Jura The idiot
General
Jan 18, 2018
and today Russians officially (Интерфакс) said the contract for 11 copies had been signed:
South East Asia Military News, Reports, Data, etc.
- Thread starter paintgun
- Start date
Jura The idiot
General
Today at 5:22 PM
Kontrak Pengadaan Diteken, Sukhoi Su-35 Tiba di Indonesia Oktober
now I'm guessing this is a confirmation:
Kontrak Pengadaan Diteken, Sukhoi Su-35 Tiba di Indonesia Oktober
timepass
Brigadier
BAE OFFERS CREDIT FOR MALAYSIAN FIGHTER BID
reports that BAE Systems reiterated its willingness to facilitate a UK-based line-of-credit to back a sale of Eurofighter Typhoon fighters to Malaysia. The Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) 18 next-generation fighters to replace its legacy MiG-29s since at least 2017.
“We have an offer on the table…It’s competitively priced and we have offered UK government financing so the Malaysian government can spread the payment over a longer period,” said Alan Garwood, BAE’s Group Business Development Director.
It is unclear when Kuala Lumpur intends to pursue a contract in earnest, though the Typhoon remains as one of several contenders for the prospective contract.
Like BAE Systems, the Swedish defence giant Saab had also expressed its interest in backing a prospective Gripen sale with credit. In 2015, Sweden a loan of 39.88 billion SEK (i.e. $5 billion US today) to back the sale of 36 Saab Gripen E/F to Brazil. The loan is to be repaid over 25 years.
In December 2017, Qatar signed on as the newest customer of the Typhoon with an order for 24 Tranche 3. Qatar’s order guarantees production work for BAE in the 2020s, with a potential Malaysian order clearly extending that scope well into the long-term. Likewise, the other Eurofighter Consortium members – i.e. Airbus Defence & Space (in Germany and Spain) and Leonardo – will also benefit from those orders.
Besides Malaysia, BAE Systems may also have an opportunity in Indonesia, which is reportedly forming a new fighter requirement amounting to several squadrons. Interestingly, Jakarta has yet to ink the contract for 11 Sukhoi Su-35 Flanker-Es from Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation, leaving an opening – albeit small – for a procurement review and renewed opportunity for the F-5 Tiger II replacement program.
However, Southeast Asia is also among the US’ key defence markets, with Boeing and Lockheed Martin both maintaining key long-term contracts in the region. In particular, Boeing is hopeful of expanding upon its F/A-18 Hornet program with the RMAF to the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet.
reports that BAE Systems reiterated its willingness to facilitate a UK-based line-of-credit to back a sale of Eurofighter Typhoon fighters to Malaysia. The Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) 18 next-generation fighters to replace its legacy MiG-29s since at least 2017.
“We have an offer on the table…It’s competitively priced and we have offered UK government financing so the Malaysian government can spread the payment over a longer period,” said Alan Garwood, BAE’s Group Business Development Director.
It is unclear when Kuala Lumpur intends to pursue a contract in earnest, though the Typhoon remains as one of several contenders for the prospective contract.
Like BAE Systems, the Swedish defence giant Saab had also expressed its interest in backing a prospective Gripen sale with credit. In 2015, Sweden a loan of 39.88 billion SEK (i.e. $5 billion US today) to back the sale of 36 Saab Gripen E/F to Brazil. The loan is to be repaid over 25 years.
In December 2017, Qatar signed on as the newest customer of the Typhoon with an order for 24 Tranche 3. Qatar’s order guarantees production work for BAE in the 2020s, with a potential Malaysian order clearly extending that scope well into the long-term. Likewise, the other Eurofighter Consortium members – i.e. Airbus Defence & Space (in Germany and Spain) and Leonardo – will also benefit from those orders.
Besides Malaysia, BAE Systems may also have an opportunity in Indonesia, which is reportedly forming a new fighter requirement amounting to several squadrons. Interestingly, Jakarta has yet to ink the contract for 11 Sukhoi Su-35 Flanker-Es from Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation, leaving an opening – albeit small – for a procurement review and renewed opportunity for the F-5 Tiger II replacement program.
However, Southeast Asia is also among the US’ key defence markets, with Boeing and Lockheed Martin both maintaining key long-term contracts in the region. In particular, Boeing is hopeful of expanding upon its F/A-18 Hornet program with the RMAF to the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet.
timepass
Brigadier
Indonesia inks $1.1 bn deal with Russia to buy 11 jets...
