Not when they are dragging massive plumes of smoke and water condensate after them.
Self Propelled Gun/Rocket Launcher
- Thread starter FORBIN
- Start date
Not when they are dragging massive plumes of smoke and water condensate after them.
Only to the point that there are credible fifth columnist or SpecOps with eyes on and ability to geolocate accurately the origin of these smoke trails.
This is not run-of-mill GMLRS 80km range which is well within range of counter-battery radars or even observation via UAVs. A launch site 300-400km out from Taiwan is definitely putting the missile climb phase out of view of any credible counter-battery radar or UAV observation. Question then is how much of obfuscative trajectory deviation can be put in before the missiles climb high enough to be detected/observed and ballistically back tracked to geolocate the launch site.
Or they could be heading to different impact sites and we're just shown one in the video
Hmmm, obviously HIMARS launchers are not easy target to catch given what we've seen in Ukraine, and you can see how much effort PLA is putting into catching them in Taiwan just from watching this exercise.Only to the point that there are credible fifth columnist or SpecOps with eyes on and ability to geolocate accurately the origin of these smoke trails.
This is not run-of-mill GMLRS 80km range which is well within range of counter-battery radars or even observation via UAVs. A launch site 300-400km out from Taiwan is definitely putting the missile climb phase out of view of any credible counter-battery radar or UAV observation. Question then is how much of obfuscative trajectory deviation can be put in before the missiles climb high enough to be detected/observed and ballistically back tracked to geolocate the launch site.
Or they could be heading to different impact sites and we're just shown one in the video
Is the reverse also true for PHL-191 given it's larger size?
In an actual conflict, ISR will be dependent on each side's system of systems in being able to carry our recce and deny the other side recce (which in turn is related to overall air superiority, fires, IADS etc), so direct comparisons aren't that useful.
Gotta look at the specific likely permutations
Only to the point that there are credible fifth columnist or SpecOps with eyes on and ability to geolocate accurately the origin of these smoke trails.
This is not run-of-mill GMLRS 80km range which is well within range of counter-battery radars or even observation via UAVs. A launch site 300-400km out from Taiwan is definitely putting the missile climb phase out of view of any credible counter-battery radar or UAV observation. Question then is how much of obfuscative trajectory deviation can be put in before the missiles climb high enough to be detected/observed and ballistically back tracked to geolocate the launch site.
Or they could be heading to different impact sites and we're just shown one in the video
You can see them with aerial or even satellite assets.
It's hard to say. The decreasing cost and widespread availability of long-range reconnaissance drones, along with the increasing feasibility and economics of deploying space-based reconnaissance, will narrow the window of opportunity for MLRS to evade detection.Only to the point that there are credible fifth columnist or SpecOps with eyes on and ability to geolocate accurately the origin of these smoke trails.
This is not run-of-mill GMLRS 80km range which is well within range of counter-battery radars or even observation via UAVs. A launch site 300-400km out from Taiwan is definitely putting the missile climb phase out of view of any credible counter-battery radar or UAV observation. Question then is how much of obfuscative trajectory deviation can be put in before the missiles climb high enough to be detected/observed and ballistically back tracked to geolocate the launch site.
Or they could be heading to different impact sites and we're just shown one in the video
We've overlooked this fact because we've assumed the PLA will gain strong air superiority in the Taiwan Strait, but this doesn't mean the PLA is becoming complacent.
Sure.
And the likelihood of an aircraft flying high enough to have a 300km visual horizon surviving long enough to actually get eyes on anything?
wrt to Sats. Taiwan's own ISR sats are still a nascent program and even if Uncle Sam provides sat data, you'd have to question if it is more for spotting laager locations as opposed to actual counter-battery fire.
As a generic comment, Yes. For sure.
But within the scope of a Taiwan AR, the hopes of any Blue force ISR asset (barring space based) being able to actually peek that far beyond their own FLOT and not die is pretty slim to none?
long range in Ukraine is like 50km. It is a completely different ball game in Taiwan, a lot of the lessons in Ukraine cannot be directly applied to Taiwan.
lcloo
Major
24 hour aerial observation over the size of Taiwan island is feasible by rotating surveillance satellites and high altitude drones, in addition to radio communications interceptions and aerial radar and EW platforms like the Y9/KJ series and KJ2000/3000. And also they have people on the ground who might have been living in Taiwan for decades as the locals.
The advantage to PLA is that they already haves years and decades of mapping Taiwans's defense depots, firing positions, routes etc. Tracking of ROC's heavy long range equipment, including Himar could be an ever on-going exercises in peace time, and intensify before the AR. This will ensure detection, tracking and destruction of most of these equipment at the early stage of AR.
The advantage to PLA is that they already haves years and decades of mapping Taiwans's defense depots, firing positions, routes etc. Tracking of ROC's heavy long range equipment, including Himar could be an ever on-going exercises in peace time, and intensify before the AR. This will ensure detection, tracking and destruction of most of these equipment at the early stage of AR.