The University is the National University of Singapore (NUS). The talk was hosted by an Institute of NUS, i.e. ISAS. There are a few other Institutes of our University & also our Ministry of Education. There are a few Chinese Scholars attached as Senior Visiting Fellows of some these Institutes, and are well versed on issues effecting the region. Incidentally, I am a Singaporean but not a public servant but an International Biz Consultant.
South China Sea Strategies for other nations (Not China)
- Thread starter PanAsian
- Start date
Brumby
Major
I think you are conflating doctrine and consequences. Doctrine is simply a framework to provide a path for decision making when interacting with a set of circumstances. They offer a platform across a range of subjects. Consequences by nature can vary significantly and are primary drivers in decision making. While the doctrines on SCS and nuclear escalation may share similar decision tree structures, the actions are driven by consequences and hence the paths taken can be considerably different.
In the example of nuclear standoff, even at the height of the Cold War where there were numerous incidents of Russian aircrafts probing Nato air defences, there are simply no evidence of consideration in launching a nuclear attack in retaliation because it doesn’t fit the norm of proportionate response. Such situations are not governed by goodwill but rather the prospects of mutual assured destruction. In this example, the primary consideration is the consequence of such action.
The issue as I have said before regarding the context of this conversation is not China’s reaction but whether the reclamation is fundamentally reactionary or it is part of a long term program. The test of proportionality was simply a means to distinguish between such actions. As many had pointed out, the scale of the effort is that planning of such significance does not suggest it is reactionary. Further, reactionary programs typically reflect proportionality rather than not. If you premise your argument that China can potentially exhibit petulant syndrome in its behaviour it might just explain why such massive scale is still in the realm of proportionate response.
Fortification by the way does not strengthen the legal position. As China insist it is primarily for non military purpose (if you can believe that) than it doesn’t either.
The negotiations as mentioned by China in its December 2014 paper. China’s own position paper to the Tribunal is worded exactly opposite to the reasoning you are adopting.
Extract from China’s position paper :
“China and the Philippines have agreed, through bilateral instruments and the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, to settle their relevant disputes through negotiations. By unilaterally initiating the present arbitration, the Philippines has breached its obligation under international law” (cf. China Position Paper, para. 3, Part III, paras. 30-56];
The issue is simply the scale of it.
I understand and I have in the above provided my replies.
Regarding the nuclear standoff scenario, I mention "no goodwill" as a general descriptor for a situation where there is simply no communication between both sides that could allow de-escalation such as the nuclear hotline. But the entire nuking scenario was kind of a tangent anyway, so I'll leave it at that.
But as many have already said, there is no reason why a reaction can not have a very high degree of pre planning and vigilance in place for various contingencies.
E.g.: country A may have a massive military infrastructure which is well trained, with expansive capabilities in place for use against a number of contingencies X, Y and Z, but if contingency X occurs which makes country A use its military force, that does not mean country A's military infrastructure was the precipitating action which resulted in contingency X from occurring.
Surely you can appreciate that planning for a contingency with the relevant assets in a state of readiness is different to actually wanting such a contingency to occur.
In context of our discussion, I see their fortification is not meant to strengthen the legal position but rather their physical presence in the area and generally act as a demonstration of China's resolve in the area in response to the aforementioned various actions by various players and the increasing internationalization of the dispute which China is opposed to. I do not see the fortification as being in response to only the lawsuit, but rather it is a response to a number of actions over the last few years which the lawsuit became the tipping point of.
And I think China has said it will have civilian purposes as well as certain military uses, which I do believe.
Okay I see, that clarifies things a little.
But I don't see how that passage is it contrary to my reasoning?
I'll re describe my reasoning: during negotiations to resolve a conflict, no side is obligated to "cease" any particular activities during a conflict for negotiation to occur. Obligation to cease particular activities (whether it is ceasing reclamation during a territorial dispute, or continuing to push forward one's frontline during negotiations of a ceasefire for a war) only occurs once an agreement has been reached.
As for China's position, China is saying that they were interested and willing to engage in bilateral negotiations to resolve the dispute, but by taking a lawsuit, they've voided their previous agreement -- in other words the lawsuit gave China the "right" to respond with escalatory actions of its own (namely reclamation).
Now, whatever negotiations which occurred prior to the Philippines filing its lawsuit is also not contradictory to my previous reasoning, as during previous years both sides still tested each other's capabilities and presence in the SCS by sending in coast guard ships and what not as well. But it was the Philippines filing its lawsuit which was the straw that broke the camel's back and caused China to perceive its goodwill from the Philippines to be gone, and also to plan to fortify its presence in the SCS overall as a response to the cumulative actions of various parties over previous years which they considered as provocations.
