Giving other guys weapons is very easy. The west especially the US does it all the time. Yet it's mainly a huge waste coz the guys they backed simply lack the capability to use them properly. Just look all it's middle eastern governments it has backed that have gotten nowhere in terms of military.
People ask why does China have few to no "allies". Now I realize because it has a strict selection process before choosing who to invest in. North Korea and North Vietnam are easy options despite what some think because it has over 1000 years with both so it knows their capabilities. Pakistan however is more foreign and much newer so there's less to work with. Clearly somehow during their due diligence, China must have seen something to make them go, yeah we can trust these guys to do the job. So not only will we feel comfortable arming them but also feel comfortable training them to understand the full system.
Absolutely spot on and that’s the key distinction. Supplying weapon systems is easy. The real challenge lies in whether the recipient has the institutional strength, operational maturity, and strategic clarity to actually
utilize those systems effectively. The U.S., for instance, has armed numerous partners yet many have failed to translate advanced capabilities into meaningful military effectiveness.
Pakistan, however, stands apart. The strength of Pakistan’s armed forces lies not just in acquiring modern weapon systems, but in their ability to induct, absorb, and integrate them from a wide range of sources. Whether from China, US, EU, or Turkey, Pakistan has consistently demonstrated the expertise needed to bring these systems together into a unified, network-centric operational structure. This ability to effectively combine weapon systems of diverse origin, not limited to a single supplier, is a rare and valuable capability that reflects high institutional competence, not just purchasing power.
The recent operational success involving Chinese-origin systems is just one example. It wasn’t about a single piece of equipment, it was a coordinated demonstration of data-linked operations, situational awareness, battle management, and electronic warfare under a capable command-and-control structure. This outcome was made possible by the integration of multiple systems from different suppliers & origins, working seamlessly within a cohesive framework. In short, it reflected an ecosystem, not just an asset.
This capability is likely a key reason why China chose to invest in Pakistan in a way it hasn’t with many others. Unlike long-standing partners such as North Korea or Vietnam, where centuries of familiarity inform policy, Pakistan was a relatively new strategic partner. Yet, China clearly recognized a force that wasn’t just willing to receive weapon systems, but capable of employing them effectively within a modern military doctrine.
Ironically, this very strength may explain the U.S.'s long-standing caution. Despite designating Pakistan a Major Non-NATO Ally, Washington has often withheld the full spectrum of advanced systems. Not because of doubts about Pakistan’s capabilities but perhaps precisely because of them. There’s an understanding that Pakistan’s armed forces possess the autonomy and expertise to deploy such systems independently, potentially in ways that don’t always align with U.S. strategic preferences.
In this context, it becomes clear: real military strength isn't in what a country owns, but in what it can do with what it owns.
