Taiwan SAM discussion

Vlad Plasmius said:

I'm saying it would take a lot more.

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How many - in terms of batteries and missiles? What does the PLA have in comparison to this number? Or are they vulnerable to a lesser extent as well?

Personally I think that a further 12 Sky Bow II/III batteries as is planned would make a huge difference.

FriedRiceNSpice said:

Even though the distance across the strait is very small, Taiwanese radar would nonetheless be able to give the ROCAF a few minutes notice preceding such a strike. ROCAF aircraft would be scrambled, and greatly complicate matters for Chinese strike aircraft performing their SEAD missions.

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I'm not exactly suggesting they would be alone. The first attacks would be with ARMs and long-range guided weapons. As a result response time would be much more limited and it would be easier to provide defense since China's own air defenses would give them cover a good deal of the way. Eliminating a significant portion of the air defense network makes eliminating the air force itself far easier.

During Operation Focus, the IDF Air Force was able to achieve full surprise only because 1) the Egyptian Air Force had ordered all radar stations to be shut off 2) IDF aircraft flew out across the Mediterranean before heading towards Egyptian airspace, thus avoiding the main concentrations of Egyptian radar stations. Also, the Egyptian Air Force as a whole was in a low state of readiness.

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True, which I why I wasn't suggesting it would be an identical situation, but merely present a model. In 1967 Israel didn't have anti-radiation missiles with the range of China's, they didn't have glide bombs, or long-range LACMs. There are a great deal of advances which make the situational less significant. Even an alert and well-prepared force can be surprised simply because the attack is so sudden and heavy.

In Operation Focus the IAF had to penetrate well into Egyptian airspace to carry out their strikes.

In the case of rising tensions across the strait, the ROCAF would no doubt be flying CAPs and have all radar and air defense sites on wartime alert.

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How many CAPs, where, and what aircraft are involved is the real issue there. Ultimately all that has to be done is to allow the strike aircraft to get close enough to launch their weapons and fly back. In Operation Focus one wave took two hours. The time would be greatly shortened and thus Taiwan's potential response time greatly shortened as well.

I'd say an initial wave consisting of 12 fighters and 36 strike aircraft would be a sufficient threat. The first wave would take out missile defenses and radars. Fighters would only be needed to target the nearest CAPs so that the strike aircraft can carry out their mission. Following from that would be a ballistic missile barrage to disable as many airbases as possible. This could all be achieved within the first half hour. During that period more fighters and strike aircraft would be prepping to take off and launch another strike. Even disabling the airbases for a few hours would be more than enough time to allow the PLAAF to achieve air superiority and destroy most of Taiwan's air force and air defense network.

Mr T said:

How many - in terms of batteries and missiles? What does the PLA have in comparison to this number? Or are they vulnerable to a lesser extent as well?

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It depends on the scenario. With what I'm talking about maybe double what they're planning to have. Any scenario involving a more massive strike would probably be too great for Taiwan to overcome with its resources.

Personally I think that a further 12 Sky Bow II/III batteries as is planned would make a huge difference.

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Is it actually in addition to what they currently have or just how many they plan to have in all? The latter would not be as significant.

Vlad Plasmius said:

It depends on the scenario. With what I'm talking about maybe double what they're planning to have.

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Well, no offence, but as I'm not sure you know what the longer-term plan is, it might help if you came up with some numbers of what you think you need and in what sort of scenario. That way I could know that we're both reading from the same hymn sheet

Any scenario involving a more massive strike would probably be too great for Taiwan to overcome with its resources.

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Maybe, but it would be a suicide run for many PLAAF pilots.

Is it actually in addition to what they currently have or just how many they plan to have in all? The latter would not be as significant.

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They are to replace the HAWK batteries. That would be a significant increase in capability (quality and numbers). Existing Sky Bow batteries would be maintained (those themselves would have Sky Bow I phased out and replaced).

Vlad Plasmius said:

I'd say an initial wave consisting of 12 fighters and 36 strike aircraft would be a sufficient threat. The first wave would take out missile defenses and radars. Fighters would only be needed to target the nearest CAPs so that the strike aircraft can carry out their mission. Following from that would be a ballistic missile barrage to disable as many airbases as possible. This could all be achieved within the first half hour. During that period more fighters and strike aircraft would be prepping to take off and launch another strike. Even disabling the airbases for a few hours would be more than enough time to allow the PLAAF to achieve air superiority and destroy most of Taiwan's air force and air defense network.

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Exactly. The ROCAF as of right now just doesn't have an answer for the PLAAF/PLAs one-two punch of disruptive strikes by missles and aircraft against radars and airbases followed immediately by a larger strikes against the airbases. More SAMs, as well as situational factors like a large CAP/s, and hardened structures at the bases can mitigate this somewhat, but if executed correctly and with surprise the PLAAF could destroy the majority of the ROCAF in a few hours.