"Indonesia has inked a billion-dollar deal to buy 11 Sukhoi Su-35 jets from Russia, an official said Saturday.
The contract, signed by both countries' representatives in Jakarta on Wednesday, is worth a total $1.14 billion, Indonesia defence ministry spokesman Totok Sugiharto said."
"Indonesia has inked a billion-dollar deal to buy 11 Sukhoi Su-35 jets from Russia, an official said Saturday.
The contract, signed by both countries' representatives in Jakarta on Wednesday, is worth a total $1.14 billion, Indonesia defence ministry spokesman Totok Sugiharto said."
timepass
Brigadier
DRONES DELIVER CHINA ACCESS INTO HIGH-VALUE, NON-TRADITIONAL MARKETS
IHS Jane’s that Indonesia signed a deal with the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) for four Wing Loong I unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). Manufactured by AVIC’s Chengdu Aircraft Design and Research (CADI) division, the UAVs will join the Indonesian Air Force’s (TNI-AU) Aviation Squadron 51. The Wing Loong I will form the nucleus of the TNI-AU’s strike-capable UAV force, which may grow in the future through additional imports and and production initiatives.
AVIC’s successful Wing Loong sale to Indonesia speaks to now long-established reality, i.e. the availability of armed UAVs from AVIC is enabling China to enter markets that are dominated by U.S., European and Russian original equipment manufacturers (OEM). Indonesia now joins the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kazakhstan and others as an operator of Chinese UAVs. The CADI Wing Loong-series and the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) CH-4-series are AVIC’s leading UAV products, with CADI and CASC competing with one another for prospective customers.
China’s strength in this market originates with its willingness to sell armed UAVs to customers that could not procure analogous solutions from the U.S. or Western Europe. In the early 2010s, these countries had included Pakistan (CH-3-series), Saudi Arabia (, ), Egypt (), the UAE (), Iraq () and Kazakhstan (). In effect, the U.S.’ arms restrictions prevented key markets in the Middle East and Central Asia from acquiring American solutions, thus paving a clear and essentially uncontested avenue for the Chinese to enter these markets.
However, it would be unfair to now pin China’s success in selling drones to purely accessibility and cost, though these are certainly factors thanks the rapid iteration of drone technology in China atop of growing domestic and overseas-driven scale. Rather, China has begun offering truly compelling UAV solutions that aim to qualitatively enhance the end-user’s capabilities in numerous respects. For example, the offers a medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) capability with a sizable payload (1,200 kg) for guided air-to-surface munitions as well as surveillance and electronic intelligence equipment. On the other hand, CADI is bifurcating its UAV portfolio between its comparatively high-performance Wing Loong II and an improved, but lower-cost, development of the Wing Loong I in the .
AVIC provides prospective customers a wide-range of UAVs to select from, enabling for custom solutions (e.g. procuring a mixed or composite force of large and small MALE UAVs) and responding to diverse fiscal or budgetary requirements. The relatively rapid iteration (e.g. Wing Loong I to Wing Loong II and ID) also allows for AVIC to recapitalize its existing clientele with new drones to replace their older designs, while also substantially improving the end-user’s capabilities (e.g. through extended endurance and lower life-cycle costs). From a product standpoint at least, the strategy is generating new sales among existing users.
In January 2018, IHS Jane’s that the UAE was the launch customer of the Wing Loong II, which CADI claimed had secured a launch buyer before the UAV’s test-flight in early 2017. Prior, reports listed the UAE as among the CH-4’s operators. However, with Indonesia, AVIC’s customer base is also expanding, suggesting that AVIC’s OEMs are potentially viewed as industry-standard OEMs in terms of not only selling armed drones, but providing a proven track-record for sustainment/after-sale support and development. Those looking to compete with AVIC will be dealing with a party that is experienced in managing armed UAV sales, providing AVIC the coveted position of being the incumbent in the armed UAV space.
However, prospective competitors (from the U.S. Europe, Russia, etc) will have to contend with AVIC along with a growing pool of other Chinese suppliers. This includes Star UAV System Company, which revealed its unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) at the 2018 Singapore Air Show. Besides building upon China’s portfolio of armed UAVs, the Star Shadow adds the dimension of low radar-detectability via an airframe with a radar cross-section (RCS) of 0.1m2. If the Star Shadow comes to fruition, it would likely compete as the sole option of its kind (notwithstanding a competing AVIC UAV, such as Tianying), offering buyers a UAV solution they could apply in conventional warfare situations.