Yes, but why must the scale of it lead you to believe that China must have deliberately engineered or planned to always reclaim those islands like they are doing now?
Could the scale of it not simply be explained by less sinister reasons such as China having extensive planned for reclamation in case it was needed due to the importance of the territorial disputes to China's interests? (AKA good contingency planning), as well as extensive inherent Chinese industrial capability and which would allow them to provide a high scale and high speed of reclamation compared to others even though such a scale and rate may barely be stretching their relative resources and capabilities?
Last edited:
Brumby
Major
Contingency or scenario planning whichever one you care to name it is normal and to be expected. Nevertheless such planning activities do not correspond to the scale and complexities in terms of resourcing and degree of effort that goes into a plan that from the onset is for execution. It is still a question of scale.
Unfortunately that is not the line of legal reasoning that China is using in its own position paper. In effect, China is arguing that since both parties are still in bilateral discussions, the principle of estoppel is a legal restrain on the Philippines in proceeding to the Tribunal. In other words, both parties are legally bound to conduct negotiations and not act in a manner that is contrary to the process until such time the negotiations has terminated.
If you intend to equate fortification as the appropriate descriptive term for land reclamation of over 2000 acres in the SCS, I don’t believe any evidence or reasoning would convince you otherwise.
The amount of planning to undertake such a scale of reclamation as pointed out principally by Jeff (based on comparable experience) would suggest that it is a better fit within a broader strategic plan as a more plausible explanation.
There is no suggestion that the actions of China are sinister. It is not the speed of the execution but the planning involved leading to the execution. Unless you have been involved in massive projects, trying to get this understood is like pissing into the wind.
Is it though? Given that the south china sea is a self defined core interest of China, does it not make sense for extensive planning and preparation for various contingencies to be in place? Does it not make sense for a lot of effort to be put in for such an important part of China's own interests?
I don't think China is arguing that both parties are still in bilateral discussions, rather that the Philippines with its lawsuit has "breached its obligation" to the lawsuit. Note that the phrasing here is important as it leaves a lot of room for maneuver as it does not restrict China from responding to the Philippines' "breach".
The way I interpret the statement is that China is saying both sides were engaged in a level of bilateral discussions (with subtext that both would maintain a certain level of non-escalatory actions), but the Philippines with their lawsuit basically broke their bilateral discussions and effectively left the table.
I interpret this as the discussions as basically having been ceased, and erasing what previous little "good will" there was and effectively gave China the "right" to respond to what they perceive as an escalation by the Philippines.
The way I read your statement, it almost seems like you believe that if one party carries out an action which breaches the obligations during a negotiation then the other party is not allowed to respond.
(Note I use speech marks, and do not use the words in any legal sense but rather as colloquial terms)
I use fortification as a colloquial word to describe the intensification of the Chinese presence in the SCS.
"Expand its presence" or "carry out reclamation" etc, are also alternatives if you want. Here, I'll rephrase the passage you quoted to something hopefully closer to your liking.
"Now, whatever negotiations which occurred prior to the Philippines filing its lawsuit is also not contradictory to my previous reasoning, as during previous years both sides still tested each other's capabilities and presence in the SCS by sending in coast guard ships and what not as well. But it was the Philippines filing its lawsuit which was the straw that broke the camel's back and caused China to perceive its goodwill from the Philippines to be gone, and also to plan to carry out reclamation and expand its presence in the SCS overall as a response to the cumulative actions of various parties over previous years which they considered as provocations."
Of course their extent of planning and the scale of reclamation meant it is part of a strategic plan -- I've been saying that for the last few pages, that China has made plans for the contingency... and given it is in the SCS, it is naturally part of a larger strategic doctrine. That however does not mean China was actively seeking an excuse or the right to carry out reclamation, which is what you seem to be suggesting this entire time.
A few analogies:
-China also has extensive plans for a military operation against Taiwan for various situations such as independence, but that does not mean China is actively seeking to create a situation whereupon they will use military force against Taiwan
-The US had extensive contingency plans for military operations against various different potential foes prior to world war ii (such as what Shen described via rainbow five), but that did not mean the US was actively seeking to create a situation whereupon they would carry out their contingency plans against all those foes
-Buildings have extensive plans for evacuation in event of a fire or emergency, but that doesn't mean they are seeking to create circumstances for a fire or emergency to occur
I'm sorry but the appeal to authority fallacy won't work here. Partly because it's a logical fallacy, and partly because I actually agree with everything that you said.
