South China Sea Strategies for other nations (Not China)

Brumby · Jun 4, 2016

confusion said:
Let's start with some salient comments from Singapore's former foreign minister. I'm impressed with the Singaporean foreign service. If the Philippines had guys like him instead of Trillanes and Carpio...

I only included the relevant sections, but the rest of the article is still worth the read:

Mr. Yeo cites Qing map as a source of Chinese legitimate claims but unfortunately recent news report indicates otherwise by newly discovered Qing maps. Secondly, the failure of countries initially to object to the nine dash is hardly convincing because countries don't object on the grounds of dashes appearing in maps until a formal claim is raised. As an ex foreign minster, he should know better regarding international diplomatic protocols.

confusion said:
There's a lot of indirect evidence that suggests that the PCA has leaked certain aspects of the pending decision: we see some hints of this from Singapore and the Philippines. The best evidence for this is the U-turn by Taiwan's new government on its SCS stance. For months, the anti-China DPP had hinted that they would abandon the nine-dash-line. Recently, however, the DPP government has re-asserted the maximal ROC claim to the SCS. Some pundits argue that the DPP is simply trying to mollify China, but I think this interpretation is completely wrong. In almost every other policy, the DPP has taken a policy stance that is anti-China.

Why has the DPP suddenly reverted to the old ROC territorial claims in the SCS, a DPP that wants to be viewed as being peace-loving and a strict follower of international law? The answer is simple - it's in Taiwan's best interests to do so, and reverting to the old ROC claims will not diminish Taiwan's image of being peace-loving and a strict follower of international law. The DPP administration must have received reliable information that the PCA will not rule against Itu Aba's status as an island and that they will not rule against the nine-dash-line. If the DPP is pretty certain that the PCA is going to 'reward' Taiwan's claims to the SCS, then there's no reason not to change its stance and gratefully accept the gift with open arms. Sorry PRC folks, the DPP administration isn't doing this out of some new-found love for China.

I have to credit you for making some interesting speculations but connecting dots is simply just that, an exercise in imagination. Having said I would comment on some your speculations :
(a)Your belief that the PCA will not rule against Itu Aba as an island. IMO I think Itu Aba on facts would be hard pressed to rule as anything but an island. I am not convinced though that it will necessarily get the customary maritime boundaries of the 200 nm EEZ because of other immediate land mass that carries more weight.
(b)The nine-dash-line and PCA's position. I am neutral on this because I cannot determine from a legal perspective how the PCA will address this within the framework of UNCLOS and the PCA's mandate. I am sure the PCA will address it but the outcome of this is outside my pay grade to even speculate.
(c)I don't have a view of Itu Aba and the legitimacy of the claim but I don't believe it is grounded on the strength of the nine-dash. Personally I believe staking claims based on nine-dash is legally unsound. Such a position is a political decision rather than legal.

confusion said:
That brings us back to the arbitration case. From the Filipino perspective, they needed to do one of two things to achieve a significant, game-changing win over China. 1. Have the PCA declare that Itu Aba is a rock and 2. Have the PCA invalidate the nine-dash-line. #1 is more important than #2; in the absence of #1, #2 is still an acceptable result for the Philippines. Everyone expects the PCA to rule against the nine-dash-line. Not doing so would be pretty shocking.

I have said some time back that the Philippines decision to go to the PCA was a move of last resort as the other option was capitulation and that was politically untenable. I cannot see what is the Philippines end game even if the PCA rules favourably to most of its submissions. It might add strength to subsequent bilateral negotiations but I cannot see the state of play beyond that.

confusion said:
However, I'm very confident now that the PCA will not rule against Itu Aba's status as an island (because this claim is too absurd to be supportable) nor invalidate the legality of the nine-dash-line (backstopped by the VCLT and UNCLOS opt-out exemptions).

Let's see what the PCA eventually determines. I do not agree with the basis of your reasoning in how the PCA will arrive at a determination especially on the nine dash.

confusion said:
Failing to rule against China on none of the two charges would be damaging to the Philippines in many ways. 1st, they've diminished their own claims by tacitly admitting that the Filipino-held territories are nothing more than rocks. 2nd, they've actually strengthened China's claims. By asking the court to rule against Itu Aba, by asking the court to invalidate the nine-dash-line, but to be denied on both accounts, is a direct repudiation of your claims against China and a partial validation of China's claims.