AVIC’s overseas rivals, particularly General Atomics in the US and Israel Aeronautics, reiterated the long-standing experience of their respective companies. Speaking to , General Atomics’ Vice President for International Strategic Development stated: “We’ve flown 5 million hours on [the MQ-9]. That’s more than all the UAVs combined in the world.” Israel Aeronautics’ Deputy Chief Executive for Marketing and Sales Dany Eshchar stated: “You cannot shortcut 40 years to five years.” Regulations and foreign relations withheld General Atomics and Israel Aeronautics, respectively, from entering the Middle East and Central Asia markets as thoroughly as AVIC. The extent to which that can change and, just as importantly, result in offers as cost-effective and technically flexible as those of AVIC remains to be seen.
IHS Jane’s that Indonesia signed a deal with the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) for four Wing Loong I unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). Manufactured by AVIC’s Chengdu Aircraft Design and Research (CADI) division, the UAVs will join the Indonesian Air Force’s (TNI-AU) Aviation Squadron 51. The Wing Loong I will form the nucleus of the TNI-AU’s strike-capable UAV force, which may grow in the future through additional imports and and production initiatives.
AVIC’s successful Wing Loong sale to Indonesia speaks to now long-established reality, i.e. the availability of armed UAVs from AVIC is enabling China to enter markets that are dominated by U.S., European and Russian original equipment manufacturers (OEM). Indonesia now joins the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kazakhstan and others as an operator of Chinese UAVs. The CADI Wing Loong-series and the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) CH-4-series are AVIC’s leading UAV products, with CADI and CASC competing with one another for prospective customers.
China’s strength in this market originates with its willingness to sell armed UAVs to customers that could not procure analogous solutions from the U.S. or Western Europe. In the early 2010s, these countries had included Pakistan (CH-3-series), Saudi Arabia (, ), Egypt (), the UAE (), Iraq () and Kazakhstan (). In effect, the U.S.’ arms restrictions prevented key markets in the Middle East and Central Asia from acquiring American solutions, thus paving a clear and essentially uncontested avenue for the Chinese to enter these markets.
However, it would be unfair to now pin China’s success in selling drones to purely accessibility and cost, though these are certainly factors thanks the rapid iteration of drone technology in China atop of growing domestic and overseas-driven scale. Rather, China has begun offering truly compelling UAV solutions that aim to qualitatively enhance the end-user’s capabilities in numerous respects. For example, the offers a medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) capability with a sizable payload (1,200 kg) for guided air-to-surface munitions as well as surveillance and electronic intelligence equipment. On the other hand, CADI is bifurcating its UAV portfolio between its comparatively high-performance Wing Loong II and an improved, but lower-cost, development of the Wing Loong I in the .
AVIC provides prospective customers a wide-range of UAVs to select from, enabling for custom solutions (e.g. procuring a mixed or composite force of large and small MALE UAVs) and responding to diverse fiscal or budgetary requirements. The relatively rapid iteration (e.g. Wing Loong I to Wing Loong II and ID) also allows for AVIC to recapitalize its existing clientele with new drones to replace their older designs, while also substantially improving the end-user’s capabilities (e.g. through extended endurance and lower life-cycle costs). From a product standpoint at least, the strategy is generating new sales among existing users.
In January 2018, IHS Jane’s that the UAE was the launch customer of the Wing Loong II, which CADI claimed had secured a launch buyer before the UAV’s test-flight in early 2017. Prior, reports listed the UAE as among the CH-4’s operators. However, with Indonesia, AVIC’s customer base is also expanding, suggesting that AVIC’s OEMs are potentially viewed as industry-standard OEMs in terms of not only selling armed drones, but providing a proven track-record for sustainment/after-sale support and development. Those looking to compete with AVIC will be dealing with a party that is experienced in managing armed UAV sales, providing AVIC the coveted position of being the incumbent in the armed UAV space.
