Shenyang FC-31 / J-31 Fighter Demonstrator

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Blitzo

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If the carrier only brings one type of fighter jet, it need to be multi-role. J-20 being A2A only, will require modifications. Or, a lower cost strike aircarft can be brought on board. If those tasks require the jets to be 5th gen, then a heavily modified J-20 or navy J-31 would be options. But if PLAN thinks J-20 plus J-15 will work, there is no reason to develop J-31 for carriers.

Modifications to J-20 will be simple, if land based J-20s are not capable of A2G to begin with.
If anything I expect land based J-20s to already have an A2G secondary capability, or to have the capability ready to be activated if the air force wants it.

The air to surface "problem" for both a J-20 derivative and a FC-31 derivative will be whether they are going to be capable of carrying larger powered weapons like JSM inside their primary weapon bays, or if they will go another route like developing a stealthy weapons pod to accommodate such a missile instead.


Whether it is a J-20 derivative or FC-31 derivative that ends up on the carrier (or some other design entirely), I think it goes without saying that it will be multirole.
 

plawolf

Lieutenant General
Indications such as ...? AFAIK there have been few hints, official or unofficial, that the PLAN prefers the J-20 design over the FC-31.

And that is all we will get until the first carrier prototype gets photographed, as is the way of things with Chinese military developments.

But by far the most telling indication isn’t what we can see, but what we can’t. And that is any meaningful investment and pace in the J31 programme.

If the PLAN was serious about the J31, we should have seen far more prototypes and more importantly, flight hours clocked on those airframes, long before now.

The J31’s development speed and scope is more akin to the cash starved Su47 rather than the frenetic pace of the J20 programme, which to me is a dead giveaway that it is a privately funded punt by SAC rather than a PLA supported official government programme.

If so, the PLAN would not only need to build more carriers, but to be able to fit more planes onto each carrier.

Benchmark doesn’t always mean matching or surpassing, and clearly no one has suggested the PLAN has any serious plans to surpass the USN in numbers. I myself have mentioned numerous times that the USN is too big for even America’s economy to comfortably sustain without incurring serious negative impacts.

Indeed, it is precisely because the PLAN isn’t going to match the USN carrier for carrier and plane for plane that having a carrier fighter that can overmatch the F35 becomes so attractive.

Overmatch the F-35 in terms of range and maneuverability, perhaps, but certainly not at an equivalent cost when it comes to budget or utilization of deck/hangar space.

I somehow doubt the J20 will work out as expensive as the F35, but I expect you meant J31 here?

Well air dominance, unlike strike, is not as much a numbers game and more about absolute quality.

Spending 20-30% less per plane is a false economy if that means you suffer a 1-2 or 1-3 exchange rates in combat.

For numbers to really start to tell, you need something like 4-6 against one, and that is just way too expensive for even conventional fighters never mind stealths.

The USN and PLAN face dramatically different geographic circumstances and restrictions. The PLAN's potential theaters of conflicts will be near Chinese shores, the defense of which will be carried out by land-based J-20s. The carriers are designed to protect Chinese shipping lanes, especially portions that traverse the Middle East / IOR and Africa; for these potential opponents, range and individual bomb load matters far less than versatility and tactical flexibility.

Here is where you and I fundamentally disagree about the likely use of PLAN carriers.

I think the PLAN carrier fleets will still be tasked primarily with homeland defence as opposed to expeditionary support and sea lanes defence as you seem to believe.

As far as China is concerned, being able to absolutely safeguard its critically important coastal economic and population centres trumps all other considerations.

The job of the PLAN’s carrier fleets in times of war would be to push the engagement zones well outside of weapons range of the Chinese coast and to win at those extended ranged without significant land based fighter support.

It’s no good having half the PLAN’s carrier and support ship strength trapped west of the Malacca Strait (which the USN owns and could shut down with relative ease) and have China’s eastern seaboard trashed by hostile missile and air strikes.

The fact is that China doesn’t need any significant military strength to safeguard its sea based lines of communications because its not just Chinese ships that service those lines of commerce.

Modern international trade and shipping means you have ships from all nations carrying cargo from all other trading nations.

For anyone to try to cut China’s sea based lines of communications would mean they will hit every trading nation’s interest in the process.

To cut China’s sea based trade lines, you will pretty much ending up shutting down all commercial shipping in the area in question.

The place to do that to minimise impact on other nations is the South China Sea, not the Indian Ocean.