I absolutely acknowledge that I have no experience in extensive civil infrastructure development or planning, and I also acknowledge that the speed and scale of the reclamation is indicative of extensive pre planning which would allow such a project to occur.
I am not challenging the notion that extensive planning would have been required for the reclamation to have occurred. So I am actually very much in agreement with you here. Hell, in the very passage that you quote, I literally say "explained by less sinister reasons such as China having extensive planned for reclamation in case it was needed due to the importance of the territorial disputes to China's interests? (AKA good contingency planning)"
What I am saying is there is a difference between having planned out how to do something with all the assets in a state of readiness to carry it out if the situation demands it, versus seeking to create circumstances that will give them an excuse to carry out their plan... and that is where our differences seem to be.
Last edited:
Brumby
Major
By the same reasoning of core interest, the same argument be made that the land reclamation was an early integral part of the core plan rather than as a contingency.
It is not about what I or you believe and/or that somehow it is only meant in colloquial terms. It is a legal position put out by China to the Tribunal. They expressed the position of China in this matter - that is a fact and not what we may believe or not. A legal position and the choice of words are carefully considered to ensure clarity and specificity of purpose.
I am not being pedantic but words have meaning. In my view, China's scope is basically island building.
If you want to take a view that filing a lawsuit precipitated island building as an appropriate and proportionate response, I would rather leave it as such and not labour further on it.
Providing cover means taking the opportunity when it presents itself. Actively seeking would imply a more sinister attempt at creating events for opportunities - which clearly I did not suggest.
I am sorry to disagree. Appeal to authority is not necessary a fallacy in by itself. It depends on the nature of usage. In the context of the reclamation and just the scale of the program, it is my belief that the planning depth, timing, and resourcing involved leading to the implementation is not something that is appreciated simply by what had been expressed by members in this forum. You and others may not agree with this statement and I am happy to leave it as a disagreement in opinion.
I will repeat. I did not say that China created circumstances as an excuse to carry out their plan. I have consistently been saying that the narrative often quoted in this forum that the land reclamation was China responding to the actions of the other claimants is simply not palatable. I said China took cover/excuse over the actions of the other claimants in their PR as an explanation.
Well yes, the SCS territorial dispute is a core interest so naturally they would have had a number of contingency plans as part of its overall strategy for this core interest, of which reclamation was one of them.
China probably also has contingencies for carrying out naval battles in SCS against various claimants if the stuff hits the fan and for seizing other islands by force if such a situation ever arises.
Okay, if you want to just take their words for what they're worth, then my position remains the same. Nowhere in that statement has China said that they are still in bilateral discussions.
To directly refer back to the passage:
"China and the Philippines have agreed, through bilateral instruments and the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, to settle their relevant disputes through negotiations."
-here they refer to a number of previous agreements to negotiate bilaterally
"By unilaterally initiating the present arbitration, the Philippines has breached its obligation under international law."
-here China refers to the Philippines breaching its obligation etc etc by involving another party beyond the bilateral agreement
Your original point in post 609 said that China was being duplicitous as it was conducting reclamations during negotiations -- "In return, I am simply casting China by the standard that China has herself used by China's massive reclamation while in negotiations."
Therefore the point we have to assess in its Position Paper is whether they are still in negotiations.
Nowhere in the passage that you quote, nor in their Position Paper overall, do they state that they are still in bilateral negotiations with the Philippines.
My view that reading the overall Position Paper, is that China is very much pissed at the lawsuit and it would be a stretch of imagination to believe that China is still sitting at the negotiating table with open arms given they interpret the lawsuit as an unfriendly act, best summed up here: "In respect of disputes of territorial sovereignty and maritime rights, unilateral resort to compulsory arbitration against another State, however, cannot be taken as a friendly act, when the initiating State is fully aware of the opposition of the other State to the action and the existing agreement between them on dispute settlement through negotiations." (point 90 in the Position Paper)
If you interpret that or other points in the passage to mean that China is saying it is still in negotiations with the Philippines, then so be it. Logically I think any reasonable person would interpret China's statement as being that whatever negotiations they had, had collapsed.
However, for the sake of discussion, would you consider China's actions to not be duplicitous if they had clearly stated in their Position Paper that they were no longer in negotiations with the Philippines?
Fair enough, and in my revised statement I use those very words -- island building. This is a point which we no longer have to belabour.
My goodness, I've tried very very hard to emphasize my view that the island reclamation was in response to the "straw which broke the camel's back" and that "In my view, China's reclamation was in response to the cumulative build up of various actions by the Philippines, Vietnam, and the US over the past few years culminating in the Philippines and their lawsuit."