However, prospective competitors (from the U.S. Europe, Russia, etc) will have to contend with AVIC along with a growing pool of other Chinese suppliers. This includes Star UAV System Company, which revealed its unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) at the 2018 Singapore Air Show. Besides building upon China’s portfolio of armed UAVs, the Star Shadow adds the dimension of low radar-detectability via an airframe with a radar cross-section (RCS) of 0.1m2. If the Star Shadow comes to fruition, it would likely compete as the sole option of its kind (notwithstanding a competing AVIC UAV, such as Tianying), offering buyers a UAV solution they could apply in conventional warfare situations.
AVIC’s overseas rivals, particularly General Atomics in the US and Israel Aeronautics, reiterated the long-standing experience of their respective companies. Speaking to , General Atomics’ Vice President for International Strategic Development stated: “We’ve flown 5 million hours on [the MQ-9]. That’s more than all the UAVs combined in the world.” Israel Aeronautics’ Deputy Chief Executive for Marketing and Sales Dany Eshchar stated: “You cannot shortcut 40 years to five years.” Regulations and foreign relations withheld General Atomics and Israel Aeronautics, respectively, from entering the Middle East and Central Asia markets as thoroughly as AVIC. The extent to which that can change and, just as importantly, result in offers as cost-effective and technically flexible as those of AVIC remains to be seen.
The Trouble with Bangladesh's Military
Bangladesh’s military is more concerned with profit and power than defending the country.
The , totaling $3.2 billion in the year 2017-2018, according to official statistics. Yet Bangladesh’s military has proved to be incapable of showing strength in the face of repeated violations of its land, , and by neighboring Myanmar.
Bangladesh’s military has failed to restore public confidence that it can defend the country’s territorial sovereignty. If there is an overriding message from these debacles, it is that the military is ill-equipped to defend the state because it has been practically unaccountable since the very foundation of Bangladesh. Instead, the military has captured much of the bedrock of the state it is supposed to defend.
The Bangladesh military inherited both the institutional framework of its British Indian and Pakistan Army predecessors, as well as their orientation against civilian rule and their sensitivity to political power. The Bangladesh military has directly ruled the country for 15 of its 46 years of existence.
On September 15, 1991, a parliamentary system of government was proposed in the , and a constitutional referendum ratified the institutional framework for parliamentary democracy in Bangladesh. Still, to date, even Bangladesh’s democratically elected civilian leaders have been forced to tread carefully around the military. Some current Bangladeshi politicians have a military background, and often discourage the government from engaging in military matters.
Many developing countries, even those with generally democratic governments, have very weak oversight of defense matters. Bangladesh is no different. For historical reasons, many believe that the military sector is a “no-go area” for civilian oversight. State security is often used as an excuse for secrecy, resulting in insufficient transparency in defense budgeting and procurement. The defense sector believes that they require special treatment compared to other public sectors since they deal with national security matters. The military itself discourages “interference” from parliament, or from the civilian government.
Further complicating things, Bangladesh’s armed forces also have a dual role as internal security forces. The is repeatedly called on to prevent civil unrest. For example, the amid unrest when the two major political parties were battling over who would come to power.
The dual role causes significant issues of prioritization. Bangladesh’s military must juggle its national security and internal stability responsibilities, in addition and disaster relief operations.
In addition, the political involvement of the military in internal affairs makes it hard for the civil administration, such as the Ministry of Defense and parliament, to hold the the military accountable.
The ) is the principal administrative organization by which military policy is formulated and executed. The should exercise authority over the Armed Forces; however, it is far less potent than the AFD. Weak governance, civil authority, and lack of accountability make it difficult to see defense policies executed.
Currently, both the AFD and the MoD are headed by the prime minister of Bangladesh. To coordinate military policy, both the president (who is also the commander-in-chief of the military) and the prime minister of Bangladesh are advised by a six-member advisory board, three chiefs of staff, the principal staff officer of the AFD, and military secretaries to the president and the prime minister. The current convoluted military and civilian organization make it hard for the government to push through changes in military structure or defense procurement.
For example, the defense budget is not well planned and executed based on national security but rather is focused on a procurement list catered for . As a result, Bangladesh military budgeting and expenditure processes fall short of international best practices.
Bangladesh’s defense procurement suffers from a disconnect between policy and budgeting and procurement practices. Military budgeting and procurement should be linked to established defense policy goals, not Forces Goal 2030. Because decision-making is carried out in a policy vacuum, the result is wasting money on unnecessary systems while failing to meet genuine security needs. There is also an enhanced risk of corruption.