Nothing is free. There are consequences to arbitration claims that fail.

When this happens, China can easily sit back and proclaim "The Filipinos took us to arbitration. We didn't even bother to contest their claims. The Filipinos asked the PCA to declare that Itu Aba is a rock. The PCA said no. The Filipinos asked the PCA to declare that the nine-dash-line is invalid and illegal. The PCA again said no. The PCA said no in both cases because Itu Aba is an island and the nine-dash-line is fully in accordance with international law. All that happened without us having to lift a finger. Just imagine the results if we had bothered to contest these silly, frivolous Filipino claims with our mountain-loads of historic evidence!"

The two main things that you repeatedly emphasized i.e. nine dash and Itu Aba is not necessarily central to the Philippines submissions and will not undermine the rest of the submissions. The PCA might not rule on the nine dash as it may be determined to be outside its mandate to rule. However even under such a scenario I would expect the PCA to state that the nine dash is unprecedented and not in conformity with any existing customary international law. Such an outcome doesn't make the nine-dash legal though but rather an issue unresolved through the PCA.

confusion · Jun 5, 2016

The two main things that you repeatedly emphasized i.e. nine dash and Itu Aba is not necessarily central to the Philippines submissions and will not undermine the rest of the submissions.

The status of Itu Aba is absolutely vital to their claims. If Itu Aba is an island, the PCA has no jurisdiction to do any of the following below - that determination is out of the hands of the PCA:

I am not convinced though that it will necessarily get the customary maritime boundaries of the 200 nm EEZ because of other immediate land mass that carries more weight.

(From Yale Law Professor Paul Gewirtz).

IV. “The Very Heart of This Case”: Itu
Aba
Claims 5, 8, 9, and to some extent 12 and 14 share
a common element: the Philippine claim that Chi-
na is interfering with the Philippines’ rights with-
in its EEZs. However, these claims are all greatly
complicated by the fact that at the outer edge of
the Philippines’ EEZ is a land feature called Itu Aba
by the Philippines and Taiping Island by China and
Taiwan (hereafter referred to as “Itu Aba” because
that is what the tribunal has been calling it). Taiwan
has claimed sovereignty over this feature, and also
claims that it is an “island” that brings with it a 12
mile territorial sea, a 200 mile EEZ, and a conti-
nental shelf. 8 If Taiwan is right, then Itu Aba’s EEZ
would greatly overlap with the EEZ generated by
the major Philippine island of Palawan, and there
would be overlapping maritime claims related to the
Philippines’ Claims 5, 8, 9, and perhaps also Claims
12 and 14. These overlapping claims could not be
resolved without making a “sea boundary delimita-
tion” establishing the boundary of these overlapping
claims. However, the tribunal would lack jurisdic-
tion to decide the proper “sea boundary delimita-
tion” since China has removed such matters from
UNCLOS’s remedial provisions under UNCLOS
Article 298 discussed above. In previously deferring
a decision on whether it had jurisdiction over these
claims, the tribunal itself suggested this very reason
that it might not have jurisdiction. 9

The Filipino defence team would not do this if it weren't so important:

