washington and KMT leader Ma Ying-jeou has said he will halt the development of “offensive” missiles. After a long delay, it appears that Taiwan will buy new Raytheon Patriot PAC-3 missiles capable of intercepting most PLA SRBMs, but these are expensive and the numbers required are prohibitive. Instead, as this author has previously suggested, Taiwan requires energy intensive weapons like lasers and rail-guns. These have the potential of firing thousands of very inexpensive “rounds” and thus have a chance giving Taiwan’s “defensive” posture a significant advantage over the PLA’s offensive missiles.
Air Threats: The 2008 PLA Report notes that 20 percent of the PLA’s 2,250 combat aircraft can be considered “modern,” 4th generation or with 4th generation capabilities, which works out to an estimated 450 modern aircraft (2008, pgs, 34, 52). Of this number, close to 300 are from the Russian Sukhoi family of Su-27K, Su-30MKK, Su-30MKK2, plus the co-produced Shenyang J-11A, and soon, the largely copied J-11B—which may soon enter series production. Added to this there is close to 100 indigenous Chengdu J-10 multi-role fighters and then 50 or more of the indigenous Xian JH-7 and JH-7A strike fighters. Shenyang and Chengdu are developing twin-seat dedicated attack variants of the J-11B and the J-10. There are persistent though unconfirmed reports that the PLA will purchase the light-weight Chengdu FC-1 co-developed with Pakistan. Most Russian-made fighters are armed with the self-guided Vympel R-77 medium range and the helmet-sighted R-73 air-to-air missile (AAM). All new Chinese-made fighters carry the self-guided Luoyang PL-12, though they could also soon carry the helmet-display sighted PL-10/13 and the long-range ramjet-powered PL-13/14, which both apparently benefit from South African technology.[18] China is now developing two families of laser-guided and satellite-guided bombs for precision attacks.
But as repeated PLA Reports have noted, the PLA air threat also comes from increasing numbers of advanced surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) acquired from Russia, and increasingly, produced by China (2008, p. 56). The PLA Air Force is in the process of acquiring up to 900 missiles of the deadly Russian S-300 family, to include 300 of the 150km range S-300PMU-2. From Fujian Province bases the S-300PMU-2 can reach targets over Taiwan. And with Russian technological help, China has put its 100-150km range HQ-9 into production, a SAM that is thought to be as good as early versions of the S-300. The 2008 PLA Report says there are 64 HQ-9 launchers, meaning a potential for at least 300 of these SAMs. The Pentagon for the first time mentions an “HQ-9 follow on” (2008, p. 56); Asian sources have noted that the PLA may be working on a 400km range SAM. These new SAMs combine very high speed and highly difficult to jam phased array radar guidance systems which pose a very high threat to U.S., Japanese and Taiwanese 4th generation combat aircraft.
Taiwan’s 390 combat aircraft face a rapidly increasing threat from the PLA’s missiles, LACMs and increasing numbers of advanced combat aircraft armed with modern aerial combat and precision ground-attack weapons. As repeated PLA Reports have noted, Taiwan would do well to invest much more in passive defenses such as shelters. However, Taiwan has also in the last year requested to begin the process of purchasing 66 new Lockheed Martin F-16 Block 50 fighters, which the Bush Administration has so far refused to commence. Given the rapidly increasing threat from Chinese missiles and precision strike aircraft that can target Taiwan’s Air Force, and the growing threat posed by modern Russian SAMs, it is necessary for the U.S. to consider Taiwan’s requirement for a 5th generation fighter like the Lockheed-Martin F-35B. This fighter has advantages of stealth which can counter the threat of the PLA’s new SAMs and a very-short take-off capability to allow for rapid aircraft dispersal to avoid missile attack.
