South China Sea Strategies for other nations (Not China)
- Thread starter PanAsian
- Start date
That is an interesting view.
In the event of a China-Japan conflict in the East China Sea - it would more likely that Japan would be trying to shut down freedom of commercial navigation in the South China Seas - as Japan doesn't rely on those shipping lanes, but China does.
In comparison, the shipping lanes in the South China Seas are vital to China - so China would be doing its utmost to maintaining freedom of commercial navigation.
Of course, there are a number of scenarios where China could use control of the SCS to apply selective and temporary pressure, but it simply is not in China's interest to allow widespread disruption in trade through the SCS.
In the event of a China-Japan conflict in the East China Sea - it would more likely that Japan would be trying to shut down freedom of commercial navigation in the South China Seas - as Japan doesn't rely on those shipping lanes, but China does.
In comparison, the shipping lanes in the South China Seas are vital to China - so China would be doing its utmost to maintaining freedom of commercial navigation.
Of course, there are a number of scenarios where China could use control of the SCS to apply selective and temporary pressure, but it simply is not in China's interest to allow widespread disruption in trade through the SCS.
Brumby
Major
Such a line of argument is simply propaganda. The one who controls the waterways control the taps. It is an even more compelling agnostic argument given the situation to control the waterways from risk management as what China is attempting to do. However the prevailing and long established customary international law is that such waters are a global commons. The question of control should not even surface and hence the notion of FON.
If China fully controlled the SCS, Japanese shipping is merely inconvenienced; Japan can avoid a blockade of the SCS by shipping out further east and sailing up through the Celebes Sea, Sulu Sea and international waterways of the Philippines.
The true chokepoint here is the Strait of Malacca.
The true chokepoint here is the Strait of Malacca.
It is mutually assured economic destruction, stupid.
The US Cancelled a Scheduled FONOP in the South China Sea. What Now?
Instead of a FONOP, Washington chose to conduct fly-overs near Scarborough Shoal. What are the ramifications?
By
April 27, 2016
The United States canceled a scheduled freedom of navigation operation (FONOP) in the South China Sea,.According to a report published in theJournal Tuesday evening, in a bid to “lower the temperature” in the South China Sea while still demonstrating resolve to China over possibly intensifying activities near Scarborough Shoal, the United States chose not to hold a freedom of navigation operation this month and instead carried out air patrols near Scarborough Shoal., the reported freedom of navigation operation in April would have been the third since the United States began challenging excessive maritime claims in the Spratly and Paracel Islands. One operation was held in October 2015, in the Spratly Islands, and another in January 2016, in the Paracels.
The circumstances surrounding the cancellation of the operation aren’t fully known, but it is likely that the United States wanted to manage the diplomatic fallout with China in the South China Sea. Instead of another FONOP, which would have drawn a negative reaction from the Chinese foreign ministry, as previous operations in the South China Sea have, the Obama administration chose to signal its support for the Philippines. U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter was in the Philippines earlier this month., among other things, Carter’s visit was the first high-level U.S. official visit to the country–a U.S. ally–since the activation of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), which will allow U.S. forces rotational access to Philippines bases. Additionally, Carter became the first defense secretary to observe the bilateral U.S.-Philippine Balikatan exercises.
The other bit of context here is the growing concern in the United States that China could begin land reclamation activities at Scarborough Shoal in earnest soon. Scarborough Shoal was famously seized by China in 2012, after a highly publicized stand-off with the Philippines, which previously administered the waters around the feature. (See a more detailed discussion of the history and circumstances of possible.) With the cancellation of the FONOP, Washington diverted its energies toward “three different air patrols near Scarborough in recent days,” according to theJournal‘s report. U.S. A-10 Thunderbolt fighters and HH-60 Pave Hawk helicopters were deployed from Clark Air Force base in the Philippines.
The cancellation of a scheduled freedom of navigation operation undermines earlier pledges by senior U.S. officials, including Defense Secretary Ashton Carter, that the patrols would become a regular occurrence in the South China Sea. The move also suggests that tensions between the Pentagon and the White House continue to persist over just how much of a cost the United States is willing to bear in the South China Sea with regard to its broader bilateral relationship with China. No doubt, the Scarborough Shoal overflights shortly after the Balikatan exercise with the Philippines had a desirable effect for the United States: They showed Washington’s resolve to Manila. (The two allies recently revealed the.)