If the PLAN can secure the SCS, anyone looking to try and cut China’s sea lanes will need to pretty much stop all commercial shipping traffic in the Indian Ocean, the economic impact of which will be so devastating and far reaching as to be almost unthinkable short of a WWIII scenario.

China’s OBOR initiative will also further reduce the risks and impact of any attempted blockade.

As for bombing random ME or African countries, well a) that’s so not how China operates, and b) a pure carrier based strike campaign is ineffective at best.

Even the US freely acknowledges that its boots on the ground that matters.

Without your own boots on the ground, you rely on local actors and/or cause power vacuums, which leads to instability and the likes of Al-Q and ISIS popping up out of the woodworks.

So why risk and spend so much for such a ineffective token capability?

If China is serious about military action, think Desert Storm. In which case it’s boosts on the ground and land based air power that will carry the day. Naval air power would be nice to have, but not a critical necessity.

In a way, I see future PLA expeditionary military deployments as almost like the reverse of the US, with naval carrier aviation being the home guard, while land based air power gets deployed overseas for combat ops in support of ground troops if and when needed.

That is as much a reflection of current and projected future military balances as it is of geopolitical and economic developments like OBOR.

The USN is going to be unquestionably stronger globally compared to the PLAN. That’s a race the PLAN isn’t even going to try to win.

What the PLAN is going to play for is local superiority. Where, when they concerntrate their entire strength in East Asia, and supported by some long range land based assets, they can match or even overmatch USN forward deployed forces in the region at extended ranges. If the USN redeploy ships from the rest of the world, the PLAN can pull back closer to home to bring more Chinese land based assets into play to counter the greater USN strength.

Unless the PLAN serious expects to be able to match or even surpass the USN in total ship number and capabilities, then trying to fight the USN in the Indian Ocean or beyond is just a mugs game that China is almost guaranteed to loose since it won’t have the numbers or logistics to support that kind of extended range combat operations against a superior foe. And it will leave the mainland’s defences weakened as a result.
 

plawolf

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I say it's more realistic for the PLAN to focus on support platforms (such as IFR drones and aircraft) rather than have Frankenstein airframes on a ship. Of course, we also need to realize that USN carriers are and will be larger, more capable, and significantly more sophisticated than PLAN ones.

Is the Rafale a Frankenstein’s monster of an airframe? What about the F18? Su33/J15? How about the F35C?

Developing aircraft originally designed for land based operations for carrier use is well established and not as unusual as you seem to think.

It is only extremely rare in the US, but that’s more down to inter-service rivalry instead of pure merits.

I would also not bet on USN carriers always being bigger than PLAN carriers.

China’s leaders have never been afraid to think and go big, and as I already stressed, since China isn’t likely to try to match the USN in numbers, quality becomes more important.

And we have yet to see if the PLAN is really content with the size of the J-15 (which, by the way, makes a really tight fit on the Liaoning's elevator), or whether a slightly-smaller FC-31 really takes away significant range (enough so to affect combat operations).

It’s hard to think of any examples where for two fighters of the same country and same time period, the medium weight fighter managed to outrange the heavyweight.

Aircraft are tailored to their vessels, rarely vice versa.

That’s just because carriers last far longer than planes, so odds are when a new generation of carrier fighters are needed, the nation in question already have carriers that will last for decades more.

But it’s hardly unheard of.

The British QE II class was designed for F35Bs as a recent example.

The Liaoning and Shangdong are not really clean slate designed. When China comes to designing and building its own clean slate carrier design, there is absolutely nothing stopping them from spec’ing that carrier to accommodate for J20s if the PLAN wants carrier J20s.

Just how long would it take for the J-20 to reach that level of economy of scale? If you are premising that the naval order for the FC-31 won't be significant, just how big would a naval J-20 order be (hint: less since each ship would carry fewer J-20 vs FC-31s)? Have we accounted for the fact that the J-20 will be bigger in most aspects (larger radar/weapons/engines/etc.) which will significantly drive up the price?

It’s not time that matters in economies of scale, it’s total numbers. And besides, however long it takes J20 production to ramp up to full speed, it will take the J31 far longer on account of how far behind the J31 development is.

The relative unit price difference between a J31 and J20 is currently impossible to reliably quantify. We would literally be pulling numbers out of the air.

But have you considered just how much extra funding would be needed to complete the J31’s development and set up a separate production facility?