Want Vs. Need: Taiwan is requesting 66 new F-16C Block 50 fighters to replace its very old F-5 fighters, but the mounting missile, air and SAM threat from the PLA would easily justify a future request from Taipei for the 5th generation F-35B V/STOL fighter. Source: RD Fisher
Naval/Invasion Threats: The 2008 PLA Report notes slight growth over 2007 in the PLA’s total submarine force, from 58 to 60, and further notes for the first time that a nuclear powered attack submarine is deployed with the East or South Sea Fleet near Taiwan. What this report does not note, however, is that after three years of trial and development, the PLA Navy has started series production of the new Yuan-class conventional submarine. Two new Yuans were spotted near the Wuhan shipyard in early 2008, and recent production runs for PLA submarines have ranged from 10 to 20. In 2007 Chinese sources also revealed the first images of the new Type 093 nuclear attack submarine, which Asian sources in the past have said three were launched by 2006. The 2008 PLA Report also does not assess the significance of the PLA Navy’s first Type 071 large LPD amphibious assault ship, launched at the end of 2006. It displaces about 20,000 tons and may carry up to 800 troops plus armor and equipment. In early 2008 Chinese Internet sources revealed the first images of the specialized hovercraft, similar in size to the U.S. Navy’s LCAC, which may be used by China’s LPD and LHD to move equipment rapidly to shore. Chinese sources and other reports also indicate that the PLA will be building a similarly sized helicopter assault ship or LHD.[19]
Quest For PLA Transparency Requires Better PLA Report
One key goal that the Bush Administration has sought to advance by releasing 2008 PLA Report early, and on the week it did, was clearly to increase pressure on Beijing to improve its willingness to become more “transparent” militarily. The 2008 PLA Report warns bluntly:
“China’s leaders have yet to explain in detail the purposes and objectives of the PLA’s modernizing military capabilities…The lack of transparency in China’s military and security affairs poses risks to stability by increasing the potential for misunderstanding and miscalculation. This situation will naturally and understandably lead to hedging against the unknown.” (2008, p. 1)
DoD released its report on Monday March 3, just as China’s largely rubber-stamp National People’s Congress (NPC) convened in Beijing. For Chinese Communist Party (CCP) the NPC provides an essential opportunity to justify its near total political control of China, by detailing economic goals and announcing budgets, usually led by its military spending announcement, which for 2008 marks 17.6 increase for 2007. But instead, the Bush Administration chose that week to put Beijing on the defensive by offering facts about China’s military build-up that the CCP would never reveal, and posing questions that it cannot answer at the risk of having to really justify its actions to the people of China.
It was indeed welcome that the Bush Administration would elevate its pressure in this way to seek to convince the Chinese government to become far more open about its military modernization and military-political goals. However, successive administrations since Ronald Reagan have pursued the same goal, with the Bush Administration the latest to resort to venting frustration. While pressing China to increase transparency may be laudable, it is simply the fact that China’s responses reflect a centuries-old abhorrence of military transparency.
When questioned on the BBC in 2006 about U.S. concerns about China’s military spending and transparency, China’s UN Ambassador to Geneva Sha Zukang said “It's better for the US to shut up and keep quiet.”[20] At least Dr. Shen Dingli of Shanghai’s Fudan University, an oft-cited unofficial “spokesman” for the Chinese government, offered an honest reason for Chinese reticence: "We have to keep certain secrets in order to have a war-fighting capability…We can't let Taiwan and the U.S. know how we are going to defeat them if the U.S. decides to send forces to intervene in a conflict over Taiwan.”[21] Ralph Sawyer has noted that for Sun Zi, perhaps China’s most venerated military strategist, a stress on secrecy was a “force multiplier,” quoting his formulation, “The pinnacle of military employment approaches the formless…If I determine the enemy’s disposition while I have no perceptible form, I can concentrate my forces while the enemy is fragmented.”[22]
As long as China perceives that there will be opposition to its military goals, for Taiwan or for the Greater Asian region, it will seek to mask its intentions and to conceal its accumulating military capabilities. Largely cordial diplomatic attempts to make Beijing explain and reveal basic military information will only result in marginal gains. Even though these meager gains may justify continued effort, it is also time to greatly increase pressure on Beijing. During the Cold War the Reagan Administration’s Soviet Miltiary Power served not only to inform Americans and their allies of real threats, it also informed citizens in the former Soviet Bloc of the massive military expenditures that undermined economic and social conditions. A relatively easy upgrade for the online China Military Power report would be to translate it into several languages, including multiple Chinese dialects. But ultimately this report deserves to be a standing volume with extensive images and charts. The “risks to stability” of China’s military buildup are very real and deserve a far more serious investment in the China Military Report.