Recognizing that the arbitration tribunal has no
power to decide what the delimitation should be,
the Philippines has put an enormous amount of lit-
igation effort into trying to prove that Itu Aba is not
an “island” but is only a “rock” under UNCLOS
Article 121(3). In the oral argument before the ar-
bitration tribunal, the Philippines lawyer went so
far as to say that Article 121(3) and the status of Itu
Aba “lies at the very heart of this case.” 10
If Itu Aba is only a “rock,” then China/Taiwan’s
sovereignty over it would generate only a territorial
sea and no EEZ or continental shelf. There would
be no overlapping claims requiring a “sea boundary
delimitation,” and the arbitration tribunal would be
able to decide the Philippines’ Claims 5, 8, and 9
and probably Claims 12 and 14 as well. The diffi-
culty for the Philippines is that in fact Itu Aba looks
very much like an “island” 11 and also seems to fit
the UNCLOS definition of an “island” not a “rock”
under UNCLOS Article 121(3).
Article 121 is entitled “Regime of islands,” and
those who advocate a regime of law to govern in-
ternational relations and the disputes in the South
China Sea must read Article 121 in its entirety,
because interpreting such legal texts is what “law-
based” solutions are all about. Article 121 reads in
full:
“1. An island is a naturally formed area of land,
surrounded by water, which is above water
at high tide.
2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the
territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the ex-
clusive economic zone and the continental
shelf of an island are determined in accor-
dance with the provisions of this Conven-
tion applicable to other land territory.
3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation
or economic life of their own shall have no ex-
clusive economic zone or continental shelf.”
The structure of this Article is to define an “island”
(section 1), then set forth what maritime rights
come with sovereignty over an “island” (section 2),
and then state an exception to those maritime rights
for mere “rocks” (section 3).

Itu Aba clearly meets the definition of an “island”
in section 1: it is “a naturally formed area of land,
surrounded by water, which is above water at high
tide.” The Philippines nevertheless argues that it
fits within the exception of section 3 because al-
though it meets the definition of an “island,” it is
a mere “rock.” Section 3 defines “rocks” as places
that “cannot sustain human habitation or economic
life of their own”—permitting inquiry into what is
hypothetically possible, not only what is currently
occurring. However, with Itu Aba we do not need to
hypothesize—in fact, Itu Aba currently is sustaining
“human habitation or economic life of its own.” It
has in fact been inhabited by humans for at least 60
years—now totaling about 200 people, mostly coast
guard personnel but also environmental researchers,
fishermen, and people staffing a hospital, a post of-
fice, and a temple. 12 Supplies are mostly flown in,
but there are chickens and natural vegetation on
the island, and many reports say it has fresh water
(the Philippines contests this). It’s big enough for all
that activity—not Australia, but not a “rock” like so
many other tiny land features in the South China
Sea whose tips just poke above water at high tide.
an unhelpful lack of judicial authority,” the Philip-
pines’ lawyer admitted. 13 The better conclusion is
that Itu Aba is not a “rock” but is an “island,” and is
entitled to a territorial sea and EEZ.

confusion · Jun 5, 2016

cont'd
And the Filipino defence team then proceeds to make this difficult argument, and supports my claim why not ruling against Itu Aba is a big loss for the Philippines:

In addition to their legal arguments building on each
phrase in Article 121(3)’s definition of a “rock,” the
skillful Philippines lawyers put forth an additional
reason they thought Itu Aba should not be called
an “island.” To do so, they said, would make the
adjudication of legal rights and claims in the waters
between the Philippines and Itu Aba very compli-
cated. Multiple land features involved in the Philip-
pines’ claims would all be within Itu Aba’s EEZ as
well as the Philippines’ EEZ. Furthermore, since Itu
Aba’s sovereignty is claimed by Taiwan and China as
well as the Philippines, and since the arbitration tri-
bunal may not resolve this sovereignty dispute, the
only way to decide the main issues the Philippines
has raised in the relevant claims would be to make
a “sea boundary delimitation” deciding which part
of the overlapping EEZs belongs to the Philippines
and which part belongs to whoever is sovereign over
Itu Aba. However, the tribunal lacks the power to
make any “sea boundary delimitation.” The con-
tending issues in the South China Sea would be so
much simpler if Itu Aba were just a “rock” and not
an “island.”

And then resorts to arguments like this:

In one of the most remarkable parts of the four-
day oral argument before the arbitration tribunal
in November 2015, the Philippines’ distinguished
lawyer Paul Reichler admitted as much. If Itu Aba
is determined to be an “island” and “China and po-
tentially other claimants [allowed] to continue to
assert [rights] that overlap,” Mr. Reichler said, “this
would open the door to much mischief ”:
“Mr President, this can’t be right....[T]he
dispute in this part of the South China
Sea would remain frozen in place, perhaps
permanently. China, as the superior power,
would continue to run roughshod over the
Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and the oth-
er coastal states, claiming and exercising all
rights and jurisdiction for itself.... In these
circumstances, Mr President, the Philip-
pines respectfully submits that the avoid-
ance of such a frozen conflict is consistent
with the Tribunal’s mandate to promote
the maintenance of legal order in respect
of the relevant maritime areas....Indeed,
a determination that [Itu Aba is a “rock”]
could very well be the most important con-
tribution this Tribunal could make to the
establishment of legal order and the main-
tenance of peace in the South China Sea....
[T]he incentives to acquire and build more
would no longer exist, and therefore the
prospects would be greatly enhanced for
a peaceful negotiated solution to the most
contentious issue fueling the dispute be-
tween China and its neighbours.” 14