Weak monitoring, controls, and audits facilitate corruption and waste. Sometimes the parliament, the auditor general of Bangladesh, and the anti-corruption watchdog are reluctant to investigate the military — or even actively prevented from doing so. Even in the absence of dishonesty, failure to implement due process often leads to purchases of high-cost items of questionable strategic purpose, severe delays, and cost overruns.
Bangladesh provides limited information on military expenditures, other than a headline defense budget figure. Often, the military expenditure figures are not defined, or the definitions have changed, and it is not clear whether figures are linked to budgeted expenditures or not. Bangladesh systematically excludes significant items from its expense reporting; it also bans disclosing expenditures for arms imports, similar to other developing nations.
It has been well-documented that the international arms trade and, more specifically, arms procurement practices in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East are highly susceptible to waste and corruption. Bangladesh military’s off-budget spending is often contributed to the military’s business activities, rather than national defense.
Following the , Sena Kallyan Sangstha (SKS), a concern of the Bangladesh Army, operates a dairy farm and an ice cream factory. that the Bangladeshi military food, textile, jute, garment, electronic, real estate, automobile, shipbuilding, manufacturing, and travel businesses. The military also operates Trust Bank and the Ansar VDP Bank, and has a record of giving illicit loans from these institutions to top officers. According to the BBC investigation, the Bangladesh Army’s business interests further include power plants, roads, infrastructure, and s, amounting to billions of dollars of private assets.
In 2009, the Bangaldesh Rifles ( “was partly fuelled by resentment among the BDR’s rank-and-file over the corruption of army officers engaged in the retail sale of consumer items,” BBC notes, citing Bangladesh’s official report on the incident.
Some leading Bangladeshi figures in the business sector have admitted that military-owned businesses are virtually indistinguishable from other commercial enterprises in the way they operate. The irony is that military business interests have thrived more under the civilian rule than under the of General Hossain Mohammad Ershad.
However, as Bangladesh’s military ambitions develop, it’s past time for a debate about whether the military should engage in such business activities or instead concentrate on national security and protection of sovereignty.
Bangladesh’s military is more concerned with profit and power than defending the country.
The , totaling $3.2 billion in the year 2017-2018, according to official statistics. Yet Bangladesh’s military has proved to be incapable of showing strength in the face of repeated violations of its land, , and by neighboring Myanmar.
Bangladesh’s military has failed to restore public confidence that it can defend the country’s territorial sovereignty. If there is an overriding message from these debacles, it is that the military is ill-equipped to defend the state because it has been practically unaccountable since the very foundation of Bangladesh. Instead, the military has captured much of the bedrock of the state it is supposed to defend.
The Bangladesh military inherited both the institutional framework of its British Indian and Pakistan Army predecessors, as well as their orientation against civilian rule and their sensitivity to political power. The Bangladesh military has directly ruled the country for 15 of its 46 years of existence.
On September 15, 1991, a parliamentary system of government was proposed in the , and a constitutional referendum ratified the institutional framework for parliamentary democracy in Bangladesh. Still, to date, even Bangladesh’s democratically elected civilian leaders have been forced to tread carefully around the military. Some current Bangladeshi politicians have a military background, and often discourage the government from engaging in military matters.
Many developing countries, even those with generally democratic governments, have very weak oversight of defense matters. Bangladesh is no different. For historical reasons, many believe that the military sector is a “no-go area” for civilian oversight. State security is often used as an excuse for secrecy, resulting in insufficient transparency in defense budgeting and procurement. The defense sector believes that they require special treatment compared to other public sectors since they deal with national security matters. The military itself discourages “interference” from parliament, or from the civilian government.
Further complicating things, Bangladesh’s armed forces also have a dual role as internal security forces. The is repeatedly called on to prevent civil unrest. For example, the amid unrest when the two major political parties were battling over who would come to power.
The dual role causes significant issues of prioritization. Bangladesh’s military must juggle its national security and internal stability responsibilities, in addition and disaster relief operations.
In addition, the political involvement of the military in internal affairs makes it hard for the civil administration, such as the Ministry of Defense and parliament, to hold the the military accountable.
The ) is the principal administrative organization by which military policy is formulated and executed. The should exercise authority over the Armed Forces; however, it is far less potent than the AFD. Weak governance, civil authority, and lack of accountability make it difficult to see defense policies executed.
