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now I read this
Opinion 09:34, 08-Jun-2019
The U.S. should stop showing its flag in Taiwan Strait
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For the United States to be a force for peace and stability in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, it must turn away from the deadly arms trade with Taiwan, stop showing the flag and throwing grenades into Chinese maritime areas, and focus instead on abiding by international law, the one-China policy, and the three Sino-U.S. joint communiques.

This outlook was made crystal clear once again by Lu Kang, spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, on June 6, when he urged the political class in Washington to stop stirring the waters and “realize the sensitivity of the issue and the harm this could bring to bilateral relations.”

Make no mistake: The Chinese waterway is not Washington's new Strait of Hormuz periphery for long-term great-power competition, and certainly, there exists no pretext for the Chinese island to beef up its forces and invest heavily in America's industry of death to stop the non-existent Chinese tanks and troops from landing across the Taiwan Strait.

Taiwan is not under what the Pentagon terms “growing threat from Beijing,” and certainly, this is not a new Cold War.

Washington needs to stop selling arms to the island and labeling it as a “close defense partner in U.S.-Indo Pacific strategy.” The latest salvo is not just about stirring the waters and Taiwan loading up on American military equipment, or the U.S. meddling in China's internal affairs and breaking from earlier commitments to Beijing; it's also about double opportunity.

The official Washington and Pentagon generals want to project power, police the region, and as a consequence, exert upon China the full impact of their influence in every domain.

In order to drive the waterway to the edge of instability, Washington further sends warships and guided-missile destroyers to needle and goad China on the pretext of “freedom of navigation operations.”

Less publicized in Taiwan, these provocative moves and other multi-domain engagements on the peripheries of China are intended to serve America's long-term strategic interests and future war-scape. They are not there to protect Taiwan.

Lest we forget, America's deadly arms business is a major cause of conflicts and tensions in other parts of the world, where many countries spend more on military expenditure and war than on regional stability and dialogue combined.

As they proceed down this path, the growing availability of U.S. arms, military support, naval presence and other provocative moves are similarly a major factor in the increase in the level of tensions in Chinese maritime areas. They provide no security for Taiwan but record profits for well-positioned American arms manufacturers.

It is precisely for these geopolitical calculations that U.S. government officials and Pentagon accountants brag, outrageously, about their “strong Taipei ties” and “export success” in weapons sales to Taiwan.

Here, enough simply isn't an option. They will try and find major boosts to future arms sales above and beyond what's already been sent, or would be sent, to the clueless Chinese island.

Taiwan's reported purchase of 108 M1A2 Abrams tanks, 1,240 TOW anti-armor missiles, 409 Javelin anti-tank missiles, 250 Stinger man-portable air defense systems and 66 additional F-16 fighter jets falls into this line of policy.

The aim is to keep the destabilization campaign moving forward, reorder the region to Washington's advantage, and weaken any efforts toward reunification and amity.

This should stun no one. The confirmation on June 6 by Taipei came after reports said the U.S. could soon give the green light to sales of tanks and weapons to Taiwan worth more than 2 billion U.S. dollars. It also came after senior military officials from Taiwan and the U.S. held their first meeting last month – after four decades – to strengthen military ties.

In this environment, expect no attempts to limit U.S. arms exports to Taiwan, as the arms sales under the U.S. Taiwan Relations Act are not based on an assessment of the island's defense needs.

The U.S. is therefore responsible for contributing to, rather than impeding, the militarization of the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. Tensions will not go away as long as the U.S. continues to sell arms to Taiwan and roil the Chinese territories.

Under the one-China policy and the three Sino-U.S. joint communiques, however, Washington is responsible for revoking all the existing arms export permits to Taiwan and refrain from issuing any new licenses. The U.S. government cannot ignore China's calls to end its lethal trade with Taiwan.

Sending more arms will foment insecurity and distrust. It won't encourage the political class in Taipei to sit down for talks with Beijing to find a solution to the long-drawn-out dispute over the legal and political statuses of the island.
 

Max Demian

Junior Member
Registered Member
Oh Jura. ..
... to stop the non-existent Chinese tanks and troops from landing across the Taiwan Strait.

This made made me spill my morning coffee.

The only reason why everybody takes these statements seriously is precisely because of the threat of military violence upon the people of Taiwan.

Now what they could really use is a few THAADs.
 
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Max Demian

Junior Member
Registered Member
By antenna aperture, you mean the cross-sectional area of the nose with the radome removed? Yeah, larger that could possibly diminish stealth, but that largely depends upon the materials and design of the radome. What it absolutely leads to is room for a larger, more powerful/capable radar, so if there was a small sacrifice in stealth for a vastly superior radar, that's going to be a compromise made. And whether there was a sacrifice or the size of that sacrifice will depend so much on radome design. You certainly cannot point to a slightly
Radomes are designed to be transparent in the frequency range of the radar. So if that radar can detect enemy RF radiation then the enemy might also get a ping back of its radar aperture. But yeah, it's a design compromise. Some of the rumors I heard suggested that the radar was transplanted from J-11 and that's what determined the needed aperture.
 

Max Demian

Junior Member
Registered Member
Certainly, it is not logical to conclude that the tint observed on 2017 was removed leading to production models that are inferior and have no RCS countermeasures on the canopy.
My thinking was that they might have encountered a problem with the canopy design and that we will again see tinted canopies further down the road. And if you look at the EODAS and FLIR windows you can notice the yellow/golden tint.