A reaction from the Chinese foreign ministry earlier this week to the flights near Scarborough Shoal was surprisingly muted. Hua Chunying, a spokesperson for the Chinese foreign ministry, noted that “It is nothing strange for relevant planes to fly outside airspace adjacent to Huangyan Dao,” using the Chinese name for Scarborough Shoal. “Yet there is something unnatural with the high-profile hyping up of such a flight, and the reason why they did this is questionable,” she added. The Chinese foreign ministry hasn’t issued any further statements as of this writing; Hua’s reaction to the Scarborough fly-overs can be juxtaposed with the reactions fromand.
The Chinese defense ministry’s statement was more forthright, using language similar to what we’d seen in the aftermath of FONOPs in the Spratlys and Paracels. “The Huangyan island is China’s inherent territory and the Chinese military will take all necessary measures to safeguard national sovereignty and security,” it said. The ministry added that China opposes “such actions by the U.S. which threaten sovereignty and security of countries around the South China Sea and undermine regional peace and stability.” Echoing what has become a refrain in recent Chinese statements on U.S. activities in the South China Sea, the defense ministry said “the U.S. is promoting militarization of the South China Sea in the name of ‘Freedom of Navigation.’”
From Washington’s perspective, cancelling the FONOP might not have been all that bad. After all, the post-Balikatan air patrols near Scarborough have a similar signaling effect toward China, all while reassuring the Philippines, an important U.S. ally. Moreover, China’s response to the Scarborough fly-overs suggests that Beijing is treating them as it would a FONOP. The defense ministry’s statement, in particular, uses language seen previously in the aftermath of both the October 2015 and January 2016 FONOPs. For an administration that’s highly sensitive to , focusing on Scarborough may have been a more appealing option given the circumstances.
I do worry, however, that Washington’s cancellation of a scheduled FONOP may be more deleterious in the long run than the Obama administration may think. The administration has claimed–correctly–that the U.S. Navy’s freedom of navigation program is a fairly mundane, regular, and universal activity. It isn’t something directed at China; indeed, previous FONOPs have protested excessive claims by other South China Sea claimants as well. Calling off an operation undermines this narrative and imbues FONOPs with a special sort of signaling value.
Finally, there is the possibility that the recent tensions around Scarborough and reports that China is surveying the area for land reclamation are a red herring of sorts. China has good reasons not to conduct land reclamation there. With the pending ruling inPhilippines v. China at the Permanent Court of Arbitration expected this June, Beijing is already set to suffer some reputational costs. Even though China has said it doesn’t recognize the Court’s jurisdiction, it would have little incentive to magnify its reputational damage with new reclamation activities at Scarborough Shoal. Additionally,, an artificial island at Scarborough, unlike the seven artificial islands China has constructed in the Spratly Islands, would be built on a feature acquired coercively from another claimant. China has held its Spratly features since the 1980s.
The US Cancelled a Scheduled FONOP in the South China Sea. What Now?
Instead of a FONOP, Washington chose to conduct fly-overs near Scarborough Shoal. What are the ramifications?
By
April 27, 2016
The United States canceled a scheduled freedom of navigation operation (FONOP) in the South China Sea,.According to a report published in theJournal Tuesday evening, in a bid to “lower the temperature” in the South China Sea while still demonstrating resolve to China over possibly intensifying activities near Scarborough Shoal, the United States chose not to hold a freedom of navigation operation this month and instead carried out air patrols near Scarborough Shoal., the reported freedom of navigation operation in April would have been the third since the United States began challenging excessive maritime claims in the Spratly and Paracel Islands. One operation was held in October 2015, in the Spratly Islands, and another in January 2016, in the Paracels.
The circumstances surrounding the cancellation of the operation aren’t fully known, but it is likely that the United States wanted to manage the diplomatic fallout with China in the South China Sea. Instead of another FONOP, which would have drawn a negative reaction from the Chinese foreign ministry, as previous operations in the South China Sea have, the Obama administration chose to signal its support for the Philippines. U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter was in the Philippines earlier this month., among other things, Carter’s visit was the first high-level U.S. official visit to the country–a U.S. ally–since the activation of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), which will allow U.S. forces rotational access to Philippines bases. Additionally, Carter became the first defense secretary to observe the bilateral U.S.-Philippine Balikatan exercises.
The other bit of context here is the growing concern in the United States that China could begin land reclamation activities at Scarborough Shoal in earnest soon. Scarborough Shoal was famously seized by China in 2012, after a highly publicized stand-off with the Philippines, which previously administered the waters around the feature. (See a more detailed discussion of the history and circumstances of possible.) With the cancellation of the FONOP, Washington diverted its energies toward “three different air patrols near Scarborough in recent days,” according to theJournal‘s report. U.S. A-10 Thunderbolt fighters and HH-60 Pave Hawk helicopters were deployed from Clark Air Force base in the Philippines.
