Hey, good question. I wrote an essay on the Sino- Soviet split to examine where the split was solely due to ideological differences. It may help you in discovering whether you think by 1969 there was ever a chance of Sino- Soviet war. However, remember that conflict did actually occur in 1969 at the Ussuri river.
'How far was the Sino- Soviet split of the late 1960’s a result of ideological differences between the two communist powers?
When China turned communist in 1949, relations between China and the Soviet Union looked promising; Mao, viewing Stalin as the Father of communism, was willing to edge towards the Soviets and agree a defensive treaty against the communist West in the hope of propelling China onto the world stage as a super power. Whilst Stalin recognised the importance of securing Chinese allegiance for different reasons, most probably the fact that communist alignment would increase Soviet national security but at the same time, encourage the West into presuming communism now had a greater foothold than capitalism in the Cold War struggle, the Sino- Soviet treaty of 1950 marked the start of a relationship that, despite US predictions, would steer the nations into dispute, misconception and uncertainty. Whilst this newfound communist coherency did initially hold potency and stability, demonstrated in 1953 by the two nations’ reciprocity ending the Korean War conflict, Stalin’s death that shortly followed brought about drastic and devastating consequences for the relationship; Stalin’s successor, Khrushchev, would not inherit Stalin’s ruthless ideological ambitions and absolute hostility when addressing the West; two characteristics that Mao had greatly admired and respected. This shift in ideology, caused by the death of Stalin, undoubtedly commenced the gradual deterioration in Sino- Soviet relations that ultimately resulted in the Ussuri River conflict of 1969 between the two communist powers.
After snatching authority in 1956 following a three-year struggle against his competitors Makarov and Molotov, Khrushchev unveiled a clear message in his secret speech that under his new leadership, the Soviet Union would reverse all repression and censorship that Stalin had previously installed during his dictatorship. Commencing by releasing millions of Soviet political prisoners from Gulag labour camps, as well as relaxing Soviet control over Eastern European countries like Finland and Austria, Khrushchev’s new policy of de-Stalinization alerted Mao into recognizing that his previous northern ally, of whom he admired for it’s staunch hardline approach to enforcing communist control across Europe after the second World War, was steering clear from Stalin’s ruthless and oppressive tendencies and instead, was moving more towards the policy of ‘peaceful- coexistence’. Khrushchev’s belief that the Soviet Union, who were viewed by both China and the West as the figure head of the communist movement, could peacefully coexist with the capitalist Western block, directly contrasted Mao’s antagonistic contradiction principle that was fuelled by his intensive Leninism philosophy that Communism and capitalism could never coexist in peace. Consequently, this momentous difference in ideological principles strained the Sino- Soviet relationship significantly; Mao and Khrushchev now had different perceptions of communism, henceforth resulting in contrasting foreign and domestic policies.
The second Taiwan Strait crisis of 1958 demonstrates this ideological and political divergence. Mao’s endeavor to neutralise the offshore threat of Chaing Kai-shek in an attempt to intensify Chinese national security by bombing the island of Quemoy resulted in direct disagreement between the two communist nations. With Western presence in the form of the United States Navy looming off the Chinese peninsula intending to support the Chinese capitalists, Mao looked towards the Soviet Union for nuclear support in the hope that Khrushchev would aid the Chinese military in oppressing capitalism from China’s immediate sphere of influence. Unlike Stalin’s approval and financial support in the Korean War, Khrushchev followed his peaceful policy, acknowledging that under no circumstances would the Soviet Union physically or financially support any communist military actions against the capitalists positioned on Taiwan. Oblivious to the rationality behind Khrushchev’s response, and the threat of Western nuclear intervention, this decision profusely aggravated Mao and had enormous repercussions for the Sino-Soviet relationship. Mao not only proclaimed that Khrushchev was degrading communist prestige, appearing weak against the capitalist West, but he also recognised that China could no longer rely on the Soviet Union to propel the movement forward; Mao needed to let go of the Marxist- Leninism safety net Stalin had woven into Chinese society and take matters into his own hands; a decision that would only push the communist powers further apart.
In an attempt to supersede Marx and Lenin, and to make himself communist legend, Mao’s ‘Great Leap Forward’ between 1958-1961 focused greatly on stablising the Chinese economy through mass domestic steel production and largely transpired from the single belief that China no longer needed the Soviet Union to survive. Mao publically condemned Khrushchev’s policies and, despite the catastrophic failure of his domestic venture resulting in the death of 26 million civilians, no longer viewed the Soviet Unions as his neighboring communist nation as an ally, but more so as a rival and threat. Similarly to Mao’s response to the Soviet Union’s ideological and political alteration, Khrushchev highly criticized Mao’s Great Leap Forward, proclaiming that it was in fact Mao who was weakening the communist movement, and not the Soviet Union. Consequently, tensions between the nations escalated and not only were there several heated verbal confrontations between the communist leaders, but both nations drastically increased military presence on their borders. Any ideological symmetry between Chinese and Soviet was now truly demolished and with it, so were Sino- Soviet relations.