The production rate is still quite low, so doubtless there are issues they are trying to resolve and not telling us about. If we don't see tinted canopies again in the next few years, then I will bury my theory :)
 

manqiangrexue

Brigadier
Now what they could really use is a few THAADs.
Now what they could really use is some sense.
Radomes are designed to be transparent in the frequency range of the radar. So if that radar can detect enemy RF radiation then the enemy might also get a ping back of its radar aperture. But yeah, it's a design compromise. Some of the rumors I heard suggested that the radar was transplanted from J-11 and that's what determined the needed aperture.
You heard that the radar size of the J-20 was designed around transplanting the radar of J-11 into J-20??? Are you joking? Where did you hear this?

J-11 variants don't even use AESA. J-16 uses an AESA and supposedly, J-20's radar is an enhanced, tailored version of that (and I mean the radar is tailored around the J-20, not the other way around). Technology aside, you scale radars to the intended size of your jet; you don't design the nosecone of a jet, especially not a top-end 5th gen fighter, to be the size of whatever your existing radar happens to be.

Radomes are designed to allow your emissions to pass freely while preventing enemy emissions from being beamed back. How that works it way beyond me, but it's not as simple as, "The bigger the radome the more detectable it is," across different designs; that's for sure.

My thinking was that they might have encountered a problem with the canopy design and that we will again see tinted canopies further down the road. The production rate is still quite low, so doubtless there are issues they are trying to resolve and not telling us about. If we don't see tinted canopies again in the next few years, then I will bury my theory :)
Tinting a canopy is about as simple as it gets; it's not really plausible that Chinese tint was so terrible they decided it's better to go bare canopy no RCS reduction than a simple gold tint.

"Issues" is a relative term. The jet doesn't fly well is one kind of issue, but another, very Chinese issue, is that improvements are coming so fast it's better to hold off for an even better version, especially when there is no threat of imminent conflict.

So basically, you thought a J-20 uses 30 year old engines, an off-the-shelf MSA/PESA radar, and a compeltely radar-exposed canopy? What else? You think it uses vacuum tubes, canards controlled by foot pedals in place of FBW, maybe 2 guys in the weapons bay throwing missiles out when they're fired? LOL
 
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Max Demian

Junior Member
Registered Member
You heard that the radar size of the J-20 was designed around transplanting the radar of J-11 into J-20??? Are you joking? Where did you hear this?

I read on this board that the radar is probably Type 1475 AESA. But I see now why I got that that mixed up with J-11. From Wikipedia:

"Official information on radar type that the J-20 uses has not been released to the public. Some analysts believed that J-20 uses Type 1475 KLJ-5)
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(AESA) radar with 1856
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modules,
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but more recent informations revealed that this radar is designed for upgraded versions of J-11D"

As for the radome. If you want to detect enemy radar emissions with your AESA then your radome needs to be transparent to their operating band. Most fighter radars are in X-band, so it's conceivable there is some overlap.
 

manqiangrexue

Brigadier
And if you look at the EODAS and FLIR windows you can notice the yellow/golden tint.
I see you added this a little later. Good stuff. So what does this say to you? That Chinese are too cheap to use the gold tint on the canopy cus it's way bigger than the EODAS/FLIR so they decided to leave the canopy untreated? Or they have developed a different, more suitable clear treatment for the canopy to reduce RCS hence why they're not going gold on it?

As for the radome. If you want to detect enemy radars emissions with your AESA then your radome needs to be transparent to their operating band.

Right, but I believe that the complex part is being transparent to letting their operating band enter and be detected, but scrambling it or not being transparent to it on the way out after it's reflected. That's why design is so important and is even more a factor in determining frontal RCS than the size of the radar aperture.
 
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TerraN_EmpirE

Tyrant King
Taiwan military announces results of Hsiung Feng III missile test
Test was conducted last year off Pingtung County

By
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, Taiwan News, Staff Writer
2019/06/07 16:42

TAIPEI (Taiwan News) – The Hsiung Feng III missile only needs 71 seconds to destroy a target at a distance of 47 kilometers, Taiwan’s military news agency said Friday (June 7).

The result was achieved during a live-fire drill last July 16 off the coast of the Jiupeng base in Pingtung County, the Central News Agency reported.

The Navy sent its Tian Dan Cheng Kung-class guided-missile frigate to the area in June 2018 to prepare for the exercise. At 7:10 a.m., the ship fired off the missile, and at 7:11:11, the target was reported destroyed.

Since the Tuo Chiang corvette featured a star on its hull with the same date, it meant that ship had also successfully conducted a similar missile firing on the same date, the CNA report said.

Officers expressed satisfaction about the success of the tests because they had been conducted amid rough seas with high waves.

The Hsiung Feng III anti-ship missile is believed
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to a range of about 400 kilometers and was developed by Taiwan’s National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology
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Max Demian

Junior Member
Registered Member
I see you added this a little later. Good stuff. So what does this say to you? That Chinese are too cheap to use the gold tint on the canopy cus it's way bigger that the EODAS/FLIR so they decided to leave the canopy untreated? Or they have developed a different, more suitable clear treatment for the canopy to reduce RCS?

It had me wondering why they would use two different implementations on the canopy and the EODAS windows. The latter are what I would expect, having seen similar on F-22 and F-35. And why was the 2017 canopy a one off? Prior to seeing it, people were quite sceptical about the J-20 canopy RCS. Afterwards, they were enthusiastic. Just speculation, I know.
 
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ZeEa5KPul

Colonel
Registered Member
So basically, you thought a J-20 uses 30 year old engines, an off-the-shelf MSA/PESA radar, and a compeltely radar-exposed canopy? What else? You think it uses vacuum tubes, canards controlled by foot pedals in place of FBW, maybe 2 guys in the weapons bay throwing missiles out when they're fired? LOL
You mock, but some people are really that stupid. A few of them even write for Western defense publications.

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Wow, they even managed not to hit one of their own fishing boats this time. What a weird way to phrase the missile's speed (47 km in 71 seconds) - just say Mach 1.9.
 
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