The cancellation of a scheduled freedom of navigation operation undermines earlier pledges by senior U.S. officials, including Defense Secretary Ashton Carter, that the patrols would become a regular occurrence in the South China Sea. The move also suggests that tensions between the Pentagon and the White House continue to persist over just how much of a cost the United States is willing to bear in the South China Sea with regard to its broader bilateral relationship with China. No doubt, the Scarborough Shoal overflights shortly after the Balikatan exercise with the Philippines had a desirable effect for the United States: They showed Washington’s resolve to Manila. (The two allies recently revealed the.)
A reaction from the Chinese foreign ministry earlier this week to the flights near Scarborough Shoal was surprisingly muted. Hua Chunying, a spokesperson for the Chinese foreign ministry, noted that “It is nothing strange for relevant planes to fly outside airspace adjacent to Huangyan Dao,” using the Chinese name for Scarborough Shoal. “Yet there is something unnatural with the high-profile hyping up of such a flight, and the reason why they did this is questionable,” she added. The Chinese foreign ministry hasn’t issued any further statements as of this writing; Hua’s reaction to the Scarborough fly-overs can be juxtaposed with the reactions fromand.
The Chinese defense ministry’s statement was more forthright, using language similar to what we’d seen in the aftermath of FONOPs in the Spratlys and Paracels. “The Huangyan island is China’s inherent territory and the Chinese military will take all necessary measures to safeguard national sovereignty and security,” it said. The ministry added that China opposes “such actions by the U.S. which threaten sovereignty and security of countries around the South China Sea and undermine regional peace and stability.” Echoing what has become a refrain in recent Chinese statements on U.S. activities in the South China Sea, the defense ministry said “the U.S. is promoting militarization of the South China Sea in the name of ‘Freedom of Navigation.’”
From Washington’s perspective, cancelling the FONOP might not have been all that bad. After all, the post-Balikatan air patrols near Scarborough have a similar signaling effect toward China, all while reassuring the Philippines, an important U.S. ally. Moreover, China’s response to the Scarborough fly-overs suggests that Beijing is treating them as it would a FONOP. The defense ministry’s statement, in particular, uses language seen previously in the aftermath of both the October 2015 and January 2016 FONOPs. For an administration that’s highly sensitive to , focusing on Scarborough may have been a more appealing option given the circumstances.
I do worry, however, that Washington’s cancellation of a scheduled FONOP may be more deleterious in the long run than the Obama administration may think. The administration has claimed–correctly–that the U.S. Navy’s freedom of navigation program is a fairly mundane, regular, and universal activity. It isn’t something directed at China; indeed, previous FONOPs have protested excessive claims by other South China Sea claimants as well. Calling off an operation undermines this narrative and imbues FONOPs with a special sort of signaling value.
Finally, there is the possibility that the recent tensions around Scarborough and reports that China is surveying the area for land reclamation are a red herring of sorts. China has good reasons not to conduct land reclamation there. With the pending ruling inPhilippines v. China at the Permanent Court of Arbitration expected this June, Beijing is already set to suffer some reputational costs. Even though China has said it doesn’t recognize the Court’s jurisdiction, it would have little incentive to magnify its reputational damage with new reclamation activities at Scarborough Shoal. Additionally,, an artificial island at Scarborough, unlike the seven artificial islands China has constructed in the Spratly Islands, would be built on a feature acquired coercively from another claimant. China has held its Spratly features since the 1980s.
This doesn't quite fit into rule based propaganda and customary international norms of irritating hypocrisy.
China, Indonesia to boost security ties despite South China Sea spat
Chinese and Indonesian officials pledged to boost security ties, marine cooperation and infrastructure investment, state media reported on Tuesday, after a diplomatic spat over what Indonesia called a breach of its sovereignty by the Chinese coastguard.
Subi reef, located in the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, is shown in this file handout CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative satellite image
BEIJING: Chinese and Indonesian officials pledged to boost security ties, marine cooperation and infrastructure investment, state media reported on Tuesday, after a diplomatic spat over what Indonesia called a breach of its sovereignty by the Chinese coastguard.
The report came after a meeting between Chinese State Councillor Yang Jiechi, who outranks the foreign minister, and Indonesia's chief security minister Luhut Pandjaitan. Pandjaitan is visiting China this week.
The two countries will strengthen defence ties including in anti-terrorism, law enforcement, curbing narcotics, as well as "marine cooperation", according to the official Xinhua news agency.
Jakarta and Beijing will also work together in the fields of railway, electric power, mining, aerospace, agriculture and fisheries, Xinhua added.