That is to say, I believe the reclamation in China's eyes was not in response "only" to the lawsuit, but rather preceding small island grabs by vietnam in preceding years, and more importantly the general greater involvement of the US into the dispute. It was, however, the lawsuit which precipitated China's actions to actually carry out the reclamation, but it is not the singular reason, rather there were a number of preceding reasons as well. The lawsuit was merely the final provocation which resulted in an actual physical response by China.
Okay, I appreciate that you're not saying they were trying to create an opportunity for reclamation, it's good to have that out of the way.
On the contrary I have already agreed that extensive planning must have preceded their reclamation.
And absolutely, fallacies does depend on the context and in this context invoking an appeal to authority does not preclude my opinion from being invalid. Like I say, I agree that extensive planning preceded their reclamation.
Why is it not palatable? Is it because of the scale and speed of the reclamations?
Do you believe that it is not reasonable or conceivable for China to have made a contingency plan of this scale with the resources and effort that they have put in?
I've stated variations of this before: remember that China has a lot of industrial capability to call upon such that the scale of the operation may simply be a result of the industrial expertise and resources at hand, and also recall that the SCS disputes are a core interest of China therefore it has every reason to plan carefully and extensively for any contingencies.
Competency in carrying out a task does not mean one had a desire from the outset in seeking to carry it out, it could just mean one has planned well for various situations and is simply very capable in those domains.
The US and the coalition forces put together a vast, capable military force in a small amount of time which wiped the floor with Iraq during the Gulf War. It was almost laughably successful. If you believe that competency, speed, and scale are reflective of preplanned desire to wait for an excuse to do an action, then applying your logic, the possibility that the coalition responded to what they considered to be Iraqi aggression is simply not palatable and they must have desired to fight Iraq from the outset.
If you believe that China could not have planned for such a contingency to the scale and breadth we see then fine you can stop reading and we'll end it here.
But if you do think it's reasonable for contingency planning to have been sufficiently competent for such an operation to kick in if a provocation ever occurred, then why is the possibility of China responding to the other side's actions not plausible to you?
Actually I've done a bit of thinking now and I've realised that in this case there is actually no material difference between planning for contingencies and planning to take advantage of a situation of the circumstances arise.
I think sometimes I forget that this is a territorial dispute and that all parties are inherently driven by the basics of all territorial disputes... To make their own claim the only valid one and invalidate others.
In that sense, every action taken by every party involved will seek to use all the methods at their disposal to try and reach the goal, keeping in mind that their actions will always have to either elicit a minimal response/retaliation from other parties, or at least carry out their action in response to other parties... All with the overall aim of securing their own territorial goals.
In that context, it is actually irrelevant whether or not china had planned its reclamation as a contingency plan or if it planned it and also hoped that circumstances would have arisen to allow them to justify reclaiming the islands, because their end goal is still the same, beyond the mere immediate result of having a few airstrips in the SCS. They are merely intermediary steps for an overarching goal, and if other options such as negotiations had panned out successfully reclamation may not have been necessary because things could have been settled to China's favour anyway but when things turned away from China's favour and became provocations they resorted to the island reclamation. No doubt there are other similar plans of varying degrees and layers all with the same final result in mind.
I think sometimes I forget that this is a territorial dispute and that all parties are inherently driven by the basics of all territorial disputes... To make their own claim the only valid one and invalidate others.
In that sense, every action taken by every party involved will seek to use all the methods at their disposal to try and reach the goal, keeping in mind that their actions will always have to either elicit a minimal response/retaliation from other parties, or at least carry out their action in response to other parties... All with the overall aim of securing their own territorial goals.
In that context, it is actually irrelevant whether or not china had planned its reclamation as a contingency plan or if it planned it and also hoped that circumstances would have arisen to allow them to justify reclaiming the islands, because their end goal is still the same, beyond the mere immediate result of having a few airstrips in the SCS. They are merely intermediary steps for an overarching goal, and if other options such as negotiations had panned out successfully reclamation may not have been necessary because things could have been settled to China's favour anyway but when things turned away from China's favour and became provocations they resorted to the island reclamation. No doubt there are other similar plans of varying degrees and layers all with the same final result in mind.
Brumby
Major
I am simply grounding my comments based on the legal arguments that China has presented to the Tribunal and that is negotiations are still ongoing. If you wish to dispute China's position I do not have an issue.
The involvement of another party as a breach is in my view an assertion on your part not supported by any wording to that effect. In other words, you are making this up.
If it gives you any satisfaction, the Tribunal when considering all the facts might agree with your reasoning and throw out China's arguments. We will just have to wait for the Tribunal to make that assessment.