Whilst this ideological bend did spark China’s repel from the Soviet Union, the fact that Khrushchev’s Peaceful co-existence policy allowed the opportunity of the Soviet Union establishing relations with the West only enraged Mao, consequently pushing China further from the Soviet Union. ‘The Geneva Spirit’, formed from several meetings between the Soviet Union and the West that commenced in 1954 with the Geneva Conference, had severely negative affects on Sino- Soviet relations, contributing greatly to the eventual split. Not only did Mao intrinsically disagree with Khrushchev’s willingness to compromise with Capitalism, but the thaw in relations between the Soviet Union and the West also resulted in three crucial events that epitomized Mao’s belief that Khrushchev was demoralizing communism by following an ideological policy that China could simply not adhere to. Firstly was the lifting of the Berlin Ultimatum. Since 1945 Berlin had been the heart of the Cold War struggle and when announced, Khrushchev’s Berlin Ultimatum of 1958 was strongly supported by Mao. Demanding the West to withdraw from the city or else fear Soviet invasion, the warning was viewed by China as a direct declaration against capitalism. However, with Khrushchev’s policy of peaceful co-existence catalysing a thaw in Sino- American relations, the ultimatum was eventually lifted at the 1959 Camp David Summit in America after a conference with Eisenhower. Once again Mao recognised that Khrushchev’s ideological stance was very different from his own. In Mao’s eyes, Khrushchev had publically humiliated communism; not only had he visited the heart of capitalism, America, but more importantly he had appeared immoderately weak to Eisenhower, allowing the West to postulate the philosophy that communist aggression can be neutralised via leadership correspondence.
The lifting of the Berlin Ultimatum led to the further two significant events that effectively hammered the nails into the coffin of mutual Sino-Soviet ideology. For Mao, both the creation of the Berlin wall in 1961, and then the Cuban Missile Crisis of the following year confirmed his communist hypothesis; China and the Soviet Union now had completely contrasting ideological perceptions, let alone an astronomical lack of trust. Mao, adamant to maintain a hostile stance when viewing the Capitalist West, once again needed to further detach China from the Soviet Union in order to obtain communist leadership. China’s deliberate retaliation to the atomic weaponry Test Ban Treaty in 1963 by successfully testing their first nuclear bomb in 1964 demonstrated China’s determination to liberate itself from its ‘patriarchal father’, the Soviet Union. By 1964 ideological differences between the two communist powers had played a fundamental role in the gradual deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations however,
with Khrushchev leaving office later that year, it would be Brezhnev, the new Soviet leader, later renowned for drastically increasing Soviet global influence, who would prompt Mao into recognizing the importance of stablising Chinese national security through geopolitics and consequently cause the final Sino- Soviet split.
Releasing the ‘Brezhnev Doctrine’ in 1968 that publically declared that any communist countries intending to branch off from the Soviet Union would be invaded, Mao recognised that due to his own domestic liberation attempts at securing communist authority, such as China’s independent approach to nuclear weaponry and his cultural revolution of 1966 that secured his own national supremacy, China was now in direct threat from the Soviet Union on it’s northern border.
It appears that from 1968, Chinese national security outweighed previous ideological disputes; the xenophobic Mao, now isolated from the Soviet Union on the northern border, Korea on the East, and the two capitalist giants Japan and India from the South, recognised that despite all previous ideological disagreement, Sino- American rapprochement was the only avenue available in order to secure national safety. A Sino- American relationship would not only allow Mao to focus all attention on his northern border against the Soviet Union, but would also pressure the Soviet Union into seeking relations with the West and China after realizing their disadvantaged and outnumbered Cold War position. Mao had passed his ideological philosophies aside; whilst Sino- Soviet ideological differences had deteriorated relations up to the late 1960’s, the threat to Chinese national security had driven Mao into recognizing the importance of securing relations with the West; an action that completely opposed his private communist beliefs.
In fact, it may be appropriate to state that the Ussuri River conflict between the Chinese and the Soviet Union in 1969, the event that generally marks the official Sino- Soviet split, owed little to ideological differences between the communist nations; if Mao was primarily focused on ideology then he would never have delved into the possibility of improving relations with the West. Further more, the Soviet Union’s retaliation to the Chinese offensive at the Ussuri River was merely in response to a national threat of security from the Chinese on the southern border. Consequently, when assessing the Sino- Soviet split in the late 1960’s, it may be necessary to proclaim that whilst ideology did play a significant role in the initial deterioration of relations between the two communist powers up to the mid 1960’s, it was in fact both nations’ adamancy to secure their own national securities towards the end of the decade; Mao’s nuclear activity and geopolitical rapprochement that were both intended to secure China’s isolated position against both capitalist and communist nations, and Brezhnev’s oppressive doctrine intending to maintain a strong Soviet buffer zone, that were truly responsible for the final Sino- Soviet split.
'