However, that persuasiveness is not a legal argu-
ment. It is a policy argument and a political argu-
ment. The “law-based” argument is on the side of
Itu Aba being an “island.” The law-based argument
is therefore on the side of the arbitration tribunal
answering “No” to various questions it had deferred
in its earlier opinion on jurisdiction. The tribunal is
likely to lack jurisdiction over these claims because
it lacks the power to make the ‘sea boundary delim-
itations’ central to resolving them.

And here's why that's very important:

Most significantly, this conclusion would probably
put a major obstacle in the way of the tribunal’s
ruling on one of the most explosive and important
issues in the South China Sea, the land reclamations
that China is undertaking—specifically Claim 12,
which argues that “China’s occupation and con-
struction on Mischief Reef is unlawful.” Under
UNCLOS, a country is explicitly allowed to build
“artificial islands” within its territorial sea, its EEZ,
and on the high seas (Articles 60 and 87), but it
may not build artificial islands inside another coun-
try’s territorial sea or EEZ. The Philippines argues
that Mischief Reef is within its EEZ, but if Itu Aba
is an “island,” Mischief Reef would also be within
the 200 mile EEZ of the country with sovereign-
ty over Itu Aba. Deciding where the boundary of
the overlapping EEZs should be drawn is exactly
the “sea boundary delimitation” that the tribunal is
barred from making. So it is doubtful the tribunal
could declare China’s construction of an artificial
island unlawful as within the Philippines’ Exclusive
Economic Zone. 15

If Itu Aba is more than a rock, then all that the PCA can do is to say "rock", "rock", "LTE" in the Spratlys, which doesn't change anything on the ground without jurisdiction to draw "sea boundary delimitation". Without the authority to delimit, these classifications don't change anything for the Philippines. However, the US will be happy; any LTE designation is a minor victory for the US and more aggressive FONOP; for the Philippines, NOTHING changes in the Spratlys. It's still deadlocked, and bilateral negotations are the only way to sort this out.

The only victory that the Philippines will achieve is a small one at Scarborough. However, even that only reduces China's overall claims from around 80% to 70%, and the waters 12 nm+ around Scarborough are much less useful economically, since there's no gas/oil around there, and the primary economic activity at Scarborough is fishing at or very close to the Shoal. If Scarborough is an LTE, then the PCA can transfer sovereignty over Scarborough to the Philippines; if it's a rock, then it's claimable as sovereign territory and the PCA has no authority to make a judgment on who owns it. There's nothing in international law that would prohibit reclamation at Scarborough as a rock.

So in the end, after all this arbitration, the only thing that the Philippines will gain is the much less useful EEZ zone around Scarborough. This is the type of question that Duterte will ask "DId the PCA give us back Scarborough?"

There's no ruling on the legality/illegality of reclamation. There's no awarding or changing hands of any occupied feature.

The primary beneficiary of arbitration is clearly the US. How this benefits the Philippines is much harder to see. China will receive a minor reputation hit and a small reduction in its claims around Scarborough and the James Shoal, but the bulk of their claims would not be invalidated. Not the best of results for China, but not truly a big deal that can't be handled.

Brumby · Jun 5, 2016

Below is a summary of the 15 submissions of which 7 are under reservations and #15 subject to clarification by the Philippines.

I think the Philippines best chances are those that have exclusive nature which there are 7. Personally I think the Philippines will win # 1 because UNCLOS is precisely set up to define maritime entitlements. This together with the expected favourable ruling of the 7 exclusive nature will make # 2 i.e. nine dash moot and have the effect of curtailing China's planned overreach even if the PCA does not rule on the legality of the nine dash.