That is a counterfactual proposition. If China's views are that the negotiations had indeed terminated then the basis of the legal argument would not have arisen in the first place, making this whole discussion irrelevant to begin with because the source of the contention would not have existed.
In my comments I have generalised that China's reclamations are not driven primarily by the actions of the other claimants but of a specific agenda with a life of its own. That is the scope of my comments. I would not venture into specific actions of claimants because in my view that is a too hard basket.
The ongoing narrative that the reclamations were in reaction to the actions of the other claimants. That is a narrative that I do not believe is true. It is a narrative aimed to absolve China's island building effort.
As I have said before, which one offers a better explanation. That in itself implies I did not rule out the plausibility of the alternative.
But the legal arguments that China has presented does not suggest that they are still in bilateral discussions. In fact in their entire Position Paper nowhere do they state that bilateral negotiations are still ongoing and any reasonable read of the paper would infer that bilateral negotiations (if they'd ever occurred in meaningful ways at all) had collapsed due to the unfriendly act (China's words in the paper) of the Philippines filing their lawsuit
Actually, let's backtrack a little.
Which "legal argument" do you speak of, and what "contention" do you speak of? I think we're talking about completely different things.
The way I see it, your original position was:
-china and the philippines are still in bilateral negotiations
-china is carrying out reclamation during negotiations
-therefore china is being duplicitous
My counter, is:
-china and the philippines are no longer in bilateral negotiations (as is highly suggested by their Position Paper, and nowhere in that Position Paper do they state that any bilateral discussions are still being maintained)
-china is carrying out reclamation not during bilateral negotiations
-therefore there is no duplicity
If China came out and clearly said that they were still in bilateral negotiations, then I agree with you that China's current island reclamation could be described as duplicitious
But will you agree with me, that if China came out and clearly said they were not in bilateral negotiations, would you agree that there is no duplicity involved?
Because the fulcrum in this argument I think is whether or not China and the Philippines are still in bilateral negotiations, and it is that factor which determines the guilt of duplicity or not.
I understand what your consistent position has been, I'm just saying that your previous statement here "If you want to take a view that filing a lawsuit precipitated island building as an appropriate and proportionate response, I would rather leave it as such and not labour further on it." -- is a strawman because I never said that the island reclamation was only in due to the lawsuit but rather due to cumulative provocations of previous years.
In other words, I appreciate what your position is (that they're due to an agenda of China's own), but I'd also appreciate if you acknowledge my position instead of re wording it which leaves out essential context and premises which is inherent to my conclusion.
Technically there should be nothing to absolve for. Like you agreed a few pages back this is a competition and no party is obligated to hold back.
In my view, all parties in the territorial dispute are interested in gaining the territory which they claim, and are willing to use a variety of methods to do it ranging from negotiations to show of presence, and to island reclamation, and eventually to the use of military force all depending on where the escalation chain is and how much they have to lose due to the actions of other sides.
So in a sense I agree with you that China probably "wanted an excuse" to reclaim the islands in the sense that it is a way of advancing its overarching terriortial claims, but I think it is incorrect to assume that reclaiming the islands has any "specific agenda" beyond being part of an overall goal. The island rebuilding is only one of many potential means to a final end that was planned for.
The reason why I think it's illogical to assume that China had always wanted to reclaim the islands as an end in itself, is that it ignores the other viable more peaceful opportunities for China to have achieved its goal of advancing its territorial claims without taking a route that could be considered provocative by other parties and raise tensions in the area not to mention being a source of monetary expenditure.
In other words, I believe that all parties in disputes universally would prefer to avoid conflict and escalation if there are other ways of achieving their goals, but would undertake those measures if they they find those other options being squeezed out or if other sides are not willing to use more peaceful means to solve certain issues. Of course "more peaceful" does not equate to "fair," because China always said it prefers bilateral negotiations. Of course bilateral negotiations allows it to bring bigger clout against its smaller competitors... but again, there's not exactly an obligation for China to be "fair" when desiring the terms of negotiations.
In that sense it is justified for the Philippines to file their lawsuit because that's probably the most viable way that they can try to hold back China's territorial claims given they cannot win during bilateral negotiations at present, and if China doesn't agree to multilateral negotiations then the result will be simply a steadily increasing Chinese coast guard presence in SCS and expanding Chinese influence and pressure until the Philippines loses resolve and goes back to the negotiating table in a bilateral way. So I am actually sympathetic to the Philippines in its position, but China has also made it clear in previous years that it strongly opposed bringing in other parties to make it a multilateral international issue (which would dilute its influence and clout and result in a poorer deal for China) so it gave China the means to choose other means of striking back -- which evidently we can see, was in the form of island reclamation.
Last edited: