I would say archer is less compact and would take extra effort to airlift. OTOH the autonomous advantage is unquestionable. But beside these both are top of the line truck mounted artillery.
Self Propelled Gun/Rocket Launcher
- Thread starter FORBIN
- Start date
It's timing. The tracked PLZ 155mm SPH was already in the works for quite some time, so it has already replaced the old 152mm. The wheeled SPH is replacing old towed guns that are only recently being retired.
They are not really comparable. Archer is meant to be top of the line, no compromises. 181 is meant to be cost-effective, replacing towed guns.
Meant to be cost effective means it took some compromise in performance compare to other of their OWN design. It indicate nothing when compare to systems from other countries. Never mention one is 20 years newer than the other. From what info we can gather now 181 would be somewhat on par with archer in most key characteristic. And their major difference (autonomous and compactness) would more origin from their respective operation needs.
Archer needs to operate in extreme arctic environment and thus came the capability to operate without crew leaving their cabin. 181 needs to deploy through long distance quickly and have good maneuverability in rough terrain which leads to a compact design with a robust truck chassis.
Considering fully autonomous offer less on SPG and all the drawback brought by archer's dimension and such I would dare to say PLA won't take archer even if they can switch 181 for it on a 1 on 1 basis.
Archer's design owes relatively little to extreme cold, unless one wants to fight for 20 rounds only. Reasons for its mechanization are the exact same as for the others: time to open fire and time to get away from counter fire in high intensity conflicts. Even savings in manning need to be checked, because, well, someone will have to load this in the end, and TLV isn't a 100% answer here.
I think so.
Yes absolutely, the PLA military reform which was initiated is inspired by US military reform, a shift from a heavy mechanised force to mobile rapid response force ready to fight a limited war, see the emergence of strykers, the Marine Corp shedding its tanks and the light tank program. All/most the vehicles used by PLA light bridges are wheeled I think.
It's bonkers though. Even the US realized this and then went with the GCV program. Only to backpedal on it. It is simply a cost cutting exercise. If the Syrian conflict is any indication proxy wars are going to see a lot more proliferation of ATGMs. Lightly armored vehicles have no chance. The idea the conflicts are going to be police actions against firearms like it was in Iraq is nonsense IMHO.
Google translation:
"Worst record" forced the equipment "best performance"
2020-09-17 08:44
"1 shot missed", "2 shots missed", "3 shots missed"... In the Gobi Desert, a new type of vehicle-mounted artillery from a brigade of the 74th Army ushered in a live ammunition assessment. No one thought that the results of the assessment were beyond everyone's expectations: only two rounds of 20 shells hit the target. Not only was the hit rate far lower than the data given by the manufacturer, it also set the worst record since the formation of the brigade.
Appearance is a "fuck", and some officers and soldiers questioned on the spot: "If the new artillery is installed in less than a month, the extreme conditions are organized to shoot. Is the pace too far?" Some officers and soldiers are advised to suspend the assessment for safety reasons. , Wait for the reason to be found, and then organize another one. The technical personnel of the manufacturer who accompanied the guarantee reminded: "This time the shooting was shot at the extreme distance and extreme weather conditions, and the target size was only a quarter of the size of the finalized test shot. If the difficulty is reduced, it should be able to produce good data."
Faced with the voices of all parties, the brigade command and leadership team held a meeting on the artillery position. Everyone agreed that: the core combat capability of the brigade cannot be improved; the data of the manufacturer is authoritative, but the troops want combat data close to actual combat, not Targeting data.
"Fight again the next day! The shooting distance remains the same, the weather conditions remain the same, and the target size remains the same. Everything is still set up according to actual combat requirements." Facing the command post’s "dead order", Battalion Commander Zhou Jianhaili issued an order: "Fight again. No, I am willing to accept disciplinary action."
Based on many years of artillery command experience, Zhou Jianhai used the two rounds on the target as a breakthrough. On the Gobi Desert, he led technical backbones and battalion company commanders to find problems one by one. In the evening, Zhou Jianhai finally focused on the crux: an error occurred in the manual review link.
Zhou Jianhai boldly suggested canceling manual review. The brigade leader asked with a certain degree of certainty. He replied: "Although I am not absolutely sure, how can I know right and wrong without trying?" Manual review is not only to ensure that the gun is adjusted accurately. The guarantee of precision strikes is also an insurance measure to prevent artillery from deviating from the maximum range of fire and causing safety problems. Zhou Jianhai knows that cancelling manual review requires certain risks. In the face of risks, the brigade command and leading group made a final decision: "Boldly try, if there is a problem, organize and be responsible!"
Data is the best proof. In the live ammunition firing the next day, the artillery after the manual review was cancelled, and the hit rate increased to over 86%. The analysis shows that the new type of artillery has a high degree of automation, and has strong automatic adjustment and correction capabilities, while manual retargeting can easily lead to errors.
"Do the corresponding safety precautions and let go of your hands and feet." With this successful experience, the brigade command and leading group encouraged officers and soldiers to be bold in innovation and bold trial and error. On the same day, the brigade also dedicated two artillery pieces and multiple rounds of ammunition to verify the actual firing of more than 10 other speculations. Not only did they obtain data that were not in the equipment manuals and textbooks, but also mastered the optimal performance of the new artillery.
The training and tactics of new equipment also require bold innovation and bold trial and error. The brigade has just completed the upgrade and transformation of a certain long-range fire weapon system and participated in a cross-regional mobile exercise and a major live ammunition exercise. During the exercise, more than half of the training methods and tactics were put into practice for the first time.
"Although some training methods and tactics have exposed many problems during live ammunition exercises, and have not even fully integrated into the new weapon system, it is precisely because of continuous attempts and improvements that we have made considerable progress." Wen Xuan said.
It is understood that during the months-long resident training exercise, the brigade conducted research and training on 3 new types of main combat equipment, and conducted research on more than 20 important and difficult subjects. More than 10 new training methods and tactics have passed actual combat tests and have been extensively tested. Promotion.
The trucks for the two are different as well. E.g.: count the wheels.
A whole lot of PCL-181s.
That's China for you. Once a design is finalized and put in mass production, you see A LOT of them.