Currently, both the AFD and the MoD are headed by the prime minister of Bangladesh. To coordinate military policy, both the president (who is also the commander-in-chief of the military) and the prime minister of Bangladesh are advised by a six-member advisory board, three chiefs of staff, the principal staff officer of the AFD, and military secretaries to the president and the prime minister. The current convoluted military and civilian organization make it hard for the government to push through changes in military structure or defense procurement.
For example, the defense budget is not well planned and executed based on national security but rather is focused on a procurement list catered for . As a result, Bangladesh military budgeting and expenditure processes fall short of international best practices.
Bangladesh’s defense procurement suffers from a disconnect between policy and budgeting and procurement practices. Military budgeting and procurement should be linked to established defense policy goals, not Forces Goal 2030. Because decision-making is carried out in a policy vacuum, the result is wasting money on unnecessary systems while failing to meet genuine security needs. There is also an enhanced risk of corruption.
Weak monitoring, controls, and audits facilitate corruption and waste. Sometimes the parliament, the auditor general of Bangladesh, and the anti-corruption watchdog are reluctant to investigate the military — or even actively prevented from doing so. Even in the absence of dishonesty, failure to implement due process often leads to purchases of high-cost items of questionable strategic purpose, severe delays, and cost overruns.
Bangladesh provides limited information on military expenditures, other than a headline defense budget figure. Often, the military expenditure figures are not defined, or the definitions have changed, and it is not clear whether figures are linked to budgeted expenditures or not. Bangladesh systematically excludes significant items from its expense reporting; it also bans disclosing expenditures for arms imports, similar to other developing nations.
It has been well-documented that the international arms trade and, more specifically, arms procurement practices in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East are highly susceptible to waste and corruption. Bangladesh military’s off-budget spending is often contributed to the military’s business activities, rather than national defense.
Following the , Sena Kallyan Sangstha (SKS), a concern of the Bangladesh Army, operates a dairy farm and an ice cream factory. that the Bangladeshi military food, textile, jute, garment, electronic, real estate, automobile, shipbuilding, manufacturing, and travel businesses. The military also operates Trust Bank and the Ansar VDP Bank, and has a record of giving illicit loans from these institutions to top officers. According to the BBC investigation, the Bangladesh Army’s business interests further include power plants, roads, infrastructure, and s, amounting to billions of dollars of private assets.
In 2009, the Bangaldesh Rifles ( “was partly fuelled by resentment among the BDR’s rank-and-file over the corruption of army officers engaged in the retail sale of consumer items,” BBC notes, citing Bangladesh’s official report on the incident.
Some leading Bangladeshi figures in the business sector have admitted that military-owned businesses are virtually indistinguishable from other commercial enterprises in the way they operate. The irony is that military business interests have thrived more under the civilian rule than under the of General Hossain Mohammad Ershad.
However, as Bangladesh’s military ambitions develop, it’s past time for a debate about whether the military should engage in such business activities or instead concentrate on national security and protection of sovereignty.
Jura The idiot
General
timepass
Brigadier
Malaysia Considers JF-17 Light Fighters to Replace its MiG-29 . . .
[By: ,
April 30th - 2018]
Pakistan and Malaysia have begun preliminary discussions regarding the potential export of JF-17 Thunder single engine light fighters to meet Kuala Lumpur's defence needs. The JF-17 is a joint product of China’s Chengdu Aircraft Industry Corporation and the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC), and with a number of signifiant enhancements which allow it to contend with and in many fields outperform modern fourth generation fighters. Speaking at the Defence Services Asia (DSA) 2018 exhibition in Kuala Lumpur, an official form PAC said the two governments have had “primary level talks” about a potential sale of the fourth generation fighter to meet the aerial combat requirements of the Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF). The official stated: “We are aware of the potential requirements in Malaysia for cost-effective fighter aircraft. There have been no serious talks but through government to government channels there have been what we can describe as primary level talks about the JF-17 program.”