Mr T said:

Well, no offence, but as I'm not sure you know what the longer-term plan is, it might help if you came up with some numbers of what you think you need and in what sort of scenario. That way I could know that we're both reading from the same hymn sheet

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Going off what you said taking out double the number of planned Sky Bows and Patriots would require about 4 squadrons of strike aircraft. That would be closer to the scale used in Operation Focus. If it was focused on a specific area of the network it would be more effective. The central western and southern parts especially since it is more porously defended and also has more significant airbases.

Maybe, but it would be a suicide run for many PLAAF pilots.

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There's always a good chance of casualties. It's highly unlikely casualties will be at levels you're thinking though. Mainly because initial engagement distance would be too far out for there to be any significant losses.

They are to replace the HAWK batteries. That would be a significant increase in capability (quality and numbers).

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Not significant enough, unless they're concentrating a larger part of them in one area..

Up until now, the distance of Taiwan straight might look small on a map, but the 180 km distance offered sufficient buffer for the ROCAF to operate safely beyond PLA SAM range.

But with improvements in SAM radar and range (i.e. S-400 = 400 km?), TW's geographic limitations and lack of depth will be a problem. It's not impossible to think that in the next decade, PLA's costal SAM's would be able to cover every ROCAF AB in TW.

ROCA's own SAM's may be able to cover PLAAF coastal AB, but cannot reach out and touch the ones beyond it. Thus, PLAAF would enjoy a vital advantage where they could deploy from safe distance and launch stand-off munitions.

IMO what the ROC military should be looking at is providing better (and cheaper) short-range protection to vital infrastructure targets, such as power plants, dams/reservoirs, water treatment centers, telecom centers, petro storage, etc. This could be a combination of CIWS style missile and gun deployment. Long-range SAM batteries cost hundreds of millions of dollars. How much does land-based RAM or Phalanx systems cost?

adeptitus said:

Up until now, the distance of Taiwan straight might look small on a map, but the 180 km distance offered sufficient buffer for the ROCAF to operate safely beyond PLA SAM range.

But with improvements in SAM radar and range (i.e. S-400 = 400 km?), TW's geographic limitations and lack of depth will be a problem. It's not impossible to think that in the next decade, PLA's costal SAM's would be able to cover every ROCAF AB in TW.

ROCA's own SAM's may be able to cover PLAAF coastal AB, but cannot reach out and touch the ones beyond it. Thus, PLAAF would enjoy a vital advantage where they could deploy from safe distance and launch stand-off munitions.

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Well the HQ-9 and S-300 are presently capable of extending just beyond that range. I know there are some S-300 batteries deployed along the coast, not sure how many, and that gives China coverage over the whole strait so if they can eliminate most of Taiwan's SSM threat after eliminating Taiwan's long-range SAMs China would have undisputed control of the air over the Straits.

IMO what the ROC military should be looking at is providing better (and cheaper) short-range protection to vital infrastructure targets, such as power plants, dams/reservoirs, water treatment centers, telecom centers, petro storage, etc. This could be a combination of CIWS style missile and gun deployment.

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Those won't do much against ballistic missiles.

Are these reported ranges slant range or ballistic? What about radar coverage?

Taiwan isn't exactly a big place and you can always argue that the number of SAM batteries are too low, but IMO that's a dead argument.

I don't know much about ATBMs or how effective they really are, so I am leaving BMs out of the equation and assume that SAMs are useless against BMs.

If you turn Taiwan into an AA fortress with SAMs every kilometer and a no man's land for PLA in general, then what is there to life in Taiwan? =D PLAAF has hoards of aircraft and you can assume that no matter what, there are more airplanes coming in than TW SAM can handle.

I don't like the idea of replacing HAWKs with PACs or TKs though. It is the biggest SAM system in Taiwan that still has 360 degree coverage. Even if its capability and/or range is a bit low and out of date, it's still got a bite and you can definitely use it to form an onion shield around the TKs and PACs, both of which has only a 120 degree coverage. Imagine if the HAWKs are gone. If PLAAFs manage to go past your SA shield, they are practically free to roam around in Taiwan hitting whatever they like (assuming airfields are knocked out.), including TKs from the back using maybe even dumb bombs. (While a bit unlikely, it isn't impossible, especially if you go through the "corridor")

Taiwan should procure more mobile radars also for their TKs. While TBMs probably would not be able to KO fixed/silo SAM sites, the radars are over if hit and what use are SAMs if the radar is hit. You can't reliably hit mobile radars with TBMs or with ARMs, depending on ARM operation.

Taiwan isn't known for having spares and that is represented well with their TC-2 situation. IMO, while it is a good idea on paper, I don't think Taiwan should bother with a TC-2 SAM unless they procure way more TC-2s.

As for the TK-2s, they are reporting single stage and weighing around 1.1 tonnes. How will they do against fighters? If it was dual staged, that'd be different, but I am inclined to think right now that these SAMs aren't exactly a good match for fighters.
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Can anybody confirm or reject that F-5s and IDFs can operate from grassfields?

What Taiwan needs is:

1.) Kick out Pan-Green coalition
2.) favour mainland relations over US/Japanese
3.) Have China build an airbase. In Taipeh.

I call that perfect International safety. Most of Taiwan's defense are "patrolling" US fleets near it to begin with.

.....