# 5, 8, 9 are likely to be impacted by the Itu Aba ruling but I think it is premature to speculate on the outcome over whether it will be ruled as an island or not. I have seen the Philippines submission and it is not as weak as I originally thought. It is now in the hands of the PCA.

Whether it is the right course of action for the Philippines to go to the PCA I think history will be the ultimate judge.

confusion · Jun 6, 2016

Haha, how do you go from this,

IMO I think Itu Aba on facts would be hard pressed to rule as anything but an island.

to this on the issue of Itu Aba's status?

Brumby said:
the Itu Aba ruling but I think it is premature to speculate on the outcome over whether it will be ruled as an island or not. I have seen the Philippines submission and it is not as weak as I originally thought.
.

That's very uncharacteristic of you. I'm surprised that a highly principled man such as yourself would suddenly change his opinion due to political expediency. Perhaps you've suddenly come to the realization that Itu Aba's status is indeed absolutely vital to the Philippines' core claims?

If reviewing the Philippines submission has given you a new-found realization that Itu Aba = rock is a reasonable, winning claim, by all means, please share and explain your line of reasoning. Show us how this position is supportable. Provide us with the facts to back up this claim. Show us how your understanding of this case and interpretation of international law is superior to that of Dr. Paul Gewirtz, Professor of Constitutional Law at Yale, who asserts that:

The “law-based” argument is on the side of
Itu Aba being an “island.”

confusion · Jun 6, 2016

Includes a very interesting observation on how the US think tank system works:

A Legal Imbroglio In The South China Sea – OpEd
By
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June 6, 2016

The rhetorical war between the China and the United States over the South China Sea dispute is increasing in tempo and magnitude by the week. The US is wasting no time, resource and effort in sponsoring seminars, talks and think tank confabs to drive a wedge between China and other claimant nations in the region. Ambitious young ASEAN scholars and diplomats, anxious to boost their resumes and post-retirement corporate prospects, are actively being lured towards this end via the offer of generous stints at prestigious American universities and think tanks.

Vietnam is the suitor du jour in America’s new carousel game called the “Asian Pivot.” While China is financing and building essential infrastructure in Vietnam, the US is ironically offering weapons to a nation it pummelled during a genocidal two-decade war that left two million Vietnamese citizens dead, as well as an untold number injured and maimed. This tally does not include the yet incalculable effects of Agent Orange on future generations of Vietnamese.

A New York Times report on May 11, 2014 noted that “the war has not ended for many of the 2.8 million” individuals who “are convinced that their cancers and nervous disorders and skin diseases — not to mention congenital maladies afflicting some of their children — are a result of their contact with Agent Orange.”

The NYT was referring to US Army personnel and support staff here; not the Vietnamese victims!

While Chinese businesses have poured in investments worth $7.9 billion into Vietnam in 2014 alone, the US has only offered to clean up chemically contaminated parts of the country some 40 years after the Vietnam War ended. Presumably, both the offer of weapons and nationwide decontamination is subject to strict Vietnamese compliance over the United States’ glaring anti-China stance in the South China Sea.

Yesterday’s bitter enemies are today’s strategic partners whenever history is reinterpreted with facile sleaze.

But history cannot be easily brushed aside, even if the United Nations Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague rules in favour of the Philippines over its claims in the South China Sea. The ruling is expected to be made this summer.

Why Extra-Regional Arbitration May Backfire
The Philippines’ resort to The Hague may backfire badly for all claimants in the region. Involving the United Nations and the United States into what was originally a regional issue may irk China, but it ironically opens up a few legal Pandora’s Boxes in Beijing’s favour.

For one, the amnesiac Western media has forgotten that Taiwan’s maritime claims mirror those of China. Can the UN issue a definitive verdict that discounts Taiwanese claims, especially when Taipei is not a member of the United Nations? Will the 22 nations that recognize Taiwan as a separate political entity endorse any such international ruling? This, in turn, opens up another legal conundrum over the status of Taiwan.

A shrewd legal expert on territorial claims, international law and geopolitics can easily punch holes the size of a US aircraft carrier once the UN and the US are brought into the picture, and embarrass both entities to no ends.