The J20’s development costs are already paid for. It doesn’t matter if the J31 only costs 75% as much to develop as the J20, because that’s another 75% of a very expensive prgramme cost that Beijing will ultimately have to foot the bill for when it may only need to invest another 25% of the original developmental funding to make the J20 carrier capable (no matter how much one thinks adapting the J20 for carrier ops, unless one actually think it will cost more than developing another 5th gen, it we will just be arguing about how much more funding the J31 would be instead of whether funding it will be cheaper than going for a carrier J20).

For the J31 to enjoy superior economies of scale would require the relative number difference between a carrier J20 order and J31 order to be greater than the entire PLAAF J20 order.

As a simple illustration of how unrealistic that is, if we assume a generous 33% reduction in carrier fighter wing size between J20 and J31, with a new gen PLAN super-carrier able to carrier 72 J31s or 48 J20s, you will need 12.5 J31 carrier wings (900 fighters!) for J31 production run to match the numbers of a modest 300 PLAAF J20 order plus PLAN 12.5 carrier wings of J20 (300+48x12.5).

Realistically, you will be hard pressed to get 3 J31s in the same parking space as 2 J20s when both have folding wings and other carrier specific mods, so if anything, that 12.5 is an underestimate!

So anything less than 12 carrier wings will mean the J20 will enjoy greater economies of scale with a joint navy and Air Force order compared to both going for different planes.

While not perfect, you can take a look at the F35 unit price movements between LRIP blocks to get a very rough sense of how much economies of scale have impacted on unit price.

Lockmart is claiming a 60% reduction in unit price from LRIP 1 (2 units) to LRIP 10 (355 units cumulatively). While that is obviously a disingenuously generous number cherry picked by Lockmart, i just don’t have the time to do any detailed analysis on this (you can graph all 10 LRIP runs and graph trend lines and decide which outliers to exclude if you got time, but the general principle is there).

The FC-31 is lacking subsystems, which could be installed with relative ease, but it seems to me that its design is near finalization, judging by its closeness to the scale models. Additionally, SAC is still putting out the claim that it can get a production FC-31 to fly by 2019. In fact, given that the FC-31 has dual front wheels and that SAC has far more experience in the R&D of carrier-based jets than CAC, the FC-31 will have a much smoother transition to a navalized model than the J-20.

Unless they got a dozen prototypes hidden in a Chinese Area 51 that have been flight testing like crazy, the J31’s design is far from complete.

Most fighter prototypes get retired at the end of the test programme because they have exhausted all their flight hours. That’s how extensive flight testing is. They don’t do that just for fun (as any test pilot will tell you, 99% of flight testing is anything but fun, and is rather dull in fact).

Given the track record of CAC vs SAC, I would not really bet against CAC, especially since development a 5th gen is significantly harder than developing a carrier version of the same plane you have been making for 20 years and have someone else’s conversion to consult on.


Are you talking about the PLAAF or PLAN? I see no use for the FC-31 in the PLAAF (unless there is no secondary 5th-gen design to replace the J-10), but the PLAN is another story.

Applies the same to both.

Pakistan will not buy the FC-31, and the reason is that the Chinese backtracked on their promise of inducting the JF-17. The fact that the PLAAF is not buying the JF-17 has essentially neutered JF-17 sales (among other factors, of course).

Has Pakistan ever raised that as an issue or expressed anything less than total satisfaction with the JF17 programme?

When has the PRC ever broken its word?

Rather than assume China decided to break a formal commitment to a key ally, I think on balance of probabilities, China and Pakistan simply amended the deal.

The reason is simple - control of the JF17 programme.

It is well documented that the PLAAF wanted something very different out of the Super-7 fighter programme, which became the JF17.

The PLAAF essentially wanted the JL9 or a single seat version of it - a J7 with a modified nose and intakes to allow it to house a good sized radar for BVR that doesn’t cost too much, and which has as much parts commonality with the J7 as possible.

If Pakistan had insisted that China kept to the original deal and ordered the same number of JF17s, China would have honoured its commitment, but there is no way in hell they PLAAF would have allowed the PAF to call all the shots in terms of setting the design parameters for the JF17.

I see two most likely, not mutually exclusive possibilities:

1) With the success of the J10, the PLAAF’s interest in the JF17 cooled massively, and the PLAAF wanted something else from the programme - a trainer. So the JF17 programme was unofficially split in 2 - the JF17 and JL9.

And/or 2) China offered Pakistan a choice - either settle for a true 50-50 partnership where the PLAAF and PAF had equal say in the development process and both forces get a compromised plane, or Pakistan can release China from its commitment for equal purchase in exchange for the PAF getting full control over the programme and iron-clad assurances that CAC would continue to support the JF17 future block developments for a reasonable length of time.