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[1] The text of the 1997 authorizing language for the annual Department of Defense China Military Power Report can be accessed at:
[2] Li Xiaokun, “Pentagon report smacks of Cold War Mentality,” People’s Daily, March 5, 2008,
[3] Annual Report To Congress, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2008, Office of the Secretary of Defense,
[4] Former Secretary of State James A. Baker III noted in his memoirs one reason for China’s persistence in selling missile technology to Pakistan in the 1990s was because “…several senior government and party officials or their families stood to gain from the performance of those contracts,” see, James A. Baker III, The Politics of Diplomacy, Revolution, War and Peace, New York: G.P.Putnam & Sons, 1995, p. 593.
[5] See author, “Shenlong Space Plane Advances China’s Military Potential,” International Assessment and Strategy Center, December 17, 2007,
[6] Bill Gertz, “Missile-related Technology Sold To Beijing by Belarus,” The Washington Times, June 12, 1997, p. A9.
[7] This report appeared on the WarSky web page on March 3, 2008, titled, “The United States Wants China To Stop Deployment of DF-31A: China’s Military Rejects Categorically,”
. This report also suggests that that China may eventually deploy 120 DF-31A ICBMs. The Chinese Internet is often a fertile source of disinformation and the author cannot confirm the veracity of this report, which is cited to illustrate the uncertainty surrounding projections of China’s future nuclear missile forces.
[8] “Two Cheers for the 2007 PLA Report,” International Assessment and Strategy Center, June 10, 2007,
[9] Report of the Select Committee On U.S. National Security And Military/Commercial Concerns With The People’s Republic of China, Volume 1, Submitted by Mr. Cox of California, Chairman, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999, p. 186.
[10] This point was made recently to the author by a Japanese defense official.
[11] Ta Kung Pao, January 20, 2008, relayed in “China rethinks no-first use of nuclear weapons: Policy not unlimited, without conditions,” East-Asia Intel.com, January 30, 2008.
[12] Alexandra Harney, Demetri Sevastopulo and Edward Alden, “Top Chinese general warns US over attack,” Financial Times, July 15, 2005,
[13] Elaine M. Grossman, “U.S. Might Retain Multiple Warheads on 25 Intercontinental Missiles,” Global Security Newswire, November 30, 2007,
[14] For background see, “Reliable Replacement Warhead program,” National Nuclear Security Administration Fact Sheet,
[15] Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, The Science of Military Strategy, English Edition, Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 2005, pgs. 442-443.
[16] Ross Munro, “Taiwan: What China Really Wants,” National Review, October 11, 1999.
[17] Ma Ying-jeou, “A SMART Strategy for National Security,” A Speech before the Association for the Promotion of National Security, Republic of China, February 26, 2008.
[18] See author, “China’s Emerging 5th Generation Air-to-Air Missiles,” International Assessment and Strategy Center, February 2, 2008,
[19] See author, “Chinese Aspects of Singapore’s IMDEX Naval Technology Show,” International Assessment and Strategy Center, June 20, 2007,
[20] H. Josef Hebert, “Top Chinese Diplomat Tells US To ‘Shut Up’ On Arms Spending,” Agence France Presse, August 17, 2006.
[21] David Lague, “A Mystery in Beijing: Who Runs the Military?,” International Herald Tribune, June 22, 2007,
[22] Ralph D. Sawyer, “Chinese Strategic Power: Myths, Intent and Projections,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Winter 2006/2007, pgs. 4,5.