To begin with, did the United States and the UN General Assembly or any other permanent member of the United Nations Security Council contest the validity of the 11-dash line unveiled on Dec 1, 1947 by the Republic of China – itself a permanent council member at the time? Without a proper de jure challenge, the “international community” – a term the US glibly invokes all too often – seems to have proffered at least de facto recognition over China’s 1947 claims.

Many of the contested islands in the South China Sea, namely the Paracels, Pratas and Spratly, were actually reclaimed by the Republic of China’s naval forces in the immediate aftermath of Japan’s surrender in WWII. Hardly any disputes rose till Vietnam lodged a counter-claim in 1951 but this was blunted by China’s concession of the Bach Long Vi island to Vietnam in 1957. Beijing’s maritime claims were in fact tempered by Zhou Enlai’s new 9-dash line during this period. Again, there seems to be scarcity of UN debates, protests, documents or motions regarding the 9-dash line till a decade or two back – when the United States began to challenge China’s economic hegemony in the region.

The disputed islands slipped into a state of limbo from the late 50s onwards. Hardly any news buff was acquainted with its existence. The United States was too busy fighting Vietnam. Later it was busy courting the People’s Republic of China, culminating in Nixon’s 1971 visit. The geopolitical pendulum, and the implicit maritime claims, now superficially swung in Beijing’s direction. There was no way the US was going to honour the claims of Hanoi. America neither countenances nor honours the claims of any nation that militarily kicks its rump. Being the gracious loser that it was, Washington refused to engage in diplomatic relations with Hanoi from the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 till 1995. Hanoi’s maritime claims were presumably treated with the same level of hostile contempt.

Just how did the US treat Vietnamese claims till 1995? Is the US now making a hypocritical volte-face, dangling the prospects of arms and regional naval support in lieu of war reparations and the blighted lives of future generations of Vietnamese babies over a few islands?

Or will it resort to another round of musical chairs when future regional developments require an opportunistic recalibration yet again? As for China and claimant ASEAN nations, all parties should continue holding regional dialogues towards a final settlement in the South China Sea, no matter how long it takes.

Asia should resolve its own problems without entangling Janus-faced outsiders.

Janiz · Jun 6, 2016

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(Bloomberg) -- France will urge European Union nations to coordinate navy patrols to ensure a “regular and visible” presence in the disputed South China Sea, in the latest sign of international push back to China’s expanded military clout in the area.

The French government views the protection of freedom of the seas as critical from an economic standpoint and is concerned that a loss of such rights in the South China Sea may lead to similar problems in the Arctic Ocean or Mediterranean Sea, Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian told attendees at a global defense forum, including top Chinese officials.

“If we want to contain the risk of conflict, we must defend this right, and defend it ourselves,” Le Drian said on Sunday at the Shangri-La dialogue in Singapore.

He said so far this year, France’s navy has been deployed three times through parts of the South China Sea. “Several times per year, French navy ships cross the waters of this region, and they’ll continue to do it.”

European nations have previously urged claimant states in the South China Sea -- China, Taiwan and some Southeast Asian nations -- to resolve their disputes peacefully, while calling for the continuation of free navigation through one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes.

‘Be Present’

Still, there has not so far been a major boost in the military presence from Europe. At the same time, China is increasing its navy and aerial patrols of the South China Sea and installing defense infrastructure on some reclaimed reefs, amid a broader focus on long-range military capacity in the western Pacific.

“This is a message that France will continue to be present at international forums,” Le Drian said. “It’s also a message that France will continue to act upon, by sailing its ships and flying its planes wherever international law will allow, and wherever operational needs request that we do so.”

Le Drian said he regretted that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations had not made substantial progress toward a code of conduct with China on the South China Sea.

Minimizing Gaps

Speaking at the same forum Saturday, U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter said China risked erecting a “Great Wall of self-isolation” in Asia over its actions, and called China’s land reclamation in the area “unprecedented.”

A senior French official who traveled with the minister said the country will discuss plans with EU partners in coming weeks, with a focus on guaranteeing that EU navies regularly crisscross the waters.