Malaysia’s Air Force currently fields the Russian MiG-29 an U.S. F-18 twin engine light fighters, which fulfil a complementary role alongside the country’s elite Su-30MKM heavy platforms. With both the MiG-29 and the F-18 nearing the end of their service lives, and with Malaysia’s program to acquire a replacement twin engine light fighter stalling largely due to a lack of funds, the country has shown renewed interest in acquiring the JF-17. Malaysia might be eyeing JF-17 Block III variant which is about to enter the production next year. The JF-17 will be able to deploy a number of Chinese and U.S. made weapons, including advanced Chinese air to air platforms such as the PL-12 which have few rivals elsewhere. The fighter makes extensive use of composite materials, which makes it highly durable and manoeuvrable. A legacy from the J-7, the fighter’s maintenance requirements are extremely low and the JF-17 can maintain an extremely high sortie rate if properly serviced - a critical asset in wartime which can serve as a valuable force multiplier. The fighter also deploys an AESA radar, invaluable for long range air to air combat, which is more sophisticated than the radar of any fighters currently deployed by any of the country's neighbours and makes the JF-17 far more difficult to detect at long ranges.
To promote further sales of the JF-17, particularly in the case of large acquisitions which Malaysia may well be willing to make, the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex has stated that it is willing to enter collaborative partnerships with local industry involving technology transfers and either localised component manufacturing or maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) by the Malaysian side. “Of course, the industrial engagement would depend on the sale of the Malaysian requirement,” a PAC official stated. Should the country acquire the fighter, it would be the platform’s third export customer and could well facilitate closer defence ties with both Pakistan and China. With Pakistan’s JF-17 block III set to enter production in the near future, with far more advanced capabilities than its predecessors and a highly competitive export price, the platform could well become highly popular around the world. A number of countries across the world have already show interest in procuring the fighter, which was designed as an effective light complement to heavier platforms such as the Su-30 and F-15.
[By: ,
April 30th - 2018]
Pakistan and Malaysia have begun preliminary discussions regarding the potential export of JF-17 Thunder single engine light fighters to meet Kuala Lumpur's defence needs. The JF-17 is a joint product of China’s Chengdu Aircraft Industry Corporation and the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC), and with a number of signifiant enhancements which allow it to contend with and in many fields outperform modern fourth generation fighters. Speaking at the Defence Services Asia (DSA) 2018 exhibition in Kuala Lumpur, an official form PAC said the two governments have had “primary level talks” about a potential sale of the fourth generation fighter to meet the aerial combat requirements of the Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF). The official stated: “We are aware of the potential requirements in Malaysia for cost-effective fighter aircraft. There have been no serious talks but through government to government channels there have been what we can describe as primary level talks about the JF-17 program.”
Malaysia’s Air Force currently fields the Russian MiG-29 an U.S. F-18 twin engine light fighters, which fulfil a complementary role alongside the country’s elite Su-30MKM heavy platforms. With both the MiG-29 and the F-18 nearing the end of their service lives, and with Malaysia’s program to acquire a replacement twin engine light fighter stalling largely due to a lack of funds, the country has shown renewed interest in acquiring the JF-17. Malaysia might be eyeing JF-17 Block III variant which is about to enter the production next year. The JF-17 will be able to deploy a number of Chinese and U.S. made weapons, including advanced Chinese air to air platforms such as the PL-12 which have few rivals elsewhere. The fighter makes extensive use of composite materials, which makes it highly durable and manoeuvrable. A legacy from the J-7, the fighter’s maintenance requirements are extremely low and the JF-17 can maintain an extremely high sortie rate if properly serviced - a critical asset in wartime which can serve as a valuable force multiplier. The fighter also deploys an AESA radar, invaluable for long range air to air combat, which is more sophisticated than the radar of any fighters currently deployed by any of the country's neighbours and makes the JF-17 far more difficult to detect at long ranges.
To promote further sales of the JF-17, particularly in the case of large acquisitions which Malaysia may well be willing to make, the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex has stated that it is willing to enter collaborative partnerships with local industry involving technology transfers and either localised component manufacturing or maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) by the Malaysian side. “Of course, the industrial engagement would depend on the sale of the Malaysian requirement,” a PAC official stated. Should the country acquire the fighter, it would be the platform’s third export customer and could well facilitate closer defence ties with both Pakistan and China. With Pakistan’s JF-17 block III set to enter production in the near future, with far more advanced capabilities than its predecessors and a highly competitive export price, the platform could well become highly popular around the world. A number of countries across the world have already show interest in procuring the fighter, which was designed as an effective light complement to heavier platforms such as the Su-30 and F-15.