Pakistan is not all over the J31because of budgetary limitations and because it’s not developed by CAC. Not because it got secretly shafted by China.
 
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vesicles

Colonel
Pakistan will not buy the FC-31, and the reason is that the Chinese backtracked on their promise of inducting the JF-17. The fact that the PLAAF is not buying the JF-17 has essentially neutered JF-17 sales (among other factors, of course).

Pakistan inducts the JF-17 because they need the fighter for their national defense. Any potential sales of the plane is simply an added bonus. Selling the JF-17 is definitively not their priority. So whether the PLAAF inducts the JF-17 has nothing to do with the Pakistanis' decision. Would it help the Pakistanis sell the plane? It might. Would it influence their decision to induct the JF-17? Absolutely not. Again, their main objective in inducting the fighter has always been to enhance their own defense. They will still induct it even if they sell zero JF-17.

Similarly with the FC-31. If the Pakistanis believe the FC-31 will help them in their national defense, they will buy it and they will invest in it. If they don't think the plane will help them, they won't buy it. The PLAAF's decision has no sway over Pakistanis'. The two countries have vastly different strategic needs and need very different equipment to fulfill their own objectives. Just because one country buys something, it doesn't mean the other has to do the same.
 

Blitzo

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Here is where you and I fundamentally disagree about the likely use of PLAN carriers.

I think the PLAN carrier fleets will still be tasked primarily with homeland defence as opposed to expeditionary support and sea lanes defence as you seem to believe.

I agree with this, WRT how Chinese carriers would be used in a high intensity war involving the US.

However, I think I also think China will face the contingency of medium to high intensity naval/air conflicts involving near peers in the IOR (India specifically) in the near future -- i.e.: conflicts which don't involve the US -- and that such conflicts will likely involve Chinese carrier forces.

Of course, as I wrote before, in such conflicts, I expect the carrier force to benefit from fighters with longer range and endurance as well.
 

latenlazy

Brigadier
I agree with this, WRT how Chinese carriers would be used in a high intensity war involving the US.

However, I think I also think China will face the contingency of medium to high intensity naval/air conflicts involving near peers in the IOR (India specifically) in the near future -- i.e.: conflicts which don't involve the US -- and that such conflicts will likely involve Chinese carrier forces.

Of course, as I wrote before, in such conflicts, I expect the carrier force to benefit from fighters with longer range and endurance as well.
Venturing off topic here, but I really think the geopolitical tensions between China and India are overinflated. They have no fundamental grievances with each other, they don’t have cause to see each other as directly significant threats to one another, and much of their most important interests are served better either by cooperation or by getting out of each other’s way. Other than some border disputes that aren’t worth inflaming a full blown war over I suppose there are a few potential flashpoints like water scarcity caused by climate change, but if there’s a security trap here it’s not very highly loaded. You could make a stronger case for Japan, but that’s a formal US ally so at least for some arbitrary mid term view those two countries are a package in terms of security politics. If you want to discuss this further I’d take it to PMs.
 

Blitzo

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Venturing off topic here, but I really think the geopolitical tensions between China and India are overinflated. They have no fundamental grievances with each other, they don’t have cause to see each other as directly significant threats to one another, and much of their most important interests are served better either by cooperation or by getting out of each other’s way. Other than some border disputes that aren’t worth inflaming a full blown war over I suppose there are a few potential flashpoints like water scarcity caused by climate change, but if there’s a security trap here it’s not very highly loaded. You could make a stronger case for Japan, but that’s a formal US ally so at least for some arbitrary mid term view those two countries are a package in terms of security politics. If you want to discuss this further I’d take it to PMs.

I don't disagree, however I do think that the future trajectory of China-India relations to me look like they could risk some sort of military conflict (even if limited), and I would not be surprised if it had a naval component in the post 2020 or ~2030 era. I do not expect a full blown war, but the possibility of a limited conflict with a naval dimension is there.

It will not be helped by the fact that China will inevitably want to have a greater naval presence in the IOR (closer to Africa, Middle East area) to escort its shipping, but India will likely perceive that as a threat and there will be higher risk of miscalculation.

In regards to the carrier fighter discussion, my overall point was that I do believe that Chinese carriers may have to be ready to fight a medium to high intensity conflict in blue water (IOR primarily) in coming decades, and that the uses of Chinese carriers should not be viewed with a focus only on high intensity conflicts with the US (such contingencies will likely be fought in westpac, as plawolf correctly states)
 

plawolf

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I agree with this, WRT how Chinese carriers would be used in a high intensity war involving the US.