With countries such as the U.K. and Netherlands sending ships to the area from time to time, France is interested in better coordinating patrols to ensure there is no long gap without an EU presence in the area, according to the official, who asked not to be identified, citing policy.

Another possibility, the official said, is smaller EU navies or those currently less engaged in the area may send ships that would be integrated in French task forces to minimize supply difficulties.

PanAsian · Jun 6, 2016

Janiz said:
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Since WW2 France has been the second most active colonial military interventionist after the US. Its attempt to crush Vietnamese independence morphed into the US intervention in Vietnam's civil war. In recent years France was also a primary instigator behind the intervention in Libya's civil war under the guise of a "no-fly zone" and pushed for the same in Syria. So it is not a big surprise to see France looking to exacerbate discord in SE Asia to re-establish colonial inroads especially in Vietnam and once again with the help of the US.

solarz · Jun 6, 2016

PanAsian said:
Since WW2 France has been the second most active colonial military interventionist after the US. Its attempt to crush Vietnamese independence morphed into the US intervention in Vietnam's civil war. In recent years France was also a primary instigator behind the intervention in Libya's civil war under the guise of a "no-fly zone" and pushed for the same in Syria. So it is not a big surprise to see France looking to exacerbate discord in SE Asia to re-establish colonial inroads especially in Vietnam and once again with the help of the US.

Reminds me of the Eight Nations Alliance.

confusion · Jun 7, 2016

The Indian position on UNCLOS and the SCS dispute:

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The Shangri-La dialogue hosted annually by the Institute of Strategic Studies, London, is a major event in Singapore. Though it has, in recent years, become something of a China versus US event, it is a place where defence ministers, security wonks and media gather, an ideal place to make a statement, signal an intent or a new policy.

By that measure, to go by the remarks of our defence minister Manohar Parrikar at the forum, the opportunity was sadly wasted.

...

The Minister did spell out the traditional Indian stand of not taking sides in the South China Seas disputes and upholding the freedom of navigation and overflight in accordance with international law, especially the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS).

The minister’s suggestion was on the need for “collective action and cooperation” to deal with the situation. Interestingly, in recognising, as he did “that security in Asia is primarily the responsibility of the Asians”, he sounded more like a Chinese official than one whose government had last year made certain commitments to the US through a Joint Strategic Vision for Asia Pacific and the Indian Ocean to “develop a roadmap… to better respond to diplomatic, economic and security challenges in the region.”

Parrikar’s ambivalence, or to be more accurate confusion, stems from a well-considered Indian policy of using the South China Sea to occasionally needle Beijing, but steering clear of any deeper commitments which could needlessly involve us in a quagmire in a region far from where our primary security interests lie.

Nevertheless, a government that says it Acts East could have been much more forceful in articulating a new and nuanced point of view just as US Secretary of Defence Ashton Carter did. Carter toned down his China bashing of last year’s Shangri-La, where he attacked China’s militarisation of the South China Sea. This year, speaking on the eve of the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue in Beijing which began on Monday, he called on all parties to join a “principled security network,” even though he did not quite spell out what that meant. His talk of China isolating itself because of its behaviour lacked credibility, given the deep economic ties Beijing has with the region and with the US and Japan.

And questions why the US does not ratify UNCLOS:

Actually, many US allies are now wondering how to get US to ratify UNCLOS. The US has used international law as a weapon to belabour China, but it has itself not ratified that key instrument of maritime international law. The US claims to observe it, but that is not quite the same thing. President Obama has recently once again appealed to the US Senate to ratify the UNCLOS, but that is not likely to happen.

The second issue the US has with its allies is that it is going soft on the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP). Here again, Obama lacks the time to push for it, and it is far from clear whether his successors will.

Meanwhile, the overwhelming feeling is that all sides are talking past each other in the South China Sea isssue. The arbitration council decision on the Philippines case is likely to trigger consequences we cannot easily predict.

South China Sea Strategies for other nations (Not China)

Brumby

Major

confusion

Junior Member

confusion

Junior Member

Brumby

Major

confusion

Junior Member

confusion

Junior Member

Janiz

Senior Member

PanAsian

Major

solarz

Brigadier

confusion

Junior Member