Indonesia attempted to detain a Chinese trawler it accused of fishing in its exclusive economic zone in the South China Sea, prompting the Chinese coastguard to intervene last month. China has said its vessels were operating in "traditional fishing grounds".
Indonesia is not embroiled in the rival claims with China over the South China Sea and has instead seen itself as an "honest broker" in disputes between China and the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei.
Pandjaitan has previously said Indonesia would maintain good relations with China but "without sacrificing Indonesia's sovereignty", and had urged Chinese ships not to enter Indonesia's maritime territory near the northern Natuna Islands, where Indonesia said the incident took place.
China's increasingly assertive military posture in the South China Sea, a strategic shipping corridor that is also rich in fish and natural gas, has rattled the United States and its allies in Southeast Asia.
China, Indonesia to boost security ties despite South China Sea spat
Chinese and Indonesian officials pledged to boost security ties, marine cooperation and infrastructure investment, state media reported on Tuesday, after a diplomatic spat over what Indonesia called a breach of its sovereignty by the Chinese coastguard.
Subi reef, located in the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, is shown in this file handout CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative satellite image
BEIJING: Chinese and Indonesian officials pledged to boost security ties, marine cooperation and infrastructure investment, state media reported on Tuesday, after a diplomatic spat over what Indonesia called a breach of its sovereignty by the Chinese coastguard.
The report came after a meeting between Chinese State Councillor Yang Jiechi, who outranks the foreign minister, and Indonesia's chief security minister Luhut Pandjaitan. Pandjaitan is visiting China this week.
The two countries will strengthen defence ties including in anti-terrorism, law enforcement, curbing narcotics, as well as "marine cooperation", according to the official Xinhua news agency.
Jakarta and Beijing will also work together in the fields of railway, electric power, mining, aerospace, agriculture and fisheries, Xinhua added.
Indonesia attempted to detain a Chinese trawler it accused of fishing in its exclusive economic zone in the South China Sea, prompting the Chinese coastguard to intervene last month. China has said its vessels were operating in "traditional fishing grounds".
Indonesia is not embroiled in the rival claims with China over the South China Sea and has instead seen itself as an "honest broker" in disputes between China and the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei.
Pandjaitan has previously said Indonesia would maintain good relations with China but "without sacrificing Indonesia's sovereignty", and had urged Chinese ships not to enter Indonesia's maritime territory near the northern Natuna Islands, where Indonesia said the incident took place.
China's increasingly assertive military posture in the South China Sea, a strategic shipping corridor that is also rich in fish and natural gas, has rattled the United States and its allies in Southeast Asia.
@Brumby
There are 2 issues here:
1. Freedom of navigation
2. China's sovereignty claims
1. China fully subscribes to freedom of commercial navigation in the SCS.
And if China controls the taps of commerce in the SCS, most of the water flowing through these taps is actually China-related. That comes from China being the world's largest trading nation and being at the centre of the Asian trading network.
So we can rely on Chinese self-interest to keep the commercial shipping lanes open - unlike the US or Japan which would seek to close those shipping lanes in certain scenarios.
And if we talk about control of the oceans - note that the US Navy is very big on being able to go anywhere it pleases and control those waters - in the name of keeping the shipping lanes open.
2. The other issue is China's sovereignty claims - which are deliberately left vague and ambiguous.
Again, it's not in China's interests for an outright conflict to occur, but peacetime dominance of the SCS does allow China to use non-military or paramilitary means to mete out carrots or sticks.
Part of the reason why China has taken such a hard line with the Philippines is precisely because it clings too tightly to the USA and thinks it can ignore/defy China - so China is making sure they serve as an example. Look at how Cuba has been an example of American vindictiveness - but which does serve as an object lesson for the rest of Latin and South America.
joshuatree
Captain
The SCS as the equivalent of taps is actually more compelling when it comes to blockading shipping to/from China; not so with the other surrounding countries.
As already pointed out, shipping for Japan plus Taiwan and Philippines can be inconvenienced but not blockaded vis-a-vis SCS as the open Western Pacific is a perfectly sound alternate. Same can be said for South Korea and even the Russian Far East.
States like Malaysia, Brunei, and Vietnam may seem to be hemmed in by a SCS blockade at first but unless one is talking about blockading territorial waters of these countries, shipping can still be rerouted as such so it's again more an inconvenience than anything else. Also, a SCS blockade if implemented by China would logically be in the northern and central portions of the SCS. Malaysia and Vietnam would still have clear access in the southern portion of the SCS.
On the other hand, China's access to the oceans is either via ECS or SCS and any control of both by other powers is far more critical to the Chinese, considering the amount of trade China conducts via water.