However, I think I also think China will face the contingency of medium to high intensity naval/air conflicts involving near peers in the IOR (India specifically) in the near future -- i.e.: conflicts which don't involve the US -- and that such conflicts will likely involve Chinese carrier forces.

Of course, as I wrote before, in such conflicts, I expect the carrier force to benefit from fighters with longer range and endurance as well.

As I said in my last post, with modern shipping and globalised trade, you cannot pick and choose whose shipping lanes you are closing down, since all ships can carry cargo to and from pretty much anywhere, owned by pretty much any country and crewed by people of any nationality.

Either all shipping lanes are open, or none are.

The last time anyone tried anything like this in a globally important waterway was the Iranians in the Strait of Hormuz, and look at the sh!tstorm that brought down on their heads.

The only way to minimise the impact of any blockade attempt to a remotely acceptable level is to confine it to waters where only shipping to and from a specific country are going to sail. And you need to have both the soft and hard power to weather all the inevitable freedom of navigation challenges other major trading and military powers are likely to pose to you over such a move.

For anyone wanting to cut China’s sea lanes while not shutting down global trade, the furtherest from China they could set up a no-go zone to isolate Chinese shipping is the SCS (forget about trying to screen shipping. The numbers involved will make that unmanageable and a total non-starter).

Closer to China would make it less disruptive for others, but exponentially increase the risks and costs involved. Further away and you make it impossible or prohibitively expensive for neutral shipping to go around your no-go zones.

Chinese carriers will only need to fight the IN in the Indian Ocean if China was trying to blockade India. That just doesn’t seem remotely likely since China just doesn’t care enough about India to divert and expend that much military might and political capital.

It is also likely that in the event of conflict between India and China, the likes of the US and Japan might try to indirectly help India, but more so screw which China, and stir up tensions in the Korea, Taiwan or the SCS during any military clash between China and India to force the Chinese to keep assets on its East coast.

The recent Indian provocations in Donglian and tensions in Korea would be a classic example, only in reverse, where the US and/or Japan could do or say something most of the world would find rather innocuous, but which would have Fatty K foaming at the mouth, thereby creating enough tensions as to require China to keep enough of its best forces and assets in the region in case things kick off.

It would be a brave PLAN Admiral indeed who decides to order the bulk of the PLAN’s best fighting forces to the Indian Ocean with trouble brewing in Korea/Taiwan/SCS.

If China really wanted to hurt India, it has plenty of land based military options and easily generated excuses to start a war and cause India serious damage while minimising the impact to other nations and not needing to deploy key naval assess through American controlled natural chock points.

If the PLAN does forward deploy assets to the Indian Ocean region, it will be the likes of 056s, 022s and maybe some older SSKs or some of the smaller model new gen SSK China has recently offered for export rather than carriers and 055s.

But, my main point is that India is so far down China’s priority list that it will take something extra special for India to provoke China into war. So such eventuality is unlikely to be a core concern for the PLAN when they are drafting their future carrier and fleet planning. It’s something they would have considered, but only as an aside, and not something they would sacrifice core capacity and/or goals to address.
 

FORBIN

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Pakistan inducts the JF-17 because they need the fighter for their national defense. Any potential sales of the plane is simply an added bonus. Selling the JF-17 is definitively not their priority. So whether the PLAAF inducts the JF-17 has nothing to do with the Pakistanis' decision. Would it help the Pakistanis sell the plane? It might. Would it influence their decision to induct the JF-17? Absolutely not. Again, their main objective in inducting the fighter has always been to enhance their own defense. They will still induct it even if they sell zero JF-17.

Similarly with the FC-31. If the Pakistanis believe the FC-31 will help them in their national defense, they will buy it and they will invest in it. If they don't think the plane will help them, they won't buy it. The PLAAF's decision has no sway over Pakistanis'. The two countries have vastly different strategic needs and need very different equipment to fulfill their own objectives. Just because one country buys something, it doesn't mean the other has to do the same.

Right now and even in some years Pakistan don' t have budget for buy a J-31 surely enough expensive or sure don't replace one by one older a J-10C is a much more interesting bird - not all countries have stealth in 2030's ofc it is a weapon fo rich and reason why JF-17 is good also for Africa by example -and this chick turn well ( close of a Rafale ) if you have one in your 6 not really good :) you see bias here o_O
 
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